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The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia was established in 1971. Previously, some of the functions were carried out through the Social Science Research Council of Australia, established in 1942. Elected to the Academy for distinguished contributions to the social sciences, the 428 Fellows of the Academy offer expertise in the fields of *accounting, anthropology, demography, economics, economic history, education, geography, history, law, linguistics, philosophy, political science, psychology, social medicine, sociology and statistics*.

The Academy's objectives are:

- to promote excellence in and encourage the advancement of the social sciences in Australia;
- to act as a coordinating group for the promotion of research and teaching in the social sciences;
- to foster excellence in research and to subsidise the publication of studies in the social sciences;
- to encourage and assist in the formation of other national associations or institutions for the promotion of the social sciences or any branch of them;
- to promote international scholarly cooperation and to act as an Australian national member of international organisations concerned with the social sciences;
- to act as consultant and adviser in regard to the social sciences; and,
- to comment where appropriate on national needs and priorities in the area of the social sciences.

These objectives are fulfilled through a program of activities, research projects, independent advice to government and the community, publication and cooperation with fellow institutions both within Australia and internationally.

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President's Report

The Commonwealth budget was brought down in May, and contained no reference to the grant-in-aid to the Learned Academies that is usually part of the DEST budget. At the time of writing, we still have no official indication of the size of the grant-in-aid (if any) that we can expect for 2006-07. We have informal advice that it will be the same as the previous year, and formal advice that we will not receive the \$115,000 supplement that we have had for the past three years and which we have used to fund a substantial expansion of our activities. The situation is still not clear, but we must prudently plan on a substantial reduction in our income, for the coming year at least. We are in the process of examining what this means for our programs, but it will inevitably reduce the level of activity of the International Program and the Policy and Advocacy Program. We will, if necessary, draw on some of our reserves to manage this difficult situation in the short term.



This very disappointing outcome aggravates our concerns about the report of the Review of the Learned Academies. This report recommended an approximate doubling of our grant-in-aid (to \$660,000 and including a continuation of the \$115,000). It also made a number of generally useful recommendations to which we are responding. These were set out in my last report. But the full report of the Review included a few critical sentences directed to our relation with CHASS and the opinion that we have been 'less energised in reinvigorating [our] organization', that, to our eye, appear gratuitous and ill-founded. We have vigorously contested this opinion, to DEST and to the Minister, believing it to be based on an inadequate appreciation of our extensive submission.

On the more optimistic side, the Review does say that:

Together the five institutions provide easy access to independent advice from some of the nation's best minds. This advice is not only important for guiding the nation in building and maintaining excellence in each of the disciplines represented by the Academies. It is also invaluable for collecting, validating, and disseminating critical knowledge that the public and the nation need for wise decision-making.

And

The Academies maintain fiercely their mandated independence, and the advice and assistance they provide to Government is therefore perceived to be free of political constraints. Advice from the Academies also carries the special prestige and credibility of the Academy members. Government decision-making, therefore, gains an enhanced credibility where it has been informed by the Academies' inputs.

The Fellows provide their expertise on a pro bono basis. Consequently, the cost of advice is very modest, compared with the alternative of employing external consultants. The dollars contributed by Government towards the necessary administrative cost of operating the Academies are greatly leveraged because

the expertise of the Fellows is provided on a pro bono basis. Hence the Academies' advice represents excellent value for money to the Government and the community generally.

Optimising the value of this resource to the Government depends on having appropriate infrastructure to mobilise the volunteers. Harnessing the talents of the Fellows, whether fully employed, or retired, requires talented professional staff to identify, mobilise, coordinate, and support them in their pro bono work. This applies at the individual level – finding one or two Fellows to give advice on a specific issue – but it is especially critical when assistance is requested that requires a consolidation of information and judgments from a range of disciplines, such as preparing a submission on sustainability issues. The Secretariats of the Academies already provide leverage capacity, but the provision of modest additional resources could considerably increase the capacity of the Academies to assist Government and contribute to the national benefit.

We, of course, endorse these sentiments.

The ABS and the Academy

Many Fellows will be aware of an exciting new initiative with the Australian Bureau of Statistics.

The Academy has agreed to manage, on behalf of the ABS, the generation of six or seven original papers, based on data from the 2006 Census. These papers will be about 30 pages long, written in an engaging style and telling an important story about some aspect of Australian life. The topics will be chosen by the Academy in collaboration with the ABS. We already have a number of excellent suggestions, provided by Fellows in response to a request for ideas. The topics will be selected at a meeting in August, and authors (not necessarily Fellows) will be then be commissioned. The ABS will provide for a modest payment to each author. It will also provide support for analysis of the Census. We anticipate that the papers will be published as *Occasional Papers* of the Academy, in our refereed series. They may also be presented at the Census Analysis Conference in early 2009, to be organised by the ABS. If the first set of papers is judged a success by the ABS, they are interested in commissioning a second set in 2009, also based on the 2006 Census. In the longer term, the cycle might be repeated for the 2011 Census.

This collaboration is an excellent fit between the needs and resources of the ABS, and the capacities and objectives of the Academy. The Academy will manage the project, advise on topics and select the authors, ensure that the work is carried out in a timely fashion and to a high standard, and publish the results. It exemplifies what the Review had in mind when it said that the Academies 'provide easy access to independent advice from some of the nation's best minds - [which is] invaluable for collecting, validating, and disseminating critical knowledge.'

Policy Roundtables

A second example of the Academy providing *easy access to independent advice from some of the nation's best minds* is our series of Policy Roundtables. These are managed by the Policy and Advocacy committee, led by Mike Keating. There will be three such roundtables in 2006. The first one, held in May, was based on research

done under the Academy's Learned Academy Grant, on the wellbeing of children (Children, Work and Family). The results of this research were published in 2005 (*No Time to Lose*, published by MUP). The co-editors of the book (Margot Prior and I) were joined by several other contributors and 19 other scholars and policy makers in a half day discussion centred on some of the findings of the research. The format involves active discussion among all participants, stimulated by introductory remarks on each topic. On this occasion, a particular effort was made to involve state-level policy makers. It was a very successful event, and a summary of the discussion, skilfully penned by Anise Clarke, can be found elsewhere in this issue.

A second roundtable will be held in August, also based on the work of a Learned Academy Grant project. This one is on the meaning of 'wellbeing' and its implications for policy, and will be led by the Convenor of that project, Lenore Manderson. It is interesting to note that the Commonwealth Treasury is taking an interest in notions of wellbeing that go beyond the traditional reliance on economic output. Representatives of the Commonwealth Departments of Treasury, Finance, Health and Ageing, Family and Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, the ABS and the Productivity Commission will all participate. Each topic will be introduced by a pair of speakers, one an academic and the other from the public sector.

The third roundtable is a response to a suggestion from the Commonwealth Department of Family and Community Services and Indigenous Affairs. They would welcome an informed discussion on the notion of 'community' and how it may best be fostered. The Academy will draw on work done in a third Learned Academies Grant project, on the sustainability of rural communities, led by Graeme Davison, and will involve other scholars as well.

These roundtables are an excellent vehicle for the Academy to share the knowledge gained from research projects which it sponsors, and exchange ideas in an interactive environment with leading policy makers. They are by invitation, and restricted to about 25 people, so that genuine discussion is possible. Roundtables can also be convened on other topics of interest to Fellows and to an identifiable constituency.

The Academy ARC Linkage Project

Research on the ARC linkage project *The Social Sciences and the Making of Postwar Australia* (led by Stuart Macintyre and in collaboration with the National Library) is well advanced. The focus of the research is the institutional history of the Academy, research policy and how the Government viewed the importance of social science research. A key aim is to present a broad view of social sciences research. The project includes extended interviews with about twenty significant people in the life of the Academy, together with

- a full list of Fellows, by discipline and region;
- the early history of the social sciences governing structure;
- the role of Government and the links forged during the Second World War;
- how the Commonwealth was drawn into funding and the way the Committee and Council became an Academy;
- a comprehensive list of office holders and locations of the Academy.

An important by-product of the self-reflection will be a systematic review of and improvement in our archiving policy. We are fortunate to be able to draw on advice from the National Library, which is reviewing our approach to archiving.

I will finish this report by reminding Fellows of this year's Symposium and AGM. The program of events will begin on the evening of Monday 20 November, with the Colloquium. Ann McGrath, Director of the Australian Centre for Indigenous History, will initiate the discussion of 'Who stole Australian history? Current debates and future directions'. The Symposium, on the intriguing issue of the large scale internal migration in Australia, will draw on the research undertaken for the Learned Academies Project of 2005 (led by Peter McDonald, Graeme Hugo and Martin Bell). In addition to illuminating geographical shifts, it will examine the relationships between internal migration and employment, housing, ageing, the environment, social change, the Indigenous population and impacts on young people. The Symposium will be followed by the Cunningham Lecture, to be given by distinguished student of International Law and Fellow, Hilary Charlesworth.

The AGM, and Panel discussions, will follow on the morning of Wednesday 22nd. There are important matters to be decided at this AGM, arising from the recommendations of the Review. These include the structure of the Panels, and strategies to improve the engagement of the Academy with the next generation of intellectual leaders in the social sciences. I hope that you will attend, and contribute to our decisions and collegiality.

Sue Richardson

President

Anise Clarke has recently joined the Academy Secretariat as Project Manager for the Workshop and Policy and Advocacy Programs. She is a graduate from Flinders University in South Australia where she completed a Bachelor of Arts, majoring in Italian and International Relations. She is currently studying for a Masters degree in International Law at the Australian National University. Anise has a background in working with Academy Fellows in the pure sciences and is looking forward to the diversity of demands within the social sciences. She can be contacted at anise.clarke@anu.edu.au.

Comment

Remote Aboriginal Australia and the Banishment of Culture **Bob Tonkinson**

Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, The University of Western Australia

Federal government policies towards Indigenous Australians since the abolition of ATSIC and the decision to mainstream service delivery seem to have firmed up, beginning with last year's pronouncements by Senator Vanstone about new 'real and practical' solutions to the problem of remote Aboriginal settlements. Federal Minister Tony Abbott's recent call for a 'new paternalism' in Indigenous affairs has provided an appropriate label for current policy orientation. We are getting a clear message that most of the kinds of difference on display in remote Australia are 'dysfunctional' and therefore unworthy of support. This trend would seem to render 'mainstreaming' as little more than assimilation by another name. Remote Aboriginal communities, dubbed by Senator Vanstone 'living museums', should be closed to impel people into 'real' economic relations with the dominant society. Those who stayed put would be opting for 'culture', along with a lifelong welfare dependency, while the migrants would be forced to engage with a mishmash of economically-driven 'mainstream' cultural values.

