

THINKING PEACE

MAKING PEACE

Occasional Paper Series 1/2001

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Edited by Barry Hindess and Margaret Jolly

Occasional Paper Series 1/2001

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THINKING PEACE, MAKING PEACE: MILLENNIAL REFLECTIONS

Margaret Jolly and Barry Hindess

The year 2000 not only marked the millennium in Western calendars but, as a sign of millennial optimism perhaps, was declared by the United Nations to be the International Year for a Culture of Peace, inaugurating an International Decade for Peace. UNESCO was selected as the focal UN agency for all related activities. In response to an approach from UNESCO Australia, both the Academy of Social Sciences and the Academy of Humanities focused their annual symposia on the question of peace. The ASSA Symposium on 5 November 2000 was organised under the rubric of 'thinking peace, making peace'.¹ Our aim was to combine the insights of scholars and practitioners – to connect the intellectual challenges of 'thinking peace' with the moral and political challenges of 'making peace' – in a world pervaded by violence and war.

Peace: the absence of violence and/or injustice?

But what is peace? It is, as most of our speakers insisted, much more than the absence of war or violence. As Rob Walker attests many prefer to see peace as the absence of injustice, or more fully the absence of the *forces* which generate injustice and violence. Yet struggles to redress injustices of ethnicity, class or gender can generate violence and war while appeals to the values of peace can entrench such injustices in the name of law and order. So, the rival norms of order and justice haunt both the ideals of peace and its practical realisation – as is eloquently attested in this volume by Jacqueline Siapno for Aceh and East Timor and Ruth Saovana Spriggs for Bougainville. In struggling to reconcile the claims of nationalists for justice and freedom from Indonesian imperialism *and* their espousal of violent masculinist values Siapno suggests, that 'the opposite of war is not peace – it is creativity' (Siapno, this volume: 44).

Walker points out that our very notions of peace, as a normative ambition, as a cultural ideal, are closely entangled, even congealed with those of state sovereignty. The emergence of the state system in Europe entailed foundational claims to sovereignty over what were contingent containments of space and time: particular territories were defined by borders and particular histories proclaimed through selective genealogies of 'nations'. Within its borders, a state arrogated a legitimate monopoly on violence while peace and altruism were proclaimed as internal ideals. Without its borders a state arrogated a right to violent defence of its self-interests and war was presumed a natural outcome of relations between hostile states. Thus, the emergence of European models of states and citizens generated potent and persisting paradoxes between the universalist ideals of the 'human' and the relativist claims of particular nations, and between the demarcation of zones of peaceful altruism and agonistic self-interest. But, as Walker argues genocide against enemies in war was often more visible than genocide against a state's own citizens through routine injustice and neglect (see also Etherington and Scott, this volume).

The abstract discussions of Rob Walker reverberate with the more empirical register of Ian Hunter's history of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and Norm Etherington's wide-ranging history of war and peace in the twentieth century. Westphalia and its associated treaties have been seen both as the triumph of secular reason over religious intolerance and as the origin of the system of European states. After thirty years of continuous warfare and civil violence and four years of arduous negotiations in making the peace, these treaties were an extraordinary feat. But, as Hunter argues, the peace they delivered was integrally connected

to the conflict they ended – religious wars and oppositional faiths, created by the successive waves of Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic ‘confessionalisations’. Not only had confessionalisation divided the universal authority of the divine church but it had also provoked the emergence of proto-states founded in faith as much as discrete territory, within which religious minorities were persecuted. Westphalia inaugurated the development of a distinctive, de-sacralised form of politics within states and a secular security system between states. The enemy was no longer a criminal or heretic but a rival state and worldly peace was proclaimed in lieu of a *pax Christiana*.

As Hunter shows, dissenting assessments of Westphalia by contemporaries are echoed in divergent accounts today: some see Westphalia as the valued source of visions of global peace pursued by rational individuals; others as the archaic origin of a system of sovereign states understood as moral communities, now rendered obsolete by global capitalism and transcendent moral cosmopolitanism. Still others see Westphalia as a sham, its vaunted neutrality hiding partiality and injustice, its cosmopolitanism eviscerated by particularist nationalisms. Hunter’s reinterpretation of Westphalia gives it a more modest purchase on the present: neither rational individuals nor moral communities were prominent actors in seventeenth century Europe, he argues. Moreover, in his view, this fragile re-spatialisation and de-theologisation of European order opened the way for the export of savage wars and violent territorial battles to the non-European world, to the colonies. With the collapse of European colonial empires in the twentieth century, confessional warfare returned to Europe, this time invoking the new theologies of nation and race.

Hunter’s reflections on the seventeenth century Peace of Westphalia might be linked to Etherington’s provocative reinterpretation of how ‘peace broke out’ in the twentieth century. He is painfully aware that this proposition is at best premature and at worst, offensive, given the perduring and pervasive patterns of global violence. He assiduously sifts the gruesome data about ‘war-related deaths’ in the twentieth century (about 110-120 million) and ponders the speculations of hawks and doves about the changing causes and character of global violence. Three stark patterns emerge from his research. Firstly, that over the course of the twentieth century the casualties of war were increasingly civilians rather than soldiers: he cites, for example, Mattern’s estimate that in 1900 soldiers constituted ninety per cent of casualties, while by 2000, civilians constituted ninety per cent and soldiers a mere ten per cent. Secondly, that far more were killed in the period between 1900 and 1945 than in the latter half of the century: in any graph of casualties ‘the spikes associated with the two world wars and the revolutions in Russia and China still dominate the grisly landscape’ (Etherington this volume: 10). Thirdly, the wars *between* European states which dominated the landscape of violence in the early twentieth century had been supplanted at its end by a predominance of wars *within* states or violence unleashed *by* a state on its own citizens.

Like Hunter, Etherington discerns a relation between the patterns of global war and peace and the European state system. He concludes that the European wars of 1600-1945 were generated by the state system and that the deadliness of these wars reflected the combination of the advanced technology of capitalism with the ‘archaic’ militarist ethos of strong states (rather than the ‘modern’ theology of armed nationalism, which Hunter privileges). Etherington also criticises the Eurocentrism of much scholarship on the causes of war and extant typologies of conflict but suggests that this might be justified by the centrality of Europe, not only to wars fought in that region, but also to those fought elsewhere. Still, such studies have two large lacunae: non-state violence and violence within states. The former has a deep human history; the latter is a compelling contemporary phenomenon embracing large scale armed conflicts, including wars of decolonisation, civil wars,

secessionist revolts, ethnic violence and government suppression of dissidents. Such violence accounts for 24 of the 25 million lives lost between 1946 and 1995 but is typically ignored by those who seek peace through the control of armaments and international agencies for conflict resolution.

Pasts, presents and futures of peace

All of the papers in this volume attest to the importance of a historical perspective on peace. But history is invoked not just as a resource for scholars but by all actors engaged in thinking and making peace. The relation of past violence and injustice to present and future reconciliation is central to the essays by Evelyn Scott on Australia and Tessa Morris-Suzuki on East Asia. Scott observes how the image of Australia as a 'peaceful' nation is at odds with the violent history of dispossession of indigenous people and the continuing injustices they suffer in health, education, employment and political representation. She considers the work of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation from 1991 to 2000 as a process of both thinking and making peace between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians. These two aspects are for her embodied in the two formal documents of reconciliation: *Corroboree 2000* is the declaration of ideals, while the *Roadmap to Reconciliation* plots more practical strategies for individuals, communities, organisations and governments. Taken together they envisage a road towards peaceful reconciliation, through an apology for past violence and injustice and a reciprocal forgiveness. The metaphors for this process of reconciliation are those of walking together on paths to the future (as evinced in the large massed gatherings of supporters who crossed Sydney Harbour Bridge and other Australian bridges in May 2000) and of healing – making peace is constructed as a process of individual and collective recovery from past trauma and the recuperation of a healthy body and spirit of nation.

At the end of the formal legislated work of the Council, Scott saw this path still strewn with obstacles and discerned that the wounds of the past were only partially healed. The tentative, even pessimistic tone of her conclusion seems justified not just by the failure of the present Australian Federal Government to walk down this path of reconciliation but also by the plethora of academic challenges to indigenous histories emerging in 2001. Ron Brunton has recently vituperated against the *Bringing Them Home* report's account of the 'stolen generations' and the violence of the removal of 'half-caste' children and Keith Windschuttle has challenged the veracity of Henry Reynolds' representations of frontier violence and settler massacres of Aboriginal people. Different ideals of peaceful co-presence are proclaimed in these different visions of 'Australia'.² In the conservative vision it seems Australia must, as in the most recent past, be a 'white nation', not a black and white nation or a multicultural community.

Morris-Suzuki hears an echo between these debates about reconciliation in Australia and debates in East Asia where questions about 'responsibility' in the present for past injustices are similarly painful and heated. She considers the case of the so-called 'comfort women' who were abducted by the Japanese army in World War II and forced to work in military brothels where they were raped and violently assaulted. Their testimony of faltering or whispered words, in courts of law and before the media, bespeaks the enormity of past injustices and their continuing consequences. Following Tetsuya, the Japanese philosopher, Morris-Suzuki ponders the *action* of responding in responsibility to voices, not just from the past but also to those from the future asking questions like 'Why did you let resentments congeal into nuggets of grievance which are then passed on from generation to generation like a poisoned heirloom'? (Morris-Suzuki this volume: 56). She thus espouses a view of responsibility broader than that of a merely individual culpability, a view which sees

contemporary politics as implicated in transmitting past injustices to the future by ignoring their consequences in the present. This entails a search for historical truth as much as judicial restitution.

She situates such questions in the turbulent geopolitics of contemporary East Asia, where the consequences both of World War II and the end of the Cold War have been dealt with more slowly and more falteringly than in Europe. Populist nationalist historians in Japan not only want to elide the history of Japanese colonialism in Korea, they also want to repress again those especially powerful memories of foreign comfort women conscripted as part of Japan's Pacific war. They are being opposed by the efforts of NGOs in forums such as the International Tribunal on Military Crimes Against Women (held in Tokyo in December 2000) and by scholarly collaborations between Japanese and Korean historians (and we might add Australian historians like Morris-Suzuki herself). As Morris-Suzuki astutely observes, the resurgent populist history of war and peace in East Asia has both an ethnic and a gender bias: it is doubly chauvinist. '[T]he voices of the 'military comfort women' were, for decades silenced, not just by Japanese amnesia, but also by a patriarchal Korean nationalism' (Morris-Suzuki, this volume: 61).

The gendering of nations in peace and war is the focus of two other papers in this volume, Jacqueline Siapno writing on Aceh and East Timor and Ruth Saovana-Spriggs on Bougainville. Both are scholars with intensely personal ties to their *topoi*. Siapno, though Filipino by ancestry, has been personally involved in struggles against the violence of Indonesian rule and her East Timorese partner was jailed for six and a half years because he was considered a threat to the Indonesian state. Saovana-Spriggs, (herself from Bougainville though long resident in Canberra) has been actively involved in the peace process and especially in promoting women's crucial role in making peace and effecting the transition to autonomous recognition.

Siapno bemoans those forms of 'making peace' which conform to a generic mode of conflict resolution that marginalises women in much the same way as the masculinism of making war. Sexual violation and sexual torture have been as integral to the violence in Aceh and East Timor as in other wars, and women were both demonised and humiliated as the wives and mothers of male combatants. But Siapno eschews any caricature of women as stoic victims or faithful widows – the preferred representations of some human rights workers on Aceh. Instead, following Judith Butler's arguments against the 'purity' of binary models of powerful and powerless³ she celebrates the 'cunning agency' of Acehnese and East Timorese women: deploying sexual wiles and performing conventional femininity in order to secure the release of their brothers or husbands or deferentially enacting the role of good wife, sister or mother to secure favours from the military or police. She also teases out, in a haunting translation of a funerary oration by a woman who had lost her son to the struggle in East Timor, the tension between her faith in his martyrdom as a 'son of Timor' and her grief at the loss of a son whom she bore, breastfed and nurtured .

The masculinist structures of war persist in the making of peace. Siapno laments how the mobilisation of women on Aceh has often been seen as undermining both male power and men's 'protection' of women, and how both there and in East Timor demands that women be included in the agencies of reconciliation and restoration are often dismissed as disruptive, divisive and even treacherous. She paraphrases Frantz Fanon's observation on decolonisation⁴, but with a gender inflection: 'one group of men is replaced by another group of men' (Siapno this volume: 46).

Ruth Saovana-Spriggs is also keen that the violent remaking of Bougainvillean men in war not persist in the peace, although she is more hopeful than Siapno about the modes of conflict resolution and restorative justice being pursued in this conflict. In contrast to patriarchal values which suffuse the situation Siapno describes in Aceh and East Timor, Saovana-Spriggs attests to the power of Bougainvillean women: as custodians and controllers of the land, as mothers and custodians of the names of the next generation, as treasurers of matrilineally inherited heirlooms and traditional currency and as peacemakers and mediators in times of conflict. Moreover, although many of the introduced structures of business, government and law are male-dominated, the Christian churches are, despite the predominance of male clergy, crucial sites of women's quotidian power.

Saovana-Spriggs has been heavily involved in the recent events on Bougainville, as part of an important advisory team as well as through her commitment to the political aims of a particular women's organisations – Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom (BWPF) and the Bougainville Inter-Church Women's Forum (BICWF). She attests to the power women have, in groups like BWPF and the various church organisations not just in intervening to stop violence but also in negotiating settlements between groups of armed men. She demonstrates how crucial women's efforts were to the culmination of the formal peace talks and agreements made in New Zealand and Australia from 1997. Like many women involved in the peace process Saovana-Spriggs sees this as a chance not just to end the cycles of violence of the last decade but also to reinstitute gender justice. In the indigenous polity women shared decision making with men but this was eroded by Western patriarchal institutions. In the arduous business of surviving the war, ending the fighting and reintegrating those men who were armed for so long, women have rediscovered their past powers – as partners with men. If her optimism proves justified, the process of making peace and restoring government may mean that an autonomous Bougainville is led by a group of men *and women*.

Towards a culture of peace: UNESCO's role

Common to the peace-making and restoration ongoing in both East Timor and Bougainville at present is the central role not just of local agents but also of global agencies, most prominently international organisations like the United Nations and international non-government organisations. In both places the co-ordination of such efforts has proved difficult and especially in East Timor at present the presence and the power of global agencies threatens to overwhelm the local leadership. So we must look closely and critically at such agencies, and how they negotiate the local-global relation.

Malama Meleisea in his contribution to this volume portrays the role of UNESCO, for whom he works in Bangkok, in promoting a 'culture of peace' in Asia and the Pacific. He notes that the UN is the 'only institution with an internationally recognised mandate to address the global problems associated with peace' (Meleisea this volume: 76). That mandate is perhaps not so universally accepted in situations of violent conflict as he would desire, as the killings of United Nations peace-keepers in many parts of the world attest. But, Meleisea clearly conceives the promotion of a culture of peace in terms of a model of human development – which would eliminate not just war and ethnic conflict but poverty, injustice and political repression. His preferred concept of peace, in Walker's terms then, has less to do with order and more to do with justice and the elimination of the causes of violence and injustice.

He charts the history of the Culture of Peace program within UNESCO. Its large ideals – the shared global values of justice, human rights, tolerance – are clearly an expression of what others would call 'moral cosmopolitanism'. Like Amartya Sen⁵ Meleisea challenges those

critics who see here only the imperial projection of specifically Western values onto other parts of the globe, and argues for indigenous precursors in Asian and Pacific philosophies. Moreover he dissociates these values from a flabby tolerance, from indifference, preferring rather the UNESCO portrait of the culture of peace as 'an everyday attitude of non-violent rebellion, of peaceful dissent, of firm determination to defend human rights and human dignity' (Meleisea, this volume: 78). He also honestly confronts the obstacles to a culture of peace in Asia and the Pacific: how nationalist sentiments and state sovereignty provide an excuse for violence and oppression, how unequal economic development generates class inequities and instability, how globalisation can entail not just economic growth but greater oppression of workers, how rapid development can also entail environmental degradation and heightened conflict over natural resources, how the international exchange of ideas can be impeded by both poverty in resources for information and lack of freedom of the press.

Conclusion

The contributors to this volume write from a diversity of positions and offer a polyphony of voices on the problems of thinking peace and making peace. Their contributions range across a wide spectrum from abstract theory, through the empirical researches of historians, anthropologists and political scientists, to the more engaged interrogations of practitioners of peace who, in the particular locales of Australia, East Asia, Aceh, East Timor and Bougainville, combine activism and policy making with intellectual reflection. Some write in an optimistic way about the prospects of a future culture of peace while others are more pessimistic, noting how such global ideals of peace are complicit with the language of national sovereignty. But they confront remarkably similar problems about how in thinking peace and making peace one should be aspiring not only to end violence but injustice in all its forms – be it grounded in ethnicity, class or gender.

¹ At this point we should thank not just the several speakers at the Symposium whose papers appear in this volume but Norman Etherington who was, until he accepted the invitation to give the Cunningham Lecture, chair of the Planning Committee, Roy MacLeod and others who gave early advice. In addition, we had wonderful administrative support from the Academy staff. We must especially applaud Sue Rider for her enthusiasm and meticulous attention to detail and Peg Job who has done a consummate job in editing these papers for publication.

² Ron Brunton (1998), *Betraying the Victims*. Melbourne: IPA, Keith Windschuttle (2000), 'The Myths of Frontier Massacres in Australian History', *Quadrant*, xlv, 10-12. See also Henry Reynolds (1982), *The Other Side of the Frontier: Aboriginal Resistance to the European Invasion of Australia*. Melbourne: Pelican.

³ Butler, Judith (1993), *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, New York and London: Routledge: 241.

⁴ Fanon, Frantz (1963), *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press. (Trans. Constance Farrington): 27.

⁵ Sen, Amartya (1998), 'Universal truths: human rights and the westernizing illusion'. *Harvard International Review*, 20, 3.

**BLAINEY REVISITED:
HAS PEACE BROKEN OUT IN THE 20TH CENTURY?**

Norman Etherington

Thirty-one years ago, in Adelaide, I attended my first academic conference — not just my first in Australia — my first anywhere. Ken Inglis talked about the ANZAAC tradition. Geoff Blainey talked about the causes of peace. What stands out in my memory of Ken's talk are the pictures he showed of soldiers depicted on war memorials, the unsettling fragility of those stiff white marble effigies standing enigmatic guard at the crossroads of hundreds of little towns on the great Australian flatness. What I remember about Geoff's performance is the pleasure I experienced seeing a vast sweep of world history illuminated by the device of the unexpected question: Why does peace break out? It was all quite thrilling for someone newly arrived on a continent I had half-expected to be an intellectual Texas. I was young. My professors were Hugh Stretton and Trevor Wilson. I had come to a good place.

What I did not see at the time were the connections between Inglis's dead soldiers and Blainey's ingenious speculations on peace. Nor did I reflect on the links between their themes and what was going on in the world around me — American soldiers on 'R&R' in Sydney; some students jailed for defying conscription, others occupying Vice-Chancellors' offices in the hope that they might — as one banner put it — stop the war by stopping the university. I found it normal and natural to live in a culture of war. I had been living in one all my life. Born on an army post on the eve of Pearl Harbour, dragged from school to school by a soldier father, educated at a university which trained half of LBJ's war cabinet, I had known no other world. Only in retrospect does it strike me that in the intervening years peace has broken out. In this paper I want to defend that proposition and explore some of its implications.

On the surface the proposition seems at worst offensive, at best premature. So much killing goes on every day. It fills the evening news bulletins. While I was investigating the theme of this paper, 'Intifada II' erupted on the West Bank and someone nearly sank an American warship in Aden. Organised killing goes on in West Africa, Sudan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. Neither the merchants of arms nor the think-tanks of peace acknowledge much significant change.

Captain Richard Sharpe, RN, in his foreword to the 2000-2001 edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* sees threats on every side.


There is a danger of forgetting that Russia still has considerable naval firepower, particularly in its submarine force. The sudden and unexpected deployment of a Northern Fleet "Oscar class" SSGN *Kursk* to the Mediterranean last September was reported in the Russian press with obvious approval.

Nor has the shipbuilding capability gone away. China and India are both in the process of receiving major warships and submarines from Russian yards. There appear to be no inhibitions about selling the latest military equipment to anyone who can pay some fairly modest prices.

From an opposite perspective, peace-lover Douglas Mattern wrote in March of this year.

Cunningham Lecture and Annual Symposium 2000

Humanity departed the twentieth century with a bright history of scientific and social progress, but also with a dark legacy of mass violence, war and environmental destruction . . . In the wars of the twentieth century about 120 million people were slaughtered. At the beginning of the century 90 percent of those war casualties were soldiers. As the century ended over 90 percent of war casualties were civilians. Modern war is a direct assault on the innocents . . . Technology has helped bring us to the very brink of total ruin through the creation of nuclear weapons . . .if we continue to accept the presence of nuclear weapons and rely on luck or the rational decision of national leaders, we guarantee the ultimate human disaster.²



A closer look at the statistics accumulated by captains of warships and the doves of peace reveals that both are aware that much has changed in the course of the twentieth century. Captain Sharpe fulminates that

There is something rotten in the continent of Europe, when the combined armed forces of NATO's European allies are unable to conduct a military campaign against a country the size of Serbia without massive assistance from the United States . . . western Europe has lived for so long under the shelter of an American defence umbrella that the political will to spend money on real armed forces . . . has withered and been replaced by social self-indulgence. Only in the US is there still strong political and popular support for interventionist forces capable of supporting diplomacy world wide. . .


If that sounds like an overstatement, it is only necessary to study the latest figures for the percentage of GDP being spent on defence by European nations. Of 5,000 aircraft in NATO Europe suitable for air strikes, less than 500 are fitted with precision-guided land attack weapons and most of those have to be escorted into battle zones by US aircraft providing both air-to-air and EW defences. Europe can muster just one fixed-wing aircraft carrier and five STOVL carriers, while the United States has twelve of each type. . .

In a league table of international wealth the USA and Japan are followed by Germany, UK, France and Italy. Each of these European countries has slipped far behind the US in the proportion of national income spent on defence.

On the doves' side of the ledger, the overall statistic of 110 million war-related deaths in the twentieth century conceals a disproportionate weighting toward the period 1900-1945.³




The disproportion is even more marked when we look just at military personnel.



Cunningham Lecture and Annual Symposium 2000

When war and war-related deaths are spread roughly on a graph across the whole century the spikes associated with the two world wars and the revolutions in Russia and China still dominate the grisly landscape.



Compiled from Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditure*, 1996.

This pattern for the first six decades of the century is more precisely and dramatically charted in Gil Elliot's remarkable *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead*.⁴

These are, of course, unimaginably awful statistics. Unfortunately, anyone who wants to consider war and peace in historical perspective must enter the statistical hecatombs. Lumping the whole twentieth century together as an undifferentiated mass of wickedness is not helpful. While the numbers of discrete conflicts (numbers of wars, if you prefer) did not decline after 1945, the numbers of people killed fell precipitately. When I accepted the unexpected invitation to talk on this subject, my idea was to look back to Blainey and the other explainers of war in the hope of finding clues to the remarkable drop in the global death toll from war after 1945.

A major problem was finding reliable figures. I had naïvely supposed that some institute of peace or war would be keeping track of the annual carnage. I thought encyclopedia yearbooks would give me those numbers. Actually, nobody keeps a systematic count. The closest thing I could find to an organised death watch is Ruth Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures*, now in its 16th edition. The object of this publication is to argue that the human race would be better off if we exchanged guns for butter. It does not count deaths in wars for their own sake, but in order to concentrate attention on the consequences of spending money on armaments. Decade-by-decade figures can only be arrived at by extracting them from overall figures given for particular wars. A lot of the figures are suspiciously round (2 million dead in the Biafran war and its

aftermath; 1.5 million lost in Bangladesh in 1971, including 250,000 deaths by smallpox). This chancy business cannot approach exactitude, but it does give a fair indication of trends.

Which brings me back to the *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead*, in which Gil Elliot observes that 'counting the dead is not back-breaking work but the records are patchy and you have to think yourself through a morass of slippery doubts to the feeling that a figure is reliable.'⁵ Elliot's book appeared just a year prior to the book Blainey developed from the talk I heard. Both publications in turn formed part of a larger research effort which peaked in the 1970s.⁶ Much of it aimed at producing a scientific or at least social-scientific account of the causes of war. Significantly, Blainey associated his work with the larger enterprise by calling his book *The Causes of War*. Whether this was his own choice or his publisher's, I regret the shift of emphasis away from his original arresting question about the causes of peace. As far as Blainey's own argument goes, the title did not much matter. His over-all conclusion was that the root cause of peace is simply the opposite of the cause of war. War comes when a diplomatic crisis 'cannot be solved because both sides have conflicting estimates of their bargaining power'. Peace comes when they reach agreement on their respective power.⁷

Revisiting Blainey's book, I was struck more by his methodology than his conclusions. He stands out from the rank-and-file of his profession in his capacity to get right inside a field outside his established expertise. His boldly announced object was to survey 'all the international wars fought since 1700'.⁸ Although he does not list them, his text implies that these wars were overwhelmingly fought by European states. The wars he discusses outside Europe were either initiated by European states or fought by states such as the United States and Japan which had assimilated themselves to the European state system. My initial reaction as a student of African and the third-world history was astonishment at the Eurocentricity of Blainey's study. Further reading showed that this imbalance is common in studies of war.⁹ Most military history is an armour-clad version of the 'history of western civilisation', stalking a world whose limits were demarcated by Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. Part of the reason is, no doubt, that modern historical scholarship itself emerges from a classical curriculum which revered Thucydides as the father of war studies. However, it is at least worth considering the possibility that the imbalance is justifiable — maybe Europe has in fact been the world's great disturber of the peace.

Most modern texts tend to take that for granted, even to the extent of building it into the definition of war. Quincy Wright's pioneering *Study of War* distinguished four types of conflict:

1. balance of power war, in the sense of a war among state members of the modern family of nations;
2. civil war, in the sense of war within a state member of the modern family of nations;
3. defensive war, in the sense of a war to defend modern civilisation against an alien culture; and
4. imperial war, in the sense of a war to expand modern civilisation at the expense of an alien culture.¹⁰

This desperately unhappy 'family' is simply the European constellation of nation-states. Another influential survey identifies 118 'interstate' and 'extra-systemic' wars fought between 1816 and 1980.¹¹ Apart from a number of older Latin American conflicts and some recent Southeast Asian and African wars, this list is likewise overwhelmingly weighted towards wars involving at least one member of the European system. These wars all display the familiar trappings conventionally associated with war: marching armies, sailing navies, invasions and occupations of territory.

An important consequence of using these particular wars as the basis for studying the causes of war in general is that dynamics unique to that system might unjustifiably be extrapolated to places outside the system. That is to say, even if we could reach reliable conclusions about the causes of war involving members of the European system, those might not cover the causes of other wars. Two notable exceptions spring to mind.

1. **Wars not conducted by organised states.** This is the subject of Lawrence Keeley's recent book, *War Before Civilization*.¹² Subtitled *The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*, it argues that conclusive archaeological and anthropological evidence attests to the persistence of deadly conflict in 'tribal societies' over several millennia. While Keeley explicitly rejects the idea that violence is rooted in human nature, he believes it to be more common and more deadly in its 'primitive versions. Taking as his example the figure of more than one hundred million deaths attributed to twentieth century organised war, he reckons:

this appalling figure is *twenty times smaller* than the losses that might have resulted if the world's population were still organised into bands, tribes, and chiefdoms. A typical tribal society lost about .5 per cent of its population in combat each year. Applying this casualty rate to the earth's twentieth-century populations predicts more than 2 *billion* war deaths since 1900.

2. **State-organised violence directed internally against the state's own people.** This is the phenomenon R J Rummel terms 'Democide'.¹³ He believes that twentieth-century compilations of war and war-related deaths (such as those in Sivard's *World Military and Social Expenditures*) give a misleading impression. By excluding interstate wars, and adding up the deaths caused principally by totalitarian regimes, he concludes that 'nearly 170 million people probably have been murdered by governments in this century; over four-times those killed in combat in all international and domestic wars during the same years'. While there is a powerful undercurrent of Cold Warrior anti-communism in Rummel's writing, he has a point. One implication of his argument is that no campaign against tanks, missiles and bombs could have substantially lessened the death toll from state-sponsored violence against internal enemies. Another is that no existing explanation of the causes of war accounts for those deaths.