We are also seeing yet another cycle of media-fuelled moral panic about violence, sexual abuse and other issues in Aboriginal communities, and the federal government seem to have grasped these events as an opportunity to impose new policies that it is making on the run. In a speech in Parliament on May 30th, Federal MP Dr Carmen Lawrence made a timely call for long-term strategies rather than the usual reactive quick fixes. As she noted, there is no point in Minister for Indigenous Affairs Mal Brough trying to absolve the Commonwealth Government of responsibility for Indigenous well-being and acting as if more police and more arrests would solve the problems. Dr Lawrence identifies a 'shocked minister syndrome', aptly labelling it 'galling' in the face of numerous inquiries and reports dealing with violence and other forms of pain and suffering, addressing factors that contribute to these and including suggestions about ameliorative measures. Of particular relevance to my observations are her comments about the 'preferred mode' of governmental response, involving threats to close down remote communities by the stroke of a pen or by starving them of funds. She mentions two significant findings from recent W.A. research: first, that 'the level of clinically significant emotional and behavioural difficulties amongst children is actually lowest in the most remote communities'; secondly, that 'alcohol consumption is much lower amongst the young people who live in those outermost communities than it is among those in metropolitan areas or areas surrounding agricultural and mining regions'.

The current position of Minister Brough and his colleagues, fuelled by reports from conservative think-tanks, such as Gary Johns' on education, is that the failure of past policies is a consequence of too much indulgence of Aboriginal cultural difference,

and that the solution is to take tough measures to enforce conformity with social conservative Australian values. This is a short-sighted view that is also ahistorical. Coercion was a feature of many of the earlier attempts to deal with Indigenous Australians, and the results include some successes but many disasters, such as the stolen generations. If Aboriginal people like the Martu, with whom I have done research over the past forty-odd years, are either lured or compelled away from the homelands they have often struggled long and hard to win back via successful claims to native title, the consequences could be catastrophic. Though significant numbers of Martu now live in Pilbara towns, because of severe medical problems or the availability of some services such as housing and attractions such as alcohol, they are largely segregated – in, but not of, the towns. They are rarely participants in the workforce, being poorly educated and otherwise unready for the jobs that may be available. Their Aboriginal identity and sense of their own difference are mostly positive, but combined with entrenched racist attitudes among many of their co-residents in the towns, serve to perpetuate their exclusion.

There is a dearth of innovative long-term thinking among policy-makers. The Federal Government's current fondness for Shared Responsibility Agreements is certainly an attempt to address the problem of how to motivate Aboriginal people to do what the state wants. However, the blunt carrot and stick approach is more coercive than collaborative, and is offensive in that it requires a high degree of intrusion into the lives of Aboriginal people in return for services other Australians take for granted. SRAs are about modifying autonomy, reducing difference, and doing things for people's own good. Their current prominence strongly suggests that the federal government's price for allowing remote settlements to persist will be a more active coercion of their inhabitants into community-based reciprocal duties aimed at 'fixing' problems, identified via 'consultation' between its agents and community organisations or identified compliant sections of communities, often under duress. The government's agents, public servants, also are receiving incentives for signing people up to SRAs, and this probably distorts the process as well.

The Aboriginal population is diverse, and blanket measures are unlikely to be effective; this is one reason why the policy-making process cannot be rushed, and requires genuine consultation with the people who will be affected. To cite a little of my own experience, ARC-funded research Myrna Tonkinson and I conducted between 2002 and 2005 among the Martu people strongly confirms the continuing pull of country and 'home'; everyone we interviewed in remote communities expressed a preference for staying put. Despite their frequent absences from their home communities, visiting kin, attending funerals, on so on, they remain very attached to them. In fact, within the nexus formed by country, homeland, kin and cultural distinctiveness lie the crucial underpinnings of the strong sense of self, personal identity and feelings of security that imbue Martu with an amazing ability to cope with a plethora of hardships, setbacks and tragedies while retaining a seemingly unshakeable sense of humour, compassion and humanity. These are on the positive side of the cultural coin, the source of people's inner strength and cultural integrity. The retention of their cultural distinctiveness, albeit at considerable social cost and entrenched disadvantage, is still strongly preferred by Martu to the kinds of engagement with the dominant society that not only assault their sense of self but threaten to overwhelm whatever autonomy remains to them. Government policy must recognise that culture (understood by social scientists as the shared values and beliefs of a group that informs their everyday practices) is not like a tumour that can

be excised; rather, it pervades every aspect of people's lives and shapes their sense of self. Culture can be changed and modified, but this requires desire and motivation on the part of its carriers. The challenge to policy makers is to come up with ways to engender such motivation, rather than attempting to impose unwanted or poorly understood measures on those they are seeking to change.

Urban Change

Fay Gale

Emeritus Professor of Geography, The University of Adelaide

Through all of the negative publicity currently highlighting difficulties in some indigenous communities, the positive advances should not be ignored. There have been substantial improvements in the lives of a large number of Aboriginal people depending on where they live. The present media flurry is doing little more than reinforce the negative stereotypes many non-indigenous Australians already hold towards indigenous Australians. It is a one-sided view taken from very selected areas.

Certainly, there is domestic violence in some post-colonial indigenous communities. What we read about in the media now is not new, but has been a hidden feature of post-colonial societies where the former social controls women could exert have been diminished or usurped by outside authorities. Women no longer have the social mechanisms for dealing with men who behave badly. When the women I worked with in the 1970s and 1980s talked of rape and violence by their menfolk, they did so in hushed tones. They said they were afraid to speak out, saying it would be disloyal to their own people and they would be ostracised for criticising Aboriginal men. It was mistreatment by whites they felt they should report, not that of their own people.

The difference is that now some indigenous women are prepared to go public. They are being increasingly supported by other women working in the field, by those nurses, counsellors and welfare workers who daily see the raw edge of male violence. Let us not further reduce the power and influence of these brave women.

We tend to forget that alongside many of the continuing difficulties for post-colonial Aboriginal people in many areas, vast improvements have been taking place in other areas. Since the early 1950s, Aboriginal people, individuals and families, have been voluntarily moving in increasing numbers to the larger rural communities and cities. For a significant number this has been a life-changing move, if not always for the parents then certainly for many of the children. Access to better health, housing and especially education and employment opportunities have changed their lives. Our cities now have increasing numbers of highly articulate, indigenous young people who are teachers, academics, lawyers, doctors and skilled people in a range of other occupations.

Since the 1970s increasing numbers of Aboriginal young people who have come to the cities have become organised and willing to speak out against Aboriginal disadvantage wherever it may be. The advances we have seen in every area of Aboriginal lives, whether in housing, indigenous education, specialised medical facilities or land rights, are due in a large part to the protests and outcries of these educated, vocal, city-based Aboriginal people in raising the consciousness of non-indigenous Australians.

Dare I say that this originally began with the traumatic, forced removal of indigenous children from the late 1940s through the 1960s. These children suffered terribly, in the ways in which they were snatched from their mothers and sent far away; in many

cases, never to see their families again. This suffering has now been well documented, but it is also true that it was in some cases not without positive consequences. In the cities, many of these children were educated; some became articulate and spoke out. In so many areas, they became the initial leaders who raised awareness and began to change the situation.

Since then many more have moved to the cities, for various reasons, but amongst other benefits they have received better education than was possible in the smaller communities. This has been facilitated by the introduction of a number of positive policies such as Aboriginal scholarships that have made secondary and tertiary education possible for those previously denied those opportunities. How important, but also how fragile, the Abstudy scheme has been in this process can be seen by the drop in enrolments since 2000 when the scheme was changed and per capita funding reduced.

An exciting development in recent years has been the number of independent schools offering scholarships to Aboriginal young people. These include full board and thus enable young people to escape the environments that are counter-productive to study. But unlike the 1950s and 1960s these are voluntary moves and those participating can go home during holidays, maintain their family and cultural ties, and thus continually renew their links to country.

The future does have a silver lining but it will need a great deal of financial and other support from all Australians and some continuing sacrifice by the young people themselves. It is not, and never will be, helped by negative images regularly portrayed by the media and many politicians.

Between them, *Bob Tonkinson* and *Fay Gale AO* have around 100 years of experience working with and within Aboriginal communities in various parts of Australia.



Lessons from the Americas?

This issue of *Dialogue* considers some aspects of changes occurring in the Americas, particularly those 19 republics of the 'South' of the Americas, commonly known as Latin America, and the impact of geographical location on the USA (often referred to as 'the North').

To begin, a cautionary tale.....

It is time for the socks. They're thick, patterned in brown geometrical shapes and made from alpaca wool. I bought them in Bolivia and going to bed in my warm, now tattered socks always reminds me of that bizarrely beautiful, desperately poor country. I bought them in summer. It was raining and cold and devilishly difficult to climb the cobbled street to the hotel. Altitude sickness had hit me with a vengeance in La Paz, a city nearly 4000 metres above sea level, and my knees buckled, my head ached, my vision blurred; breathing was agony. I was served tea made from coca leaves and felt better.

There is a legend about Coca.

She was a beautiful woman, whose beauty was total. Generous of spirit and body, she never said 'no'. Men loved her generosity for they always felt heroic, humbled and full of grace when they had been with her. The women of the village grew angry and resentful; Coca was too flawless, too giving, and their men could not be satisfied with ordinary wives who grumbled and loved more selfishly.

Finally the anger of the women reached into the men, and poisoned their hearts. They came for Coca, and even as she died, she blessed them with smiles of understanding.

They buried her with eyes averted, appalled by what they had done. In the morning the turned earth was covered with a plant. They called it coca, and gathered its leaves with reverence, to make tea, to drink in the beauty of Coca. The tea soothed the pain of dysentery, dried up the vomiting of infants. When chewed, the leaves dulled the pangs of hunger, and eased the breathlessness of women climbing slopes on the treeless high plains of the Andes to tend the llama and alpaca.

The inhabitants of that vast mountain range, later to be known as the Andes, and the slopes down to the mighty river, began to cultivate the coca plant as knowledge of its medicinal qualities spread. Over the centuries, it became commonplace; great sacks of leaves lay in markets, between the coriander and the cumin, the cooking herbs. Women in wide skirts, numerous stiff petticoats and aprons squatted behind the sacks. Their long dark hair hung in plaits under the pork pie hat.