At this point I would like to go back to my earlier charts of twentieth-century war-related deaths and take a closer look at the period 1945-1995. In particular I want to ask how much of that death is attributable to the kind of war studied by Blainey and the other modern explainers of war. The next chart sets out war deaths in post-1945 conflicts in which the total loss of life exceeded 100,000. Taken together, the 'wars' on this list account for more than 24 million of the total of 25 million killed during the period 1946-95.

Wars with War-related Deaths in Excess of 100,000 since 1946

Colombia	Liberals v. Govt.	300000
Greece	UK intervenes in civil war	160000
India	Communal violence: 'Muslims v. Hindus'	800000
China	Communists v. Kuomintang	1000000
	Govt. executes landlords	1000000
	Cultural Revolution	500000
Tibet	Tibetan revolt	100000
Korea	Korean War; Chinese.& US intervention.	3000000
Vietnam	Independence v. France	600000
Vietnam	US inter. In civil war	300000
Vietnam	Vietnam War	2358000
Cambodia	N. Vietnam & US intervene civil war	156000
	Pol Pot famine & massacre	1000000
Iraq	Kurds v. Govt.	105000
Yemen North	Egypt inter. In civil war	101000
Indonesia	Abortive Coup	500000
	annex. E. Timor	106000
Sudan	Civil war	2000000
Congo/Zaire	Crisis	100000
Algeria	Independence v. France	100000
Bangladesh	India interv; famine ;mass.	1500000
Burundi	Hutu v. Tutsi	180000
Nigeria	Biafran war etc.*	2000000
Uganda	Obote; Amin &c.	610000
Iran	Iran-Iraq War	500000
Afghanistan	USSR interv.	1500000
Angola	Civil War	750000
Ethiopia	Eritrean rev. & famine	539000
Mozambique	famine & civil war	1050000
Bosnia	Civil War	283000
Kuwait	Gulf War	200000
Liberia	rebels v. Govt.	150000
Rwanda	Hutu/Tutsi	602000
Somalia	Civil War	355000

My compilation, derived from R Sivard, *World Social and Military Expenditures*

*Note, some sources estimate Nigerian deaths at 1,000,000

They may be roughly grouped into the following categories.

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1. Wars involving large-scale clashes of organised armies, including wars of decolonisation. About 77 per cent of the casualties in these conflicts occurred between 1946 and 1975.

Final stages of the Chinese communist revolution and civil war	1000000
The Korean War	3000000
The Vietnamese war of independence from France and its American sequel	3258000
The Algerian War of independence from France	100000
USSR intervention in Afghanistan	1500000
The Iran-Iraq War	500000
The Gulf War	200000
Total	9,558,000

2. Civil wars, often involving large numbers of irregular combatants and substantial death from famine & disease

Columbian Liberals v. Govt.	300000
Greek civil war	160000
Cambodian civil war with Nth Vietnamese & US interv.	156000
North Yemen civil war	101000
Indonesian abortive coup	500000
Ugandan civil wars and coups	302000
Angolan civil war	750000
Mozambique civil war and famine	1050000
Bosnian civil war	283000
Liberian civil war	150000
Somalian civil war	355000
Total	4,107,000

3. Revolts aiming at secession, often involving substantial loss of civilian life due to famine.

Tibetan revolt	100000
Sudanese civil war	2000000
Kurds v. govt of Iraq	105000
Failed Biafran secession from Nigeria	2000000
Eritrean revolt and famine	539000
Total	4,744,000

4. Communal/ethnic violence, often involving substantial loss of life due to famine.

India	Muslims v. Hindu	800000
Bangladesh	crisis	1500000
Congo	crisis	100000
Burundi	Hutu v. Tutsi	180000
Rwanda	Hutu v. Tutsi	602000
Total		3,182,000

5. Government suppression of dissident elements

China	Execution of landlords & Cultural Revolution	1500000
Cambodia	Pol Pot massacres & famine	1000000
Total		2,500,000

To my eye the striking feature of these tables is that none of these conflicts pitted the members of the old constellation of European states against one other. Only the conflicts in Category 1 even vaguely resemble the wars which Blainey and the other modern theorists of war try to explain. Why should this be so?

One popular view holds that for four decades the Cold War and the nuclear 'balance of terror' stayed the hands of all the old warrior states. In the right-wing version of the theory, The Bomb was the peace-maker — the Nuclear Umbrella. In the left-wing version, fear of communism caused old antagonists to abandon imperialist competition. In the pacifist version, the whole period was a lucky break in which a catastrophic accident was — probably still is — waiting to happen.

Another possibility I would like to consider is that the great inter-systemic European wars of the period 1600-1945 *were generated by the system itself*. In advancing this suggestion, I depart from the unspoken assumption of all who have previously tried to generalise about the causes of war. From Quincy Wright to Geoffrey Blainey, JD Singer and Melvin Small, they all took for granted that warfare is a product of modernity. It was therefore to be expected that as new states joined the 'family of nations' they would suit up like their older siblings. For a time this certainly appeared to be the pattern. Japan embarked on the road to industrialised modernity under the slogan 'Wealthy country, Strong Military'. With a constitution and conscript army based on Prussia's and naval shipyards based on Britain's they were soon looking to pick a fight. As early as 1872, elements in the government were discussing an invasion of Korea. Unified Italy, China, Thailand, Egypt, and the Balkan states pursued similar paths.

At some point, however, new states stopped following the model. Post-colonial independent states generated very little death through wars with their neighbours during the twentieth century. Latin American countries went to war with each other on only four occasions after 1900, and only once after 1935. Brazil alone participated in World War II (losing about a thousand soldiers).¹⁴ Africa has had many wars of independence, some attempts at secession through civil war and a devastating period of confrontation with the South African apartheid regime in its death throes. But only Ethiopia has fought its African neighbours in something resembling a war of nation-states. The decolonisation of the Soviet Russian empire has thus far been marked by

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much less warfare than the decolonisation of the European overseas empires — and only two of the ex-members of the USSR have fought each other (at the cost of something like 25,000 lives). In the Middle East, only the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars have cost relatively heavy casualties on the battlefield. Since the Americans left Southeast Asia, battles between states in that region have ceased. In South Asia, it is probably too soon to announce that peace has broken out among nations. The armies Pakistan and India inherited from the British Raj are equipped with the most up-to-date weapons, including, of course, The Bomb. India has become a significant naval power built on old-fashioned lines.

Another remarkable feature of the post-World War II period has been the decline in deaths in Rummel's category of 'democide'. Mao's China and Pol Pot's Cambodia stand out as virtually the only mass murderers motivated by ideology after 1945. Why this should be so is hard to say. Have instant communications and world opinion made democide more difficult to get away with? It is probably fair to say democide is more easily practiced when war rages on a large scale. World War II threw up a dense fog of chaos concealing much of the Holocaust from public view. Similar chaos during and immediately following World War I made it harder to see the massacre of the Turkish Armenians. And it is worth remembering that without the World Wars there might have been no Bolshevik regime in power, no Holocaust, maybe even no Maoist government in China. It might be argued with even more confidence that the Vietnam War made Pol Pot possible.

Most other megadeaths after 1945 are associated with civil warfare fuelled by ethnic and nationalist sentiment. These make up my categories 2, 3 and 4. Taken together, they contribute about half of all war-related deaths. While they are clearly the biggest killers, their relationship to old debates on the causes of war is unclear. None of them resulted from factors said to have been responsible for European wars in previous centuries. The deaths of kings, disturbances in the 'balance of power', scapegoat diversions engineered by unpopular rulers, and arms races had nothing to do with them. In contrast to the wars of old, these conflicts are associated with weak states, not strong ones. About half the deaths attributed to them occurred in three countries — Sudan, Nigeria and Bangladesh — which rate near the bottom of any list of military powers. Armies and modern weapons played very minor roles in these contests. In Rwanda, as in Pol Pot's Cambodia, people used agricultural implements to slaughter their neighbours. It may be that they belong in a category apart from War with a capital W. Like the Taiping rebellion (said to have cost 11 million lives in 19th century China), the Irish potato famine (1 million lives), and the Bengal famine of 1877-78 (5 million lives), they are to be explained in other ways. People who wish to stop them will have to seek other means than reducing armaments and strengthening international agencies for conflict resolution.

But, to return to my main theme, of all the wonders of the latter half of the twentieth century it remains the peacefulness of Europe that commands attention and demands explanation. It is no exaggeration to say that Europe has been the beating heart of the beast of modern war. Though Captain Sharpe scorns their 'social self-indulgence', the old members of the fratricidal European family still maintain the best-equipped military machines in the world. If armaments made wars, as some used to say they did, then these historic enemies should still be on the lookout. Instead they remain obstinately tranquil. They do not talk about menacing neighbours. They do not threaten each other. They showed remarkable reluctance to become involved even when the disintegration

of Yugoslavia set sparks flying about the old 'powder keg of Europe'. They do not respond to American calls to spend more on defence, because, I suspect, they are not sure against whom they ought to be defending themselves.

On the basis of the evidence before me I might stop here, happy to observe that peace has broken out where war had done the most damage.¹⁵ But I am tempted to press on with speculations about the reason why Europe gave up war in the second half of the twentieth century. On Blainey's principles, the answer must be related to the reasons they used to go to war. In search of that answer I would like very briefly to consider a mostly forgotten discussion about the causes of war which took place at the beginning of the last century. In 1910 a then unknown British writer named Norman Angell tried to stop the rush to World War with an appeal to reason. It was, he claimed in a famous phrase, Europe's 'Great Illusion' to believe 'that military and political power give a nation commercial and social advantage'. He set out to demonstrate that under modern conditions the conquest of territory was a profitless business.

Angell's argument was, as Blainey noted, one of the last trumpet calls of the so-called 'Manchester' theory that the rational business of global trade and investment would bring a halt to the irrational business of war.¹⁶ When world war came anyway, Angell and the other Manchester theorists were ridiculed. New theorists arose to try to explain where they had gone wrong. Henry Noel Brailsford believed that the business of making armaments was too profitable for capitalists to contemplate giving it up. VI Lenin likewise reversed the Manchester equation between capitalism and peace, arguing that the uneven development caused by the fact that capitalism operated under the aegis of nation-states would continue to fuel wars until the workers of the world overthrew the system. The continuation of capitalism without war after 1945 undermined Lenin's argument, except for those who contended that the old antagonists submerged their antagonism in the interests of presenting a united front to the Warsaw Pact. Now Communism is finished but still the advanced capitalist countries show no signs of resuming their old quarrels. Thus the Leninist theory that capitalism causes great wars proved finally to be as unserviceable for the 20th century as the Manchester theory that it caused peace.

I would suggest that one other theory from the early 20th century does deserve revival when we search for reasons why peace has broken out in the old Europe-centred state system. This was advanced by the Viennese economist Joseph Schumpeter in his 1919 essay on the *Sociology of Imperialism*. He agreed with the Manchester school that capitalists as a body gained no real advantages from war. The reason that capitalists put themselves at the service of warriors, was that capitalism in Europe had grown up under the shadow of an established militarism. Especially in central and eastern Europe, the advance of capitalism had been conditioned by the demands of the autocratic state and the land-holding aristocracy. Men of business could not strut and brag in that courtly atmosphere as they did in Manchester or Chicago. They bowed and scraped and pleaded for favours, 'for paternalism, for protection, for forcible restraint of strangers, and above all for tariffs'.¹⁷

The monarch gave them what they wanted but exacted a pound of flesh in return. He insisted that they stay in their lowly social place and conform to the ethos of the ruling class — the ethos, that is, of the war-oriented nobility'. With some modification Schumpeter's theory can be refashioned as a hypothesis for explaining the

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disproportion between early 20th century deadly warfare and late 20th century relative peace.

What made warfare so deadly in the last century was the application of industrial capitalism's technological muscle to the peculiar kinds of states which had emerged in Europe in the course of the previous centuries. As the work of John Brewer has shown, even Britain's industrial revolution occurred in a state which regularly spent more than 60 per cent of its revenue on defence and another 20 per cent servicing war-related debts.¹⁸ The cost of building the 100-gun warship *Victory* in 1765 exceeded the fixed capital assets of even the largest industrial plants then existing. At the commanding heights industrialising Britain was a nation of war-makers, not shopkeepers. So, of course, were the other powers.

It required not one but two convulsions of world war to kill the warrior spirit and war-prone structures inherited from previous ages of feudalism and absolutism. The first war swept away the most dangerous dynasts — the Romanovs, Hapsburgs, Ottomans and Hohenzollerns. It did not remove the militarist ethos embedded in the monster conscript armies and officer corps of the old regimes. For that, a second and even more deadly conflagration was required; one that brought all the horrors of the battlefield into ordinary civilian homes and neighbourhoods. General MacArthur's constitution for occupied Japan neutered another military caste. However, so long as the Cold War endured, we could not know for sure that the soul of the old European militarism had not been merely transplanted to NATO's headquarters. Now, it seems to me, there is room for cautious optimism that peace has really broken out in the world's most dangerous bearpit.

Thus, thirty years on, the answer to Blainey's imaginative question which I find most satisfying is this:

The cause of war among members of the modern European state system was the European state system. When Europe finally purged the historically constructed monsters in its bosom, peace could break out.

Blainey failed to consider this possibility, I believe, because he entered the debate on the causes of war on the terms set by those who preceded him. Paradoxically, it was precisely his enviable capacity to get inside a new field of knowledge that led him to overlook questionable presuppositions. His efforts, and those of other earnest investigators to find the causes of war within the European state system were akin to looking for time in the workings of a clock.

If there is any merit in my suggestion, certain consequences follow.

One is that the most likely cause of future mass destruction in the developed world is an accident; the sooner all nuclear weapons are destroyed, the better.

Second, it does not appear likely that the rest of the awesome arsenal will find useful employment. The last noteworthy naval engagement was the Battle of Midway in World War II; we shall not see another. Few, if any existing armies have the capacity to invade and hold the territory of any considerable nation. The deadly preoccupations of the old 'family of nations' have not spread to more than a handful of new states. The price of an entry-ticket to the games of modern war is too high for all but a few countries (India, Pakistan, and China among them).

Third, the pessimistic postmodernists appear to be wrong. Modernity and the Enlightenment are not responsible for Auschwitz and Hiroshima. Those catastrophes

occurred because modern technology and industry were set to work by archaic militaristic states, building the killing machines they required.

The degree to which truly modern states have lost their taste for mass-destruction is illustrated by the recent behaviour of the United States. When bodies in bags began coming back from Somalia, President Clinton pulled out his Marines. When a monument was built to remember Vietnam, it consisted of marble slabs inscribed with the names of *all* the war dead. A century ago a warship was sunk in Havana Harbour and William Randolph Hearst's newspapers cried for a war to 'Remember the Maine'. A few weeks ago another US warship was nearly sunk in Aden Harbour. No one demands a war of vengeance. At the remembrance ceremony for the dead sailors President Clinton read out the names of each of man who perished. A choir of cantors would have to chant a hundred years to call the names of America's previous war-dead.

How we are to prevent hand-held rifles and farm implements from facilitating atrocities in rural killing fields of Kosovo, Cambodia or Rwanda is another, quite different, question — one to which I can suggest no answers. But it is at least worth pointing out that the answer is unlikely to be found reading the entrails of Europe's wars.

Here in Australia, it should be the role of the intellectual to distinguish most rigorously between 'defence' spending which replicates the icons of military strength valued by the old European state system (aircraft carriers, fighter-bombers, missiles, submarines) and preparations to use organised force to truly make peace. Preparing for peace is as important as preparing for war. Debates about defence spending should always be paired with talk about peace. Each mooted purchase of new arms should be accompanied by something like a 'peace impact statement'. This is not simply a matter of guns versus butter. If building a defence facility is likely to increase the chances of putting us on someone's target list, the advantages of the installation must be systematically balanced against the security it may provide. The probabilities of each outcome must be intelligently compared.

For, if I remember with undiminished enthusiasm Geoffrey Blainey's provocative questions, I have not forgotten Ken Inglis's brittle, bone-white marble statues in the parks of our suburbs and country towns. We do not want new ones. The projected power of the old imperialist, militarist European state system brought the soldier-colonists to this continent. Despite dreams that 'blood should not stain the wattle', the same system dragged them back to die on the beaches, in the trenches, on the Burma Railway, on the high seas. I like to think they did not die in vain; that by being part of the final catastrophic paroxysms of the deadly old system, they helped to kill it. But I will not say that by so doing they 'made a nation', for to do so would be to breathe again the noxious spirit of the vanished regimes.

¹ Sharpe, Richard (ed) (2000), *Jane's Fighting Ships, 2000-2001*, 103: 77

² Mattern, Douglas (2000), 'Humanity's Juncture', *The Humanist*, 60:9.

³ The following two tables are compiled from statistics published in Sivard, Ruth (ed), *World Military and Social Expenditures*, an irregularly issued periodical of which the last number appeared in 1996. The form in which statistics appear varies from number to number, which poses difficulties for anyone wishing to compile decade-by-decade figures. The definition of war itself is problematic, but these figures are the best I could find.

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- ⁴ Elliot, Gil (1972), *Twentieth Century Book of the Dead*. Penguin: London: 195.
- ⁵ Elliot, Gil *ibid*: 146.
- ⁶ Singer, J David (1979), *Explaining War*. Sage: London: 14, estimates that as much 'data-based research on the explanation of war' was published in the 1970s as in all previous centuries 'from the Peloponnesian Wars to 1970'. He follows this with the surprising statement that 'we should forget how pitifully small that quantity is . . . those many millennia saw barely 160 [studies], almost all of which were in English. In our files for the volume that will cover the decade since, I find just about the same number of journal articles.'
- ⁷ Blainey, Geoffrey (1973), *The Causes of War*. Macmillan: London: 114.
- ⁸ Blainey, Geoffrey *ibid*: vii.
- ⁹ See, for example, Addington, Larry H (1994), *The Patterns of War since the Eighteenth Century*, 2nd ed (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, in which there is no entry for South America. The only non-European Wars surveyed are those in which a European nation or Japan figured as a combatant.) Parker, Geoffrey (ed) (1995), *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, makes similar assumptions but has the merit of displaying its bias in the revealing subtitle: 'The Triumph of the West'. Eurocentrism also afflicts discussions of possible psychological causes of war; see, for example, Pick, Daniel (1993), *War Machine: the Rationalisation of Slaughter in the Modern Age*. Yale University Press: New Haven.
- ¹⁰ Wright, Quincy (1942, rev ed, 1965), *A Study of War*. University of Chicago Press: Chicago: 641.
- ¹¹ Small, Melvin, and Singer, J David (1982), *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*. Sage: London: 79-80. Eckhardt, William (1992), *Civilizations, Empires and Wars: A Quantitative History of War*. McFarland & Co: London, took a different approach. His broad position is that war is closely associated with 'civilisation'. Using other people's surveys he arranged wars chronologically from 'primitive warfare' to 'modern wars', and included a number of previous 'civilisations'. When he gets to the modern period, however, he acknowledges only a single 'modern civilisation' which on closer inspection turns out to comprise the usual list of European, Japanese and American nation-states.
- ¹² Keeley, Lawrence (1996), *War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage*. Oxford University Press: Oxford: 93.
- ¹³ His arguments can be read in two rather lurid online books (*Death by Government* and *20th Century Democide*) available at: <http://www2.hawaii.edu/~rummel/20TH.HTM>.
- ¹⁴ Eight Latin American nations declared war against Germany during World War I, but only Cuba and Brazil participated in the fighting, and that to a limited extent; see Williams, Benjamin (1941), 'American Leadership in the Non-Totalitarian World' in Clarkson, JD and Cochran, TC (eds), *War as a Social Institution: The Historians' Perspective*. Columbia University Press: New York: 276-77.
- ¹⁵ Melko, Matthew (1990), *Peace in Our Time*, Paragon: New York, presciently noticed this phenomenon. His thesis differs from mine, however, because he does not view Europe as the main engine of modern warfare and is pessimistic about the prognosis for peace in parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America.
- ¹⁶ Blainey, Geoffrey *ibid*: 18-32.
- ¹⁷ Etherington, Norman (1984), *Theories of Imperialism: War, Conquest and Capital*. Croom Helm: London: 161-62.
- ¹⁸ Harling, Philip and Mandler, Peter (1993), 'From "Fiscal-Military" State to Laissez-faire State, 1760-1850', *Journal of British Studies*, 44-70; and Brewer, John (1989), *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783*. Unwin Hyman: London: 34.

PEACE IN THE WAKE OF SOVEREIGN SUBJECTIVITIES

RBJ Walker

I.

To try to talk about peace is to evoke everything and nothing. There is hardly any claim to knowledge that does not in some way have implications for how we think about peace, or its absence, even if only by offering basic metaphors about order, natural necessity, or the ultimate meaning, or non-meaning of the universe. Conversely, to think about peace at such levels of generality is to seem, and perhaps to be, radically insensitive to the specificities, the aching violences, of all those situations that make abstract discussion seem both vacuous and somehow immoral.

Nevertheless, to speak in fairly abstract terms is precisely what I intend to do here.

This is partly out of necessity. Specific situations require a lot of specific knowledge and experience, which I do not have. In any case, the question to which I am trying to respond is about what it could possibly mean to speak of peace, now, in a world which does not seem to be staying still, and does not seem to be readily amenable to the assumptions and categories we now tend to take for granted, including those through which we try to make sense of claims about peace.

More crucially I want to insist on the importance of thinking about some fairly abstract matters because the ways in which we are usually encouraged to think about peace rely on ways of engaging with the world that have gradually congealed, under specific historical conditions, into apparent abstractions: congealed, that is, into principles, ideals, institutions and regularised routines of behaviour that both enable and enact extraordinary practices of violence. This, I assume, is related to what it might mean to speak, with UNESCO, of 'cultures of peace.'¹

This is especially so, I want to suggest, when, as is usually the case, talk about peace starts to revolve around claims about sovereignty. Claims about sovereignty are now all the rage, usually in the well known form of a sparring match between those who think that it is something that is here forever and those who think that it is something that is about to disappear before a flood of globalisation, global civil society and the rest. But I think there is also an emerging sense that there is a lot more at stake in claims about sovereignty than whether something is staying around or on its way out, and not least in relation to questions about what exactly sovereignty is supposed to be.

There are indeed ways of persuading oneself that sovereignty is a very simple thing: that is, that it is both simple and a thing. Political scientists, political theorists, theorists of international relations, statesmen, diplomats and other apologists for the modern state have worked out a very nice repertoire in this respect. But it is also increasingly obvious that sovereignty is a very strange phenomenon indeed, not least because of the ways in which it expresses a series of injunctions about how we **must** think about peace, or its alternatives. To think of sovereignty as a simple thing, as something that ought to be taken for granted, as the primary condition of the possibility of saying anything at all about modern politics, is to ignore both its character as a normative ambition – an aspiration for peace, but also for all the other claims about democracy, justice and so on for which the term peace has become a convenient shorthand – and as an expression of historically and culturally specific ambitions, historically and culturally specific accounts both of what the world is and what it should be.

If I manage to do nothing else here, I would like to persuade you that it is worth thinking quite carefully about the complexity – both the ontological and the political density – of claims about sovereignty in general and specifically modern forms of sovereignty in particular. I especially want to argue a case about the need to take sovereignty seriously without succumbing either to the awful rituals of the kind of ‘political realism’ that celebrates military power – the necessities of national interest and the injunction to seek peace by preparing for war – or the kind of ‘political idealism’ that has so often been the basis for claims about the normative necessity for peace in a world in which the necessities of sovereignty and political realism have been left behind.

I will try to spare you the more arcane theoretical aspects of the argument. Those of you who are familiar with the grand debates of post-Kantian, post-Nietzschean, post-Heideggerian philosophies of subjectivity over the past half-century or so will no doubt be able to read much of that sub-text here. In this context, I want to say only that we are just beginning to get some sense of what such debates might mean politically, and that while such debates have often been quite sophisticated in relation to the problems of modern subjectivity within states, they have hardly begun to address the status of modern sovereignty, either within or between modern states.

My overall argument is predicated on four major themes.

First, that our most familiar discourses about peace currently hang on a set of options framed by some primary claims about whether sovereignty is or is not (or should be or should not be) the fundamental principle or reality through which we organise human affairs. Modern notions of peace more or less mimic a prior set of claims about sovereignty.

Second, that these options express a deeply embedded and institutionalised account of what it means to make a claim to legitimate authority in modern life; this, after all, is what sovereignty is supposed to be about, though we pay remarkably little attention to how this account is sustained. In this context I shall want to insist that there is little point in trying to say something about peace without recognising the highly problematic status of claims about legitimate authority under contemporary conditions.

Third, that what is going on in the contemporary world can be understood neither in terms of the simple continuation of sovereignty nor its imminent disappearance but rather of

1. a serious intensification of the **problem** of sovereignty; and
2. an increasing difficulty in responding to this problem through the paradigmatically modern practices of drawing the line, whether in terms of discriminating among territorial jurisdictions or by analogical discriminations between legitimate and illegitimate forms of authority.

I believe it is time to put a plague on the houses on both statism and globalism and to focus on what we now mean by legitimate authority under contemporary conditions, including the legitimate authority to deploy violence, given what I take to be the declining plausibility of attempts to give order – peace – to the world by drawing nice Cartesian lines of separation, whether physically or metaphorically. If anything is changing in the contemporary world, I believe it is our capacity to discriminate, in both the positive and negative senses of this word, in the ways we have learnt from Descartes, Hobbes, Kant and their modern successors.

Fourth, that if we are to make sense of claims about peace, we should still expect to see a continuation of a familiar discourse about peace and war that takes a specifically modern account of sovereignty for granted. But we should also expect to see an increasing emphasis on framing questions about peace in relation to the difficulty of sustaining claims about legitimate authority. Consequently, the difficulty of thinking about peace is going to become increasingly framed in terms of questions about where and what we take politics to be.

If politics is indeed what the claims of the modern state insist it must be, then there is not much choice except to go on living with the basic contradictions that are enshrined in the modern sovereign state. These contradictions, enshrined in the Treaty of Westphalia three and a half centuries ago, produce our modern forms of hypocrisy and the legitimation of violence as the condition under which all our highest values can be expressed. Consequently, the problem of talking about peace, I want to suggest, lies not only in the intransigence of so many sites of contemporary conflict and injustice, but also in the forms of nostalgia that tell us what peace must be, a nostalgia through which claims about peace end up justifying the resort to violence.

I do not have time to go through all these four themes sequentially, but will try to say a few things that speak to all of them. I will do so first by stressing the relationship between claims about peace and questions about legitimate authority that are expressed in claims about sovereignty and thus by emphasising the general structures of hypocrisy and sanctimony that inform modern claims about peace, and then by speculating about the kinds of issues that might lead us to think about peace in some other way.

II.

There are as many ways of thinking about peace as there of thinking about the ways in which human beings live together. Every cultural, philosophical and religious tradition has got something to say on the matter. One can survey the modern social sciences, too, so as to accumulate a broad array of claims about how we might make sense of some state of affairs that we call peace. While everyone and their dog, or cat, may think that they share a common aspiration and competence to make claims about peace, however, it is fairly obvious that such claims are remarkably heterogeneous, and that the grand search for the causes of war, or peace, is all too susceptible to crude reductionisms of all kinds, for two broad reasons.

First, there are sharply divergent accounts of what one might mean by a condition of peace. For some, it might mean an absence of large scale physical violence, that is, an absence of war. For others it might mean an absence of various states of injustice – inequality, economic and cultural domination – that encourage people to deploy violence in order to bring greater justice. For still others it might mean an absence of the huge historical and structural forces – capitalism, the modern state, the modern system of states, colonialism – that are claimed to generate injustice and violence as a matter of course.

It does not take much imagination to see how it makes some difference whether we think about the absence of peace in the contemporary Middle East, to take only one example, simply in terms of outbreaks of physical violence between differentially armed combatants, or of a broader history of injustices that are being reproduced on a daily basis, or of a broader structure of forces that ensure that the conditions under

which violence continues to flare up are sustained for reasons that go well beyond the specific lives and passions of those engaged in killing and destruction.

Perhaps the point should be put less negatively. For some, peace might mean the achievement of a social order in which large scale physical violence does not occur; that is, peace can be read precisely in terms of a condition of social order: a reading that might appeal as much to authoritarian politicians, generals and police chiefs as it might to pacifists. For some it might mean a condition of social justice, at which point attempts to think about peace begin to engage with all those hard questions about what it might mean to have a just society, questions that might lead to claims that some values are rather more important than social order, or pacification. And for some it might mean the presence of practices of production and forms of human interaction that generate justice and non-violent behaviour as a matter of course, whether by working to perfect the promises of capitalism, the state, the states system and colonialism or by ensuring their eventual demise; a presence, of course that would require some rather traumatic changes in the way the world is currently organised and enacted.