In the warmer parts of Bolivia, on the slopes of the Amazonian basin, they found that four coca crops a year could be grown. The demand was great and agricultural advisers who came from the North to suggest oranges instead caused puzzlement. Why wait so many years for a return?

'Oh, but coca is turned into cocaine' said the experts, 'and people in the North are dying from it'. Dying? How could you die from such a beneficent plant? The Bolivian farmers shrugged and sipped their tea. They listened, because they are polite, and know they may learn useful things. But oranges do not cure the sickness of children

or dull the hunger pangs in the furnace of the tin mines, or help the climb to 4000 metres above sea level. 'More tea?' they asked.

When I put on my Bolivian socks, to warm me in winter, I remember the dignity and generosity of the people who tended the animals, spun the wool, and knitted the socks that provide me with such comfort. In my warmth there is a history, a legend, a land of different lives. I dream of a village without trees, the mud bricks squatting in the landscape from which they have come, the smoke wisping from the flat roofs and into the glare of sky. Even the sky is cold in this stark, exposed altitude, the high plains of the Andes. I hear the faint echoes of pan pipes, the quena, music that seems to emanate from the distant snowy peaks. The music fades into the wail of the siren, and another shift blinks into the glare of daylight in Potosi, a shabby town that in the 16th century was a city, rich on the silver mines, larger and more sophisticated than London. The silver has mostly gone; tin is left, deep underground. The miners are all young, and fatigue etches lines around the bulge in the cheek. The wad of coca leaves and lime has made it possible to endure another day in a life that will end too soon as 'black lung' strangles the dream.

I am awake. My shoulders are cool now, and I slide back into the heat of the bed. The socks are magic, special in the way that Coca was. Somewhere, someone dies of an overdose of cocaine, the processed, 'value-added' product of coca, sniffing powder to learn how it is to be heroic, humble and full of grace.

Peg Job, Editor



Neo-feudalisation and the Rhetoric of Development in Latin America

Jeff Browitt

I often begin my university courses on Latin America with a provocation: 'Latin America does not exist'. Coined by a French diplomat in the mid-nineteenth century as an attempt to throw a net, as it were, over societies apparently infused with 'Latinity', the term Latin America covers at least 19 republics which often exhibit markedly different characteristics, especially if one compares the Southern Cone countries with the Meso-American and Andean nations. Thus the term often conceals more than it reveals. Nevertheless, all so-called Latin American countries do share a history of violent imposition of Iberian Catholicism and languages and an Iberian version of Westernisation. In addition, all have suffered through colonial relations and subsequent neo-colonial arrangements after independence, as local elites continue to sell out to Euro-North American nations and their globalising corporations. This dependent relationship has only been exacerbated under neoliberal economic restructuring over the last two decades, which has left the majority of Latin American poor even worse off. Though the recent turn to social democratic governments in Latin America should therefore be welcomed, we should not celebrate too hastily. The world has been substantially restructured in this time and control of 'national'

development has largely been transferred to the capitalist, transnational corporations. Capital now flows to where it can get the highest returns on its investment and where it is least encumbered by unionism and controls on the repatriation of profits.

What we are witnessing since at least the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing vacuum of alternative politico-economic imaginaries, is not so much the withering away of sovereign nation-states (as per the inflated claims of globalisation theorists) as a widening breach between the state and the cultural nation. Citizens, in theory, identified with the constitutional order and national administrations via the integrative dynamics of national cultural belonging. But state sovereignty and national identity in Latin America are now challenged from without – by multiple transnational links, such as global telecommunications and entertainment media, global capital flows, multinational financial institutions which shape economic investment and strategy – and from within – by alternative or parallel power structures, including local mafias, revolutionary groups, paramilitaries and informal economies. In many countries (Andean nations, Mexico and Central America), the crisis of the nation-state has created a vacuum of legitimacy into which have flowed military and paramilitary forces and the drug industry, especially over the last 15-20 years, all of which have problematised the successful functioning of electoral politics and the rule of law, the twin pillars of modern democratic states. Given similar tensions in Africa and the Middle East, we are witnessing the normalisation of an already existing situation in which an international constabulary of 'First-World' nations trying to maintain 'stability' by 'peace-keeping' forces, counter-drug, nuclear-trafficking and anti-terrorism operations, bullying in the United Nations, withholding of aid and humanitarian assistance, and when necessary, a punitive 'coalition of the killing' against 'renegade' states. This is the real New World Order.

In this crude, Darwinian nexus between neoliberal restructuring and state illegitimacy, much of the world, and certainly Latin America, seems to be heading towards a kind of neo-feudalism. To label current world politico-economic processes 'neo-feudal' is of course a rhetorical flourish. Nevertheless, with a little license one can draw some striking resemblances with classical feudalism. If feudalism was considered a form of socio-economic organisation which privileged control by a reduced number of feudal lords within a decentralised state structure, then it is not too outlandish, for sake of argument, to see a rough parallel with the current nexus of reciprocal 'obligations' between a transnational class of wealthy executives and shareholders of large, blue-chip corporations backed up by 'democratic' state structures, the military (especially of the United States and other G8 countries) and international 'consensual' agreements on trade to maintain access to markets. These neo-feudal lords of capital maintain economic (and often political) hegemony over states similarly decentralised within globalisation. Meanwhile, the vast majority of the world population, especially in 'developing' countries (the term is always ideological), provide bodies and minds easily coopted into armies, low-skill low-paid jobs or religious fundamentalisms, while the financial nobility administer the ever-widening wealth gap between rich and poor. However, as opposed to classical feudalism, which operated on the basis of a virtual caste system, limiting social mobility, in neo-feudalism anyone who respects the rules of the capitalist game can advance. Thus it is no surprise to see the wealthy elites from the so-called 'Third-World', and latterly the (ex-Soviet) 'Second-World', sharing the same social space around the world as First-World elites as they mimic their lifestyles and aspirations.

If the post-Enlightenment period witnessed an opening up of a political-civil public sphere partially separate from the private realm of business, this is once again closing down within neoliberal restructuring. Whereas in classical feudalism public and private were not separate realms because the affairs of the feudal lord were both, here we have a curious inversion, but similar collapse, as everything becomes privatised and under the sway of those who have capital: workers become dependent on private interests that are more powerful than democratically elected polities. In this scenario, in which the world is manifestly capitalist, to imagine some significant socio-economic change in Latin America in a progressive direction within a Western developmentalist paradigms is, of course, a fantasy. Let us review the course of such developmentalism in the twentieth century by tracing the rise and fall of dependency theory. A brief excursus will reveal, I believe, why the course of events could never really have been any different within a Western, developmentalist model. In order to do this, we need to look back to dependency theory's precursor – modernisation theory – since dependency theory was an answer to the failings of modernisation policies in less-developed nations.

Modernisation theory

One conception of development, and a dominant one at that, is purely economic, that is, principally concerned with statistical indicators of economic growth or stagnation, such as Gross Domestic Product. Behind the economic approach is the assumption that if we take care of the economy, the benefits will trickle down to everybody. Other definitions, however, view development in a more holistic way; for instance, as the social condition of a nation, that is, as the set of indicators which determine if the basic needs of a population are being met. Such basic needs might comprise education, health, housing, employment, provision of energy, clean water, security and so forth. A country may register solid growth in terms of macro-economic indicators such as GDP, but in no way does it necessarily follow that this growth is converted into benefits for the whole population or that it is distributed evenly across all regions according to the spectrum of needs to which I have just alluded. This is, of course largely the case in Latin America.

Though modernisation theory had its heyday in the 1950s, it is still the dominant paradigm underpinning global trade and the foreign policy of most so-called Western, industrial democracies, especially the United States, as can be seen in US rhetoric regarding Afghanistan and Iraq. Modernisation theory originally grew out of the aftermath of the Second World War and the rise of the Soviet Union.¹ The democratic West, especially the USA, sought to minimise the influence of the Soviet Union over less-developed nations and to this end theorised the 'obstacles' to development of so-called Third World nations so as to facilitate and accelerate their entry into the orbit of Western liberal democracy. Many new nation-states were born out of the wave of postwar decolonisation in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. While Latin American nations had become independent much earlier, as far back as the 1820s, they were considered still 'vulnerable' to Communist ideology, political instability and military coups, especially given that they were said to have never, or only partially, modernised. For modernisation theorists, then, economic prosperity and political stability were thus considered to go hand in hand. The type of modernisation flowing out of such views is virtually synonymous with Europeanisation and Americanisation: market capitalist modes of production and consumption underpinned by liberal, parliamentary democracy. In this scenario, 'traditional' pre-modern social and cultural

values and political structures are regarded as obstacles to development and therefore in need of renovation, if not outright rejection. Backing up this attitude is a belief in the long, slow evolution of economy and society in the developed West as inevitable and natural. What was needed, then, was a bourgeois revolution in each developing country. In order to bring about such change, non- or under-developed countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America became the target of a struggle for hearts and minds (and stomachs) in the context of the Cold War. Both the USA (especially through the Alliance for Progress for Latin America) and the Soviet Union sought, through aid, technological transfer, preferential trade arrangements and, where necessary, coercion, to draw the less-developed world into their respective orbits.

The birth of dependency theory

Modernisation theory has been heavily criticised by non-metropolitan intellectuals and political economists for several reasons: it assumes that European values and European ways of doing things are some sort of universal truth to which the 'developing' nation should aspire; it assumes that developing countries have a homogeneous set of values and that these are necessarily traditional, ignoring the sometimes important differences between elites and the under-classes in these countries; it automatically assumes that tradition and development are necessarily antithetical; lastly, it makes an assumption (by no means proven) that military dictatorship and authoritarianism, the bane of many developing countries, are primarily issues of underdevelopment. Dependency theory was born in answer to these shortcomings. It was largely a Latin American-derived theory and had its roots in the 1950s in the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), a think-tank for resolving development issues in Latin America. One of the outcomes of ECLAC studies was a policy to break with what were regarded as dependent relations with the developed metropolitan states by a kind of economic nationalism. The first major dependency theorist was Raul Prebisch, who was originally an Argentinian economic adviser in the 1930s.² For Prebisch, development theorists should focus on both the external and internal political and economic factors, which explain underdevelopment, rather than the internal failings which modernisation theorists consider the cause of under- or non-development. Developing countries were disadvantaged by unequal terms of trade, that is, the purchasing power of primary products consistently falls against manufactured products and this creates a built-in disadvantage. This situation reflects the international division of labour set up by colonialism in which core (metropolitan nations) retained capital-intensive production and peripheral nations provided low-skilled labour and raw materials. Prebisch proposed that the conditions for development therefore required: a strong role for the state in promoting national development; a strong emphasis on industrialisation and import-substitution policies (ISI) linked to the creation of internal demand for national products so as to reduce reliance on imported industrial manufactures; giving preference to local-national capital investment and increasing wages for workers in order to create purchasing power for the new consumer goods that would be produced in and for the domestic market; and the protection of the whole national system by tariffs and quotas.