Again quite obviously, and as in many other cases, it is a great deal easier, though still depressingly difficult, to envisage peace in the Middle East in the relatively narrow terms of an absence of physical violence than of any broader account of justice, let alone in terms of any profound changes to the major historical structures in which we now live. Peacekeeping, as they say, is different from peacemaking, and peacekeeping without the possibility of peacemaking is sometimes simply impossible. Moreover, while the outbreak of physical violence is sometimes spectacular, the banal eradication of people through poverty, neglect and the attrition of forced development, is often much worse, and more or less invisible. So it is important to stress at the outset that rather a lot hangs of how we frame any claims about peace, and that the political stakes involved in defining what we think we are talking about when we invoke the word peace are very high.

Second, and related to this, there are many competing attempts to explain the forces that give rise to social conditions in which peace is absent. All the grand theories of our time have something to say on this matter.² Whether as possibility or impossibility, as regulative principle, teleological destiny, or ultimate evidence, claims about peace, or its absence, are invariably present in most, perhaps all the great systems of knowledge of our time. Sometimes overtly, sometimes by implication, sometimes as a pervasive metaphor for the good, the true and the beautiful, claims about peace permeate our knowledge claims well beyond the specificities of particular violences or aspirations. It is not surprising, for example, that to search for the causes of war is to become lost in a maze populated by geneticists, moralists, economists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, political scientists, theorists of international relations, historians, geographers, cultural theorists, novelists, logicians, peace researchers, conflict analysts, theologians and journalists, among others.

Yet while the heterogeneity of accounts of peace, or of the causal factors that are invoked to explain its absence, may be a problem for some scholars, it is not a problem for everyone; not for those scholars who know that whatever the heterogeneity of the sources of human conflict, they all come together and find their expression in the structures and practices of the modern state and the modern states system. And they come together not only in specific institutions of power and force but

under the rubric of a specific capacity to declare violence legitimate. For the political analyst, for the theorist of international relations, questions about the possibilities of peace hinge on the claim of the modern sovereign state as the sole site of legitimate authority, as, in Weber's famous definition, that which successfully claims a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence in a specific territory. Whatever the causal determinants of human behaviour, and whatever the diversities of values, cultures, ways of life and conceptions of peace, it is the sovereign authority of modern states that ultimately authorises those behaviours and aspirations that have political legitimacy, and thus a claim to reality.

III.

So how do we begin to engage with claims about sovereignty, or its possible futures?

It is not easy to engage with claims about sovereignty in anything other than a banal manner. This is not only because of all the well-known difficulties of talking about such a huge topic, or of even speaking of the future at all (remember Hegel's Owl of Minerva, or Benjamin's Angel of History), but because of two very specific versions of this general problem:

1. Sovereignty has to do with politics, and politics is largely concerned with engagements with the contingent, with chance, with *fortuna*, with time, with the unforeseen.
2. Moreover, modern sovereignty already tells us how to deal with the contingent. Modern sovereignty already expresses a very specific account of space and time as well as of legitimate authority.

It does so largely by seeking to draw lines and jurisdictions and containments in space. This is what Hobbes gets at in his version of the story of a move from a state of nature to a state of sovereign authority, a story that finds powerful resonances in Kantian accounts of an autonomous subjectivity and Schmitt's definition of the sovereign as he who decides the exception, among many other accounts of the limits of modern politics.³

Consequently, modern claims about sovereignty produce a series of logical puzzles in that:

- (i) modern sovereignty, as a specifically modern account of the character and location of legitimate authority in space and time, already tells us how to think about all spaces and all times, including the road to the future that may or may not be based on the presence of sovereignty. Generally speaking, and very crudely, it tells us that either there will be sovereignty forever, or there will not be sovereignty forever, in which case all will be either heaven or hell, depending on whether you like your metaphors to be written in claims about globalisation or in claims about anarchy;
- (ii) consequently, there is a problem in simply taking sovereignty's own story of the future for granted, but also
- (iii) we cannot pretend that we can easily stand outside of modern sovereignty and tell a different story.

But enough is enough; we don't want to go off into theoretical space in such a short time; except to insist that it is impossible to say much about sovereignty unless we do, because sovereignty is precisely a practice that seeks to express a particular kind of theoretical space.

One might start instead by trying to say what sovereignty is; except that we immediately run into another paradox: Sovereignty works by giving authority to definitions, and to start with a definition is already to think about sovereignty on terms given by sovereignty. This is why all the basic literature on sovereignty insists on the importance of thinking about sovereignty in the context of practices of authorisation, including the ways in which various claims about what sovereignty is gets authorised.

Here we at least can specify a key problem: who authorises the sovereign who can then authorise? This was especially Hobbes' central problem. It is known as the paradox of founding, and it goes back a very long way before Hobbes, and not least, of course, to the great foundational myths of modern politics articulated by Plato and Aristotle. Hobbes' way of responding to it is still largely our own. The basic intellectual problem here is how we can begin to think about the future of sovereignty without simply assuming all the very basic assumptions about time, space and political identity that Hobbes used to solve the paradox of founding in a very specific and paradigmatically modern way.

Again, this may all sound like the usual mumbo jumbo of the political theorist. I do not apologise for this. I want to insist that there is no point even in talking about sovereignty if one treats it as a thing, a hard, brute material reality that has to be engaged without getting into some strange theoretical terrain. The whole point of modern sovereignty is that it does not exist, and yet it has tremendous effects, it does not exist and yet it is constantly enacted, it has no foundations yet it is always foundational. Whatever it is, it is perhaps the strangest beast in the modern political world.

Now one can pursue these kinds of considerations in many arcane directions, and I for one am convinced that it is important to do so. But they also lead to a rather basic point that is both entirely obvious and yet seems very difficult to grasp. Moreover, once grasped, it is profoundly disconcerting to the modern political imagination. It is a point that bears especially on claims about peace and violence.

Simply put, the basic paradoxes that are inherent in the modern claim to sovereign authority have been expressed in the fundamentally contradictory constitution of a modern state and system of states, and the ways in which these contradictions have been resolved have brought us a form of political life that is, in principle, hypocritical. Our highest values as moderns depend, in the final instance, on the reproduction of violence, a violence that we can hardly bear to acknowledge or even think about. Consequently, there is a rather serious problem in assuming that the values that we hold in such high esteem – call them, among other things, the aspiration for peace – can be applied to solve the problem of violence. On the contrary, the problem may well be less the violence that makes peace desirable than the concept of peace that makes violence desirable, and legitimate.

It is especially important to remember that the great political invention of the modern era was not just the modern state but the modern system of states. It is the organisation of the modern system of states that permits the very existence of the sovereign state as the highest source of political authority. It is also the system of states that offers the archetypal solution to the problem of authority left by the collapse of the hierarchical theological order of premodern empires.

Instead of some version of the Great Chain of Being ascending from the many lowly orders at the bottom up to the lords, popes and angels at the top, all ultimately

guaranteed by God's eternal presence, we got the construction of modern subjects, whether as states or individuals, each claiming, in principle, to be the site of both particularity and universality; that is, to be modern autonomous subjectivities. Thus the modern states system allows for a claim to humanity in general – we the peoples of the United Nations, for example – and for particularity – we the particular people, or culture of this specific state. In this way, the modern states system offers a culturally specific answer to all questions about the one and the many. It is basically an answer that depends on drawing a line between different authorities, all claiming to be the site at which all contradictions between universality and particularity can be resolved.

Now one should say that this was an extraordinarily elegant solution to the problem, one worked out on a horizontal plane of different political communities here and there rather than a vertical plane of subordination from lower to higher. It was an elegance affirmed by a new culture of representational space, a new culture of self-possessive individuals, a new culture of Protestant communions with a transcendental God who had wound the clockwork and gone on holiday, and so on. The very elegance of this solution still underlies the highest hopes for modernity, expressed most powerfully perhaps in certain interpretations of Kant's account of a universal peace, in a quasi-Kantian account of autonomous subjects seeking to follow a universal moral law.

As is well known, however, it is possible to give a much less positive reading to this situation, one in which the states system becomes not the site in which modern human beings can work out their particular subjectivities as well as aspire to be properly human beings, but conversely, a site at which particular states and particular individuals can act out of mere self interest, thereby driving them to engage in the most inhuman forms of barbarism. The claims of citizenship and nation become the condition under which one can aspire to become properly human, but also the condition that renders humanity impossible in any meaningful sense; unless, of course one succumbs to the cultish fantasy that confuses politics with econometric accounts of rational individuals in an abstract global market.

The great modern hope is that all political communities can gradually become more mature, more democratic, more Kantian domestically thereby removing the need for international conflict. Hence the ambition for national self-determination. Hence the democratic peace theory that has been so popular recently. Hence grounding of the United Nations in Article 2 paragraph 7 of the Charter affirming the principle of domestic jurisdiction. Hence the proclamations of UNESCO affirming domestic jurisdiction and national sovereignty as the condition under which we must think about peace. And on and on.⁴

Now this is all well and good. It is a model of the world, and of political possibility that can be enormously attractive; indeed it may well be the highest ambition to which modern liberal societies can aspire. But there are some fairly significant problems with it, of which three seem crucial.

1. There is the basic problem that it is not obvious that the perception of moral goodness articulated in one state is going to be recognised as a Kantian universal by other states; on the contrary. In this way, nationalism becomes the obvious form of resistance to the claims of hegemonic universalisms being imposed from outside. Some state's conception of peace, we might say, is always likely to provoke war. This is the possibility that preoccupies theorists of international relations, especially in their guise as so called political realists. There are several

related problems here, not least the extent to which all states are created equal, or not, so that the aspiration for autonomy expressed in Kantian traditions is at odds with massive discrepancies of power among the states in the modern states system.

2. There is the problem that the creation of a modern system of states, the inscription of lines of demarcation between the included and excluded, itself tends to be a massively violent act. Consider only the carving up of Africa, or the construction of Israel, or Iraq, or, perhaps paradigmatically, the Partition of South Asia in 1947. Or consider, more contentiously perhaps, the process of territorial delineation that progressed from the recognition of Slovenia to the Dayton Peace Accord to the final struggle between intransigent Serbian particularism and intransigent NATO universalism. Between the absolutism of nationalist exclusion and the absolutism of hegemonic intervention, this was a situation in which it scarcely possible to think except in self-righteous dogmas worthy of the Cold War, or other wars of religion. We are used to thinking about the construction of modern jurisdictions as the mature response to primordial passions, tribalisms and the like. But from the writing out of indigenous peoples onwards, the drawing of modern lines of inclusion and exclusion has long involved massive violence masquerading as peace, development, progress and inevitability.
3. Well, one might live with all that. We moderns have known about this for a while, even if we prefer not to think about it too much. The political theorists, sociologists, economists, moralists and the rest have been content to defer the dirty side of modernity to those who are trained to face up to it: the theorists of international relations and military planners. Let them reconcile their soul with the demands of political necessity and violence. Or at least, let us defer such thoughts until the next time we come up with an exception to the general rule that thou shalt not kill, as long as we can sustain the illusion that it is only an exception to the general rule that make us properly human, at least most of the time.

Still, there is always the nagging doubt that this play of norms and exceptions, of a division of labour between those who promote goodness, truth and beauty at home and those prepared to contemplate violence in a state of emergency ought to be profoundly troubling to all those who wish to celebrate, and universalise the values of modern political order. This, I think, gets us close to the heart of the kinds of questions about the claims of modern reason posed by a range of intellectual traditions throughout the twentieth century.⁵

But there is also an increasing suspicion that the basic accommodation between the claims of universality and the claims of particularity is no longer sustainable on terms given by the modern states system. Hence the significance of, but also the puzzlement provoked by, claims about globalisation. There is reason to be concerned about the ways in which claims about peace are constituted through the contradictions of an always potentially violent modernity. But there is also reason to be perplexed by the ways in which these contradictions are being resolved in ways that do not affirm a classically modern account of political subjectivity or of legitimate authority.

IV.

It is all too easy to become caught up in the outpouring of claims about globalisation. In fact, I think it is more helpful to get some sense of its potential significance, or otherwise, by keeping ones attention precisely on the claims of state sovereignty that globalisation

supposedly challenges. Not least, I would say, sovereignty is a term that covers too many sins, too many practices. It seems to me that some quite extensive conceptual unpacking is called for. In order to think with any clarity about how we view our possible futures in terms set by sovereignty, it seems important to distinguish between at least five different though related phenomena:

1. the *problem* of sovereignty; that is, the question of how legitimate authority gets to be constituted and under what conditions, and thus how we come to terms with (i) attempts to distinguish claims about authority and those about power, or (ii) claims about power from those about knowledge, or (iii) claims about sovereignty and those about subjectivity – just to name three key sites at which we can expect to see intense negotiations for quite some time.
2. the specifically *modern* framing of the principle of sovereignty; that is, all those practices that enable us to believe we can draw a very sharp line between the legitimate and the illegitimate, the authoritative and the non-authoritative.
3. the application of this claim to the territorial *jurisdiction* of modern states; that is, to all those practices that enable us to believe that we can draw lines within spatially delineated jurisdictions legally claimed by modern states.
4. the embodiment of this claim in specific state *institutions*; that is, all those practices through which the claim to sovereignty is reproduced in a multiplicity of contexts and sites by institutions that have themselves been enabled by claims about sovereignty and its proper territorial articulation.
5. the reproduction of this claim in the practices of modern political *subjects*; that is, all those practices through which the principle of sovereignty is inscribed in the identities of peoples, most obviously in practices of nationalism, citizenship, and human rights, but also in the cultural codes of, say, gender formation and the authorisation of personhood.

One could go much further than this. In each of these five cases, I believe it necessary to distinguish between how sovereignty works as a *principle*, as a *practice* and as an *institution*. Furthermore, I would want to insist that modern sovereignty has to be read *both domestically and internationally*, and read in such a way as to get a sense of how the internal and external expressions of sovereignty constitute each other. Then one could start to pick out some specific sites in which sovereignty intersects with some other concepts with great intensity – democracy, rights, and so on – and where the specifically modern forms of sovereignty have hardly caught on at all.

Staying with my simple five-fold classification, I want to make three brief observations:

- (i) We conflate them all very easily, not least because this is what we are supposed to do; everything converges on a monopoly of legitimate authority in a specific territory. This is our normative ideal, though it may not be our reality.
- (ii) Different analysts tend to fixate on one of these and think that it is the entire package.
 - the problem of sovereignty tends to be the preserve of philosophers and people who read sovereignty as an expression of philosophical and theoretical puzzles
 - the modern framing of sovereignty tends to be the preserve of historians and theorists of modernity

- the territorial jurisdiction of modern states tends to be the preserve of constitutional and international lawyers and statesmen and sets the basic framework assumed by the conventional theorists of government and international relations
- the practices of the institutions of modern states tends to be the preserve of students of domestic law and politics
- the practices of modern political subjects tend to be the preserve of sociologists, psychologists and cultural analysts.

It is instructive to move from one set of scholars to another and find them all diligently working on their own bit of the elephant; when they do converge one generally sees varying degrees of hostility and incomprehension.

(iii) One way of thinking about our possible futures, it seems to me, is that we might expect an increasing disaggregation of all these, and possibly other, different meanings or sites of political engagement. It may be that classical definitions of sovereignty, not least that of Hobbes, insist that it is an all or nothing affair, that sovereigns either are or they are not. It may also be, if we accept these terms, that we court incoherence if we try to talk about sovereignty in terms of more and less, of the parcelling out of sovereignty on this issue or that issue, to this jurisdiction or that jurisdiction. It seems to me, however, that we risk even greater incoherence, and indeed have succumbed to incoherence for quite some time, when we continue to fuse all such meanings into a simple definition. What needs to be at issue is not the necessity of the definition but the conditions under which so many meanings can be fused together in a single necessary definition. We only have to think about the enormous political work performed by concepts like 'national interest' or 'national security' to see the practical effects of the way we take simple definitions at face value.

So just for the sake of illustration, in running through my five rather arbitrary categories, it is not unreasonable to imagine:

1. An increasing intensification of the problem of sovereignty as sources and sites of authority become increasingly inconsistent with any claim to a single authority in a specific territory. Thus it seems to me that one can read a very wide range of contemporary debates, not least about global governance, global civil society, or the strange status of the World Bank, the WTO, various so-called regimes, and so on not in terms of some easy claim about the disappearance of sovereignty but precisely an intensification of the problem of sovereignty, and as a sense that this problem has to be posed on terms other than we have been used to. For all that modern social science has been able to churn out utilitarian accounts of regime formation and governmentality, it seems scarcely capable of even asking questions about legitimate authority. These are precisely the questions, it seems to me, that are raised by all those critical literatures that the social scientists tend to dismiss as trivial and irresponsible. This seems to me to be a rather profound mistake, with dangerous consequences for the kinds of scholarship that are considered to be legitimate. Whether in the wider world or in claims about knowledge, the key issues are those of legitimate authority, of authorisation. It seems to me to be quite clear that our futures will involve increasingly contested struggles over the authorisation of authority. This is very largely what is at stake in claims about democratisation, rights, and all the rest. Authority – legitimate authorisation – is at the heart of our modern dilemmas. There is no point in

pretending that we can respond to it by saying that sovereignty is still here or that it's gone forever, or by universalising an abstract logic of rational action.

2. A decreasing plausibility of the specifically modern way of framing sovereignty as a relation between a specific point – the monopoly of legitimate authority – and the drawing of sharp lines between either territorial spaces or between, say, public and private, politics and governmentality, friend and enemy. The specifically modern, which is to say spatially organised, account of where and what sovereignty must be is in serious trouble. Perhaps the easiest phenomenon to identify in this respect is the changing character of boundaries, which are increasingly porous and disaggregated, though it is certainly not the case that boundaries are going away; they may even be proliferating.
3. This trouble extends to the modern constitutions of states and the norms of the states system as well. It is here especially that there is a danger of falling into a misleading zero-sum game. States will be able to fudge this issue for quite some time, and in any case there will be huge variation across different states in different structural situations. But there is no reason to expect any clear correlations between any measures we might use to evaluate the powers, influences or scale of state institutions and the measures we might use to evaluate the state of a state's sovereignty. Theses about the decline of state sovereignty understood as a monopoly of authority in a specific territory are quite compatible with theses about the continuing or even increasing scale, size, influence and so on of statist institutions. They are also quite compatible with claims about the proliferation of sovereignties as long as we don't conflate the practices of sovereignty with the practices of state sovereignty; but then, of course, we run into very difficult questions about what it means to disaggregate political communities, identities and so on.
4. So as we move to think about the future of the institutions of sovereign states, life gets very complicated because again we are encouraged to think of sovereignty as an all or nothing affair. What we see instead, it seems to me, is both a proliferation of sovereignties and a decline in the plausibility of claims about state sovereignty. Moreover, where state sovereignty was conceived as a more or less unchanging spatial, territorial affair, fixed on land, modern sovereignties seem to be highly mobile. It is not apparent to me that anyone has a clear conceptual grip on this, but if one tries to read the movements of agencies and governmentalities that are at work in the contemporary world, it is not difficult to get a sense of sovereignties as temporary and specific in their claims. They are much more difficult to map than the sovereignties of states, and by the official codes of sovereign states they are not sovereignties at all. But then, it would not take much to argue that there are also no sovereign states at all either, no matter how much state agents might insist that there are.
5. With the practices of modern subjects we are on territory that seems the furthest removed from matters of state sovereignty as conventionally conceived by analysts of international relations and law, but of course closest to the hearts of political theorists. For it is one of the effects of the discourse mobilised by claims to state sovereignty that there is a huge gap between the concerns of international relations and the concerns of the political theorist. This gap has long seemed to

me to be nonsense, but also difficult to negotiate. In this context, one might talk at length about a wide array of themes. I will only mention some of them:

(i) the claims of modern state sovereignty have long been in tension with claims about popular sovereignty. This is what generates the problem of democracy. I would note only that in the context of all the noise about globalisation especially, the problem of democratisation is indeed a bit of a problem, though one to which most political theorists, and especially theorists of democracy, seem entirely oblivious.

(ii) the claims of modern state sovereignty have been the condition under which it has been possible to construct the category of citizenship as our primary form of political identity. Again, I would say only that in a world of movement, multiple identities, and all the rest, one should probably look at the ways in which the concept of citizenship is being rearticulated.

(iii) The modern account of state sovereignty was worked out intellectually on the basis of a modern concept of a free and equal subject: the individual in the paradigmatic case of Hobbes, the nation as the major alternative variation on the same theme. And again I would say only that while there may be a lot of individualism and nationalism about, the regulative ideal of the single self-identical autonomous individual or nation is increasingly difficult to sustain.

V.

So, it's a complicated picture; and one that needs to be made even more complicated. What is not on the agenda is the simple minded notion that state sovereignty is here forever or gone tomorrow.

What then does one look for?

First, I think it is important to pay some attention to the way the basic paradox of sovereignty was resolved in the early modern period, and I am referring here both to the extraordinary conceptualisation worked out by Hobbes and to the more concrete expressions of something very close to Hobbes' position that we generally choose to associate with the Treaty of Westphalia.

It is worth noting that the tension between secularisms and religions was crucial in both cases. It was also, and crucially, a resolution that depended on two key and related moves. One was to identify a fixed point in space and time and one was to draw straight lines between points. Modern sovereignty can be understood quite simply as the capacity of a monopolistic centre to be able to draw the line, and to draw this line both physically and metaphorically. Moreover, modern sovereignty expresses not simply a point, or a line of authority, but a point/line at which claims about universality and plurality are resolved, a specific account of how universality and diversity *must* be related. Modern accounts of state sovereignty cannot be understood as a claim about either fragmented authority, as claims about international anarchy would have it, or a claim about monopolies of authority in a particular territory, as claims about society and the state would have it, but a very specific account of the proper relationship between unity and diversity, order and anarchy.

This is what gives us our historically specific way of responding to the *problem* of sovereignty with a specifically *modern account* of sovereignty as that which is able to draw clear lines between the normal and the exceptional, here and there, legitimate and illegitimate, citizen and non-citizen and all the rest. This is also what makes it

seem so desirable but also impossible to deal with the problem of sovereignty by imagining a move from anarchy to universality.

Thus contrary to the ways in which claims to universality and claims to particularity are conceived as opposites – nationalism/ globalism, realism/ idealism, domestic jurisdiction/ humanitarian intervention – they are part of the same package and are subject to all kinds of rhetorical switches and reversals, as we have seen in debates about the bombing of Kosovo, among many other cases.

Second, it seems to me, then, that what is at stake is not the eternal presence or imminent absence of sovereignty, but:

1. the proliferation, that is, functional disaggregation, multiplication and spatial differentiation, of centres of sovereign authority.
2. the decreasing capacity of central authorities to draw lines at the same place; thus the disaggregation of borders. Moreover, lines of inclusion/ exclusion are being challenged by lines of connection. This is why so many of the major intellectual moves of our time involve metaphor of networks and relationalities rather than of things and their containers.
3. the increasing mobility but also only temporary effectiveness of functionally disaggregate authorities.
4. the increasingly contestable status of all such authorities that are no longer able to draw all lines once and for all in the same place.
5. the consequent struggle between two quite different forms of democratic practice, one concerned to work within the spaces of political representation carved out by modern sovereign states, and one concerned to challenge the assumption of sovereignty by proliferating and functionally/spatially disaggregated authorities.

All of this comes with three obvious warnings:

- one should not underestimate the continuing power of state institutions, even though state institutions are not coextensive with nations, territories, communities, identities or authorities
- one should not underestimate the continuing appeal of forms of politics that seek to draw lines of inclusion and exclusion, though these lines are no longer drawn exclusively on simple territorial space
- one should not underestimate the highly variable character of these processes in different settings. Whether one speaks in the language of uneven development or of cultural/regional difference, we are dealing here with many potential variations on a very complex theme.

Nevertheless, as a basic point of departure for thinking about peace, one should not assume that one can use the categories of modern sovereignty – the categories of modern space, time and identity – to figure out what else is going on anywhere, including what is going on with what seems to me to be a fairly profound rearticulation of political space, time and authority, the basic categories that are expressed by modern sovereignty. The problem of sovereignty, one should expect, is going to become ever more difficult, intense, and contested, while the modern framing of state sovereignty as a spatial enclosure in which all contingencies can be contained and all decisions rendered as legal/illegal here/there is going to seem increasingly nostalgic. This is no doubt to confront a murky realm of exceptionally difficult questions, a realm

in which it is difficult to have much confidence in the criteria upon which we might begin to judge any answers that are offered. But then, scholarly responsibility has always rested more on the importance of the questions that are posed than on any certainties that our answers are correct.

VII.

This leads me to a few concluding observations about the recent UNESCO declaration invoked at the outset of these comments. In many ways it reminds me of nothing so much as the work of late-mediaeval theologians trying desperately to integrate all the massive changes of early-modern Europe into some kind of Thomist or Ptolemaic orthodoxy. One understands how such documents are constructed. The basic principles of orthodoxy are reiterated and then, knowing the limits of orthodoxy, various people attempt to insert into the text a variety of considerations and problems that have to be taken into account. The result is both a political accommodation and a conceptual mess. In this case, orthodoxy consists of a re-reading of the principle of sovereign self-determination as consistent with a culture of peace, respect for life, ending violence, promoting non-violence through education, human rights, freedom, justice, democracy, tolerance, cultural diversity, dialogue and understanding at all levels of society and among nations. This principle demands mutual respect and understanding, international cooperation, compliance with international obligations under the Charter and international law, and so on. And all this is then read as consistent with, for example, 'promoting democracy, development and universal respect for and observance of all human rights and fundamental freedoms,' 'eradicating poverty and illiteracy and reducing inequalities within and between nations,' 'eliminating all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance,' and all kinds of other no doubt very good things.

What is disturbing about this kind of document is an absolute refusal to confront the contradictions of the modern state and the modern states system. It is a purely Kantian reading (though one with only a dubious relation to Kant) of the possibilities of national self-determination. There is no sense that these possibilities have been precisely the condition under which war has been understood to be both necessary and legitimate, or the condition under which it is proving increasingly difficult to engage with structures of inequality. One can understand (without agreeing with) the kind of knee-jerk reaction that would come from those who are less persuaded of the possibility of reconciling mature democracies with universal reason and humanity in general. More than this, however, one could not imagine the representatives of states to write such a document in any other way.

The quasi-Kantian ambition for autonomous moral communities has become the official rhetoric of the modern states system. It remains the regulative ambition of modern political thinkers everywhere. Most modern political theory can be read as nothing less than a sustained attempt to pretend that one can avoid acknowledging the extent to which all our progressive political aspirations depend on a prior insistence on the legitimacy of violence. I find this pretence intolerable and a profoundly unacceptable ground on which to think about the possibilities of peace. I also think that it rests on a romanticised and nostalgic reading of the patterns of power and authority that are overwriting the claims of states in patterns we scarcely know how to read. It may well turn out that we have good reason to be nostalgic about the achievements of the modern states system. But I suspect that we have no alternative than to (i)

acknowledge the violence that has made possible our most cherished aspirations, and (ii) to try to read the possibilities of peace not through the violent inscription of spatial discriminations but through the framing of relations that are not simply international.

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- ¹ See (2000), Launch of the International Year of the Culture of Peace, Bangkok: UNESCO-PROAP.
 - ² The relevant literature here is obviously massive. The most sustained attempt to engage with the question of what it might mean to offer a causal explanation of war is Hidemi Suganami (1996), *Causes of War*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 - ³ Hobbes, Thomas (1651), *Leviathan*. Edited by Richard Tuck (1991), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Hans Reiss (ed) (1991), *Kant's Political Writings*, (2nd ed). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Carl Schmitt (1932), *The Concept of the Political*, translated with an Introduction by George Schwab and New Foreword by Tracy Strong (1996). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 - ⁴ For a more extensive discussion of what is at stake here, see RBJ Walker (1993), *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - ⁵ The extent to which Max Weber's reading of the contradictions of modern reason has been erased by converting him from a very sharp political thinker to a bland sociologist is especially instructive in this context.
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WESTPHALIA AND THE DESACRALISATION OF POLITICS

Ian Hunter

Introduction

Seen historiographically, assessments of the Peace of Westphalia – the twin treaties of Münster and Osnabrück signed in 1648 – have been decidedly mixed. For the many combatants, and for the statesmen and jurists who had forced four years of arduous negotiations to their bitter end, there was reason to celebrate the end of thirty years of continuous warfare and civil violence. Yet even then there were dissenting views, those of the papacy in particular, whose nuncio Cardinal Chigi had publicly protested the peace process as a sin and a crime in 1647. The Protestant political and natural jurists of the next generation – most famously Samuel Pufendorf and Christian Thomasius – celebrated Westphalia as the precondition for their secularised conception of politics, and appealed to its provisions in practical defences of religious coexistence and toleration. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, the Peace was being actively marginalised, at least by such Kantian philosophers as FH Jacobi. According to Jacobi, it was not statecraft and law that put an end to religious war but ‘that inner, invisible power which, if not in the forefront, was at least lying in wait everywhere in the world where good happened and evil had to make way for it: the ceaseless striving of reason’.¹ By the end of the nineteenth century Westphalia was being attacked from a different quarter, that of German nationalist historiography, which began to regard the Peace as a catastrophe for the German *Volk*. Here Westphalia was seen as a capitulation to the historical enemy, France, and as hastening the end of the First Reich – a viewpoint reiterated by historians enamored of the Third Reich. Fritz Dickmann’s scholarly rehabilitation of the Peace of Westphalia was not published until the 1950s.²

In recent Anglophone political theory, Westphalia – or the states-system it inaugurated – has continued to undergo various kinds of assimilation, marginalisation and repudiation. Like his eighteenth-century predecessor, Jacobi, John Rawls assimilates the Peace to reason, identifying the end of early modern religious conflict with the generalised emergence of freedom of conscience and toleration.³ He has also outlined the vision of a global peace in which ‘peoples’ will behave in the manner of the moral individuals, reaching agreed standards of international justice on the basis of convergent rational choices.⁴ For its part, globalisation theory and moral cosmopolitanism marginalises Westphalia, identifying it with a system of states whose defining characteristic, sovereignty, has either been eviscerated by transnational flows of capital or transcended by cosmopolitan law, morality and human rights.⁵ Finally, a good deal of communitarian and multicultural theory tends towards the repudiation of the Westphalian settlement altogether, viewing the religious neutrality of the post-Westphalian liberal state as a sham,⁶ demanding a politics in which the state will directly represent its constituent moral communities,⁷ and imagining that something called democracy will be capable of maintaining the peace between these communities.⁸

Without attempting direct engagement with this vast array of debates, this paper offers to shed light on some of the animating issues. It does so by returning to the circumstances of early modern religious war from which the Peace of Westphalia emerged. By focusing on the interaction of great-power politics and Germany’s religious civil wars, I argue that Westphalia marked the emergence of a distinctive desacralised

form of politics. While acknowledging that the Westphalian order did not survive the nineteenth century unscathed, I suggest that this form of politics remains central to understanding and governing religiously driven civil and international conflict.

Confessional politics

To understand the kind of peace brought by Westphalia one must first understand the kind of conflict it was intended to end. Despite the multiple economic, military and dynastic rivalries informing it, the Thirty Years War (1618-48) is appropriately seen as a religious war, for it was confessional division that brought these rivalries to a head and that gave this series of conflicts its extraordinary intensity and duration. Moreover, the Osnabrück treaty itself acknowledges confessional division as a prime cause of the war, devoting its core provisions to the settlement of religious grievances (*IPO*, V).⁹ The sixteenth century emergence of a group of mutually hostile confessional states or proto-states may itself be seen as the product of two fundamental historical processes: early modern state-building, and the 'confessionalisation' of proto-national populations.

Territorial state-building in the German Empire began during the fifteenth century and was most successful in the electoral states of Brandenburg, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony and Bavaria. Led by powerful electoral princes (*Kurfürsten*), these states were pre-eminent in the complex system of imperial estates, which included lesser territorial princes, prince-bishops ruling over electoral sees, imperial city states and knightly orders. The distribution of rights and privileges across this complex system, and the adjudication of conflicting claims, was managed by the Empire's core political-legal institutions: the Imperial Diet (*Reichstag*), the Aulic Court (*Reichshofrat*), and the Chamber Court (*Reichskammergericht*). Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries the great electoral princes and several of the smaller territorial princes had been engaged in intensive state-building activities. This involved measures to group their possessions within territorial borders, subordinate their estates to a single central government, contest the sovereignty of the Emperor, establish independent military forces, improve agriculture and industry, and discipline their populations.¹⁰ Until the Thirty Years War, however, these activities had taken place within the legal and political structures of the Empire, which reserved crucial sovereign rights to the Emperor – including rights of final jurisdiction, of military tribute and, especially, the rights of war and peace. Moreover, the process of intra-imperial state-building was occurring at a time when the Habsburg Emperors were not only seeking to consolidate sovereign power in their own Austro-Hungarian territories, but were aspiring to the status of a 'universal monarchy' via the alliance with the Spanish branch of the Habsburg line.¹¹

Rather than using the Protestant-inspired notion of a Reformation, historians of religion now speak of a process of confessionalisation.¹² They use this term to describe an authentically religious phenomenon in which the boundaries of a distinct religion are drawn via the elaboration of a confession or definitive articles of faith, and in which a 'confessionalising' of populations takes place via a systematic intensification of the church's pastoral and pedagogical work.¹³ The three overlapping waves of confessionalisation – Lutheran, Calvinist and Catholic – were of decisive importance for the cultural formation of early modern and modern Europe. Not only did they split the universal church into mutually opposed faiths, but they were responsible for carrying religious observance into the daily life of whole populations in an unprecedented manner.¹⁴ In tying moral regeneration and salvation to adherence to a single 'true faith', the credal religions ensured that the emerging moral communities of Europe would

view each other as enemies, sometimes even as heretics whose very existence could become a threat to the covenant with God and the true path to salvation. This deeply rooted view of rival religious communities as heretics jeopardising God's rule on earth was responsible for the extraordinary ferocity of early modern religious violence.¹⁵ In the German territories the process of confessionalisation was at its most intense during the second half of the sixteenth century, during which time the three religions finalised mutually opposed confessional formulas, and at the end of which a series of mutually hostile confessional states had emerged, each containing persecuted religious minorities.¹⁶

The effects of the convergence of state-building and confessionalisation were as profound and long-lasting as they were unforeseen and uncontrolled. On the one hand, the emergent territorial states provided the Protestant churches with political and military protection against the pope and the emperor. There had of course been prior reform movements in the Catholic church, most recently the proto-Protestant Hussite movement in Bohemia; but these had always ended with the reassertion of Rome's theological and ecclesiastical control. John Huss learned this the hard way when he accepted an invitation to argue his case before the church's leading theologians at the Council of Constance (1414-18), only to be taken out and burned alive, together with his hapless follower Jerome of Prague who, just a few years earlier, had debated these same theologians at the University of Vienna.¹⁷ On the other hand, the confessionalising religions provided state-building princes with an extremely powerful instrument for the cultural disciplining of their populations, together with the rights belonging to the 'defender of the faith' and, in Protestant territories, those belonging to the head of the church.¹⁸ This convergence of state-building and confessionalisation allowed the cultural or moral community to be superimposed on the territorial or political community – the 'man' or Christian on the citizen – giving rise to proto-national populations inside the borders of what would become 'nation states'.¹⁹ It also gave rise to the phenomenon of the confessional state; that is, to states whose ruling houses regarded the imposition of a single confession as crucial to both the spiritual welfare and the political governance of their populations.

This was the state of affairs that was formalised by the first religious peace, the Augsburg Religious Peace of 1555. The treaty of Augsburg, ratified by the Imperial Diet and adjudicated by the Imperial Chamber Court, gave political-legal recognition to the existence of the two religions (Catholic and Lutheran), accorded a right of emigration to dissenting minorities, while attributing an ecclesiastical 'right of reform' (*jus reformandi*) to secular rulers on the famous principle *cuius regio eius religio* - whose the government, theirs the religion. Although it represented an important attempt to contain religious differences within the political-legal framework of the Empire, and while it was itself a major contribution to Imperial *Staatsrecht* or public law, the treaty of Augsburg also served to show just how intractable were the problems of pacification after the emergence of a confessional politics. For while the *jus reformandi* recognised a degree of religious pluralism at the Imperial level, it served to intensify the process of confessionalisation within states and territories, as rulers sought to consolidate power over and through their churches.²⁰ This provided the grounds for a whole series of incendiary events as Protestant territorial princes sought to secularise massive Catholic religious foundations; prince-bishops who had changed faith sought to bring their territories, foundations and populations with them into the new religion; and, of course,

as populations attempted to resist new faiths being imposed on them, or else to convert to these faiths against the wishes of the authorities.²¹

The Augsburg Peace showed just how difficult it was to contain confessional conflict within the cultural-political parameters of secular politics and jurisprudence. For while the signatories had appeared to accept the legal coexistence and equal rights of the two religions, this was not in fact the case. The Protestant jurists interpreted the treaty as a 'pragmatic sanction' (*sanctio pragmatica*) in which the rights of their religion and states had been given the durable recognition and protection of imperial law. But the Catholic political theologians and jurists interpreted it as only a 'law of necessity', acceded to under the duress of exceptional circumstances, and able to be broken in good faith at a later time; for the papacy viewed the Protestant rulers as heretics with whom no binding contract could be entered into.²² Small wonder then that the Peace of Augsburg broke down, and that the first signs of pressure were registered in the Imperial Chamber Court itself, whose judgments were increasingly made along confessional lines, thereby losing credibility with the plaintiffs who then sought to pursue their grievances through force of arms.²³ The degree of juridification and secularisation achieved by Augsburg was thus insufficient to contain the extraordinary fissiparousness and intractability of confessional politics. Further, when war did break out, with the anti-imperial uprising of the Protestant Bohemian nobility in 1618, it was confessional politics that internationalised the conflict. For it was the Emperor's ruthless suppression of the Bohemians – culminating in the public decapitation of twenty seven members of the high aristocracy – which led to Sweden's intervention on behalf of its co-religionists and in pursuit of its own economic and security aims.²⁴ With that the die was cast for thirty years of religious war in the German territories, where the hegemonial struggle of France and Sweden against the Empire and Spain coalesced with the struggle between the Empire's Protestant and Catholic estates.

The circumstances with which the congress of Westphalia had to contend were thus those in which the confessional politics of the German territories had shattered the old political-judicial order of the Empire and Rome, giving rise to a series of protracted and devastating religious wars. These in turn provided a theatre for the war of European hegemony between the great powers. Given this kind of conflict, what kind of peace could Westphalia be? We can comment in passing that two of the figures most favoured by modern political theory – the individual governed by a rational moral law and the community acting in accordance with a collective moral culture – seem to have left little mark on the peace process. Indeed, we might say that communal moral cultures were part of the problem not the solution, and that rational individuals – whether Kantian moral agents or naked 'utility maximisers' – were exceedingly thin on the ground; although we will see that certain highly circumscribed forms of juristic reason and 'reason of state' did play an important role. In the event, peace of a kind would be reached neither through an overarching moral culture nor through an underpinning moral reason, but along two different but convergent paths: first, via the construction of a 'secular' security system between the sovereign states; and second, via the gradual desacralisation of politics inside the German states. I shall say just a few things about each of these developments.

Emergence of a 'secularised' European states-system

The Peace of Westphalia was entirely dependent on the emergence of the European inter-state system of which it was in fact the first formal expression. The appearance of

a series of autonomous states in the form of consolidated territories ruled from a single political centre represented a fundamental transformation of the European political order.²⁵ It replaced the prior order – in which a Rome-centred European ‘world’ was to be jointly ruled by Pope and Emperor until the second coming of Christ – with a quite different spatio-temporal order. This order – a system of independent territorial states ruled by secular sovereigns owing no allegiance to a superior temporal or spiritual power – found its theoretical expression in the works of Bodin, Hobbes and the European political jurists.²⁶ They were the first to construct the sovereign as a formal moral person whose right to rule was both supreme yet grounded in nothing higher than the need for social peace and territorial security. This momentous re-spatialisation of the European order was accompanied by a profound detheologisation of inter-state politics which, as Carl Schmitt observed, led in turn to a transformation in the concept of the enemy and in the waging of war.²⁷ Under the papal-imperial order, the enemy was both criminal and heretic, transgressor of a simultaneously temporal and spiritual European order. As we saw in the papal reaction to the Augsburg Peace, this meant that the enemy was as an outlaw with whom legal relations were impossible and on whom one waged a war of annihilation. In the detheologised inter-state system, however, the enemy was simply another sovereign with whom one duelled for territorial security, and with whom one could enter into pacts sanctioned by an emergent international legal order, which was in fact a law regulating the territorial ‘balance’ of the new state system.

In the events leading up to Westphalia it was, above all, French foreign policy under the direction of Cardinal Richelieu that most clearly reflected this emerging inter-state order. It was Richelieu who, in order to break the hegemony of the Empire and Spain, took Catholic France into an alliance with continental Europe’s leading Protestant power, Sweden. Just as importantly, Richelieu played a leading role in changing Sweden’s war aims – from ones in which peace would be secured through the destruction of the Empire and the imposition of a Franco-Swedish hegemony, to ones in which France and Sweden would act as guarantors for a European-wide security system.²⁸ Further, the French statesman must be regarded as the architect of this system, which he assembled by combining the principle of pacts pledging to maintain the territorial status quo with the principle of a guarantee of the peace provided by a ‘third’ (great) power.²⁹ For Richelieu only this inter-state security system backed by international law was capable of bringing peace. In his single-minded pursuit of it he broke completely with the papacy’s political theology and actively fostered the development of sovereign states, Protestant and Catholic, within the Empire. He thereby ensured that, unlike the Augsburg deliberations, the congress of Westphalia would not take place within the structure of the old Roman-Imperial order; that it would be instead a meeting of sovereign states and quasi-sovereign estates at which the Emperor was merely a participant and from which the papacy excluded itself.³⁰ The peace brokered at Westphalia was thus one that allowed the heretics to be treated as ‘just enemies’ possessing equal standing (*IPO*, V1), and that for the first time accepted the permanent alienation of Catholic temporal and spiritual possessions, as part of a complex series of detheologised territorial trade-offs (*IPO*, V10).

The juridical desacralisation of politics

To the detheologisation of relations at the inter-state level, there corresponded a desacralisation of politics within and among the German states and estates. This

secularisation should not be ascribed to a universalising Enlightenment reason, but to the specific rationality of the statesmen and political jurists. During the near-century separating the Augsburg Peace and the Peace of Westphalia, political jurists, operating through the institutions of positive imperial law (*Staatsrecht, jus publicum*) and working in concert with statesmen, laid the groundwork for the desecralisation of domestic politics. This occurred not through the application of (universal) secular reason to political affairs, but through the gradual elaboration of a series of measures whose effect was to juridify – and in this limited sense, to secularise – political relations within the Empire. From Martin Heckel's extensive investigations into these developments we may extract four key moments.

First, there was an attempt to rescue the Empire from the splitting of its religious foundations by reconstituting its unity in secular-political terms. This attempt to salvage a political unity for the Empire from the fragmentation of Church was, however, only partially successful, for both Protestants and Catholics continued to view this unity as grounded in the notion of 'the one true church of Jesus Christ', which both believed themselves to be.³¹ Second, the legal co-existence of the confessions was pursued through a series of measures designed to establish 'parity' between them at the level of their representation in the key institutions of imperial governance, the *Reichstag* and the *Reichskammergericht*. This mode of establishing equality between the confessions depended on a far-reaching secularisation of the imperial constitution, as all of its various offices, privileges and protections had now to be distributed on non-religious grounds, in accordance with a purely 'instrumental' political end – social peace (*IPO*, V18, 42-5).³² Third, this secularisation (juridification) of political governance contributed to the emergence of a purely secular-political concept of peace, in place of the religious conception of *pax Christiana*. Against the protests of the papacy, which continued to regard itself as the final guarantor of the just peace, this worldly concept of peace required that ex-communicated heretics be treated as equal partners in the negotiations at Augsburg and Westphalia. It therefore gave rise to confessional neutrality between states at the level of their Imperial relations, even if for a time it allowed confessionalisation (the *jus reformandi*) to proceed unabated inside state territories, on the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*.³³ Finally, the elevation of social peace to the prime objective of law and politics, together with the associated exclusion of questions of theological truth from the peace settlements, contributed to a fundamental desecralisation of political sovereignty. For, under such circumstances, the sovereign state could no longer be understood as the expression of a moral community or as the guardian of the people's spiritual welfare. It had to be seen instead as an artificial legal and political agency, instituted solely for the end of worldly security.

This desecralised conception of politics stepped onto the European stage at the Peace of Westphalia, although against stiff resistance and not all at once. Backed by the papacy and inspired by the Jesuits, the radical Catholic estates were particularly resistant to according equal rights of participation to their Protestant counterparts, whom they continued to regard as heretics.³⁴ Yet, against their wishes, it was the imperial ambassador, Graf Trautmannsdorff, who accepted the Protestant estates as independent parties to the peace, negotiating with them the extremely vexed questions of reparations, amnesty, and religious freedom. Similarly, the princes, Protestant and Catholic, were most unwilling to give up their *jus reformandi*, which they continued to regard as one of the sovereign rights, and as incompatible with the toleration of other religions. Yet here too the juridical desecralisation of sovereignty made notable gains.

This can be seen in the acceptance of the so-called *Normaljahr* — a ‘standard year’ for establishing the distribution of religious forces and possessions — as a means of settling the myriad of conflicting claims over institutions, territories, and populations (*IPO*, V2). In 1647 the Protestant and Catholic estates agreed upon 1624 as the reversion point, which, in striking a purely political balance midway between the largest gains of the Protestant and Catholic forces, represented a radically detheologised solution to the problem. Yet it was just this desacralised politico-legal compromise that resulted in a degree of religious toleration for the three main confessions. For while the standard year recognised the dominant religion in a state as at 1624 (*IPO*, V10-24), it simultaneously recognised the rights of minority religions to public worship if such had existed then (*IPO*, V25), and granted rights of private worship to those who had changed religion in the intervening period (*IPO*, V28).³⁵ While such toleration looks paltry from the modern perspective of unlimited freedom of conscience, it was nonetheless crucial to the success of the Peace, and entirely indicative of the desacralised politics ushered in by Westphalia.

Conclusion

To the extent that Westphalia represented a ‘culture of peace’, what form did it take? Let me conclude with just a few observations.

First, at the inter-state level, the Westphalian order was dedicated not to the elimination of war — which it treats as a permanent feature of inter-state politics — but to its regulation. On the one hand, by tying all of the European states into a system of reciprocally guaranteed security, and by treating territorial states as sovereign in relation to all other temporal or spiritual powers, Westphalia was designed to banish ideological wars of annihilation from the European heartlands. The system of pacts backed by great-power guarantors was not intended to preclude territorial infringements and conflicts, but to ensure that would take the form of conflicts between ‘just enemies’, thereby avoiding the cycle of outrage and revenge that had made the religious wars so savage and so difficult to end. On the other hand, this entirely concrete respatialisation and detheologisation of the European order was dependent on the existence of an extra-European colonial world. Understood precisely as a world in which no sovereign states existed — hence as a free space for conquest and expansion — the colonial world allowed the voracious appetite for territory to be satisfied without upsetting the balance of powers and system of regulated conflict established inside Europe.

Second, the restriction of war to a domain of regulated conflicts between states depended on the desacralisation of politics inside them. Here we have observed that Westphalia marked the tentative emergence of the separation of state and church together with the first forms of religious toleration. It was only when a secularised political jurisprudence permitted social peace to displace religious truth and moral right from the political arena that Catholics and Protestants could reach a compromise on the distribution of religious rights and possessions. This substitution of worldly security for theological truth, which entailed a major curtailment of the sovereign’s rights in religious matters, was the first step towards the norm of the state’s neutrality in religious affairs. Today, the entirely substantive and contingent character of this neutrality — its emergence as a minimal norm from the necessities of religious pacification — is widely misunderstood, no less by those Kantians who identify neutrality

with formal rationality than by those communitarians who attack this rationality as a sham.

Third, this concrete and contingent political order was both reflected and universalised in the works of the next generation of political philosophers and natural jurists – particularly in their construction of sovereignty. In Pufendorf's natural law, for example, the territorial sovereign state both looks outward to other such states, to which it is bound only by the balance of powers reflected in a minimalist system of positive international law. At the same time, this state looks inward towards its subjects from whose need for security its power derives, and for whom its commands set the norms of lawful civil existence. For all its centrality to the new political order of Europe, however, post-Westphalian civil sovereignty was neither foundational nor all-embracing. It was not foundational because it depended on the respatialisation and detheologisation of the earlier Catholic-Imperial 'universe', and also on the exclusion of the colonial world from this territorial-political order. Further, sovereignty was not all-embracing because domestic peace depended on excluding religion from the rights and powers of the civil sovereign, permitting it to join the family and the economy as domains beyond the state's competence.

Perhaps this is why the Westphalian order failed to survive the nineteenth century intact. For with the collapse of their colonial empires – with the self-assertion of the USA and Japan – the European states lost the capacity to export wars of territorial conquest, allowing these to return to the European heartlands. Further, with the increasing fragility of the state's 'religious' neutrality, brought about by the rise of nationalist ideologies and politics, we see the reappearance of the confessional state in its modern forms – the ideological state, the racist state – and with this, the war of annihilation.

¹ Jacobi, FH (1782/1996), 'Something Lessing Said: A Commentary on *Journeys of the Popes*', in J Schmidt (ed), *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*. Berkeley: University of California Press: 203.

² Dickmann, F (1959), *Der Westfälische Frieden*, Münster: Aschendorff.

³ Rawls, J (1993), *Political Liberalism*, New York: Columbia University Press: xxvi-vii.

⁴ Rawls, J (1999), *The Law of Peoples*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

⁵ Held, D, A McGrew, *et al* (1999), *Global Transformations*, Cambridge: Polity Press; Strange, S (1996), *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*, New York: Cambridge University Press; Buchanan, A (2000), 'Rawls's Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World', *Ethics*, 110: 697-721.

⁶ Thiemann, RF (1996), *Religion in Public Life*, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

⁷ Taylor, C (1994), 'The Politics of Recognition', in A Gutmann (ed), *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, Princeton: Princeton University Press: 25-74.

⁸ Bader, V (1999), 'Religious Pluralism', *Political Theory* 27: 597-634.

⁹ I follow convention in citing the treaty as *IPO (Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrück)*, followed by clause and sub-clause numbers. I have used the English translation in Parry, C (ed) (1969), *The Consolidated Treaty Series*, New York: Dobbs Ferry: 198-269.

¹⁰ Oestreich, G (1982), *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, (trans D McLintock) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹¹ Zeeden, EW (1977), *Hegemonialkriege und Glaubenskämpfe (Propyläen Geschichte Europas 1556-1648)*, Frankfurt a M: Propyläen Verlag: 225-38.

- ¹² Hsia, RP-C (1989), *Social Discipline in the Reformation: Central Europe 1550-1750* London: Routledge: 4-5.
- ¹³ Schilling, H (1995), Confessional Europe, in TAJ Brady, HA Oberman and JD Tracy, (eds), *Handbook of European History 1400-1600: Latin Middle Ages, Renaissance and Reformation. Volume II: Visions, Programs and Outcomes*, Leiden: EJ Brill: 641-682; Rublack, H-C, (ed) (1992), *Die lutherische Konfessionalisierung in Deutschland*. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn.
- ¹⁴ Rublack, H-C (1995), New Patterns of Christian Life, in Brady *et al* (1995) *op cit.* 585-606.
- ¹⁵ This historical significance of popular religious violence has yet to be fully registered in the history of ideas or the history of political thought. For a rare insight into the scale and ferocity of such violence in the French case see, Crouzet, D (1990), *Les Guerriers de Dieu. La violence au temps des troubles de religion*, Seysell: Champ Vallon. I am indebted to David Saunders for clarifying the significance of Crouzet's study.
- ¹⁶ Schilling, H (1988b), 'Die Konfessionalisierung im Reich: Religiöser und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Deutschland zwischen 1555 und 1620', *Historische Zeitschrift*, 246: 1-45.
- ¹⁷ Shank, MH (1988), *'Unless you believe, you shall not understand': Logic, University and Society in Late Medieval Vienna*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- ¹⁸ Zeeden, EW (1985), *Konfessionsbildung: Studien zur Reformation, Gegenreformation und katholischen Reform*, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta: 259-85.
- ¹⁹ Reinhard, W (1983), 'Zwang zur Konfessionalisierung? Prolegomena zu einer Theorie des konfessionellen Zeitalters', *Zeitschrift für Historische Forschung*, 10: 257-77.
- ²⁰ Heckel, M (1992), 'Religionsbann und landesherrliches Kirchenregiment', in Rublack (1992) *op cit.* 130-62.
- ²¹ Heckel, M (1983), *Deutschland im konfessionellen Zeitalter*, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 67-99.
- ²² *Ibid.*: 19-66.
- ²³ Rabe, H (1976), 'Der Augsburger Religionsfriede und das Reichskammergericht 1555-1600', in H Rabe, H Molitor and H-C Rublack (eds), *Festgabe für Ernst Walter Zeeden*, Münster: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung: 260-80.
- ²⁴ Zeeden (1977) *op cit.* 241-61.
- ²⁵ Schmitt, C (1950), *Der Nomos der Erde, im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Europaeum*, Cologne: Greven: 13-36.
- ²⁶ Kriegel, B (1995), *The State and the Rule of Law*, (trans Marc LePain and Jeffrey Cohen), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- ²⁷ Schmitt (1950) *op cit.* 123-40.
- ²⁸ Dickmann (1959) *op cit.* 51-8, 182-86.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*: 157-63.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*: 324-32.
- ³¹ Heckel, M (1984), 'Das Säkularisierungsproblem in der Entwicklung des deutschen Staatskirchenrechts', in G Dilcher and I Staff, (eds), *Christentum und modernes Recht. Beiträge zum Problem der Säkularisation*, Frankfurt a M: Suhrkamp: 50-1.
- ³² Heckel, M (1963), 'Parität', *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, 80 (Kanonistische Abt. 49): 261-420.
- ³³ Heckel (1984) *op cit.* 52-3.
- ³⁴ Dickmann (1959) *op cit.* 413-17.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*: 443-4, 460-4.

**DISMANTLING THE MASTER'S HOUSE:
WAR AND PEACE IN ACEH AND EAST TIMOR –
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE LANGUAGE WE USE**

Jacqueline A Siapno

When I was asked to prepare a paper for this symposium on 'Thinking Peace, Making Peace, I almost declined. I felt I didn't have much to say – except to talk about the many obstacles to peace and justice and the various groups of people who are left out in peace processes. In order to even begin to think peace and make peace, we must first acknowledge the serious obstacles that prevent us from making peace, not only in our own personal lives, but in the social struggles in which we participate. Zorica Mrsevic, a feminist working with women survivors of war and domestic violence in the former Yugoslavia argues that 'the opposite of war is not peace – it is creativity'.¹

The title for this paper is inspired by Audre Lorde's essay, 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House'.² I cite her ideas in this essay because I find the all too generic enterprise of 'conflict-resolution' profoundly problematic. Any serious endeavour to make peace must critically address issues of justice, for there is no peace without justice. The languages we continue to use to discuss war, violence, peace, grief and survival are too narrow and constraining. Hendro Sangkoyo, an inspiring Indonesian scholar and environmental activist, who has worked with different communities of refugees, widows, and indigenous tribal groups in Indonesia, West Papua, East Timor, and Aceh argues that we have not been able to create a different conceptual space to even begin to articulate the experiences of survivors of war and conflict, the use of women's and children's bodies both as instruments of violence and as instruments of peace, and victims' internalisation of the culture of terror and brutality.³

To 'think peace' and to 'make peace' entails this re-imagination of a language and space for a new kind of politics outside the conventional paradigm; a paradigm that has become entrenched and complacent and has no tolerance for taking intellectual and political risks. It is lazy to rush around from one international 'conflict resolution' to another merely addressing the superficial symptoms of conflict and not engage the structural roots of war, inequality, and violence at many different levels and forms: at the level of the family, patriarchy, technologies of violence, colonising practices, state terror, class conflict, poverty, racism, and environmental destruction.