In all, Prebisch considered that development was possible for poor countries within Western, capitalist models if they would only adjust and develop (that is, 'industrialise') their internal economies through state intervention. While this policy had some success, especially during the 1940s and in the context of scarcity due to

the Second World War, such policies soon ran into contradictions. As Ankie Hoogvelt affirms:

the issues of class and income distribution would rebound on [the Import-Substitution theorists'] policies with a vengeance ... the Import-Substitution model had in fact led to a deepening of dependence and to further underdevelopment because the existing, colonially-inherited class structure had rendered a highly unequal income distribution which limited internal markets ... it had skewed the industrialization process towards meeting the needs of the elites, while such a pattern of production involved heavy reliance on imported producer goods, spare parts, technology and so on. On the other hand, the increasing severe balance-of-payments problems resulting from this pattern of industrialization made for ever-greater dependency on foreign firms which had been invited to set up their producer-goods plants and technology locally ... [In addition] Latin American subsidiaries became the dumping ground for obsolete foreign plant and machinery ... Over time, remitted returns on foreign investment came to exceed net inflows several times over.³

We need to know some of the details of these economic and social twists and turns in order to take on board these arguments. However, it is naïve in the extreme to imagine that the developed world ever really wanted the under-developed world to catch up and potentially dominate international markets, in spite of the undoubted good intentions of some in the developed West. It is the long-term failure of import-substitution policies that ushered in a more radical and Marxist-inspired dependency theory.

Marxist-inspired dependency theory

The conclusions drawn from the failures of Import Substitution Industrialisation policies were that metropolitan or 'core' nations still continue to dominate less-developed nations and that this is a legacy of European imperialism. Theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank, Fernando Enrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Paul Baran and others began to theorise a 'dependency' model of international economic relations. Their brand of dependency theory has been invaluable in reminding us that the history of Western European expansionism and the rise to hegemony of the USA is not a benign tale of natural and inevitable evolution. Rather it began with the plundering of New World wealth by the Iberian empire and the subsequent violent colonisation, exploitation and enslavement of non-European peoples. During its mercantilist phase in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the domination and exploitation of non-European peoples and geographies and the extraction of their mineral wealth was subordinated to the overall goal of bankrolling wars in struggles for hegemony on the European continent. However, after the European Enlightenment and the rise of the political and economic power of the European bourgeoisies and the onset of industrialisation, not only interstate rivalry, but *capitalist expansion itself*, becomes the motor of Western expansion. European colonies become tributaries to this expansion, locked into a system of unequal exchange. By the end of the nineteenth century, two thirds of the planet was territorially controlled by the European colonial powers.

After the industrial revolution had been consolidated in Europe, indeed, contributing to that consolidation, manufactured goods and technology were transferred to the colonies both as an outlet for European industrial goods and in order to create the conditions for the same. The colonies, on the other hand, became merely the providers of raw materials, often depending on one cultivated food crop or one main

mineral extractive industry. This huge investment would come to lay the foundation for subsequent 'neo-colonial' dominance through overseas corporations and investments, which would yield handsome profits throughout the twentieth century, whether in ex-colonies such as those of Latin America, or in the newly-independent colonies of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, which were formed after World War II. As the value of primary commodities gradually declines in the second half of the twentieth century, the value of manufactured and technological goods and equipment rise, forcing less-developed countries and colonies further into conditions of unequal exchange. In contradistinction to modernisation theorists, then, the radical dependency theorists see external factors as more important than internal ones. The lack of development in poorer countries is seen as both a *structural* and *historical* problem of long standing.

Though European states also had internal problems of exploitation and poverty, they developed strong social welfare states to compensate for and ameliorate poverty, in effect buying loyalty to the capitalist system. They created 'diamond-shaped' socio-economic structures, with a burgeoning middle class for general political participation and as consumers with purchasing power for manufactured goods. Non-metropolitan developing countries, on the other hand, devolved into primary-producing, pyramidal structures, authoritarian states characterised by a small and extremely wealthy elite sitting atop a mass, poverty-stricken underclass. The elite entered into alliance with foreign corporations and financial institutions for their own benefit and to the detriment of their own people.

Andre Gunder Frank used the term *underdevelopment* to describe the historical result of this process. Traditionally, lack of development in many countries had been attributed to the under-exposure to modernisation, and it followed that such countries could only become developed by the diffusion of 'capital, institutions and values' consonant with European liberal democracy and industrialisation. But for Frank, 'underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage ... [but] is generated by the very same historical process which also [generates] economic development: the development of capitalism itself'. That is to say, the expansion and development of the core nations *precisely depends upon the underdevelopment of the periphery*. Regions were exploited in an unequal exchange (whatever form that unequal exchange might take) such that the more developed, capitalising nation or area of the world could carry out the necessary process of capital accumulation and modernisation for its own continued expansion. For Gunder Frank, the so-called modern and traditional areas of the world are thus 'fully ... integrated parts of the imperialist system'. The only path to change, in Frank's early writings, was through class struggle and socialist revolution.⁴

For their part, Fernando Enrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, while adopting a similarly 'structural-dependency' model within a 'world-system' approach to development and underdevelopment, nevertheless nuanced Gunder Frank's model by 'sociologising' their analysis: 'We do not see dependency and imperialism as external and internal sides of a single coin, with the internal aspects reduced to the condition of "epiphenomenal"'.⁵ Rather, Cardoso and Faletto prefer to examine the specificities of each situation of dependency and the 'particular relationships and struggles between social classes and groups at the international as well as the local level'.⁶ Thus their model pretends to give an account of the way local social groups either reproduce or resist imperialism in the post-colonial period. For example, local bourgeoisies may seek alliances with multinational corporations, or alternatively, with local social and

economic forces, to distance themselves from such influence, particularly the US multinational corporations. Within this model, then, there is scope for both dependency *and* development. Nevertheless, development in non-metropolitan countries will always be limited by dominance from the core and thus Cardoso and Faletto also end by calling for a socialist-inspired break with Western capitalist development and a more regional, autonomous development strategy through regional cooperation.

Now a key idea here is that of *autonomy* or *autarky*, the state of being politically and economically self-sufficient. In our globalising period, of course, this is virtually impossible to achieve. Ironically, if being tied to the developed capitalist-industrial world was previously considered a curse, nowadays, *not being tied to this system*, in effect being abandoned as no longer useful for metropolitan expansion, is considered an even worse situation: for so-called underdeveloped countries, no capital flows in to keep the economy afloat and these societies start to disintegrate socially – pick your own example around the world. Witness, for instance, the sad sight of Nelson Mandela, a self-declared socialist, going cap in hand to international corporations virtually begging for investment in South Africa, without which the ANC cannot deliver its post-Apartheid promises. Black South Africans, for perfectly understandable historical reasons, were very late in kicking the white racists out of power. If this had occurred 20 years earlier in a period when national states were much bigger players in international trade and finance and had a managerial role in promoting development, then South Africa may have ‘caught up’ a bit to the developed West and may have uplifted its largely poverty-stricken black under-classes.

But internationally, or rather globally, the name of the game now is catering to global corporations for investment, investment which only comes when these corporations have squeezed tariff reduction concessions, guarantees of non-union interference, no restrictions on capital transfer and profit repatriation. Such corporations no longer seem bound by the national governments where they are primarily based. Furthermore, the technological changes and computerisation of production these days often requires very little manual labour. These kinds of investment, then, hardly do much for the masses of poor people around the globe, but merely serve to line the pockets of the voracious shareholders of global corporations. The situation does not look good.

One commentator offers a devastating critique of the failures of Western developmentalism and its legacy. Oswaldo de Rivero, a former Peruvian diplomat and ambassador to the United Nations, was present at the first 1967 round of GATT agreements (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). He was also present 20 years later in Uruguay, which is when he began to come to the conclusion that after 20 years of virtual ‘non-development’ and because of the comparative disadvantage of so-called developing countries, most would not catch up and modernise like the developed world, but would gradually (or rapidly) sink into permanent decline. His startling propositions are worth quoting at length:

Two hundred years after the emergence of the modern capitalist nation-state, and more than forty years into the reign of the myth of development, reality shows that the rule is the non-development of at least 130 countries and the exception is 4 newly industrialised countries (NICs) – Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong... In total the four represent a mere 2 per cent of the population of the misnamed ‘developing world’... These are the only cases that

could be said to have undergone a process similar to that experienced 150 years ago by the present-day capitalist industrialized powers. That is, they have achieved a productive technological transformation and a sizeable conversion of the poor into middle-class citizens... Because the world strategic context has changed, it would be impossible to reproduce the emergence of this small archipelago of four almost-developed capitalist economies in the vast ocean of world underdevelopment made up of the poor, low-income populations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.⁷

This does not mean that some countries won't find a niche within the global capitalist system and be uplifted or be dragged along for political purposes. Here we need to add to de Rivero's list at least Portugal and Spain who have been lifted up, as it were, into the European Union. Also, some regions *within* poor nations do very well compared to others. China and India, for example, have made huge strides in developing strong, extremely populous middle classes of consumers. This reminds us that when we restrict our discussion to large entities like nation-states, we often miss certain dynamic sectors, regions and classes. As a similar example of misrecognition, foreign trade statistics boast that in 2004 Mexico ran a staggering 45-billion US dollar trade surplus with the United States due to Mexico's 10-year long integration into the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Mexico, it would seem, has been 'chosen' as a strategic partner. But let us not be fooled: macro-economic statistics very rarely indicate the regional and class variations of the distribution of such a surplus or the full economic impact of neoliberal restructuring. They throw little light on the living conditions and the despair among poor Mexicans (the majority), who have to deal on a day-to-day basis with chronic shortages of basic necessities. Most of that surplus is oil money and does not represent jobs. This is to say that all the exceptions to millenarian condemnation to underdevelopment only prove the rule that development is not for all. And even when some countries reach a certain level of economic and technological development, the more advanced countries have moved on to a higher level of technology and capital accumulation – it is a no win game for countries with a built-in structural disadvantage – they still remain tributary. Developing nations are never going to catch up, can never respond to a script written by the developed nations in a particular period of history. Capitalism doesn't work that way; it does not operate by democratic levelling, except in a purely formal way. Political democracy is one thing, economic democracy altogether another.

Rivero concludes by saying that perhaps all these underdeveloped nations, these non-viable economies, can now hope for is a cross-class alliance between national political parties to try and at least guarantee the minimum of energy security, clean water and food for their people. The idea of ever attaining the level of development and lifestyle we enjoy here in Australia is just out of the question. This is so, in part, because of greed by the West, which will never cede, it seems, its dominant position and its luxurious lifestyles. But it is also due to the fact that the environment could not withstand the industrial onslaught necessary to bring everyone up to the same level of consumption.

The decline of dependency theory

In spite of the obvious link between the developed world's success being dependent in large part upon the underdeveloped world's lack of development, dependency theory nevertheless lost favour among analysts, due to many factors. Dependency theorists such as Gunder Frank had called for socialism as the only way of

overcoming chronic dependency and under-development, but *really existing socialism*, not socialism in the abstract, did not look very attractive, especially given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the internal troubles of socialist development in general. This collapse of Leftist revolutionary projects was composed of many elements, including: the reality of Left-authoritarian regimes; suffocating central command economies and the destructive impact on the environment of rapid, cut-price industrialisation; the decline of the 'lettered city' in the non-socialist West, which had hitherto buoyed and nurtured oppositional intellectuals and Leftist theoretical discourse, and its replacement by privatised audio-visual media; the unresolved problems of Marxism, at least its statist, dogmatic variants, its teleological fantasies, its lingering attachment to centralism and political vanguardism, its economic reductionism, its insistence on categorising people within the discourse of political economy and neglecting the concomitant and important need for cultural self-understanding. To these issues one must add the uncertainty with the nation form: the waning, not so much of the State, as *statism per se* in face of the power of transnational corporations to steer and engineer economies. Here the State is not so much a weak entity (and arguments can be made to that effect *vis-à-vis* globalisation talk), as the very source of insecurity and disorder as it attempts to accommodate the nation to the imperatives of neoliberal capitalism. This triggers a crisis of identity in the 'cultural' nation, unable to isolate itself from or police the flows of global cultural imaginaries, largely dominated by the United States.

But aside from these problems with Leftism and the state, dependency theory's binary schema struggled to explain the success, for example, of the newly-industrialised countries (NICs) like the Asian tiger economies, or indeed the intermediate or semi-peripheral economic success of a country like Australia. In addition, dependency theory used the nation-state as the basic unit of analysis in a period when the nation-state, as the rhetoric goes, was already beginning to be eclipsed in importance by globalisation trends. Other theories began to gain more credence than dependency theory, namely, World-systems and Globalisation Theories. Before concluding this essay, let us look at these latter theories very briefly, if only to partially refute them, for it seems to me that the claims of globalisation theorists have always over-reached, and even contradicted, the brute empirical facts.

World-systems and Globalisation Theories

World-systems theory is principally associated with the Fernand Braudel School in New York, whose iconic figure is Immanuel Wallerstein.⁸ World-systems theory differs from dependency and modernisation theory in the following way: it does not take the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, but rather the world itself, which is construed as an interdependent system; world-systems theory tends to look at the cyclical rhythms and historical dynamics of world-systems rather than the boom-bust cycles of national economic histories; as opposed to the bi-polar, core-periphery model of the dependency theorists, world-systems theory uses a tri-partite model of core, semi-periphery and periphery; for dependency theory, European-North American style development is harmful, while for world-systems theorists it offers the possibility of both upward and downward mobility in the world economy. This might explain, for instance, the success of Australia, but also the failure of Argentina, which early in the twentieth century had the same potential as Australia. Wallerstein sees capitalism as one system among others that have risen to dominance in the historical world economic system. It is, however, a system that has persisted for a long time

without falling apart and without coming under one unified political structure. This gives it the air of a self-perpetuating juggernaut that operates and expands according to its own logics. For some, it also gives it the air of being 'natural'.

Globalisation theory, while sharing many characteristics with world-systems theory, differs in that it places a lot of emphasis on the cultural sphere, especially global communications networks as these intersect with the global IT industries. We live in a world where consumption is king and even if poor people cannot consume at the levels the rich do, nevertheless their imaginaries are dominated by images of the good life (a life of excessive consumption) as portrayed through the television, movie and advertising industries. Furthermore, globalisation theory differs from world-systems theory in that the core is considered to be more dispersed and not nation-state centred.⁹ In addition, there has occurred a transnationalisation of class divisions: the poverty-stricken masses in the underdeveloped world join the labouring poor in the developed countries in a transnational underclass, especially as welfarism in core countries comes under attack and is subject to dismantling; and the bourgeois shareholding classes of both the developed West and the underdeveloped non-West now approximate and mimic each other, especially as primary loyalty to the nation-state begins to break down and is replaced by primary loyalty to the corporations in which they hold shares. Even the massive tertiary education super funds for academics in Australia invest our super contributions on the open share market in major banks and in major global corporations around the world, instead of investing the money in more socially-useful, even if less profit-making, enterprises such as low-cost housing. No one, it seems, is outside the global system of capitalist development and expansion. But this focus away from traditional Leftist concepts such as 'imperialism' (both in the cultural and the general sense) and onto 'globalisation', an amorphous and less purposeful project as the distinguishing feature of our late-modern period, nevertheless brings its own problems.

Globalisation is a term which tends to resonate with the idea of a purely geographical spread, whereas imperialism and neo-colonialism (a term which conjures up images of a residual or less overt imperialism) are decidedly political, and therein lies the rub. Predictably, for a discourse that supplants a specifically political critique with a culturalist one, the appropriate response to the globalisation of capitalist modernity becomes one of intervention on the cultural level. The benefits of such an intervention, however, are yet to be assessed longterm. There are therefore a lot of pitfalls and contradictions in progressive attempts to stem the tide of capitalist globalisation or imperialism, whichever way one wishes to describe it. Exactly how the Latin American rural and urban poor are meant to survive in all this is uncertain and un-theorised, especially given that the vast majority of Latin Americans are still mired in the nation-state as the most relevant structure that impinges on their lives.

Conclusion

To sum up, dependency theory still has its usefulness, even if only to signal that the whole world system is interdependent, yet unfair. After the collapse of socialism, no one knows what to do to uplift the poorer countries of the world. The old models don't seem to work and the current neoliberal variant of capitalist relations seems to have taken Darwinism to an extreme. Unfortunately, the developed world is forever 'ahead' due to comparative advantage in terms of capital, technology, and military power to back up its 'open-door' policies of trade. The developed world also dominates international finance – the major world banks are located in the developed world,


including those international financial powerbrokers of development, the IMF and the World Bank. Even peak international political institutions such as the United Nations cede veto power to the major Western industrial nation-states; thus safeguards are built in against 'popular' moves to redress global imbalances. China is perhaps the only exception to this rule. Western-style development also implies profound social and cultural change, which has sometimes devastating effects on non-European societies. Furthermore, the cost to the environment of Western-style development for the whole globe is perhaps too catastrophic to even contemplate.

For the moment, however, it seems that there is no practical horizon beyond industrial capitalism. With signs of uncertainty and fatigue on the Left after the collapse of Left authoritarianism and revolutionary nationalism in the Soviet Union, China, Nicaragua, the indiscriminate violence of *Sendero Luminoso* in Peru, the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Colombia, and the faltering trajectory of the Cuban Revolution, the way forward is clouded. 'Third World' peoples (another heavily ideological phrase) struggle for a level playing field within capitalism to avoid being merely tributary. But 'fairness' and 'levelling' are antipathetic to capitalist logic, even within the so-called 'First World' with large, exploited under-classes. The dream of autarky, a la *Macondo*¹⁰ – living in splendid isolation – is mere fantasy and returning to the past is not an option. Once socio-economic structures have been fundamentally altered, there is no going back to before modernisation, except in some apocalyptic sense, because land tenure patterns have been irreversibly altered. In a related change, the majority of Latin Americans are now statistically urban and no longer rural; and the informal economy now accounts for more people than the formal economy. With a looming environmental crisis and the inability to turn back the clock on socio-economic change, large, sprawling, polluted and chaotic cities will stutter and stumble onwards, trying to meet the demands for fresh water, energy and housing. Massive migration both within and across national borders will continue apace.

There is of course another face to this bleak scenario – the incredible resilience and creativity-within-survival of Latin Americans, especially the poor. But this pales in the face of the ruthlessness of contemporary capitalism and Latin America is plugged into the global economy, however imperfectly, at least for the foreseeable future. Our Western societies preach Christian spirituality, but we nevertheless worship the Golden Calf – money. Truly helping your neighbour without motives of gain seems to be out of the question. International economic development is as Darwinian as one could imagine. Perhaps what the non-metropolitan, non-dominant countries need to do, then, is seek alternative paths to the future and jettison the whole rhetoric of Western developmentalism. There is no possibility of retreating into splendid isolation or the past, but it may be possible to forge models, call them 'developmentalist' if you wish, which really do answer to the needs of all of their populations; models that do not rely on obsessive consumption of non-essential goods, nor contribute further to environmental overload.

Recently, we have seen a resurgence of social-democratic governments in Latin America. These are governments still committed to capitalist development pathways, but keen to bolster and rebuild social welfare provisions for their peoples:– that is, with a more holistic sense of development. This is true of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Bolivia and Peru and may have been for Mexico a few weeks back if not for the dubious computation of the 2006 election results. But whether this new holistic

mode of development can be achieved remains to be seen. Meanwhile, preferred regions and cities (or sections thereof) will nervously and energetically attempt to plug further into technological globalisation (economically, culturally, and even socially), as the Latin American middle and upper-middle classes tied into the international system mimic the lifestyles of their counterparts in the 'First World', North Atlantic nations. They will leave behind their fellow nationals, the vast underclass of poor from whom they will attempt to quarantine themselves by building gated communities and investing in second passports, second lifestyles and second homes in cities like Miami. Class polarisation and radical stratification will persist. In this dystopian environment it is perverse to go on talking about 'development'. If this interpretation of contemporary Latin America seems too freewheeling and too apocalyptic, it is meant to be, as both cautionary tale and lament.



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 - ⁶ *Ibid*: xvii.
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 - ⁹ See Hardt, M and Negri, A (2000). *Empire*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
 - ¹⁰ A reference to the setting of Gabriel García Márquez's Nobel Prize-winning novel, *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (Editor's note).