Audre Lorde writes:

Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society's definition of acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference; those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are black, who are older, *know that survival is not an academic skill*. It is learning how to stand alone, unpopular and sometimes reviled, and how to make common cause with those others identified as outside the structures, in order to define and seek a world in which we can all flourish. It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. *For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house*. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. And this fact is only threatening to those women who still define the master's house as their only source of support.⁴

Few analysts writing on the newly independent East Timor have actually used the term 'decolonisation' or 'dismantling', in the way that Frantz Fanon uses it in his brilliant analysis 'Concerning Violence' published during a time when many of the formerly colonised Asian and African countries were going through decolonisation. Fanon writes: 'National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonisation is always a violent phenomenon...At whatever level we study it – relationships between individuals, new names for sports clubs, the human admixture at cocktail parties, in the police, on the directing boards of national or private banks – decolonisation is quite simply the replacing of a certain 'species' of men by another 'species' of men...' He adds: 'Decolonisation which sets out to change the order of the world, is obviously, a program of complete disorder.'⁵

Obstacles to peace and justice

While various elite groups and their representatives are preoccupied with 'reconciliation' projects, the majority of people in East Timor continue to live with homelessness, landlessness, poverty, malnutrition, illness, post-traumatic stress disorders and a permanent state of emergency and of mourning.⁶ How can we even begin to talk of making peace when the murderers responsible for so many monstrous and sadistic crimes have not been prosecuted? The poorest and lowest-ranking military officials are sacrificed, while a superior officer such as General Wiranto is free, making a new career as a pop-singer recording love songs. Eurico Guterres, the leader of the militias responsible for the brutal murders of East Timorese and the three UNCHR aid workers, is free to roam the streets again after being detained temporarily. Most of these victims are poor people, who are not included in the ongoing 'reconciliation' commissions (in East Timor) or 'humanitarian pause' negotiations (in Aceh), nor have any hope of seeking justice in the courts or judiciary system. In a recent interview, Ben Anderson argues:

All those killings – in Aceh, in East Timor and lots more – have never been faced up to by the elite. Or, go back to the Petrus killings in 1983, or the most important of all, the killings in 1965/66. These involved the NU's Ansor, Megawati's Banser, the army and many others. If all this were opened up, they would be in real trouble. They would be facing their own past and that's what they don't want to do... I was recently in Chile and I met Chilean historians, all of them very anti-Pinochet. I asked them how many people were murdered in Chile and they said about 3,000, but the number of victims killed by the army in Peru is at least 30,000 but no one talks about that. Chile didn't have all that many victims but they have become very well known because they were mostly intellectuals, from the middle class. In Peru the vast majority of the victims were peasants. This goes for Indonesia too...

Whichever country we talk about, the important factor is, who the victims were.⁷

In East Timor, graffiti on walls reflect people's anger towards those who murdered people in the interests of the state, were able to get away with it, and are now sitting in 'reconciliation' and 'conflict resolution' meetings at the elite level. What is written on the walls – '*uma nee Chimpanzee Chico Lopes nian*' ('This is the house of that Chimpanzee Chico Lopes').⁸ '*Lasan Bubu Boof*' ('Chico Lopes' penis is rotting and swollen in a big way') – flies in the face of the polite, diplomatic language used by the East Timorese leaders and the UN in their manoeuvres for 'reconciliation' which seek

to include, all too soon, even the most hardline of pro-integration leaders like Chico Lopes in the negotiation tables. Perhaps the graffiti serve as a chilling reminder that decolonisation is not a smooth process of compromise, whereby one group of men is replaced by another group of men, without a fundamental change in patterns of thinking and practices of building a radically more egalitarian community. Most independence movements, once in power, tend to reproduce the kinds of mechanisms of governmentality and violence exercised by the former colonialists, including hierarchical and patriarchal practices which maintain, justify, and legitimise existing structures of domination. One piece of graffiti says: 'BRTT, FPDK, PPI Pengkhianat'. 'BRTT (*Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur*), FPDK (*Front Persatuan Demokrasi dan Keadilan*) and PPI (*Pasukan Pembela Integras*) are Traitors'. These were the groups who were at the forefront of the pro-integration campaign, some of whom have attempted to ideologically recycle themselves, eager to be forgiven and included in the 'power sharing', under the present political administration.

People left out in the peace process: creating a new space for women's thinking on peace

In our simple house, Bang Nurdin's corpse was laid out. Only a few people came to pay their respects, and even they stayed only a short while before hurrying home. Normally, when someone dies, almost all the villagers come to mourn. They pray for the deceased and for the family. Now all this had changed. Bang Nurdin's corpse was bathed and buried by the few people who dared to come. After prayers, the people recited the Al-Quran and prayed for the soul, but they left long before midnight. My sorrow grew when I heard my daughter, Hasnah, praying, 'Allah, I beg of You, may the murderers of my father quickly die.'⁹

Throughout the decade of armed conflict, women in Aceh have had to bear the most serious consequences of violence. Several villages in Aceh are called '*kampung janda*' (literally 'village of widows', but, as Hendro Sangkoyo suggests, a more appropriate term in the social context of Aceh would be 'community of widows') because most of the men have either left, fled to Malaysia, been killed, imprisoned, or disappeared.¹⁰ During the Aceh War against the Dutch, widows of male nationalist leaders, for example Tjoet Nyak Dhien, Tjoet Meutia, Pocut Bahren, and Teungku Fakinah held powerful political positions, replacing their husbands who were killed as leaders of the anti-colonial resistance movement. A prominent, influential political role was possible for widowed women. There was no stigma attached to widowhood, or for that matter to women who had been divorced several times. As Anthony Reid writes: 'Much more important until very modern times, was the pan-Southeast Asian pattern of female autonomy which meant that divorce did not markedly reduce a woman's livelihood, status, or network of kin support.'¹¹ Under the New Order and in the more recent 'era of reform', military terror and surveillance strategies have succeeded in the demonisation of widows of so-called 'GPK terrorists' by criminalising the independence movement through the practice of portraying and treating civilians charged under the Subversion Law as 'criminals' and not as 'political prisoners'.¹² By association, the wives, children and families of these so-called 'terrorists' have also been branded as troublemakers. I met and interviewed many women who told me that they did not dare pick up the dead bodies of their own husbands or brothers lying on the road, for fear that they too would be accused of being 'GPK terrorists'.

There is no doubt that the presence of foreign, non-local military troops that have sexually violated and brutalised the local female population for more than a decade has had profound consequences on the rise of political consciousness and active mobilisation among women in Aceh. Yet analysts continue to pretend that political violence in Aceh is not gendered and to casually refer to 'rape' to dismiss the totality of women's experience of state violence in Aceh. Nor is it useful to interminably reproduce the male nationalist rhetoric which shares the discourse of the protection of women. We need more subtle critical analysis of the use of rape as a weapon of war in armed conflict situations like Aceh, beyond inventories of 'rape'.¹³

Suraiya It, an Acehnese woman scholar and activist provides a thoughtfully considered analysis of the psychological effects of sexual violence:

Hundreds of women experience another kind of torture as well: sexual torture inflicted and permitted, indeed considered standard procedure by military personnel. This adds to the exercise of power, of power being sexualized because it means that the person who is tortured is being violated at a deeper level. . . a sense of terrorisation of people at the most intimate level. The sexualization of violence is a form of violence aimed at instilling instability. . . it makes women vulnerable. Women who are raped are doubly violated. . . rape is a form of domination by the military, but as a consequence the women also feel ashamed, no longer clean, they do not feel like they can just go to the street and decry what has happened to them. Because they live in a society where sexual violence against women is seen as shameful. . . Targeting women is a way of communicating that the military and its collaborators are everywhere. . . it is a form of building a very deep kind of fear. . .¹⁴

The extent of the Indonesian military's killings, murders, mass executions, rape, and torture of villagers in different parts of Aceh is just beginning to become known with the recent formation of a human rights commission. In the exasperating and often humiliating negotiations with the Indonesian government and the military to seek justice or to find the whereabouts of members of their families, it is usually women (mothers, wives, sisters, children) who have taken the initiative to demand justice and accountability for crimes perpetrated by the military.¹⁵ It is also the women who have had to manage, with great difficulty, to financially support the orphaned children after the deaths, imprisonment, or disappearances of their husbands. They have borne the burden of longterm responsibilities as single parent heads-of-family, caring for their own children and other orphans, as a consequence of the armed conflict.

One woman I interviewed told me that she had changed the names of all her children and distributed them to different relatives in several parts of Aceh in order to avoid further harassment by the military who had branded her entire family as 'GPK' after the arrest of her husband. Women often talked about having been responsible for retrieving the dead bodies of their husbands and brothers from the road, the morgue, or prison after the military had discarded the bodies, and preparing the dead for proper burial. In April 1996, I met several women who had travelled quite a long distance by bus from their villages to meet at a hospital morgue in Medan to retrieve the bodies of their male family (six men), accused of 'subversion' against the state and burnt alive in a prison cell (Tanjung Gusta Prison, Medan). They waited with quiet dignity to take the bodies home. Yet despite the fact that political violence and armed conflict in Aceh has had the most profound impact on women's lives, theories and studies on political

violence (eg Fanon 1963; Feldman 1991; Giddens 1985; Taussig 1984)¹⁶ have not incorporated gender as a structural but only as a marginal, sometimes completely non-existent issue.

In her analysis of women and political violence in Northern Ireland, a comparative framework which I find useful for analysing the consequences of ongoing violence in Aceh, Begona Aretxaga argues that the traditional figure of the militant has merely served to perpetually reproduce a historical discourse of male heroism:

If jail for the interned men was a school of militant nationalism, then for women internees it entailed a reflection on the politics of gender. They were militants and as such had – like men – risked their lives, been arrested, and were organised in the same military structure; but, when it came to decision-making, their organisation slipped into a hierarchical system of gender difference within which they were not peers, but, simply, women. . . The imputation of a feminine identity is performed by the exclusion of women from the realm of political decision that constitutes the community of militants. . . As militants, men and women are purported to be the same, yet, they are not. In the arena of cultural representation and practices, militant is already marked by sexual difference.¹⁷

At one point from 1998-1999 there were up to 200,000 refugees in Aceh. While women refugees talk about ending the violence so that their children can go home and go back to school, male leaders seem to unwittingly perpetuate it (for example, by portraying teenage boys and veiled girls armed with AK-47s, thus romanticising militarism), to promote Aceh Merdeka's successful recruitment among the youth.¹⁸ Where women demand more political participation and a voice in Syariat Islam (as in the Women's Congress in February 2000), men accuse them of 'divisiveness', collaboration and co-option by the Indonesian state. Where women adopt strategies of disguising their children's identities and their own, and use seduction and femininity to negotiate with military officials to visit prisons, men often talk about using direct, confrontational tactics and fighting 'to the last drop of blood'. While women I interviewed expressed nationalist sentiments as strongly as men, they rarely ever spoke of the struggle for independence in blood-letting absolutist terms. Where the militant male nationalists talk about the desirability of complete independence and their absolute lack of willingness to accept anything else (a zero-sum game), women's groups, student organisations, and ordinary villagers are now expressing ideas about a referendum open to the possibility of not only independence, but autonomy and federalism. Where women talk about the possibility of a political settlement to end the cycle of violence, they are accused of being 'secular' and divisive.

The Indonesian military's brutal annihilation of 'pure opposition' necessitates the use of '*muslihah*'-type strategies, or what Judith Butler calls 'performative subversions':

Performativity describes this relation of being implicated in that which one opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not a 'pure' opposition, a 'transcendence' of contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure.¹⁹

My own interest in Butler's theoretical analysis of 'pure' and 'impure' opposition has to do with the fact that any careful feminist analysis of gendered opposition would have to consider multiple configurations of power which are intertwined with each other at different levels. Thus, the lines between power and resistance are not at all clear and

we may have to seriously examine, not dismiss, co-optation and contamination, forms of political contestation that are not a 'pure' opposition, a 'transcendence. . .but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure'. Butler continues:

How will we know the difference between the power we promote and the power we oppose? Is it, one might rejoin, a matter of 'knowing'? For one is, as it were, in power even as one opposes it, formed by it as one reworks it, and it is this simultaneity that is at once the condition of our partiality, the measure of our political unknowingness, and also the condition of action itself. The incalculable effects of action are as much a part of their subversive promise as those that we plan in advance.²⁰

Merayu. Conventional analysis of the opposition of Acehese women against the Indonesian military tends to portray the relationship in terms of unchanging, static poles of dominance and subjection, rather than an active process that can be modified and renegotiated. Human rights workers, in particular, are much more comfortable with the composite figure of the victimised, abused, suffering, stoic, and faithful widow, rather than the woman who deploys cunning forms of political agency.²¹ In 1996, I met two Acehese women in Lhokseumawe who wanted to negotiate with KOREM for the release of their brother and husband. During that particular meeting they 'performed' their 'femininity' to advantage by putting on lots of make-up, including carefully applied lipstick and dressing in a stylish, seductive manner. One of the women's younger brothers was arbitrarily arrested without a warrant while playing basketball at their village. The other woman's husband was arbitrarily arrested at home, also without a warrant. Both men have been held in prison without trial for seven months, accused of illegal smuggling of marijuana (*ganja*) and using funds from the sale of that marijuana to support Aceh Merdeka. One of the women said that a military officer had come to her house, asking for Rp 7 Million (US\$3,500) if she wanted her brother released. Most of the farmers in her village, including her family, earned Rp 1 Million per year, so he was basically asking for their earnings for seven years.

The two women were introduced to each other by the human rights organisation, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum-Medan, with whom they had filed their grievances asking for legal aid. They decided to meet over the weekend before the appointed meeting with KOREM to work together on a strategy of how to get their brother and husband released. Several hours before the meeting with the military, I had the opportunity to spend some time with them. When I asked them what they planned to do, they replied:

One of the most important tactics you have to learn while you are here is how to *merayu*. If you need to negotiate with men in a government bureaucracy, make sure to put on a lot of make-up and look very attractive. These military men seem to forget their duties and loosen-up when they see an attractive woman. For example, when my brother was detained, several members of my family begged the guards to see him. None of them were given permission. When I went in, with all my make-up and so on, they let me in to give him food and new clothes.

At that time it seemed that the 'feminine wiles' tactic may be even more dangerous than looking plain and simple, especially considering the high incidence of sexual violence and rape of civilians by the military and police in Aceh. It seemed paradoxical to use one's femininity as an asset in negotiating with the military, when it is precisely this femininity which jeopardises one's safety and bodily integrity in a place with a high rate

of sexual violence and abuse. After living in Aceh for several months and interviewing several women who considered it a useful strategy (ie, cultivating, performing femininity), I began to notice that in some cases it worked. Male persons of authority seemed to be much more willing to give favours to women who can perform and cultivate the deferential traditional models of good behaviour – as good mothers, good wives, good daughters and sisters. Outspoken, insubordinate, rebellious women on the other hand are much more likely to be punished severely. Melanie Budianta, an inspiring Indonesian feminist and political activist, has spoken eloquently about the subtle and strategic semantic use of the term ‘mother’ in ‘*Suara Ibu Peduli*’ (Voices of Concerned Mothers) in contrast to ‘women’ ‘*Suara Perempuan Peduli*’ (Voices of Concerned Women) in the larger context of women’s activism in Indonesia.²²

Grief and mourning

Feminist theorists like Aretxaga argue for more nuanced awareness of the ‘embodiment of emotion in social action’ in understanding female political subjectivity in situations of armed conflict. In ‘The Gendered Politics of Suffering’, she argues that emotions including silence, anger, empathy, disgust, waiting, anxiety, grief, and mourning, even if suppressed, ‘does not imply that the emotions disappear; they remain there, more or less inchoate.’ Thus the double meaning of the title of her book ‘shattering silence’, women breaking the silence and women’s silence that is shattering.²³

For example in July 1999 in East Timor, just before the historic August 30 referendum to vote for integration or independence, I met the mother of a young man named Gaspar, 23 years old, who drowned in Atauro during the student mobilisation campaign for Independence. She was a single mother who had raised several children alone, in a farming village in Baucau. While most of the male nationalists who spoke at the funeral articulated the rhetoric of martyrdom, the young man’s mother expressed her grief in contraposed subjectivities. She said to us in Tetum:

Hanesan inan nebe hahoris, fo susu no hakiak nia to boot triste ho tanis, maibe hanesan inan Timor ida, hau hatene tanba saida maka nia mate. Nia mate hanesan ema Timor oan ida maka hakarak fo buat ruma ba nia rai. Hau la triste.

As the mother who gave birth to him, breastfed him, and raised him, I am extremely sad and filled with grief. But as a Timorese mother, I understand why he died. He died as a son of Timor who wants to contribute something to the struggle of his homeland. I am not sad.

When we left, this woman’s words continued to stay with me and with my companions, some of them nationalist male leaders in the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistencia Timorese). They commented on how moved they were at the selflessness of this mother and of her deep love, understanding, and commitment to the common project of nationalist struggle. It was easier for them to identify with the latter part of her statement – the stoic, steadfast mother who is not sad about losing her son, because he is not only her son but the son of Timor who wants to contribute something to the struggle of his homeland. It was an acceptable way of justifying the deaths of so many young people, in the face of what sometimes seems like meaningless death and violence. In a society with a high rate of widowhood and loss of sons it seemed the most appropriate. Yet what stayed with me was this woman’s bifurcated expression of self: the intimate self, the one who gave birth to, breastfed, and raised her son, had to be suppressed in order for her to make some meaning out of her grief and loss.

In a perceptive article in *The Jakarta Post*, Mochtar Buchori looks at the effects of mass violence on the psyche of individuals and the nation. He writes: 'Media reports of mass violence typically mentioned only that people were terrified and did whatever they could to save their lives. Usually no further accounts are given concerning the fear, the anguish, and the frustrations, or anger that beset their minds.'²⁴ Richard Mollica, a professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, in his study of the social effects of mass violence calls these 'invisible wounds' – the 'shattered minds' that are 'difficult to detect and to count' and that will take more than just humanitarian aid, and possibly one generation or longer, to heal.²⁵

In East Timor, there are graffiti on walls demanding justice which may never happen in their lifetime. Some of them are short violent phrases, others long explicatory letters with personal signatures, perhaps written by people who felt they would die and wanted to leave a few words behind. They might be read as inscriptions against a history of loss, the kind of loss which Xanana himself once described as not only losing everything, but losing oneself, one's sanity. 'Our guerrillas who continue to fight in the mountains forgot (lost) everything. We lost even ourselves, lost everything. . . in order to regain this country for our people.' (*Os meus guerrilheiros, que continuam a resistir nas matas de Timor-Leste, esqueceram tudo, esqueceram-se de si mesmos, perderam tudo. . . para poder ganhar uma Patria para o seu Povo.*)²⁶

Other graffiti are fervent prayers written on the walls of prison cells in Comarca Prison, Balide: '*Nai Maromak Sei Tulun Ita.*' ('God Will Help Us.') and '*Hai Tuhan, Lindungilah Aku Dalam Penderitaan Ini.*' ('God, may you protect and care for me throughout this suffering').

The most peaceful of human beings murdered as 'criminals'

In 1896, Jose Rizal, poet, medical doctor, historian, revolutionary, was executed by a firing squad by the Spanish colonial government in the Philippines for subversive, criminal activities against Spain. He was thirty-six years old. In his novels he mercilessly satirised those 'social parasites: the pests or dregs which God in His infinite goodness created and *tan cariñosamente* breeds in Manila', who sustained colonial rule in the Philippines.²⁷ His ideas were way ahead of his time. It was some years before people would begin to understand and learn from the importance of his seditious social commentaries.

In our own time, on 7 September, 2000, the bodies of five people were found in a deep ravine in North Sumatra, one of them identified as the body of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a prominent human rights lawyer who was held in such high esteem by Acehnese people for his work defending poor peasants against government abuses and brutality in Aceh and North Sumatra. He was one of my closest friends and when I first heard of the news of his brutal murder, my world fell apart. I remember thinking that perhaps I needed to leave this world for several years because I no longer understand why human beings could do these things to each other. He had been stabbed several times, his face smashed and poured with acid so that it would be completely unrecognisable, and then his body dumped in a deep ravine where his murderers hoped he would never be found.²⁸ It is sadly ironic, that he who fought so hard in his life to make peace and who was described as 'truly one of the gentlest of human beings', was killed in the most monstrous, sadistic manner. There has been no serious investigation of his murder, despite strong pressure from the international community on the Indonesian military for accountability on disappearances, murders, and massacres in Aceh.

When I think of 'peace', I think of the inspiring people in this world who, in spite of the experience of torture and disfigurement of their bodies, and the loss of people they love most in this world, are able to talk about life and survival in a way that exudes a feeling of peace and peacefulness around them. In a Malay/Indonesian proverb, we say – '*seperti pohon rindang*' – 'like a *rindang tree*' – *rindang* meaning 'leafy, lush, shady and luxuriant', but it is also the name of a tree. A person who is *like a rindang tree* gives other people a sense of peace and peacefulness – one feels one can rest and find comfort under their shade.

Such a person is an extraordinary young East Timorese man named Angelo whose left eye has been sadistically plucked out by the Indonesian military. There he was – with his fake eye, replaced through surgery in Sydney (he was a key witness to the murder of the 31-year-old Dutch journalist who was killed in September 1999), and he was not embittered, but full of hope to help rebuild East Timor. He said that at night it is incredibly painful – the pain digs all the way behind his ears. He had also been stabbed by the Indonesian military in the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991, and tortured severely again in the April 1999 Liquica incident. Yet despite all these horrendous things that have broken his life and his body, he was able to free himself from becoming paralysed by a sense of vengeance and hatred. One would have thought that after his experiences he would be one of the most vengeful people in this world, internalising the culture of abuse he'd lived through. On the contrary. I think it would be fair to say that his quiet wisdom, his commitment and earnestness in helping build his newly independent country is representative of many East Timorese people who have had to live under such brutal and dehumanising conditions, and yet are able not only to survive but somehow manage to move on. I have been so immensely fortunate in my own life to have known, lived with, and learnt from people like these, including my partner, Fernando de Araujo, who spent six and half years in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, falsely accused of 'subversion against the state'. To me, he is one of the most inspiring peace-makers in this world, often talking to different groups of people in East Timor about building not from hatred, revenge, and intellectual arrogance, but from love, humility and generosity of spirit, as the basis of a truly independent country.

While current building projects are mostly about physical reconstruction of infrastructure, little has been said about what Fanon, one of the most astute thinkers about the decolonisation process, writes about in his classic 'Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders' – the re-building and putting back together of broken, disfigured, deformed, and turbulent lives, the forcible breaking-up of homes and separation of families. The violent interruption of young children's schooling and dreams of becoming something – instead forced to live in the mountains, homeless and dispossessed for most of their lives. The entire country, in East Timor and in Aceh, was turned into a prison.

In 'thinking peace, making peace', I wish to end by sharing this poem:

And here I am
a lonely woman
at the threshold of a cold season
coming to understand the earth's contamination
and the elemental, sad despair of the sky
and the impotence of these concrete hands.

(Forugh Farrokhzad 1935-1967)²⁹

- ¹ Mrsevic, Zorica (2000), 'The Opposite of War is Not Peace – It is Creativity,' in M Waller and J Rycenga (eds), *Frontline Feminisms: Women, War, and Resistance*. New York and London: Garland Publishing.
- ² Lorde, Audre (1981), 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House,' in C Moraga and G Anzaldúa (eds), *This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color*. Watertown, Mass: Persephone Press.
- ³ I wish to thank Hendro Sangkoyo from whom I have learnt a lot, for his critical insights in terms of expanding the languages we use to articulate experiences of war, the situation of refugees, survival, and peace in Indonesia, Aceh, and East Timor outside conventional paradigms.
- ⁴ Lorde *op cit* 99.
- ⁵ Fanon, Frantz (1963), *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press. (Trans. Constance Farrington): 27.
- ⁶ For a critical analysis of the possibility of Xanana Gusmao turning into another despotic ruler, see for example Kingsbury, Damien (2000), 'The New Timor: A Xanana Republic?,' in *The Jakarta Post*, 16 December.
- ⁷ Interview with Benedict Anderson on the Trial of Soeharto, Radio Nederland, 30 August 2000.
- ⁸ Francisco Lopes da Cruz, or Chico Lopes, was the former President of UDT (União Democrática de Timor); a former Lieutenant in the Portuguese Army who served in Angola; Special Ambassador 'Dubes Keliling' for Indonesia on East Timor Affairs; the Head of BRTT (Barisan Rakyat Timor Timur), an Indonesian government funded group that was at the forefront of propaganda and campaign for pro-integration policies.
- ⁹ 'A Widow's Notes,' ('*Catatan Seorang Janda*') as told to Syarifah Mariati, translated by Sylvia Tiwon, in *Inside Indonesia*, 62, April-June 2000. For the Indonesian language version, see (1999) *Nyala Panyot Tak Terpadamkan*, published by Flower Aceh.
- ¹⁰ For readings on communities of widows in Aceh, see for example, It, Suraiya (1998), 'The Wake Up Call for Acehnese Women,' Paper presented to conference on 'Years of Living Dangerously: The Struggle for Justice in Aceh Beyond Suharto,' New York University, 12 December; see also Siapno, Jacqueline (1997), 'The Politics of Gender, Islam, and the Nation-State in Aceh: A Historical Analysis of Power, Co-optation, and Resistance,' PhD Dissertation, University of California-Berkeley, published by University Microfilms International.
- ¹¹ Reid, Anthony (1988), 'Female Roles in Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia', *Modern Asian Studies* 22, 3: 631.
- ¹² On the criminalisation of political prisoners, the case of Northern Ireland provides an important comparative case study. See for example, Campbell, B, L McKeown and F O'Hagan (1994), *Nor Meekly Serve My Time: The H Block Struggle 1976-1981*. Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications.
- ¹³ See for example '600 Raped in Aceh over past Seven Years,' in *The Straits Times*, 29 July 1998; Saad, Hasballah (1998), '*Pelanggaran Hak Azasi Manusia di Aceh*', Paper presented to Seminar on Democratization in Indonesia and East Timor, Universitas Paramadina Mulya, Jakarta; see also Al-Chaidar, S, M Ahmad, and Y Dinamika (eds) (1998), *Aceh Bersimbah Darah: Mengungkap Penerapan Status Daerah Operasi Militer di Aceh 1989-1998*, Jakarta: Pustaka Al-Kautsar; Report of the Special Rapporteur, Radhika Coomaraswamy (1999), on Violence Against Women in Indonesia and East Timor to the 55th Session on the Commission on Human Rights, Geneva 22 March-30 April; see also the reports produced by student organisations, women's rights and human rights' groups in Aceh such as SIRA, Flower Aceh, Kontras Aceh, Forum LSM Aceh, Kelompok Kerja Transformatif Gender, Cordova, Forum Perempuan Aceh, International Forum for Aceh, the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh, TAPOL, and others which can be accessed through the internet: acehforum@aol.com and forumlsm@egroups.com.
- ¹⁴ It (1998) *op cit* 5.

- ¹⁵ See for example, 'The Demands of the Aceh Widows', originally published (1998) in *Forum Keadilan*, 26 June, and translated into English by TAPOL, Indonesia Human Rights Campaign.
- ¹⁶ See for example, Feldman, Allen (1991), *Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland*. University of Chicago Press; Giddens, Anthony (1985), *The Nation-State and Violence. Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; Taussig, Michael (1984), 'Culture of Terror, Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putumayo Report and the Explanation of Torture,' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 26: 467-97.
- ¹⁷ Aretxaga, Begona (1997), *Shattering Silence: Women, Nationalism, and Political Subjectivity in Northern Ireland*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 76.
- ¹⁸ See for example Reuters photographs (1999) in *The Canberra Times*, 'US urges dialogue not martial law in Aceh,' 22 November: 7; and (1999), *Sydney Morning Herald*, 'Aceh's rumblings send jitters through region,' 24 November: 12.
- ¹⁹ Butler, Judith (1993), *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'*, New York and London: Routledge: 241.
- ²⁰ Butler *ibid.*
- ²¹ For other innovative interpretations of women's subjectivity during war beyond the victimised and repressed roles, see for example Lake, Marilyn (1996), 'Female Desires: The Meaning of World War II,' in *Feminism and History*, edited by Joan Scott. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 429-447; for a fascinating article on refugees beyond their composite representation as victims, see for example Grewal, Inderpal (1999), 'The Sexual Lives of Refugees,' unpublished manuscript, presented to seminar on 'Gender and Citizenship in Muslim Communities', Humanities Research Institute, Irvine.
- ²² Budianta, Melanie (2000), 'Gender and Sexualities Panel', Presentation for Conference on 'Old Selves/New Selves: The Politics of Identity in Contemporary Indonesia,' University of Tasmania, Launceston, 8-9 Dec.
- ²³ Aretxaga (1997) *op cit.*: 135. For a moving account of women's mourning, see also Damousi, Joy (1999), *The Labour of Loss: Mourning, Memory and Wartime Bereavement in Australia*, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- ²⁴ Buchori, Mochtar (2000), *The Jakarta Post* Editorial and Opinion: 20 June.
- ²⁵ Mollica, Richard, quoted in Buchori (2000) *ibid.*
- ²⁶ Personal Correspondence with Xanana Gusmao, from Cipinang Prison, 20 Nov. 1993.
- ²⁷ Cited from Anderson, Benedict (1998), 'The First Filipino,' in *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World*. London and New York: Verso.
- ²⁸ For more information on this case, see for example (2000), 'Remembering Jafar Siddiq Hamzah' and 'Violence in an Era of Reform', obituaries and speeches presented during a memorial to honour his life at the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research, New School University, New York, 23 October, by Geoffrey Robinson, James Siegel, Robert Kostrzewa, Munir, and others.
- ²⁹ Farrokhzad, Forugh. Poem 'We Must Believe in the Dawning of a Cold Season,' in Farzaneh Milani (1991), *Veils and Words: The Emerging Voices of Iranian Women Writers*. Syracuse University Press: 152.

**REMEMBERING WAR, MAKING PEACE:
HISTORY, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST ASIA**

Tessa Morris-Suzuki

Voices from the past

She is a small and rapidly ageing woman. Her face is lined and her hands have swollen joints. Her words are not polished or eloquent. They are rough, disjointed words: sometimes difficult to catch or hard to understand. She speaks about abduction, physical violence, rape, discrimination, lost years. She unfolds the ragged story of her life before the gaze of the public in a court of law, and at the end of the day the judge dismisses her case, ruling that she has no claim against the state, and that the courts have no power to grant her compensation.

Her name is Son Shindo, and she was taken by the Japanese army from her village in Korea to work in a military brothel in China during the last years of the Pacific War. After the war, the departing troops left her behind to fend for herself, and she stayed in China for seven years before eventually, with the help of a Japanese ex-soldier, coming to Japan, where she now lives, and where she brought her unsuccessful case against the Japanese government in the 1990s.

Son Shindo's is one of the voices that speak from the past into the present. That is to say, she speaks of past injustice, but also of the way in which the consequences of injustice are still with us, still inflicting pain on the lives of the living. Such voices are to be heard in many places around the world today. In Son Shindo's words you can hear echoes, not just of the many voices of the so-called 'military comfort women', but also of other people in other countries. Seeing her, for example, I can't help being reminded of Lorna Cubillo and other members of 'Stolen Generation', unfolding their lives before the gaze of Australian courts and media.

The words that are spoken, and the voices which speak them, bear testimony to the present consequences of past injustice. They are broken words, whispered words, words full of inadequacies and silences and failures of communication. Historians, lawyers and judges like orderly accounts. We look for clarity: documents, records, unequivocal evidence. But the irony is that the greater the past injustices, the less likely they are to produce incontrovertible documents and coherent narratives. What they leave instead are fragmented stories, half-communicable memories, ambiguous sentences in official reports, smudged thumb-prints on paper.

The Japanese scholar Oka Mari, writing about the testimony of the 'comfort women', elaborates on this irony.¹ Although the fractured nature of the testimony of injustice is at odds with the demands of historians and lawyers for clarity, it is often precisely this broken quality which expresses the truth of the testimony. If people who have suffered terrible experiences speak too fluently and confidently about those experiences, their listeners feel alienated and doubt them. Their testimony sounds rehearsed and unnatural. How can they speak so unhesitatingly about such unspeakable things? So it is precisely broken speech, silences, whispered and incomplete sentences that convey to the listener something of the surviving pain of past injustice in the present.

How do we respond to these voices which speak from the past into the present? Philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya, a prolific writer on the problems of Japan's war responsibility, emphasises the connection between the noun 'responsibility' and the

verb 'to respond'.² We take responsibility for history by responding to the voices that speak about past injustice and demand redress in the present. But I think that we can extend that notion by saying that historical responsibility is not only about the past but also about the future – it operates, as it were, at the fulcrum of past and future. In this sense, historical responsibility responds not only to voices from the past but also to voices from the future – imagined but none the less powerful voices, which ask: why did you not address these problems while you had the chance? Why did you not make restitution while the immediate victims of injustice were still alive? Why did you allow problems to go unresolved? Why did you let resentments congeal into nuggets of grievance which are then passed on from generation to generation like a poisoned heirloom? Why did you not make peace?

Asymmetrical memories

These questions have a very immediate relevance in East Asia in the year 2000. A remarkable thing is happening in East Asia today. The Cold War is coming to an end. Many people perhaps think that the Cold War ended a decade or more ago, but its end has been a slow and piecemeal process, and in East Asia it is still happening as we speak. As in Europe, the end of the Cold War in East Asia is bringing about a complicated and unpredictable re-alignment of international relations and of domestic politics. Its most obvious symptom is the evolving process of Korean re-unification, but this in itself is just part of a wider movement of the tectonic plates of East Asian geopolitics. The Kim Dae-Jung regime in South Korea, for example, has brought with it, not just the thawing of tensions with North Korea but also a dramatic change in the relationship between South Korea and Japan, particularly at the level of popular culture. Japanese popular media, whose consumption was long banned in South Korea, are now readily available. At the same time, many ordinary Japanese people are starting to acquire a greater interest in and knowledge of the country long described as Japan's 'near but distant neighbour'.

Taiwanese President Chen Shui-Bian, meanwhile, has expressed a desire to follow the Kim Dae-Jung approach in pursuing reconciliation with China, though the prospects for this vision remain uncertain. At the same time, Japan is engaged in negotiations with Russia in the hope of concluding the peace treaty which the two countries failed to sign after the Pacific War. These shifts in turn create reverberations that move right across national societies. If, for example, Korea is reunited, what will become of the US military bases on South Korean soil, and what effect will shifts in the Korean peninsula have on the massive and controversial presence of US bases on the Japanese island of Okinawa?

The experience of the end of the Cold War in Europe is a reminder of the complexities of the process of peace making. When one ideological conflict comes to an end, peace does not break out spontaneously. The reunification of divided countries is a difficult and sometimes painful process. Besides, when one level of international antagonisms disappears, other more ancient levels which lay buried beneath may come to the surface, as they did (for example) in the former Yugoslavia. It is as though stripping off the layer of Cold War political ideologies allows an outpouring of resurgent, and conflicting, ethnic or national collective memories. In this return of repressed memories, all sorts of past injustices and conflicts, which seemed to have been forgotten, may once more come to the fore and become the focus of present resentments. As in Europe, so too in East Asia, the nature of the post-Cold War future

will depend crucially on the way in which the problems of conflicting histories and collective memories are addressed.

In all countries, the teaching of history has been, first and foremost, part of the nation-building process. So the study of the national past generally lies at the core of the history curriculum, and the past of foreign countries, when it is studied, tends to be presented from a national perspective, as a means of understanding how 'our nation' fits into the wider order of things. This means that national history curricula, as well as the presentations of history in national museums and monuments, often convey to the citizens of neighbouring countries radically different memories of the same historical events.

Consider just one example. If you visit historical sites on the Korean peninsula today, you are very likely to encounter a sign which reads roughly as follows: this building was constructed in the year xxx, destroyed by the Japanese in 1592, rebuilt in the year xxx, torn down by the Japanese in 1915 [or thereabouts], rebuilt in the late 1940s, and then [in most cases] destroyed again in the Korean War and rebuilt sometime in the late 1950s or 1960s. If you visit most historical monuments or history museums in Japan, what you will find written about Korea is generally... nothing, or at least very little. There are, of course, notable exceptions. Exhibitions of early Japanese history now tend to pay increasing attention to the wealth of connections with, and influences from, the Korean peninsula. There are also a few 'alternative' presentations of the past, like those displayed in the Human Rights Museum in Osaka, which devotes a large section of its exhibition space to the story of Japan's colonisation of Korea and to the history of the Korean minority in Japan, and includes discussion of the fate of the military 'comfort women'. Generally, though, postwar narratives of Japanese national history have, at least until very recently, done little to convey much sense of the centuries of intense connection between Japan and the Asian continent.

These asymmetries of collective memory have real consequences for relations between nations and communities. Most wars, after all, are fought at least in part over differing interpretations of history. In the current cautious moves towards the normalising of political relations between Japan and North Korea, for example, the North Korean side insists that normalisation depends on a proper Japanese apology for the sufferings inflicted on the Korean population by decades of Japanese colonial exploitation during the first half of the twentieth century. For Japan, on the other hand, a major sticking point is a series of mysterious disappearances of several (perhaps as many as ten) Japanese citizens who are believed to have been abducted by North Korea in the 1960s and 1970s.

This conflict vividly illustrates the problem of the asymmetries of 'collective memory'. To many Japanese people, particularly those born after the Pacific War, the colonisation of Korea seems like remote history, and North Korea's demands for apologies are therefore interpreted as political grandstanding. But this perspective ignores the vivid sense of the colonial past that lives on in Korea, and particularly in the North, through public media, education, monuments, anniversaries and stories passed down from parents to children. Conversely, the 'abduction incidents', as they are called, are repeatedly analysed and examined in the Japanese media, and have thus become an important part of understandings of the recent past for many Japanese people. But from the perspective of North Korean commentators, the unsolved mysterious disappearances of a few Japanese citizens several decades ago bear no

comparison at all to the tens of thousands of people who were conscripted into forced labour, arrested or killed during the years of Japanese colonisation. It is against the background of such problems of communication and mutual misunderstanding that questions of responsibility for the past and of 'historical reconciliation' have acquired particular salience in recent political rhetoric in East Asia.

Who is responsible?

At the end of Alain Renais' harrowing documentary on the Holocaust, *Night and Fog*, the narrator poses a stark question to the film's audience. Against a series of brief shots from the Nuremberg trials, we hear the words of Jean Cayrol's narrative recited like a litany: 'I am not responsible', says the Kapo. 'I am not responsible' says the officer. 'I am not responsible'. . . Then who is responsible? In Japan today the question 'who is responsible' for past colonialism, expansionism and injustice is the subject of intense public controversy.

One frequently expressed view holds that there is no such thing as historical responsibility: in other words, individuals can only be held responsible for events in which they personally participated. This view, for example, was succinctly expressed by conservative politician Takaichi Sanae on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War: 'I was not a participant in the War, and therefore I don't need to examine my conscience about it'.³ This view of the past, of course, is also familiar in Australia. It is, for example, precisely echoed in Minister for Immigration and Reconciliation Philip Ruddock's widely reported interview with *Le Monde*, where he says of the sufferings of the stolen generation, 'we refuse to be held responsible: we were not the ones who took the decisions.'⁴

These statements draw attention to the multiple meanings of 'responsibility'. In a strict judicial sense it is true, of course, that people can only be held responsible for events that they have helped to cause (though the case is somewhat different for institutions like governments, whose legal life outlasts that of their individual members). But if we understand 'historical responsibility' as 'answerability' towards the future as well as towards the past, the issue becomes more complex. In relation to the past, even those who are not responsible *for* causing events are surely implicated as 'accessories after the fact' as long as they ignore the voices of those who seek redress for the continuing physical and mental effects of past injustice, or participate in the erasure of the memory of uncomfortable parts of history. Accepting and addressing this 'implication' in the events of the past, then, becomes the way in which we accept historical responsibility *towards* the future: the responsibility to create both a social order and an understanding of the past which may lay the foundations for peace.

The responsibility of those in the present thus becomes a responsibility to try to understand the nature and causes of past wrongs, to redress the balance of justice by compensating for the consequences of those wrongs, but also to find ways of transcending the ruptures and asymmetries that divide national or communal narratives of the past. In this sense, addressing the burden of history has judicial and political dimensions, but also epistemological dimensions. It involves apportioning judicial responsibility and making restitution, but also remaking the stories we tell about the past in ways that will create peace rather than conflict. In the postwar European context, these two approaches to overcoming the legacy of conflict and injustice were reflected in two different forms of postwar quest for 'historical truth'. One was the quest for truth through judicial forums, such as the Nuremberg trials and the war crimes trials

later conducted in the German Federal Republic. The other approach was a quest for truth through the rethinking of history. In 1950, for example, UNESCO sponsored a major international conference which brought together history educators from various parts of the world. The aim was to find ways to overcome the nationalistic forms of history teaching that were believed to have encouraged mid-century chauvinism and international hostilities. As well as suggesting guidelines for future history education, the conference led to the signing of specific agreements among various member countries to promote mutual historical understanding.⁵

As the Cold War deepened, the universalist approach to the teaching of history lost some of its momentum, but with the evolution of the European Economic Community and later the European Union, ideas of building international historical understanding re-emerged within a European framework. From 1984 onward, for example, a joint project headed by Frederic Delouche has worked towards the creation of common European history textbooks, the first of which (co-authored by historians from France, Germany, Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Czechoslovakia) was published in French in 1991 and in English two years later.⁶

In East Asia, though, the course of events was very different. The judicial effort to reveal and punish war crimes was pursued through the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (the 'Tokyo Trials'), and through war crimes trials held in some of the territories which Japan had occupied. Unlike the German case, however, this was not followed by the prosecution of war criminals by the Japanese courts themselves. Besides, judicial tribunals which judge war crimes or crimes against humanity often work within complex political constraints, and this was clearly true of the Tokyo Trials. Here the most obvious constraint was a US strategy which deemed that the maintenance of the symbolic role of the Emperor was essential to Japanese political stability, and thus that the Emperor's responsibility for the conduct of the war was not to be a subject for adjudication.⁷

But the scope of the Tokyo Trials was constrained in social as well as political ways. A complex nexus of patriarchy and of inter-ethnic power relations ensured that the only cases of military sexual abuse to be raised at the postwar trials were those concerning European women internees and prisoners of wars. The stories of Korean, Chinese and other 'comfort women' therefore continued to be suppressed, in their own societies as well as internationally, for another forty years.

The emerging postwar order also left little scope for the forms of cross-border rethinking of history that emerged in Western Europe. The 1950s UNESCO debates on universalist history teaching, indeed, were heavily focused on the European experience, while more recent efforts to create a single 'European history' have also been criticised by some for replicating, at the level of historical narratives, a worrying tendency towards the creation of a 'fortress Europe'. In East Asia, Cold War chasms cut across human lives far more deeply even than they did in Europe. East Asia came to be fragmented between the Soviet Union, China, an increasingly isolationist North Korea, and a US-dominated bloc consisting of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Even within this bloc, political and cultural collaboration was restricted by the memories of colonialism and the gulfs between radically different political regimes. While political and cultural life in South Korea and Taiwan came to be dominated by two distinctive versions of developmental nationalism, Japanese intellectual life was characterised by a kind of isolation from Asia: an isolation which often encouraged the erasure of

memories of past intense interactions with other Asian societies. In this context, the idea of a common East Asian history to mirror Delouche's common Western European history seemed unthinkable.

But with the reshaping of the Asian political map, the map of historical memories is also starting to be redrawn. One interesting though controversial effort to address and overcome the burden of the history will take place in Tokyo in December 2000, with the opening of the International Tribunal on Military Crimes Against Women. This is an unofficial initiative, organised by a group of NGOs coordinated by the Violence Against Women in War Network (VAWW-NET Japan), which seeks to investigate the issue of Japanese military sexual slavery as a means of 'ensuring a 21st century free of violence against women'. The Tribunal's finding will have no legal force, but its members will include prominent lawyers from around the world (among them Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, former President of the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal) The Tokyo hearings follow preparatory meetings held in Manila and Taipei, and the hope of the organisers is that the tribunal will uncover and publicise neglected truths, not just about the so-called 'comfort women' but also about violence against women inflicted by other military forces, including US forces stationed in East Asia. The unofficial status of the Tribunal may deprive it of any real power, but its organisers argue that this will also give it a moral force, because it will be free of any obvious governmental or strategic pressures.

While the VAWW-NET Tribunal pursues a quasi-judicial approach to revealing historical truth and redressing the burdens of the past, other groups are pursuing an educational approach. Several recently established joint research projects link Japanese and Korean historians in an effort to develop shared visions of the past.⁸ One of the first of these groups was started in the late 1980s by scholars from Seoul National University as part of the their university's 80th anniversary celebrations. This group brings together Japanese and Korean scholars to examine history texts and teaching in both countries, with the ultimate aim of producing a common history curriculum. For the past four years, another group of prominent researchers from both countries has also been meeting regularly at Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo to study controversial aspects of shared history, from ancient cultural connections between the Asian mainland and Japan to recent issues of colonialism and post-colonial relations.

Neither project has yet achieved the objective of producing shared cross-national textbooks. Both Japan and Korea have highly centralised education systems where school texts go through a rigorous process of state approval, and it will probably still be some time before such international sharing of curricula becomes possible. An even more distant goal is the idea of creating common East Asian history curricula including China as well as Japan and Korea. But the start which has been made by these projects at least opens up the possibility of forging new forms of cross-border memory, and thus of epistemological, as well as political, peace making.

At the same time, though, the process faces enormous challenges. The most obvious comes from a counter-trend of resurgent populist nationalism in Japan: a trend which itself reflects anxieties about the position of the nation in a rapidly changing regional order. At the core of this new nationalism lies a revisionist view of history propagated particularly by a well-funded group called the Association for History Textbook Reform. Created in 1996, this group initially focused its energies on trying to remove from Japanese textbooks the first tentative references to the 'comfort women' issue, which

had begun to be included in history teaching in the 1990s. Since then, however, the group has gone on to develop its own highly chauvinistic (and sometimes racist) vision of Japanese history, which it too seeks to incorporate into the school curriculum.⁹ At the same time, the organisation has become the spearhead of a wider grass-roots nationalism whose influence is evident, not just in debates about history teaching but also in contemporary political discourse, and particularly in the push to remove Article 9 – the ‘war renunciation’ clause – from the Japanese Constitution.

Efforts at ‘historical reconciliation’ face challenges, not just from revisionist historians, but also from broader problems concerning understandings of the past. There are both exciting possibilities and potential dangers in efforts to reconcile two different national versions of history. One risk is that the process may itself obscure the diversity, the complexity, the conflict and silenced voices that exist *within* those national visions of the past. It is worth recalling, for example, that the voices of the ‘military comfort women’ were, for decades, silenced, not just by Japanese amnesia, but also by a patriarchal Korean nationalism which could find no place for such experiences. Newly emerging, cross border memories need to make room, too, for the experiences of the Korean minority in Japan, a group whose history was long ignored by textbooks on both sides of the border. They should be able to encompass the distinctive pasts of regional communities like Okinawa and Chedju Island, as well as for the pasts of Tokyo and Seoul. Ultimately, they should help to make audible the whispered, uncertain, long-silenced voices that speak into the present in sentences that historians and lawyers and judges have traditionally found difficult to comprehend.

Cross border histories need, in other words, not just to create ‘dialogue with the other’, but also to complicate the too-simple dividing lines which nations and their citizens have so often drawn between self and other, ‘our history’ and ‘theirs’. Their starting point, indeed, might be the historical experience captured in a little piece of reported conversation with which I would like to conclude this paper. This conversation, to me, expresses the essence of the repeated and painful process of confronting historical responsibility: responsibility towards the future as well as towards the past:

‘Father, how could we have done such terrible things to them?’

‘My child, the first step was that we learnt to say ‘us’ and ‘them’. The rest was easy’.

¹ Oka, M (2001), ‘Words of the Other’, *Traces*, 2. (forthcoming).

² Takahashi, T (1999), *Sengo Sekininron*. Tokyo: Kôdansha: 23-30.

³ Quoted in Hanasaki, K (2000), ‘Sensô Sekinin, Sengo to Seigi no Rinri’, *Peoples’ Plan Forum*, 3 (3): 6-11 (Quotation from p 7).

⁴ My re-translation into English. The original reads: ‘nous refusons d’être tenus pour responsables: ce n’est pas nous qui avons pris les décisions’. See ‘Philip Rudock, Ministre

Australien de l'Immigration et de la Réconciliation : Nous Refusons d'être Tenus pour Responsables', *Le Monde*, 2 September 2000.

- ⁵ Lauwerys, JA (1953), *Les Manuels d'Histoire et la Comprehension International*. Paris: UNESCO.
 - ⁶ Delouche, F (ed) (1993), *Illustrated History of Europe: A Unique Guide to Europe's Common Heritage*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
 - ⁷ See Bix, HP (2000), *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. New York: Harper Collins.
 - ⁸ See for example Kimijima, K (1996), *Kyôkasho no Shisô: Nihon to Kankoku no Kingendaishi*. Tokyo: Suzusawa Shoten.
 - ⁹ Nishio K (ed) (1999), *Kokumin no Rekishi*. Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun News Service; see also McCormack, G (2000), 'The Japanese Movement to "Correct" History', in *Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany and the United States*, L Hein and M Selden (eds). Armonk and London: ME Sharpe: 53-73.
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WOMEN'S ROLE IN PEACE-MAKING IN THE BOUGAINVILLE PEACE PROCESS.

Ruth Saovana-Spriggs

This paper does not take the form of analytical discussion, but rather of telling women's stories of their efforts in peace-making. I prefer the term 'peace-making' as opposed to 'conflict resolution' or 'management'. I think the concepts intertwine in their objectives and practice. My notion of peace-making is based on the *practice* (negotiation and mediation) of Bougainville women in their efforts to end the brutal violence. I have concluded tentatively that peace-making is within the domain of a conciliatory role, a role which embraces forgiveness. Forgiveness fosters acceptance of the perpetrator, despite his acts of aggression during the civil war. Such acceptance then brings about a degree of willingness, and perhaps a certain measure of security, which opens opportunities for dialogue with the so called 'enemy' or the 'other'. The process is open-ended, one that is evolving all the time and dictated by the unfolding of events taking place on the ground (outcomes of negotiation meetings between the government of PNG and the Bougainville leaders, for instance). Before I tell some of the women's stories, I will outline a brief history of Bougainville and its relationship to Papua New Guinea today.

Bougainville as it is today, year 2000¹

Bougainville is currently peaceful after years of heavy fighting (1989 to 1997) – I hope not superficially. On 30 April 1998, a ceasefire agreement was signed between the warring factions, the various interim Bougainville government bodies, the Papua New Guinea government and the international representatives. In March 1997, the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) made up of New Zealand soldiers and civilians was deployed on the island. Their mission was to monitor the peace process the people had initiated. During that year, it became necessary to expand and to bring other countries from the Pacific region on board. These included Fijian, ni-Vanuatu and Australian soldiers and civilians in what is now called the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) after the signing of the ceasefire in January 1998. The mission's main objective remains the same as that of the Truce: 'to monitor the progress of the peace process and to facilitate meetings and reconciliations whenever they are needed by local parties involved on the island'.

Currently, there are interim political arrangements on the ground. In May 1998, the Bougainville Constituent Assembly (BCA) was formed. The BCA embraced representatives from all parties and representatives from the former traditional constituencies, the churches and women's groups on the island. It was formed on the basis of selection/nomination/appointment. Due to the difficulties and continued sporadic fighting in different parts of the island, it was imperative to elect representatives in that type of arrangement. This was the first physical manifestation of Bougainville unity. This union set the socio-political climate that allowed for a democratic election. A year later, in the spirit of democracy, a Bougainville-wide election was held. The people elected a new body, called the Bougainville Reconciliation Government in May 1999. It was later renamed the Bougainville Peoples Congress (BPC), symbolic of the people's aspiration for an independent homeland. Mr Joseph Kabui, the former North Solomons provincial government premier (from 1986-1988, before the crisis), was elected unopposed by congressional members as the president. Two vice presidents were elected; James Tanis from the south-central region and Thomas Anis from the north and the surrounding islands. It was important to

have two vice presidents; representation from the north and the surrounding islands and the south-west was necessary to maintain and strengthen the fragile union recently forged.

Meanwhile, John Momis, who had been residing in Port Moresby throughout the crisis as the regional member of Bougainville in the PNG parliament, took the BPC to court, alleging that it was unconstitutional and therefore illegitimate. By November 1999, the high court of PNG had handed down the decision that the formation of the Bougainville Peoples Congress was illegal as it was formed outside of the PNG constitutional requirements. Under the PNG political reform introduced in 1996-1997, John Momis – as the Bougainville regional member in the PNG parliament – automatically becomes the governor of Bougainville. The status of governor gives him the power to select and appoint members to his government. Meanwhile, the BPC leadership and its members politely objected to his presiding over them. Instead they opted to step aside and let Momis and his interim government run the show. To maintain continuity in the peace process, a consultative mechanism was set up whereby representatives from both sides would continue to meet and maintain communication and negotiations with the government of Papua New Guinea. The Bougainville Peoples Congress (BPC) has maintained its legitimacy as perceived by the people as a result of it having been formed on democratic principles. The BPC continues to function independent of Momis' Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) except on a consultative basis. Representatives from the BPC and the BIG meet to discuss major issues on Bougainville's political future, negotiations with the PNG government and reconstruction and rehabilitation programs.

Throughout the period of political haggling and heavy fighting (1990-1999), the peace process has continued. Well before major international assistance (as early as 1990), people at village level had begun the peace process. Foes and friends had been coming together and reconciling with one another in small numbers in different parts of the island at different times. Members of warring factions were surrendering of their own accord, although some did so with the persuasion of the women, the chiefs and church leaders. This development necessitated the formation of an all-encompassing political body, hence the Bougainville Reconciliation Government.

My involvement in the peace process.

My involvement in the peace process has been at one level with a particular women's organisation, and at another, at the advisory (or technical) level with the Bougainville Technical Team (BTT) from 1998 to 1999. The team consists of some of the well-educated Bougainvillean men and a token woman, myself. It is unfortunate that there have not been any other women on the team, considering their crucial role in peace-making.

However, there are women representatives in the existing interim political bodies. In every meeting held within and outside Bougainville, women have been represented by six women's representatives as members of the BPC. Now that the Momis camp co-exists with the BPC, women's representatives have also been appointed to it. Although the balance of representation tips towards the men, women's voices are heard and respected in both camps. At all meeting levels (reconciliation, negotiation, rehabilitation and reconstruction), women continue to play important roles as negotiators, mediators, peace-makers, checks and balances to their menfolk, and simply as mothers.

To create a romantic view of women here is misleading. A very few women became irritant hecklers and divisive in some meetings, eager to seek the limelight and be seen as wearing the badge of 'mothers of the peace process'. But for the majority the primary objective was, and is, to bring about a sense of cohesiveness and peace in the community.

Women's efforts in peace-making/ conflict resolution

Peace-making is a huge enterprise, and women have played a major role in the process. Among the numerous players are the international community (New Zealand, Australia, Fiji, Vanuatu, the UN and various NGOs); the Papua New Guinea government and its relevant bodies, and all the people of Bougainville. However, the focus here is on the women's role in conflict resolution, or as I prefer to call it, 'peace-making' in Bougainville.

The process is not a simple one of 'condemning the act' and 'integrating the actor into the community'. Attempts to resolve conflicts of this magnitude include 'condemning the act', but the enormity of the task is revealed if one asks 'how do you integrate or re-orient an individual with post-war related traumatic experiences back into society?' This involves reintegrating young men who took up arms and who have shot civilians, perhaps their own relatives. They are the same young men who perceive many of their fellow islanders, relatives and friends as traitors and enemies. Changing this mindset of war requires a totally different set of procedures from someone who occasionally steals.

Compounding their mindset is the belief in their cause, which they have defended to the maximum, including destruction of property and killing of civilians whom they perceived as traitors. The Papua New Guinea Security Forces (PNGSF) too, had a major share in mass destruction of property and killings of thousands of civilians. As well as those men previously armed, there is a population who have witnessed horrendous killings of loved ones, friends and relatives. This physical, social, mental and spiritual climate is pervaded by the consequences of civil war: anger, bitterness, sadness, hopelessness, and enmity towards one another. There is a need to know what happened to relatives who have simply disappeared.

How does one deal with conflicts of this magnitude, ones which involve the whole society? How does one re-orient, re-settle and re-build a society that experienced progress and prosperity, then, without warning, was confronted with a seven year period of civil war a civil war now ten years old in the hearts and minds of all?

Women's role in the peace process

The peace process is still in progress. Women make peace from two main bases: the Christian churches and their traditional roles, although it is hard to separate the two in practice. Most women attribute their influence to their faith in God from whence their strength and confidence are drawn.