Nationalism and Regionalism in a Semi-Globalised World: Lessons from Latin America

Peter Ross

Introduction

The process of globalisation - best understood as the latest movement in the spread of the capitalist mode of production around the world - required the reduction in power of national governments. The resurgence of classical liberal ideology (labelled as neoliberalism) and its free market ideology demanded that governments of developing nations forsake development planning, sell off state enterprises, open their markets to foreign investors and merchants, and adhere to global rules of enterprise, trade and investment. Nation states reduced tariffs, oriented themselves towards exports (generally of commodities), cut spending (particularly on social services such as education and health) and privatised public enterprises. Multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) increased their power and influence. In many cases, governments abandoned control of monetary policy. These radical changes challenged the very notion of the 'national'. What sense is there to talk of 'nation states' in a globalised world?

Before addressing that question, it is necessary to consider regionalism in its various forms. Within Europe there has been considerable speculation that eventually nation states will be replaced by regions within and across traditional state boundaries. Capitalist development is inherently unequal and uneven. With some exceptions, capitalists invest in sectors and locations based on their reading of how to obtain the largest profits, and not on such concepts as national advantage. Thus, as the European Union (EU) consolidates and expands, so too will some local regions within the EU. As they do, their political clout will increase so that it may make more sense in future to speak of Europe of the Regions rather than Europe of the Nation States. Catalonia is one region which has subtly propagated this concept.¹

In Latin America, the maquiladora belt in Mexico is another region which has become increasingly detached at the economic level from its nation state and more closely integrated with the economy of another, the United States (US). The political ramifications of this are yet to be determined, but it is safe to say that political ramifications there will be. Similarly, the lowland gas producing regions of Bolivia have become more closely linked economically with Brazil and Argentina than with the impoverished highland regions of the nation state. This has resulted in political secessionist movements.

The other major form of regionalism, and the one I wish to concentrate on, is nation state blocs. The best example of such a bloc is the EU. But there have been many other such entities including, pre World War II, the British Commonwealth (which included colonies as well as nation states) and the Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. Here, we are principally concerned with the curious phenomenon of the formation of blocs during the globalisation process. They are curious because in a globalising world in which the same rules increasingly apply to all, such blocs would seem to be superfluous. These blocs include the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Mercado Común del Sur (Common Market of the South - Mercosur), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). To them could be

added the failed initiative (to date) of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the newly proposed and partly formed *Alternativa Boliviana para América Latina* (Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America – ALBA).

Regional blocs and their contradictions

The most recently formed blocs (with the exception of ALBA) have overwhelmingly emphasised the economic benefits to be derived from common markets and/or customs unions in terms of expanded markets and accompanying economies of scale and efficiencies in production. This would be true of some of the older blocs as well, such as the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA, 1980, but formed in 1960 as the Latin American Free Trade Association – LAFTA), the Andean Community (CAN, 1996, but based on the 1969 Andean Pact), the Central American Common Market (CACM, 1960), the Caribbean Community (based on the 1968 Caribbean Free Trade Area – CARIFA, subsequently, from 1973, the Caribbean Economic Community – CARICOM), the Central African Customs and Economic Union (CACEU, 1965), the Southern African Customs Union (SACU, 1969) and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN, 1969). This is not to say that there were no politics in the formation of these blocs. As with the EU, the desire to avoid nation state conflicts played some role. In the case of US governments' desires to create the FTAA there was, at the very least, the stated aim of excluding Cuba because it did not subscribe to capitalism. Written into the documents was the demand that members adhere to democratic forms of government.

What we have not seen with these blocs, however, is a sustained campaign to construct a new political identity to replace the nationalism which was, and is, so characteristic of the nation state. The nation state and nationalism are constructs. That a new identity will somehow be born of new economic entities without conscious construction is probable, but the nature of this identity (or identities) is unclear. Even in Europe where economic integration has been most apparent, where citizens can move freely from one country to another, where many rules and regulations emanate from Brussels, and where for most of the continent there is a common currency, people still identify themselves by nation state, though there are exceptions such as the Basques. In time, Europe may move to the Europe of the Regions with a central government in Brussels but the indications are that this will not occur in the foreseeable future. In a truly liberal sense none of this would matter. If humans act out of individual self-interest then artificial bonds such as nationalism should be unimportant. But if, on the other hand, humans do not live by bread alone, then what binds them together, and what, by extension, opposes them to each other, are very important. Even Margaret Thatcher, for all her neoliberalist rhetoric ('There is no such thing as society'), knew the appeal of nationalism to English people, perhaps most evident in rallying popular support for her war with Argentina over the Malvinas/Falklands in 1982.

Appeals to nationalism, even by neoliberals, indicate that globalisation is an uncompleted project. NAFTA is, perhaps, the most obvious example. In a totally globalised world, NAFTA, along with other regional blocs, would not exist. But even in its present form it is a poor example of how globalisation can be achieved. Unlike the EU, citizens of the bloc cannot move freely within its borders. Not only that, but a sizable and politically important sector of the US population is vehemently opposed to the elimination of the border between the US and Mexico. Indeed, many want to see a fence built along the border to stop Mexicans moving into the US. So powerful is this

section of the population that President George W Bush, despite his own beliefs, must pay attention to them. His negotiations with Mexico's President Vicente Fox to reach some agreement regarding the legal entry of Mexicans into the US and the legalisation of the status of those who have entered the country illegally have failed. On the other hand, the very large demonstrations by illegal immigrants and their supporters in the US in May 2006 reveal that this is a major problem both within the US and internationally. Something must give eventually. In the meantime, however, what is apparent is that NAFTA is a very incomplete form of integration. Its basis is narrowly economic; an agreement amongst capitalist and political elites that is not supported by many of the citizens in the participating nation states.

Mercosur is another example of a regional organisation which has been established by elites. It is the world's third most important trading bloc after the EU and NAFTA with a population of some 250 million people.² Officially it commenced at the beginning of 1995 on the basis of the Treaty of Asunción negotiated by the Presidents of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay in 1991 to form a common market with no internal tariffs. That these nation states with their traditional rivalries were able to reach such an understanding indicates that significant economic and political changes had occurred. These included greater cooperation between the region's military forces such as the notorious Operation Condor in the period of military dictatorships, the economic crisis of the 1980s when individual national governments felt obliged to bow to the dictates of the IMF, the threat to national industries posed by the opening up of economies to foreign competition, and the perceived political need to construct a counterweight to the hegemonic influence of the US. Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Mexico have joined Mercosur as associate members and Venezuela became a full member in July 2006.

Mercosur remains an incomplete common market; nor does it function as a unified bargaining agent with regard to agreements with third parties such as China. Argentina and Brazil both signed bilateral agreements with that nation state in 2005. Mercosur has also failed to achieve trade agreements with the EU or NAFTA. Certainly, regional trade increased substantially in the 1990s, and this insulated members from the chill winds of global competition. But institutions remain weak, and member states continue to take unilateral decisions that affect the others. Brazil, for example, devalued its currency in 1999 and this had a devastating affect on Argentine exports. More recently, Argentina and Uruguay have confronted each other over the project of Finland's Botnia and Spain's Ence companies to construct two paper mills on the Uruguayan side of the Río Uruguay. Uruguay's attempts to have this dispute resolved by Mercosur failed.³ Argentina has gone outside Mercosur to the World Court in The Hague to try to have the dispute resolved in its favour.

The members of Mercosur continue to act as nation states. The attempt to construct a regional economic unit is weak, even at the level of political and economic elites. There has been little attempt by governments to build integration from the bottom up. The one potentially major effort to do so has been the Brazilian government's decree that all Brazilian children learn Spanish at school. Even this initiative is weakened and undermined by the shortage of Spanish language teachers. Outside of that, governments have pursued policies that they perceive to be in the national, or in their own, interests. The former consists of protecting and extending domestic production, albeit by national or multinational enterprises; the latter of ensuring political survival.

Regionalism and nationalism

Even with the best will in the world it would be difficult to substitute or overwrite national identity with a regional or a globalised one. In the case of Latin America, the construction of nation states in the nineteenth century, while conflictual and difficult, was extremely successful. The break up of the Spanish and Portuguese empires into the Latin American republics occurred due to the struggle for power, wealth and status of regional land holding and merchant elites. These, over time, established the boundaries and inculcated the people within those boundaries with a sense of national identity. This was done primarily through the institution of state education systems oriented to a constructed national history with all the trappings of flags, anthems, heroes, and, more recently, sporting triumphs. Print media, initially, and then radio and television helped in the process. Identity presupposes 'the other', which frequently consisted of contiguous republics. Wars over borders and resources often reinforced notions of difference and otherness. The result has been, in part, the creation of notions of national identity and characteristics such as that Argentines are arrogant, Brazilians are vibrant, Costa Ricans are industrious and so on. It has become relatively easy for politicians to tap nationalism when they feel it necessary to do so. This creates serious problems in the building of a sustainable regionalism.

A Latin American region? The case of Hugo Chávez

The most important contemporary movement to address the national/regional dichotomy emanates from President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. Commonly portrayed in the Western press as a madman, a despot and a populist (and even compared to Adolf Hitler by Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of State), Chávez is worth taking seriously, at least at the level of analysis. Even if one perceives Chávez to be an enemy it is useful to know why he is the enemy. Name calling may be useful in propaganda terms, but it is not useful in the formulation and implementation of policy. Chávez is a properly elected head of government who enjoys widespread popular support in Venezuela. The use of the term 'populist' is not helpful since its meaning is unclear, the term being descriptive, not explanatory. Nor is it useful to emphasise that Chávez has considerable resources at his command because of the rise in the price of oil. This is a fact but it does not explain why he pursues the policies that he does. It is true that without the oil, Chávez would not be able to *implement* many of his initiatives, but this does not explain the political and economic direction he has chosen to take.

The fundamental message that Chávez enunciates is Latin American and Caribbean unity. His proposal is to establish a Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA – *Alternativa Boliviana para las Américas*). As with any construction of identity, Chávez's gambit contains the self and the other, The former is the memory of Simón Bolívar, the so-called liberator of South America whose attempts to hold together the former colonial entity were destroyed by local vested interests; the latter is the FTAA, the IMF, the WB, and the US. In calling for Latin American unity, Chávez is certainly not suggesting the obliteration of nation states. They are a reality. But he is making a pitch for increased emphasis on what unites rather than what disunites. In this he is drawing on a strong tradition in Latin America, especially amongst left wing intellectuals. Many of these have argued, and continue to argue, that Latin American nations are weak in large part because they have not been able to present a united front to external pressure. This has enabled the US to use a divide and rule strategy in its dealings with Latin American nation states. The outstanding proponent of this

analysis, if only because of the popularity of his work, is Eduardo Galeano. His polemical, historical overview of Latin America, *Open Veins of Latin America*, sold hundreds of thousands of copies and went through numerous editions, influencing millions of Latin Americans.⁴

Chávez takes every opportunity to propagate the view that Latin American integration is the *sine qua non* of Latin American development. The following is from an August 2005 joint communiqué of Chávez and the President of Uruguay, Tabaré Vázquez, shortly after the formation of the South American Community of Nations. Joint it may be, but the voice is the voice of Chávez:

Now more than ever we are being urgently summoned by the urgent task of building our own destiny. Such an urgency has been historically determined by the overwhelming weight of the social debt; we must act, and move from words to deeds. Social inequality, exclusion, and neglect are unacceptable. We cannot postpone settling such debt any longer. In an integration agenda set upon achieving unity, this settlement must be a first-order priority. If we are to be faithful to the legacy of our Liberators, this is the utmost responsibility we must call upon ourselves as leaders of the nations of Latin America.

South American unity is an historical task yet to be fulfilled by our nations and our peoples. It is thus necessary to look back to the saga of the struggle for emancipation in order to find our way back to the road that it carved out for us. In order to take this path once again, we must strengthen our remembrance of that struggle, and to forestall any forgetfulness of it.⁵

In appealing to the past, to a lost direction, Chávez is attempting to create, or, as he would see it, to resurrect a revolutionary tradition that will appeal to the inhabitants of the region. He is obviously not trying to copy every aspect of Simón Bolívar's program. Rather, he calls on the name so as to inspire Latin Americans to struggle for a rebirth as a people. It is the same strategy as the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) adopted in its struggle against the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua.⁶ It is significant that in their joint letter, Chávez and Vázquez also call on the name of General José Artigas, the leader of Uruguayan independence, to support their call for unity. Such appeals may not withstand rigorous historical examination: there is no homogeneous 'people' in Latin America. Artigas was principally concerned with securing the independence of the littoral province of Uruguay, not Latin American unity. And Bolívar was considerably more complex than Chávez suggests, and certainly more concerned with elite interests than those of the common people. But such an examination would be to miss the point. Identity is built on myth making; without myths, societies do not exist. Chávez wants to build a different society, and this requires a vision.

Hugo Chávez is not the first to undertake the project of Latin American unity. Juan Perón attempted to propagate his third way ideology in the early 1950s, but had little success. Latin American nation states were then embarked on import substitution economic strategies that focused development on the nation, not on the continent or, indeed, on the world. Perón's corporatism (the third way between communism and capitalism) did not require continental unity.

The Cuban revolutionary government tried to achieve unity in the 1960s through fomenting revolutionary movements from below. These were mostly defeated militarily. The death of Che Guevara in Bolivia in 1967 signalled the failure of the Cuban attempt

to stimulate a continental socialist revolution. In the 1980s Fidel Castro called for Latin American unity to overcome the debt crisis by confronting the creditors and their representatives, including the US government and the IMF. This appeal fell on deaf ears; each nation state went it alone, and paid the price during and after the 'lost decade' of the 1980s. From the other end of the political spectrum there have been attempts by political and economic elites to establish regional trading blocs. These too have been largely unsuccessful, even at the purely economic level. Both top down and bottom up strategies to achieve unity have failed. Neither economic change alone, nor ideology alone would seem to be sufficient to create the unity that so many Latin Americans have said that they aspire to.

Chávez seeks to unify these different approaches: the bottom up, the top down, the economic and the ideological. He is in a unique position to be able to do this because he has the political legitimacy of being an elected leader and he has a large amount of capital at his disposal. This capital comes from his taking control of Venezuela's national oil industry which had been the fiefdom of domestic vested interests, by forcing foreign oil companies to pay greater dividends to the Venezuelan state, and from the fortuitous increase in oil prices internationally. Moreover, international politics has provided a space in which he can operate. The US is focused on the Middle East, while in Latin America more governments are centre left, reflecting the disillusionment of many people with neoliberalism.

At home, Chávez has emphasized that Venezuelans must work from the bottom up to improve their living standards. His 'Bolivarian Circles' are essentially neighbourhood committees that identify community needs and seek means to remedy problems. Over the last three years the numbers of families below the poverty line has fallen considerably even as measured in traditional terms of incomes. A system of State shops which sell necessities at lower prices than does the private sector, vastly improved health delivery to the poor, courtesy of Cuban health professionals, and the benefits of heightened literacy and other educational courses have also increased well being.⁷ Some land reform has occurred, indigenous rights have been recognised, and a few worker run enterprises established and given State recognition. Housing remains a major problem. Capitalists and many in the middle sectors continue to have major concerns about the direction the government has taken. So, too, do many on the left. Roland Denis, a former deputy minister in the Chávez government, acknowledges that there is more democracy and open debate, but chastises Chávez for being a reformist and not a revolutionary.⁸

At the international level Chávez has conducted a whirlwind campaign with other nation state leaders and representatives of regional blocs while maintaining a steady stream of invective against the US and the multilateral lending agencies. His preferred option for regional integration is undoubtedly ALBA, his own creation, but to date he has secured only two adherents apart from Venezuela, namely Cuba and Bolivia. Cuba signed up to ALBA in December 2004 and a new agreement was concluded in April 2006 which included Bolivia. ALBA's basic principles include economic integration, and respect for national sovereignty. Unlike most regional agreements, the focus is on improving the welfare of the inhabitants, as suggested by the name 'People's Trade Agreements'. Trade includes many barter arrangements such as Cuba supplying health practitioners and teachers, Venezuela providing capital, petroleum, and energy and mining knowledge, and Bolivia (among other things, it must be said) exporting 'its expertise in the study of native peoples, both in theory and in research

methodology'.⁹ The latter gives some idea of the flavour of ALBA. Neoliberal market theory is not centre stage. Rather, trade is based on what each nation state possesses and what the others lack, without setting a monetary value to the goods and services.

To date, such barter has undoubtedly been beneficial for the peoples of Cuba and Venezuela, the former having a surplus of doctors and teachers, the latter an abundance of petroleum. And it is hard to see how Bolivian people can lose from having Cuban doctors and other health professionals giving them care. However, one can easily understand why other nations have rejected ALBA. Reservations would include the need to abandon neoliberal economic principles and the danger of putting oneself offside with the US. That said, Chávez has had considerable success in the Caribbean with his PETROCARIBE project to supply the Caribbean nations with petroleum at market prices but on a credit basis at a very low rate of interest so as to allow capital to be used for social development. Despite warnings from the IMF that the island nations were placing themselves in danger of long term indebtedness and of dependence on a single supplier, 13 of the 15 CARICOM nations, together with Cuba and the Dominican Republic, have signed the agreement. The exceptions are Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, and even these may have changed their minds.¹⁰ While these nations (excepting Cuba) have not become ALBA signatories, the document does state that:

[T]he fundamental objective of [PETROCARIBE] is to contribute to the energy security, the social and economic development and the integration of the Countries of the Caribbean through the sovereign use of energy resources based entirely on the principles for integration referred to as the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). . . . PETROCARIBE has been conceived as an integral process intended to promote the eradication of social inequalities and to foster improved living standards . . .¹¹

The CARICOM bloc has not gone all the way with Chávez, but many of its members have taken a significant step in that direction. Municipalities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras have signed similar deals with Venezuela, which has also been supplying cheap heating fuel to poor US communities.

Obstacles to Chávez's integration project

The real challenge for Chávez in his goal to achieve Latin American unity is not the smaller nations of the Caribbean, Central America, and the Andes but the nations that comprise Mercosur, particularly Brazil. The latter is, far and away, the most important economy in South America. Brazilian political, economic and military elites retain a strong sense of national geopolitical destiny. Mercosur represents their victory over Argentina, the traditional rival in South America. As one Brazilian official joked at the time of the bloc's formation, 'we provide the market, they provide the South'. For Brazil, Mercosur increases its market and also enables it to confront, from a more powerful position, the EU and NAFTA (particularly the US) blocs. The admission of Venezuela to Mercosur has advantages in terms of political and economic strength, but the last thing the Brazilian elites would want is a challenge to their hegemonic position in the region at either the economic or ideological level, or a further complication to the delicate balancing act they must perform to hold the often conflicting present members of the bloc together.

Venezuela's joining of Mercosur flows from Chávez's political aspirations, not from economic concerns. It is unlikely that membership will create more trade.¹² But what

Chávez has brought to the negotiating table is a grand vision to make South America self sufficient in energy via an integration of energy systems. If this were to be achieved, the economic infrastructure would exist for political integration. The set piece of his proposal is the construction of an 8,000 km gas pipeline from Venezuela to Buenos Aires with the possibility of branch lines linking other countries. Criticisms of the scheme include its unnecessary expense (liquefying the gas and transporting it by ship would be cheaper), the environmental consequences, the size of Venezuela's reserves, and the political danger of nations using their control of the pipeline to cut off gas to others.¹³ Brazil and Argentina have already experienced the consequences of President Evo Morales' semi-nationalisation of gas in Bolivia, in terms of lower profits for national firms involved in gas extraction and higher prices for consumers. Infrastructural integration requires a diminution of nation state power.

Argentina's President Nestor Kirchner has been much more positive with regard to Chávez than has Brazil's Lula da Silva. Venezuela has bought Argentine government bonds which has enabled Argentina to pay off its debt to the IMF, a political coup for Kirchner given the antipathy of many Argentines to that multilateral and, by extension, to the US. Argentine politics, however, is nothing if not fluid, and almost perversely national in orientation. It would be difficult for Chávez, as an outsider, to find a firm base in that country.