I found it extremely satisfying to observe churches becoming far more receptive to women's expressions of power. I believe the shift in the balance of power towards men occurred during the period Bougainville/ Papua New Guinea was under the control of the German government (1899-1914) and Australian administration (1914-1975). Through their various administrative officers assigned to officially represent the country and to oversee developmental works, Australian officials concentrated their daily contact and communication with men. Such concentration of power in the male gender

contributed to shaping a new order in which women's power was marginalised and weakened. Male power became institutionalised in the civil government's bureaucracy, the parliament, the judiciary, the military and police. The men took the helm of the ship as soon as the Australian administrators left.

Yet women's power in Bougainvillean cultures was and is fundamental, and extremely important to their work as peace-makers. Women's status was re-activated in Bougainville in the modern context of civil war and in traditional contexts women continued to exercise their power and men continued to observe and respect such powers. Let me briefly give an overview of the sources of women's power.²

Women's position of power has its origin in the land. Land does not belong to the clan but to the lineage in which women hold authority. Women's prerogative over land includes defining land boundaries for gardening purposes or for lease or purchase if male relatives make such requests; giving permission to hunt, to harvest timber not only for commercial but also for personal use; and the exclusive right to veto a decision or decisions on land related matters. While the male relatives have rights to ownership, their rights are quite limited and they are also conditional on the female relatives' permission and/or approval.

Consultation is a mechanism in the system that addresses conflicting views and any disputes arising, should men raise their flags. Women however, still have the upper-hand as the right to veto is exclusively theirs.

Other elements in women's power include:

- *The conceptualisation and symbolic significance of land as objectified in a woman's body.* The body of a woman reproduces life in the next generation. Continuity in traditional matters is essential and therefore a woman's body is crucial. Of course, males are just as important in procreation, but their rights are limited and conditional upon the permission and/or approval of women. Young Bougainville men fighting in the civil war acknowledged women's role as peace-makers/ mediators/ negotiators deriving from their role in kinship and reproduction. Women are neutral in the sense of being non-fighters and unarmed, but on the other hand, as kin (mothers, sisters, wives and relatives) they made a huge difference in the conflict, touching and moving the fighters to disarm.
- *The women keep the matrilineal (not clan) heirlooms.* In modern terms, they are the treasurers. Consultation between females and males also applies in this case, if and when problems arise. With land and traditional currency in the hands of women, they have a powerful position.
- *The authority over names and the right to name newly born babies.* This is a women's domain, although male relatives may express their opinions. Names, naming babies and the traditional process of maintaining names has its own set of social and political networks which are directly linked to land ownership.
- *The respect and recognition accorded to senior women and men in the titles they inherit.* In my area, in northeast Bougainville, both male and female heads inherit the title 'lord' as in 'a moon sunano' (literal translation 'a woman, who is a lord'/ holds the title in the Teop language) and 'a sunano' (a lord simply refers to a male and the authority enshrined in the title.). The early missionaries adopted this title to refer to Jesus Christ, the Lord, when translating portions of the Bible in the Teop language. This however, does not have any bearing on the divinity of Jesus Christ. To some degree, the use of 'big man' and the use of 'lord' in Biblical translation and everyday

use had eroded the use of 'lord' in its previous meaning (applying to both genders), but it still takes this form in many places.

Against this background of women's traditional powers, I will situate women's activities in peace-making and conflict resolution in their attempts to end the civil war on the island.

With the outbreak of civil war and its dramatic consequences, Bougainville women set about a peace mission. The peace mission's main objective was to bring the young fighters back to their senses and encourage them to return home, to unite families who were separated, to bring some normalcy to communities and to help families bond ever more stronger during the most difficult time. All have witnessed women's power at work through their activities in the peace mission, throughout the island.

Example 1: PNGDF using women's position of power

The Bougainville Women for Peace and Freedom is a Bougainville-wide organisation. Most of its membership is from the south-west-central area, with some followers in the northern part of the island. It was formally established in about 1996. The broad aims and objectives range from humanitarian to political and economic concerns. Early in 1998 an informal session was held where women exchanged stories of how their traditional position of power was used in conflict resolution. Here is a simple example related by a woman from the mountains of Arawa-Kieta in central Bougainville.

The scene: Two men are at loggerheads over an issue. They reach the point of no return where they are beyond control. Emotions erupt, ending in a violent physical confrontation. Intervention is required, so a woman steps in. What does she do? In the simplest act of intervention, she stands between the two men. The woman's presence does the job. The fight immediately stops and the men disappear from the scene as quickly as they can.

In 1989, one of the PNGDF's intelligence officer (Liria Yauka), who is from the Southern Highlands province learnt of women's influential position and quickly capitalised on it. He used it in one of his operational tasks in the Kieta-Arawa-Panguna area in central Bougainville. This is the area where the problem started and the heartland of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The operation was code named 'Operation Kisim Dog' (OPS Kisim Dog). The broad aim of the exercise was to collect people from the jungle up in the mountains and transport them to care centres (refugee camps) established by the PNG Security Forces Arawa town.

These were people who had fled into the jungles in the mountains of Panguna when the civil war broke out. The ultimate aim of the operation was to remove the civilians from the jungle, and when that was achieved, then the PNGDF and the Security Forces would go in and wipe out the BRA population in these rugged mountains. Earlier attempts had failed. The effectiveness of this particular exercise lay in convincing the women of their security in care centres. Thus, a large group of people somewhat willingly agreed to the exercise. This is what Liria Yauka had to say about the women of Kieta-Arawa. I quote:

But one thing the rebels respected and wouldn't endanger was their families; especially their mothers, sisters and wives. This respect was part of the customs and traditions of the matrilineal Bougainvillian society. It was in their blood, and that was our insurance.³

Acknowledging this, he used a couple of women as 'insurance' in a number of strategic manoeuvres: (a) as shields to protect groups of people who were willing to be taken by helicopters to care centres; (b) as guarantee that the people were honest with Liria and his men; and (c) as a signpost or landmark in a specified area cleared for the helicopters for landing.

Example 2: A foursome of women.

In early 1999, by chance, I met up with a team of four women from Buin in the south of the island. The four were selected by their umbrella Catholic Women's Organisation. Their mission was to negotiate a possible meeting between the two local armed groups of men who had apparently settled scores with each other by killing a member of each group. This was a localised incident which was a spill-over from the broader Bougainville conflict.

Before my meeting with them, a week earlier, the foursome had made their second attempt to track down this group of men, hiding in the mountainous terrain in the area. By that time, they had already secured the lowlands group's guarantee of their willingness to meet with the other group, but under strict conditions. The women spent a couple of nights in an old run-down classroom up in the mountains. The same building was used as the meeting place for the parties concerned. Prior to their departure, the nearby hamlets were notified in advance of their mission. Leaders and chiefs of these hamlets then sent word to the men in the jungle, informing them of the women's intended mission. The women had to wait for the men's response. Once their agreement was secured, the women hiked up to the mountains. On the eve of the first meeting, three representatives from the men's camp appeared. It was not a pleasant meeting at all; there was little conciliatory talk and accusations against the lowlands camp dominated the discussion. The second day amounted to little too. All the while, they were being fed by the villagers. Despite no apparent progress, the women persisted in their mission. This mediatory role took the women almost five months, until there were some tentative agreements to hold further meetings.

I was back in Arawa, Central Bougainville in July of the same year. At that time, there was a large gathering of all south-central BRA commanders and chiefs in Arawa discussing this particular incident. In addition to discussing the reconciliation ceremony between the two groups, the men also discussed ways to prevent similar incidents in future. This particular meeting was the result of the tireless and unreserved efforts of the foursome and their women's church group. A big reconciliation ceremony was staged soon after.

Example 3: Bougainville Women Unite: 1994, 1998, 1999

The year 1994 was the most significant turning point in the history of the Bougainville conflict. The first ever Bougainville-wide peace talk was held in Arawa in Central Bougainville between the government of Papua New Guinea, its Security Forces, the people of Bougainville and the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA). The BRA leadership refused to attend the meeting although they sent their junior members. Women were also invited and hundreds of them turned up. Various journalists reported the meeting as unfruitful and a huge failure due to the absence of the BRA's leadership. However, despite the perceived failure of the meeting, the women initiated a move towards unity - the coming together of all Bougainville people. This was a turning point for all Bougainville people.

How did women forge this unity? Briefly, one of the very first things the women did was to get together, putting aside their differences of opinion and their affiliation to factions or non-affiliation to factions. At this stage, people categorised themselves as pro-independence, thus BRA followers; pro-PNG, in this case the PNG Security Forces and the local militia (who were in alliance with them) and thirdly, a neutral group – people who decided not to take sides. Once the women had established open communication and some degree of understanding, they then organised daily activities that assisted the 'coming together'. The institution perceived as most neutral in the circumstances was the church. The combined churches' daily act of worship by all became the central path to the hearts and minds of the participants, paving the way to unity. The 'coming together' was not without problems, but the women persisted and the process improved.

Secondly, the women were given a hearing in the daily meetings. Women used this opportunity strategically to constantly remind the men of the hardship mothers, wives, children, young men and women and old people had been put through. It may have pained the ears of the men but it ultimately achieved its desired end.

The third strategy was to appeal to the BRA men and its leadership over the radio on a daily basis. The content of such appeals was calculated. The women pleaded for the BRA and its leadership to come down from the mountains to join the meeting. When that did not work, the women changed tactics and instead spoke of their willingness to send a group of women to talk with them face to face up in the mountains. By this new tactic, the women expressed their utmost desire for a return to peace and to unite again as one Bougainville people. Throughout the week, the atmosphere was tense, full of rumours and suspicions. A couple of nasty incidents occurred where BRA representatives were shot by members of the PNG Security Forces. This action simply confirmed the BRA's suspicions. Mr Joseph Kabui, the former president of the Bougainville Interim Government and now the president of the Bougainville Peoples Congress, could not have agreed more strongly with the women but, in his view, the time was not right. In retrospect, the women's demands may have been seen as unsuccessful, but I think otherwise: the women's plea for peace and unity, which continued to haunt the men as years went by. These initial efforts opened up future opportunities for the peace process to develop progressively and bore fruit four years later, culminating in the famous 1998 Lincoln Agreement.

Progressing from the 1994 Bougainville-wide peacetalk, two major peacetalks were held in Burnham military barracks in 1997 in New Zealand sponsored by the New Zealand government. At each meeting, a small group of Bougainville women attended. In the following year in January 1998, a lot more women (about 50) attended the Lincoln Meeting in Christchurch, another major break-through in the peace talk. Women's efforts in influencing men to accept an eventual coming together of all Bougainville people was a major factor in the debates that proceeded. Foes and friends put aside their differences, and began to acknowledge one another. This state of affairs eventually led to the formation of the Bougainville Constituent Assembly in May 1998, and then to the formation of the Bougainville Reconciliation Government – cum – Bougainville Peoples Congress, in early 1999. All these interim political arrangements embraced representatives from all warring factions, from constituencies and representatives from churches and women's groups. This was an historic moment for women. The women put out a statement representing their views and position:

. . . To survive, we looked within ourselves, our culture and our traditional society. In almost all areas of Bougainville, women traditionally own the land. The land is sacred and protected by men on behalf of the women. The men as guardians share leadership with women, taking the responsibility in open debate to protect women from potential conflict; however, women have the power to veto decisions, and therefore are involved in the final consultative process.

The destruction of this balance of powers as held in Bougainville in traditional times occurred through westernisation in the colonial period. It is a tragic fact that the ignorance of external powers exercised in Bougainville by default weakened the traditional balance that kept a peaceful and harmonious society. In the recent absence of formal western political structures, our people in social crisis have turned to traditional decision making methods in which women have been restored to their rightful place in decision making methods, to their rightful place in leadership.

Women have built bridges between their own families, clans and displaced fellow Bougainvilleans by working for mutual survival, whether it be in the bush, in care centres, or wherever they have hosted strangers in their own communities. Without remuneration they have laboured beside their men to create basic services using whatever talent or means they had to (at) hand. Today, we pay tribute to all the brave women who are waiting in our home land for news of peace and a return to a just civil society, where the rule of the gun will be replaced through a secure process for a permanent ceasefire and demilitarisation as agreed (upon) in the Lincoln Agreement.

Our menfolk have rediscovered the value of women sharing in the decision making process and we attest here today to the liberating effect this has had upon our fellow women delegates. As mothers of the land, we take seriously our responsibility to rebuild peace in our hearts and create a peaceful environment that will improve the quality of all our lives. There is so much to be done, whether it be developing ways to relieve or improve the back-breaking menial tasks; or restoring our lives so that we can freely move around, return to our homes and enjoy the ability to speak freely of our human rights and needs; or our goals for a political future where women must take their rightful place as leaders beside their men. We look forward to being included in the new Bougainville government structure so that our rediscovery of women's participation will continue to shape and build Bougainville's development and government. We have been here at Lincoln to break down the mental blockade that prevails in our home land, where women still live in fear and are not yet able to discuss and debate openly our democratic form of government. Our society, although men and women have distinctive roles, they are complementary. We, women are co-partners with our men and as such we are daunted by the enormous task that lies before us to bring about a new Bougainville. In holding to the peace message that has spread abroad in Bougainville from Burnham, we, the Women's Delegation at Lincoln University Leaders' meeting affirm with all our sisters and fellow Bougainvilleans our determination to make this peace process work until we reach our common goal of freedom. . .⁴

Concluding remarks: Why did the peace process work in Bougainville?

All Bougainvillean men and women – warring factions, leaders of traditional and modern institutions – have taken responsibility, indicating a willingness and determination amongst all Bougainville people to deal with the civil war and its devastating consequences. The north and the south and the outlying islands could have simply walked away from the problem, leaving it to the Panguna-Kieta-Arawa people to manage. But instead, all Bougainvilleans chose to solve the conflict, initially through the traditional means of conflict resolution.

It is not simply the desire to live peacefully and to regain human dignity and respect for life that drove the people to act in the way they did but I believe, their fundamental wish for an independent Bougainville. I recall parts of Joseph Kabui's speech at the Buin leaders' summit held in August of 1998 where he said something to this effect: 'The first thing we must do is define our destiny. Next, we must find the ship in which we must begin the journey in order to reach our destination'. It was a metaphor depicting the overwhelming support for independence all Bougainvilleans espoused at that meeting. The question now is how we continue the journey.

The women's role in the peace process must never be under-estimated nor forgotten. Women were the initial brokers in the process. Against all odds, at gunpoint, women risked their lives to calm young fighters, to speak and negotiate peace with them.

It is widely claimed by women that they drew, and continue to draw, strength from their traditional cultural structures and from their faith in God. All women in Bougainville who lived through the crisis have accounts of God's provision of refuge and protection, of good health, love and care, and of food when food was scarce. In chaos, members of communities find the strength to seek solutions to their problems, with the hope that there is always victory at the end.

¹ For background on the history of Bougainville and its people, see May, RJ & AJ Regan (eds) (1997), *Political Decentralisation in a New State – The Experience of Provincial Government in Papua New Guinea*. Bathurst: Crawford House Press, in particular, AJ Regan 'The origins of the provincial government system in Papua New Guinea': 9-20; 'The operation of the provincial government system': 21-55; 'The politics of provincial government': 56 –77; and James Griffin & Melchior Togolo 'North Solomons Province, 1974 – 1990': 354-382.

² I have discussed women's status in Bougainville society at some length in Saovana-Spriggs, Ruth (1997), 'The Civil War in Bougainville – Can Women make a difference?', in Donald Denoon *et al*, *The Cambridge History of the Pacific Islanders*. Cambridge University Press: 421-424. Pauline Onsa who was very active in assisting the International Red Cross in bringing medicine to areas of heavy fighting the early years of the civil war, also considers the position of power which women hold on Buka island in her (1995) paper 'How the Bougainville crisis affected women on Buka Island', in M Spriggs and D Denoon, *The Bougainville Update*. Bathurst: Crawford House Press.

³ Liria, Aluambo Yauka (1993), *Bougainville Campaign Diary*, Melbourne: INDRA Publishing: 159.

⁴ Bougainville Women's Press Statement read by Mrs Agnes Titus, Lincoln, Christchurch, New Zealand, January 1998.

RECONCILIATION IN AUSTRALIA: MAKING PEACE WITH INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS

Evelyn Scott

I would like to acknowledge that we are holding this meeting on the land of the Ngun(n)awal people, the traditional owners of this land. I recognise the living culture of the Ngun(n)awal people and the unique contribution they make to the life of the Canberra region.

I am honoured to make a contribution to this symposium, and I am pleased that the Academy has recognised reconciliation as a process of peace in what we usually regard as a peaceful nation.

Reconciliation is indeed a process of peace-making. And when we think about it in that light, it is fair to say that all Australians must be the peace-makers.

Today I want to talk about why we need to make peace between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the wider Australian community. In so doing, I will explain how reconciliation will take us forward as a nation into that peace and how the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation sees its reconciliation documents serving that end.

Reconciliation is indeed the work of the whole nation. From our homes and schools to our universities and professional organisations, from our workplaces to our governments, there is not one area that cannot benefit from understanding Australia's true history and recognising the unique rights of the first Australians.

When federal Parliament established the Council in 1991 through an Act of Parliament, it recognised the wrongs of our shared history over the last 200 years. The *Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Act 1991* states:

- *Australia was occupied by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders who had settled for thousands of years, before British settlement at Sydney Cove on 26 January 1788, and*
- *many Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders suffered dispossession and dispersal from their traditional lands by the British Crown; and*
- *to date, there has been no formal process of reconciliation between Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders and other Australians.*

The *Act* was an acknowledgment that this country was not at peace with the relationship between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and the wider community. Through the *Act*, Parliament recognised reconciliation was the process towards making peace and Council's task was to foster wider community appreciation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander cultures and achievements and of their unique position as indigenous Australians. Council was also to gain an ongoing national commitment to address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage.

One of the main functions of the Council was to consult the Indigenous and wider community on whether reconciliation would be advanced by a formal document or documents of reconciliation.

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After much consultation (and probably the most comprehensive consultation process this nation has ever seen and been a part of), the Council concluded that the reconciliation documents would truly uplift and unify the nation, and lay down the foundations for the nation to walk towards and complete the journey to a lasting national reconciliation.

Right from the beginning, back in 1991, the Council has talked to the Australian people. In particular, over the last few years, we have talked to the people about what might be in a document of reconciliation, and for over a year, Council discussed and deliberated the response from the people and carefully thought about the document's form and wording.

We worked very hard to engage Australians from all walks of life in our consultation process about the documents. We wanted people to feel ownership of the documents because we know that once the Council's life ends on 31 December 2000, it will be the people who will make reconciliation a reality in our everyday lives.

The greatest achievement of my Council has been to draft and release the final version of the documents for reconciliation at our landmark event, *Corroboree 2000* in Sydney in May.

As the theme for this symposium states: to make peace we must first think peace. This is an appropriate way to interpret the two parts to our reconciliation documents.

The Council's first document, *Corroboree 2000: Towards Reconciliation*, includes the 'Australian Declaration towards Reconciliation'. You may consider this the 'thinking' or symbolic part. It is an overarching statement of what we hope the nation can work towards to achieve a lasting reconciliation.

As with the creation of any significant public document, the Declaration took months of re-drafts before the Council could agree to it. Indeed, it took painstaking negotiation at hundreds of public meetings organised by the Council and communities to commit to these words, some eleven sentences in all. People had vastly different views on subjects such as apology, self determination, and how the Declaration could strike the right tone that befitted all of us.

For those of you who may not be familiar with our Declaration – let me quote you a few parts from it that will, I think, demonstrate its nature.

Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past so that we can move on together at peace with ourselves.

As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies and forgives.

We desire a future where all Australian enjoy their rights, accept their responsibilities, and have the opportunity to achieve their full potential.

I hope you will agree that these words are indeed about 'thinking peace'.

The second part to our documents is a *Roadmap for Reconciliation* that sets out four strategies to advance reconciliation. These strategies are to sustain reconciliation, to

promote Indigenous rights, to address Indigenous disadvantage and to encourage Indigenous economic independence.

The *Roadmap* is about 'making peace'. It was written because we at the Council acknowledge that there have been many words and papers that have failed or continue to fail to make a difference to the everyday lives of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. These strategies set out the most important actions for individuals, communities, organisations and governments.

Together, these two documents are a call to action.

Key elements of the documents include:

- An acknowledgment of the truth of our shared history. This requires a range of educational initiatives in the areas of formal schooling, the training of professionals and in raising community awareness.
- Greater government accountability. Governments provide most essential services, yet serious disadvantage remains. All service providers must be held accountable through the setting of measurable targets and the public reporting of performance.
- A legislative process to deal with unfinished business. Council is currently drafting a proposed framework legislation, which allows for negotiated outcomes on matters such as rights, self-determination, traditional law and constitutional reform.
- The establishment of a representative national body called *Reconciliation Australia* to help keep the reconciliation process going.

The *Roadmap* demonstrates clearly that reconciliation depends on us, as a nation – as a people of peace – to address the important outstanding issues that continue to be a black mark for us all.

Such issues include the need for substantial improvements in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people's health, education and employment statistics. We must find better ways to reduce the high and inequitable incarceration rates and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander deaths in custody, to recognise the place of customary law, recognise Indigenous rights, and offer a national apology to the Stolen Generations.

I will come back to our documents and let you see that you too, whether you are an organisation or an individual, can make the document become a reality. I will briefly outline some details of the National Strategy to Address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Disadvantage.

The Council has identified five critical areas where actions are necessary to address Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage:

- leadership at all levels;
- building stronger communities and equal partnerships;
- better service delivery;
- accountability and benchmarking; and
- appropriate funding arrangements.

Let me share with you one of the examples in the strategy.

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A large Indigenous community lives in the region surrounding a small country town. The town has a community centre which provides a number of services and facilities to the community, including vocational courses, computer facilities and business support, a meeting venue, and child care. However, the local Indigenous community feels that their needs are not met by the community centre. Hence, they do not use the services provided by the centre.

The first step in resolving this problem is undertaking an audit to identify what can be done to meet the needs of the local Indigenous community. This would involve the funding agencies and managers of the community centre coming together with the local Indigenous community and discussing the options and constraints, such as building a new centre for the Indigenous community or making better use of the existing centre and the available resources. Better use of the existing centre could involve:

- mechanisms which ensure that the centre provides services in a culturally appropriate manner, with ongoing consultation with the Indigenous community;
- recruiting Indigenous staff and volunteers for the community centre, as well as involving Indigenous people in the management structure of the centre; and
- using local Indigenous trainers to train staff in cultural matters and raise awareness of protocols and so on.

The National Strategy to Overcome Disadvantage, and all the other strategies, will be successful only if the agreed outcome targets are achieved. Where the performance has been less than desired, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, service providers and governments should sit down together, review what they have done and ask why they have not achieved the desired result. These discussions should lead to an agreement on new or improved actions to address disadvantage.

I hope I have explained to you the path that the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation has laid down for the future of reconciliation, the peace-making between the Indigenous and wider community. There is no fast-track way to achieving reconciliation. It is a process that requires us to work together and to take responsibility in our own private and professional lives to address the current status of Indigenous health, employment and education and to begin or continue a friendly dialogue with each other.

As with all peace processes, reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians, and no peak body or government can achieve it alone.

For me it is disheartening that there remains extraordinary disadvantage to overcome and barriers to break down. But we have indeed come along way, and I remain confident we can achieve reconciliation, and finally the soul of this nation may find itself in a place of peace. Thank you.

CULTURE OF PEACE
UNESCO'S PROGRAM IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
Malama Meleisea

Introduction

Every year, the United Nations family of organisations and agencies spend billions of dollars throughout the world on a variety of activities, which are all linked to help establish and maintain a peaceful global society, free from violence and intolerance of the kind which we witness on our television screen daily. It is the only institution with an internationally recognised mandate to address the global problems, associated with peace, in their political, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions, and the only one with the legitimacy to mobilise international efforts to deal with global economic, social and environmental problems.¹

Significant progress has been made in several areas of human development this century, particularly in the transformation of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes into democratic societies in many parts of the world. Substantial contributions have also been made towards improving the lives of many in poverty. Yet there are at least thirty areas throughout the world today, which have been identified as serious threats to world peace. Unacceptably high rates of violent abuse of human rights still exist. Ethnic tension, various forms of discrimination and intolerance still abound accompanied by deliberate and outright denial of human rights. The fruits of human development programmes are still a dream for an unacceptably large number of the world's population.

The horrifying destruction of property and loss of human lives from the last two world wars in particular, and the persistent conflicts throughout the world in the last forty years, are constant reminders of the urgency for renewed international efforts to initiate long-term measures to promote peace and to prevent human society from these inhuman activities.

That the UN has made tremendous achievements in the campaign to improve the standards of living for people throughout the world is undisputed. In particular, its crusade for universal acceptance of the ideals of justice, equality and peace as critical ingredients for a better and enlightened world, has made a significant difference from the world of some fifty years ago.

Peace is expensive and becoming more so. The UN's single most expensive and risky programme is peace-keeping. Since 1948 it has spent about US\$21 billion in direct peace-keeping activities. The estimated budget for these activities alone, between July 2000 and June 2001, is estimated to be US\$3 billion. In addition to this, different agencies spend large amounts of their own budgets on programmes and activities, which contribute to peace-maintenance. Peace has become a luxury which, in this increasingly globalised era, no one person or country can afford. Yet everyone is a loser if it is not achieved.

United Nations peace initiatives have been, and continue to be influenced by the vision of peace, which was powerfully delineated by Theodore Roosevelt, former President of the United States. Having spelt out his perception of peace during his acceptance speech as Nobel Peace Prize Laureate in 1906, he was unequivocal about his

disapproval of the kind of peace achieved by tyrannical suppression of honest and legitimate protest. His view was that:

Peace is generally good in itself, but it is never the highest good unless it comes as the handmaid of righteousness; and it becomes a very evil thing if it serves merely as a mask for cowardice and sloth, or as an instrument to further the ends of despotism and anarchy. We despise and abhor the bully, the brawler, the oppressor, whether in private or public life, but we despise no less the coward and the voluptuary.²

In spite of the huge achievements of the last fifty years, the concerns expressed in Roosevelt's words are still relevant today, almost a century after they were delivered. With the end of the 'Cold War', created in the aftermath of World War II, the international community moved into a state of uncertainty, and, as the old Chinese curse 'may you live in interesting times' implies, times of uncertainty carry with them dangerous potential for new forms of conflict arising from the processes of change. This calls for the United Nations to be even more vigilant and forthright in the implementation of its post World War II charter which, among other things, commits the organisation 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...'

In this context, the United Nations took the initiative to rededicate and refocus world attention on peace. UNESCO was asked to be the lead agency in this programme and has taken up this challenging mission by launching the 'Culture of Peace Programme'.

The Culture of Peace Programme

The Culture of Peace Programme is a contemporary expression of the original constitutional mandate of UNESCO which is 'to construct peace in the minds of men', based on non-violence and respect for the fundamental rights and freedom of all people. The idea of a Culture of Peace was born in 1989 at the Yamoussoukro Conference on 'Peace in the Minds of Men'. The conference agreed that UNESCO should:

...help construct a new vision of peace by developing a peace culture based on the universal values of respect for life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between men and women. The establishment of such a culture of peace, understood as the antithesis of a culture of war, was seen as the prime mission (for the) organisation.³

The last Director General of UNESCO took on this challenge with enthusiasm and took advantage of every opportunity he had at major international forums, to articulate and promote the ideas behind the Culture of Peace Programme. He placed it at the centre of the UNESCO's multi-disciplinary activities, within its current and future medium term strategies, thus guaranteeing the organisation's long-term commitments to achieving its objectives.

Defining Culture of Peace

Culture of Peace has been described as an ideal which is achievable when certain pre-conditions exist. These conditions are themselves often expressed in abstract terms such as justice, human rights, tolerance, understanding. The ideals of the 'Culture of Peace' include shared global values, attitudes and behaviours based on non-violence; respect for fundamental human rights; the equal participation of women; the elimination of prejudice and extremism; and the free flow of information. Culture of Peace is both a product and a process. As such it is influenced by the unique histories and cultures of

the peoples and societies which are striving to achieve it. This means that although everyone understands what it is, there is no universally acceptable prescription of how to achieve it. This can be frustrating and confusing especially for policy-makers and legislators who tend to prefer concrete principles and prescriptions. Yet flexibility may be one of the strengths of the concept because it requires people to shape new ways of thinking and acting, reflecting their particular national and regional histories, cultures and traditions.

'Peace' is often taken to mean 'order' and thus the exercise of state control over citizens, their rights of free speech, and their access to information. Arising from the certainties of the past, the fundamentals of a civil society – freedom of expression, respect for differences, civil rights and citizen participation – have often been dismissed as the values of individualistic Western culture, at odds with the values of Asia and the Pacific.

The 1998 Nobel Prize Laureate for economics, Amartya Sen, has challenged this argument, pointing out that the ideals, fundamental to a civil society are not particularly ancient, nor exclusively Western in origin, but were anticipated in many Asian and Pacific philosophies. Ideas about the values of a civil society have always moved between national and cultural boundaries at many different levels.⁴

A Culture of Peace is based on tolerance and solidarity. Tolerance might be understood as an attitude of persevering to solve problems according to the principle of peace, rather than resorting to aggression or repression. Tolerance, however, does not mean indifference. It does not imply lack of interest in those whom we tolerate, nor does it mean that we have to agree with those whose views, values, or practices differ from our own.

UNESCO's commitment to establishing lasting peace is founded on the 'intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind'. Its mission is to establish and reinforce peace through its fields of competence – education, science, culture and communication. UNESCO has described the Culture of Peace as:

An everyday attitude of 'non-violent rebellion', of peaceful dissent, of firm determination to defend human rights and human dignity. A culture of peace is not a luxury. It is not an option to be added on at the end of the process of recovery. It has to be built in from the very early stages. It is just as essential as credit-ratings and monetary policies. It is structural. Symbolically, the concept of a culture of peace is based on the fact that a lasting peace does not just mean the absence of war, but rather a dynamic process based on democratic principles.⁵

Peace is thus defined as the most basic of human rights, the one which underlies all others. The right to peace and the right to live in peace must be respected as part of the right to life.

Goals for a Culture of Peace

The goals for the Culture of Peace Programme are longterm. The basic objective behind the Programme is to actively encourage the process of transformation from traditions of conflict to those of co-operation through dialogue. Some concrete examples of how this transition might be achieved, include the transformation of traditional military peace-keeping into non-violent peace-keeping, full and democratic participation in civil society as the basic requirement for all decision-making processes

of government, a multi-vocal approach in all consultation processes, replacement of force by reason as a means of solving differences, and a rapid transition from plutocratic to democratic systems of governments. The rich diversity of cultures and their beliefs, traditions, languages, religions, and political organisations must be appreciated and used as a basis for co-operation amongst the people of the world.

It is proposed that through a Culture of Peace, a better quality of life for everyone is achievable based on endogenous, equitable and sustainable development. A fundamental assumption of the Culture of Peace concept is that people will live peacefully only if they are secure; thus economic, social and political security are its essential building blocks. Achieving the goals of a Culture of Peace require financial and intellectual resources, as well as full support and co-operation from the international community, governments and all sectors of society. It requires revolutionary changes to be made in several processes in government. The education systems for example will have to be reviewed to ensure they reflect the goals of a Culture of Peace, so that transformation will include the socialisation of the youngest and most vulnerable in society.

A Culture of Peace cannot be achieved without the support and active participation of the global community. As a multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional project, it should be world-wide in scope and linked to all aspects of society. It cannot be achieved if the partners fail to address the crucial questions such as imbalances in development. Such imbalances perpetuate economic insecurity, which are the enemies of peace. It will entail democratic and institutional reforms to build trust in political systems. It will require effective and efficient delivery of social services to reassure the population of their governments' commitments to social security and harmony.

The International Year for a Culture of Peace

To further publicise its continuing crusade for global peace, and its search for lasting solutions to continuing, and in several cases, worsening abuses in human rights, violence and equality, the United Nations designated 2000 as the International Year for a Culture of Peace (IYCP) and 2000-2009 as the International Decade for Peace, designating UNESCO as the focal point for all the related activities. The purposes for the IYCP are:

- to mobilise, inform, promote and stimulate the awareness of all individuals, social agents and political leaders about the program;
- to give renewed impetus to the work of building the future in order to speed up the transition from a culture of war to a culture of peace; and
- to encourage people everywhere to take immediate and concerted action to make peace and non-violence part of their daily lives.

The many objectives of the IYCP include: promotion of peace, human rights, democracy and tolerance in and through education; respect for cultural diversity; combating discrimination of any kind; elimination of poverty; protection of the environment; and to strive to provide everyone with the quality of life which preserves human dignity.

UNESCO has planned activities throughout the world to mark the event. These included competitions for a Culture of Peace logo from young people; media program in different regions and in different languages; and international, national and regional meetings to discuss and promote awareness of the program's objectives.

As part of the international appeal, the 'Manifesto 2000 for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence', produced by a number of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates with the help of UNESCO, was launched in Paris at the beginning of March 1999. The Manifesto was addressed to individuals and civil society who, by signing it, '...will commit themselves to adhere to the values of peace, tolerance, and solidarity and undertake to translate the values, the attitudes and modes of behaviour which underpin the culture of peace into daily action.' UNESCO aimed to collect 100 million signatures by September 2000, when the General Assembly met for the first time in the new millennium. (*UNESCO Press* 99.38). UNESCO also prepared a draft provisional Declaration and Programme of Action which has been presented to the United Nations Assembly. This will provide the guidelines for future activities for the program.

Constructing a Culture of Peace

UNESCO has helped design and implement a number of regional, sub-regional and national activities and provided assistance in the development of information networks to link individuals and organisations working in and outside areas of conflict. It has initiated training programs for parliamentarians and other elected officials on the principles and practices of good governance, democracy and justice. It has provided financial and professional support for media outlets, particularly those which actively contribute to the promotion of a culture of peace, and has embarked on a project to identify and collect information and materials on traditional methods of conflict prevention and resolution from cultures around the world.

The role of education in facilitating reconciliation and reconstruction for peace is vital. In this context UNESCO has included culture of peace ideas and materials in all its training and educational program. UNESCO Chairs are being established at universities with programs which are specifically devoted to the teaching of human rights and peace studies. UNESCO has also initiated a number of peace-related projects through its Associated Schools Programme (ASP). To ensure that the culture of peace movement remains relevant, dynamic and sustainable, the Director General has linked it to the pursuit of social and economic justice and urged everyone to become involved.

Trans-disciplinary approach

Education is a major area of competence in UNESCO. In urging collaboration between sectors under its Trans-disciplinary programs, the organisation has refocused its strategies on education to ensure a priority position for culture of peace in its programs. With help from member states, non-government organisations and several Research Institutes, UNESCO is already involved in reviews and, where necessary, revisions of existing curricula in all areas of study, to ensure that what is being taught, and how, reflects the culture of peace ideals, values and practices. Where possible, peace values and mechanisms for non-violent settlement of disputes in traditional societies are being integrated into school curricula. Multiculturalism, Citizenship and Intolerance are being broached through the integration of migration studies into the social science curricula at all levels in schools. Values Education and Education for International Understanding are also subjects for research and discussions in institutions like the newly-established Asia-Pacific Centre of Education for International Understanding (APCEIU) in Seoul. These are being supported through technical and financial assistance provided by UNESCO staff in collaboration with colleagues with special expertise from member states and partner institutions.

A key element in the UNESCO strategy is to engage parliaments and the media in the discussions of the Culture of Peace Programme and the formulation of strategies for its achievement.

Parliaments and Parliamentarians

At the 1996 joint meeting between UNESCO and the International Parliamentary Union (IPU), the IPU President presented participants with a very clear perception of the new and increasingly vital role of parliaments and parliamentarians in the world. In pointing out that public policy is becoming more international in orientation, he said: ' . . . parliaments, which are an essential force in the design of public policy, are playing a new and growing role in foreign relations and international co-operation'. He observed, that ' . . . it is today impossible to speak of dialogue and discussion among States while referring only to inter-governmental structures, without including inter-parliamentary institutions in the process'. In explaining the unique democratic characteristics of parliaments, he pointed out that: 'Through the conjunction of democratisation and globalisation, parliamentary diplomacy is emerging as a force to be reckoned with. The aspirations of economic, cultural and social actors – that is to say the people themselves – must also be heard on the international scene through those unparalleled representative institutions – parliaments.'

Given this unique position of parliaments, it follows that parliamentarians are in an excellent position to achieve four steps towards building a Culture of Peace:

1. Strengthen the links between local cultures and democracy, with the former as both a tool to achieve growth and development and also a desirable end in itself, and the latter being both an ideal to be pursued and a mode of government to be applied according to modalities which reflect diversity of cultural particularities without derogating internationally recognised principles, norms and standards.
2. Ensure a sustained state of democracy which requires a democratic culture and climate, constantly nurtured and reinforced by civic education and other methods used to shape peoples' opinions.
3. Establish strong links between a culture of peace and development at all levels and in all areas of society.
4. Introduce and reinforce legislative and other governmentally supported measures to promote and defend cultural rights.

In recognition of the important roles of parliaments and parliamentarians in the implementation of its Medium-Term Strategy, UNESCO has established a special Unit for Relations with Parliamentarians, to strengthen the links between the organisation and members of national, regional and international Parliaments and Parliamentary associations.

The special conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and UNESCO in June 1996, saw the first concrete move to establish closer working relationships between the two organisations. It was pointed out in the conference documents that there is little that international organisations like UNESCO can do without the support of parliaments, for they provide the essential legislative framework and funds for national action in education, science, culture and communication. Indeed, as these documents declared, they are for their respective nations, the guardians of democracy and stability, the defenders of the values espoused by the United Nations and its specialised agencies.

Since the first international articulation of the reasons behind these moves, UNESCO, in collaboration with IPU and other organisations, has further supported these with several initiatives. On the national level, UNESCO has:

- on a regular basis, distributed its publications and other relevant materials to parliamentary libraries around the world.
- hosted an increasing number of parliamentary delegations visiting UNESCO headquarters to familiarise themselves with the organisation's program
- responded positively to increasing number of invitations for the Director General to address Parliamentary Commissions around the world
- sponsored a number of seminars and conferences for parliamentarians to enhance their role in peace-building processes
- offered to parliamentarians the use of UNESCO expertise in order to facilitate their policy-making process.
- participated in numerous regional and international inter-parliamentary forums in its fields of competence.

UNESCO has also established working relationships with numerous regional and international parliamentary organisations. These include the European Parliament, the International Assembly of Francophone Parliamentarians, Parliamentarians for Global Actions, Parlamento Andino, Parlamento Latino Americano, etc.

The Media

The Director General of UNESCO pointed out that '...a society which restrains freedom of speech, is forced to govern by violence'. The world of today is often referred to as the 'information' age; for never before in history has there been mass media capable of reaching, via television, radio, news publications, virtually every person on earth. The media is perhaps the most potent force in the world in shaping the beliefs, perceptions and aspirations of its audiences for better or for worse.

UNESCO aims to work with the media both to build partnerships in the dissemination of the values of a Culture of Peace and by enlisting the support of the media in the implementation of a Culture of Peace Programme. The organisation also wishes to work with the media to reinforce the principles of the right to free speech and freedom of expression as necessary ingredients for a culture of peace.

But UNESCO also wishes to promote a dialogue on the role and responsibilities of the media. This includes providing the public with accurate and up-to-date information; shaping of public opinion in favour of constructive and peaceful dialogue and non-violent conflict resolution; promoting freedom of expression; and by acting as a watchdog on the formation and adoption of public policy.

UNESCO has organised and co-sponsored several regional and international workshops and conferences for media personalities, at which journalists and owners have been informed about the Culture of Peace Programme. These conferences and workshops have all issued public statements expressing their agreement with and support for the ideas behind the program.

For example at a meeting of Israeli and Palestinian media professionals on Rhodes in Greece the participants issued a declaration stating '... that freedom of expression is an essential condition for the practice of journalism, and for fostering the culture of peace in the region.' They agreed that they all shared '... the same aspirations for

making peace, regardless of personal opinions of individual participants on the proposed means of achieving them’.

Further, at a meeting of Latin American publishers and editors, the Puebla Declaration noted with concern the experience within their region, saying that ‘. . . the growth and spread of violence is usually preceded and accompanied by hostility and attempts to silence the free press. They stressed that ‘. . . peaceful understanding between nations requires openness of information and opinion in order to overcome differences and reach agreements’. They also condemned the increased use of economic pressure, through long and expensive law suits, to suppress media freedom by governments, rich companies and wealthy individuals. They declared their support for the educational role of the press and its potential role in encouraging co-operation for the consolidation of a culture of peace.

Some Asia-Pacific regional issues for a Culture of Peace

The Asia-Pacific region is one of great diversity, in which there are numerous existing and potential conflicts, threatening the possibility of a culture of peace. The following discussion briefly identifies some themes and issues for possible discussion.

Nationalism and sovereignty.

Colonialism and the post-World War II struggle for decolonisation has resulted in the drawing and redrawing of national boundaries. This has contributed to the partitioning of India and the traumatic creation of the new states of Pakistan and then Bangladesh. It has contributed also to the Indo-China war which has had devastating effects on the development of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, and it left a number of issues of national boundaries contested and unresolved – for example Tibet and Taiwan, Kashmir and clashes in Indonesia, and access to the islands in the South China Sea. In the Pacific sub-region the coercive powers of the state are more obvious in the work of institutions like the police and the military. This power is increasingly abused through political appointments, which are made on highly questionable criteria, and politicians and their cronies ‘behaving above the law’. The recent events in Fiji and the Solomon Islands demonstrated vividly the vulnerability of the state in ethnically-inspired uprising and violence. Ethnic conflicts, as Professor Crocombe pointed out, are a major threat to peace and stability in the Pacific. These are being fuelled by land disputes, economic disparities and the lack of confidence in the government’s ability to resolve differences fairly or satisfactorily, and usually a belief that those with the power to act are either biased, corrupt or ineffective.⁶ More recently the break up of the former Soviet Union in 1990 has led to the expansion and further diversification of the Asia Pacific regions with the re-alignment of the Republics of Central Asia to the Asian region.

Sovereignty and nationalism have often provided excuses for violence and oppression, as the Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan pointed out in a statement to honour the Press Freedom Day last year. Referring to the increasing use of sovereignty to justify abuses in human rights violations, Mr Annan said that as long as he was Secretary General of the United Nations, he would oppose governments using national sovereignty arguments as an excuse to terrorise citizens and warned that the commitment of the United Nations to the sovereignty of nation states should not prevent the organisation from speaking out on abuses of sovereignty. ‘No government’ he said ‘has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the human rights or fundamental freedoms of its people.’⁷

Economic stability and security

The rapid growth of prosperity in Japan and subsequently in the 'Tiger' economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea and then Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines created great social changes. The most notable of these were the growth of the middle class (accompanied by a decrease in poverty levels) and a growing demand from the middle class for greater democratic freedoms. At the same time the rapid economic growth created a massive increase in labour migration from poor regions within countries, and from poorer countries within the region. The financial crisis of recent years has slowed growth and general social well-being in South East and East Asia, presenting governments, scholars, and international institutions with a number of challenges. One of these will be to protect the gains in citizen participation in government. Another will be to ensure that the welfare of the hundreds of thousands of people who have been cast into poverty by the crisis remains high on the national agenda.

Education and curriculum development

In the Asia Pacific region, post-colonial educational curricula, at least in the social sciences, tended to focus on the study and promotion of local and national history, culture and language, and analysis of the social, cultural and economic effects of past oppression on the nation. But in the 1990s there has been an increasing movement towards the examination of contemporary, regional, international and globalisation processes that affect the nations. The trend is towards more interdisciplinary approaches to issues of common interest and concern.

Education curricula in the Asia-Pacific region has developed an increasing concern with the situation of the poor, and of youth and women. There are many national and sub-regional social research projects to document the causes and conditions of poverty, the exploitation of child labour, and the recruitment of young women, men and children into the sex industry. There is also an increase in teaching programs and research centres for women in universities in most countries of the region. There is evidence to suggest that collaborative action between social scientists and national youth associations throughout the region to document and analyse the problems and issues facing young people is increasing. UNESCO, as mentioned earlier, is collaborating with member Governments and other partners to encourage these developments through funding and through reviews of policies relevant to these areas.

Globalisation

The merits and threats of trade liberalisation were issues of debate in the last decade of the twentieth century. Some see trade liberalisation as one of the most powerful engines of economic growth, and oppose international limits on liberalisation to promote workers' rights. But many fear that social protection, if left to the discretion of each state, would allow countries to seek a comparative advantage by minimising the rights and conditions of workers. Small Pacific Island states risk losing the niche markets that are crucial to their economic survival if trade liberalisation continues. The last Director General of UNESCO quotes Zaki Laidi's identification of five characteristics of globalisation, the implications of which have caused anxiety among some counties and civil society:

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- The globalisation of markets (whose impersonal forces have become more mighty than the states) and the power they exert over societies and economies.
- The globalisation of communication, which is creating unprecedented opportunities for social communication.
- The globalisation of culture, which, with the advances made by civil societies, has led to a considerable rise in the number of players in the world game.
- The globalisation of ideology, as increasingly radical liberalism becomes the prevailing orthodoxy worldwide.
- Political globalisation, which marks the end of centuries of the West living off the rest of the world or, put it another way, a shift in the centre of the world's geopolitical gravity.

Referring to the frustrations so far with the long-awaited fruits of globalisation, Federico Mayor made this point:

The end of the cold war might have been expected to 'release' resources for development and peace. But such transfers have been negligible. The globalization of communication, which has turned our planet into a single community – a village, so they say – might have been expected to engender a more widespread sense of unity, and by abolishing distance, to create ipso facto a global sense of solidarity. Nothing of the sort has occurred. Please do not misunderstand me: I am not damning globalization, which in many ways liberalizes, even liberates, invents and forges links. Globalization is neither a good thing nor a bad thing. It is devoid of any emotional content, it is what the human community makes of it – either further proof that fortune smiles on the well-off, the egoists and the cynics among us or, on the contrary, a sign that justice, dignity and solidarity have not entirely deserted this world. It may be either a golden opportunity or a dire peril. In that sense, it is like knowledge: neutral in itself, it acquires meaning and value through the use that is made of it.⁸

Environmental degradation

The greatest issue, as we enter the 21st century, is the threat to world survival posed by the rapid depletion of natural resources due to pollution and over-exploitation. The population of the Asia-Pacific region is approximately 3.5 billion. It is widely assumed in the region that environmental degradation is largely a consequence of the farming and fishing practices of the poor. However more consideration of the effects of the quest for rapid economic growth and consumerism on the depletion of resources is needed to develop a more balanced and realistic view of the problem. Its potential to create conflict is in the growing contest within and between nations to control increasingly scarce natural resources.

Water resources

An example of the potential for conflict over natural resources is the issue of water, a resource without which there could be no life on earth. Water is becoming a vital, shrinking and contested resource and an increasing focus of conflict. For example in the Cauvery river dispute in Southern India, the states of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are in conflict over water access. The issue has been complicated and intensified due

to the displacement of local farmers who depend on the water from the rivers for their livelihood. In the countries sharing the Mekong River, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, and China, there are major debates about internationally accepted criteria for equitable uses of the river's resources. In Thailand and Laos there is conflict between those who advocate and oppose the construction of hydro-electric and irrigation dams. Some point to the benefits of generating 'clean' energy, prevention of flooding and giving poor farmers who live far from rivers access to water for irrigation. Others point to the displacement of settlements, loss of livelihoods from fishing, and environmental damage.

Ethnic conflicts and resources

In hard economic times old forms of discrimination and ethnic conflict re-emerge and civil unrest is more likely to occur. As poverty increases so does competition for resources. It becomes more difficult to restrain the destruction of the environment through pollution, deforestation and over-fishing in the pursuit of renewed economic growth. Such issues are uniting social and natural scientists in their investigation and analysis of related problems.

For example well before the present problems of political change in Indonesia, ethnic conflict and violence over ownership and utilisation of resources had begun to erupt between indigenous and transmigrant communities. In West Kalimantan, the mainly Christian Dayaks' traditional way of life was based on harvesting but not destroying the rain forest. When Moslem Madurese transmigrants were resettled in sparsely populated Dyak territories, they were given deforestation rights in order to clear lands for palm oil. In December 1996, ethnic violence between these two groups began. It continued for six weeks and it was reported that over 300 people died during these clashes. As with many other similar conflicts around the region the religious differences between the two communities were highlighted in reports, diverting attention from the underlying economic conflicts or competition over scarce resources.

Dissemination of information

One of the most important challenges in the Asia Pacific Region is to get information to the general public in an intelligible form so they may make informed decisions on issues which affect their immediate and longterm future. This is the foundation stone of a 'culture of peace'. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out recently that: 'The global information revolution has transformed civil society before our very eyes,' But the growth of global information networks and the internet assist only those who can afford television, cable subscriptions, computers and modems. The international scholarly community may use these resources to keep abreast with emerging issues and debates, but the majority of the population in the Asia Pacific Region is 'information poor'. This includes many of the social scientists in the region whose institutions cannot afford to acquire the information technology to join the 'global village'. The challenge of disseminating key information must be constantly reviewed by the countries in the region with special consideration of the gap between the information rich and information poor.

Dissemination of information is impeded by political as well as technological and economic barriers. Free and open debate is not exactly encouraged in most countries in the region, and because these usually question the status quo in many countries, the initiators have faced political impediments, as has the local press and electronic media.

Most countries in the Asia Pacific region have a long way to go in order to achieve academic freedom or freedom of speech.

One of the two themes which have been re-emphasised in UNESCO's intersectoral programs and activities during its next six-year medium term plan is the promotion of awareness and use of information technology in its major program areas.

Western versus Asian values

This is a contentious issue and frequently cited as an argument in the Asia Pacific region, either to defend or blame various perspectives and approaches to development. In writing about this the Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen argued that:

The question is often asked, that non-Western societies should be encouraged and pressed to conform to 'Western values of liberty and freedom'? Is this not cultural imperialism? The answer, of course, is that the notion of human rights builds on the idea of a shared humanity. These rights are not derived from citizenship of any country, or membership of any nation, but taken as entitlements of every human being. The concept of universal human rights is, in this sense, a uniting idea. Yet the subject of human rights has ended up being a veritable battleground of political debates and ethical disputes, particularly in their application to non-Western societies.'

. . . Dissidents exist in every society, often at great risk to their own security. Western discussion of non-Western societies is often too respectful of authority – the governor, the Minister, the military leader, the religious leader. This 'authoritarian bias' receives support from the fact that Western countries themselves are often represented, in international gatherings, by governmental officials and spokesmen, and they in turn seek the views of their 'opposite numbers' from other countries.

The view that Asian values are quintessentially authoritarian has tended to come almost exclusively from spokesmen of those in power and their advocates. But foreign ministers, or government officials, or religious leaders do not have a monopoly in interpreting local culture and values. It is important to listen to the voices of dissent in each society.⁹

Role of non-government organisations

The NGOs have demonstrated their ability to organise globally and to put pressure on national governments and international organisations in a way that would have been unthinkable just a decade or so ago. Their campaigns and advocacy on issues like land mines, the formation of an International Criminal Court, against unethical practices by the multi-national co-operations, child labour and several other issues have contributed tremendously to the demands for transparency. Governments should encourage and respect the watch-dog role of NGOs.

Intellectual freedom and exchange of ideas

The search for knowledge cannot focus exclusively on issue-based research. There is also an equally important higher level of theoretical and scholarly discourse based on on-going debate and the continuous re-evaluation of prevailing paradigms amongst national, regional and international communities of scholars.

Many scholars in the Asia Pacific region are restricted in their capacity to participate in the global exchange of ideas within their areas of interest because they cannot afford to attend international conferences, or to subscribe to leading journals in their field, or in some instances, because there are political barriers to such participation.

Scholars from Central Asia for example (Mongolia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, etc) have been isolated from international scholarly debates for much of the last century, as it operated within the framework of Soviet education values, bounded by the Russian language and the Marxist Leninist paradigm. Now these republics, independent since 1990, need assistance and encouragement to revitalise their teaching programs through various means, including international exchange programs and translation facilities. UNESCO is in a position to assist member countries to pursue these activities.

Governance

A major issue for a Culture of Peace is governance. Many, perhaps most countries of the Asia Pacific region are affected by problems of corruption, cronyism and a lack of transparency and accountability, which contribute to internal conflict and unrest. Associated with such problems is often the suppression of free speech and restriction upon the press and electronic media. The Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan expressed the crucial role of a free press when he commented that a free press is the best guarantee for sustaining reform and forcing accountability and transparency in the public and private sectors.¹⁰

There are several assumptions which need to be reviewed with respect to the accepted practices and the way they have been abused not just by those who aspire to them but also by their proponents. For example, is democracy still the best way to ensure a just and caring society? Is it still possible to believe in words like 'participation', 'citizenship' or 'justice' when corruption, social marginalisation and erosion of identity are on the rise, along with extremism, wars and massacres aimed at ethnic cleansing? What is the connection between democracy and a society's rate of development?¹¹ Democracy however, it has been argued, is nothing without transparency.

A democratic society must be governed in such a way that people who hold differing or even opposite opinions nevertheless live in harmony. When a society cannot tolerate the members making free use of their right to express their opinions, it demonstrates its weakness and tends to become even weaker still. It inevitably encourages dissimulation and flattery. The hiatus between intimate convictions and expressed opinions becomes constant and a part of daily life. The more citizens are distrustful of their leaders, judges and civil servants, the more the exercise of freedom seems to threaten the cohesion of society. By a pernicious reversal of logic, civic sense becomes a threat to the social fabric since it represents a living denunciation of an order, which can remain in place only by flattering greed and fomenting division. Such a society is condemned to strife, intolerance, hatred and, in the end, to dissolution.¹²

Transparency – making the actions and dealings of governments and large corporations open to public scrutiny – is widely accepted to be a requirement for good governance. But concurrence with the ideas behind transparency is too often limited to lip-service. Owners and holders of information wield significant influence and power,

sharing information means sharing – even losing – power, which is a significant disincentive to translating transparency from rhetoric to reality. Transparency, despite the contradictions in its practice and theory, must be pursued for without it the practice of democratic government and the exercise of people's democratic rights would be difficult if not impossible. In arguing for the establishment of a culture of transparency, Florini points out that although the idea of fostering a culture of transparency, just like the idea of fostering a Culture of Peace, may sound vague, even idealistic, it is actually a concrete proposal for changing the incentives people face and how they think about those incentives. Furthermore there is considerable historical evidence that values can be changed if a new idea and a desire for reform is held and pursued by sufficient numbers of people, particularly those who are in a position to educate and shape public opinion.¹³

Conclusion

In the last year of this millennium the three main forces of globality are changing the face of the Asia Pacific region and the world – the move away from government management of economies; the erosion of national borders as national economies become integrated; and the power of new communication technologies. The UN proclamation of the year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace will help member states address the challenge of global transformation. The last Director General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, pointed to the need for a new global mode of co-operation. This must involve a transition from societies in which the states are the sole organiser of security in a dangerous world, to civil societies that welcome and encourage *citizen participation* in national and international affairs. It must construct peace in the minds of men and women by linking local communities to international communities, and individuals to global networks of shared interest.

Achieving and maintaining a culture of peace is a huge undertaking. It is the most expensive project of the United Nations and it is taxing both intellectually and morally. UNESCO believes it is achievable though and it is seeking partners – individuals, groups and institutions – who are willing to help.

¹ United Nations (1995), *The United Nations at 50*.

² Roosevelt, Theodore, in Thee, Marek (ed) (1995), *Peace! An Anthology*, by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates. UNESCO.

³ Mayor, Federico (1997), *Culture of Peace and Democracy*. UNESCO.

⁴ Sen, Amartya (1998), 'Universal truths: human rights and the westernizing illusion', *Harvard International Review*. Summer, 20, 3.

⁵ Mayor, Federico, Regional Symposium on Co-operative Peace in Southeast Asia, Jakarta. 11 September,

⁶ Crocombe. Ron (2000), *Enhancing Pacific Security: A report prepared for the Forum Secretariat*, June.

- ⁷ Annan, Kofi (1999), *Bangkok Post*, 2 May.
- ⁸ Mayor, Federico (1997), Speech to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces Committee of the Senate on 'Globalisation and Culture of Peace: the African example' Paris, 20 November.
- ⁹ Sen (1998) *op cit*.
- ¹⁰ Pitsuwan, Surin (1998), *The Sunday Nation*, Bangkok: 22, 48411, February.
- ¹¹ (1999), 'Justice and Participation', in *Sources*, 110, March.
- ¹² Mayor, Federico (1998), Speech at a meeting on 'Africa and Globalization: the Challenges of democracy and governance' in Maputo (Mozambique), 2 July.
- ¹³ Florini. AM (1999), 'Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? Politics of Transparency'. Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC, 28-30 April.
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