The problem of realising the Chávez dream of integration is best exemplified by his relations with the Andean nation states. He had considerable success by supporting Evo Morales and subsequently signing up Bolivia to ALBA. However, his very open backing of Ollanta Humala in the recent Peruvian elections backfired as Alan García was able to secure victory, in part because he could play the nationalist card. Peru and Colombia have also signed bilateral Free Trade Agreements with the US. In response, Chávez pulled out of the Andean bloc (CAN) but he continues to try to exert influence. The collapse of the FTA between Ecuador and the US as a result of Ecuador's decision to annul the contract it had with the US owned Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) in May 2006, has given Chávez some room to move. He quickly signed agreements with the Ecuadorian government to build a refinery in Ecuador and provide liquefied gas, claiming that Ecuadorian consumers would obtain gas at 20 per cent lower prices because of the elimination of middlemen.¹⁴

Globalisation, regionalism and the nation state

The Chávez project throws up a number of questions with regard to globalisation and the semi-globalised nature of the world today. In liberal thinking, nation states have often been seen as the equivalent of the rational economic individual, free to make economic agreements based upon self interest. However, just as liberalism ignores the power relations that exist between economic players, so too does it gloss over the power inequalities between nation states, and the economic, social and political inequalities within those states. As the world globalised, national elites often had recourse to regional economic formations as a means to limit the damage they might suffer from a complete globalisation along neoliberal lines. This was true for elites within the developed world as well as in the less developed. The result, in part, has been the retardation of the globalisation process which may well have run its course in the current historical period. Both the EU and the US have failed to liberalise their agricultural sectors, protectionist sentiment has increased within them, the US has increasingly chosen to operate unilaterally and pursue bilateral FTAs rather than multilateral agreements, and many of the world's poor blame globalisation for failing to

deliver the benefits that it promised. The Doha Round of WTO negotiations has failed. Globalisation, in effect, was over sold.¹⁵ Nation states, however, have survived, and so too the attempts at region construction. Regions do provide benefits in terms of larger markets and more efficient production than in the world of inward looking nation states. One of the major failures of globalisation has been cultural. Consumers may have learnt to increasingly identify themselves with brand names, but this is no substitute for the deeply entrenched sentiment of nationalism. Chávez will probably not succeed with his grand vision, but elements of his strategy to achieve it may point towards the future. These include an emphasis on redistribution from more well off nations to poorer ones via trade agreements and social policies such as literacy campaigns and the establishment of health services for the poor; sustained ideologically campaigns including the institution of new mass media concerns such as Telesur which now broadcasts throughout much of Latin America providing an alternative to private television, including US networks; and the identification of a common enemy – in this case the United States. Chávez reaches out not just to the governments and elites of his region but also to the common people.

Lessons for Australia?

Are there lessons in this for Australia? Geographically, Australia is located in the Asia – Pacific region. The increasing recognition of this in the 1980s in the context of the globalisation process led the Labor government of the time to encourage the formation of APEC. This regional bloc has not developed. There are far too many nation states involved, and many of them have very divergent views with regard to the role of the bloc.¹⁶ Moreover, under the coalition government since 1996, the focus has shifted from the region to a focus on bilateral agreements including the signing of a FTA with the US. The latter reveals the confusion of the current government with regard to globalisation. At one level it continues to push for trade liberalisation in the Doha round of WTO negotiations, but on the other it did not insist on this in the agreement with the US, effectively betraying the interests of sugar producers in Australia.

The emphasis on ANZUS and following US foreign policy (as in the invasion of Iraq) has reduced the focus on the region, as a region, even more. Paradoxically, this has occurred at the very time when Australia has intervened militarily in the Pacific to the greatest extent since World War II. From 1999, Australian military and police forces have been sent twice to East Timor, to the Solomon Islands and to Papua New Guinea. The Australian government has set itself up as the saviour of what it perceives to be failed or failing states. At the same time it has made it almost impossible for inhabitants of the region to come to Australia as refugees or as workers. Its solution to the problem, as outlined in the 2006 *White Paper on Aid*, is to reinvent the Colombo Plan so as to educate regional elites in the ways of Australian government. This may well be a recipe for instability, as political outs in the region may institute unrest to trigger Australian intervention to restore order and remove the political 'ins' who have obviously failed the good governance test.¹⁷

Social scientists and historians do not generally engage in counterfactuals. But, if only as a means to highlight Hugo Chávez's radicalism, I am going to imagine the domestic and regional policy of an Australian Hugo Chávez. In the first instance, this President (of the Australian Republic, needless to say) would look for a unifying regional myth. This would be composed of two elements: the indigenous peoples and the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle. This would require a radical re-working of Australian

history and of Australian nationalism. Many of the present touch stones could be retained but with a different interpretation. Anzac day, for example, would be portrayed as a needless sacrifice in support of imperialism. Clear apologies would be made for the dispossession and oppression of native peoples, for the White Australia policy, and for past colonialist activities. Emphasis would be placed on the support Australians gave to decolonisation movements. Regional trade would be based on actual needs rather than monetary values, reflecting an abandonment of neoliberalism. Given the strength of the tertiary sector, Australian professionals, including health workers and teachers, would be more comprehensively employed in the region. In return, the region could provide skilled and unskilled workers, and students. There would be a redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor nations, and from the rich to the poor within nations. Regional insecurity would decline.

Obviously, the above scenario is a pipe dream. What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that we have not come to the end of history. The contradictions of nationalism, regionalism and globalisation are yet to be played out. And a dreamer like Hugo Chávez may be the wild card that casts economic, political and social developments in directions unimagined by the globalising visionaries.



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Border Crossings: Radical, Worker and Union Transnationalisms in Mexico and Latin America 1910-2006

Barry Carr

Introduction

This author has long been interested in the history of worker and union internationalisms in Latin America, as well as in the history of the transnational wanderings and networking associated with counter-hegemonic intellectuals and activists of what might be called the 'peripatetic left'. This concern has become enmeshed with a newer interest in tracking and understanding contemporary transborder worker/union networking and cooperation in Mexico, the USA and Canada - the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Researchers in the growing field of what is now called 'globalisation from below' are incorporating a number of trends in international history and international relations. We have been encouraged to develop a complex ('multifaceted and 'multivocal' are the preferred terms) and many-stranded framework for examining the uneven relationship between the USA and Latin American societies. We have been urged to move away from an exclusive focus on states and to acknowledge more informal kinds of power relationships, constructed:¹

via business and communications networks and cultural industries; and through constructions; through scientific foundations and philanthropic agencies; via imported technologies.

There is now much more interest in looking at civil society actors and less interest in formal organisations, 'official' agents and agencies. There are also calls to reject interpretive frameworks which are based on crude notions of domination and subordination in cultural, political, economic and ideological encounters. There is greater emphasis on cultural analysis, more concern with encounters (a favourite term of the new history) in which actors attempt to empathise and understand as well as dominate and contest. The protagonists in international politics do more than just accept uneven power relations or resist them absolutely; they practice 'borrowing, negotiation, offstage resistance, lip service, overt confrontationism'.² In this new approach power and shaping influences flow 'north' as well as 'south', a particularly important phenomenon for those of us who are interested in how Latin American actors have shaped patterns of conflict and resistance within the boundaries of the USA.

Current scholarly interest in transborder exchanges/internationalisms has been spawned by the centrality of globalisation as a concept and a reality. Just as earlier imperial projects led to outcomes that had not been anticipated by hegemons - so late twentieth century and early twenty first century globalisation is full of unexpected outcomes. Globalisation is frequently presented as an inexorable 'steamroller' drive towards internationalising politics and economics along lines laid down exclusively by big investors and traders. In this script, globalisation has swept aside a century of achievements by labour and social movements, weakened if not destroyed national sovereignties, and encouraged a rush towards savage international competition at the cost of worsened wages and living conditions for working people.

This sketch of what has unfolded over the past 20 years is not entirely inaccurate, but it is excessively simplistic.

The last decade and a half has seen the emergence of a variety of social movements, consisting of worker unions and advocacy groups, environmental, human rights and indigenous peoples' organisations. Such social movements have learned how to exploit the internationalisation of politics, economic and social life and communications in order to build cross-border alliances between the First and Third worlds. These alliances do not follow a logic which narrowly shadows the project of international capitalism. (Nor is there reason to believe that Australia's Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) will be immune from these unanticipated side effects.)

Mexico is a prime laboratory in which this development has unfolded. Mexico's march towards the internationalisation of its economy and society was initiated by the country's accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and was greatly accelerated by the signing of NAFTA which came into effect at the beginning of 1994. But the exquisite timing of the 1994 Chiapas rebellion demonstrated that globalisation could elicit some unusual and largely unforeseen responses; the Zapatista peasant rebels of southern Mexico situated their challenge to the Mexican government squarely within a framework of resistance to the deleterious effects of free trade agreements on peasants and indigenous peoples.

Regional economic integration pacts such as NAFTA have also promoted the development of a complex web of cross-border (mostly US-Mexican) coalitions involving labour organisations, immigrant rights workers and environmentalists. Globalisation has clearly changed the dynamics of debate, making politics less predictable. The business community and politician architects of NAFTA surely did not anticipate that their dream project would promote grassroots as well as elite exchanges?

Over time transborder exchanges, communication and networking in the North and Central American regions have changed a good deal and they have also taken a wide variety of forms. Transnational union and worker activities, for example, have included: cooperation and exchange within centralised organisations affiliated to one of the blocs of the old Cold War; the activities of 'official' organs of workers in the same industries in different countries; the sponsorship of horizontal relations between rank and file workers of several countries *with or without* the support of their union leaderships and transborder assistance in labour organising. The content of labour internationalisms has also been varied, consisting of the sharing of economic data between workers in subsidiaries of the same transnational firm; exchange of visits by rank and file unionists; the establishment of sister trade union branches or locals; the forging of solidarity campaigns to support strikes and demand the release of imprisoned unionists; struggles for the implementation of international labour rights and standards; and the establishment of ties between labour activists and human rights, women's and indigenous peoples' organisations.

It is important to distinguish between the different levels on which the new grassroots internationalism is unfolding, and between the actors involved. Are the protagonists involved in the internationalisms discussed here 'abstract' classes, grassroots workers, national organisers of unions and parties, theoreticians and intellectuals, or deracinated transborder agitators and activists? And what have been the relationships between these transnational actors and formal and informal structures of state power?

It may also be useful to distinguish between successive types of internationalism associated with different phases in the history of states and capitalism. Following

some suggestive comments by Eric Hobsbawm and further elaborated by Peter Waterman, one might come up with a typology of internationalisms which distinguishes between the internationalism of agitators and the internationalism of agents. Hobsbawm (referring to Europe and the nineteenth century) describes the first type of worker/radical internationalist (the nomadic internationalist might be a useful label for this brand of international actor) as:

a small body of men and women to whom the states and the nation(alities) to which they belonged were generally irrelevant, the future revolution being, as it were, their only real 'country'. In this sense Brecht's Comintern agent 'die Laender oder wechselnd als die Schule' [changing countries more often than shoes PW] remained in the same territory wherever he or she found themselves [...] In the Second International period we find such people frequently among anarchists, quite often as migrants or re-migrants from one national movement to another... Such persons would clearly have put their energies with equal zeal into the struggle in Switzerland or Portugal if this had seemed politically desirable.³

Hobsbawm goes on to note a shift in the kind of internationalist visible in the years following the 1917 Russian Revolution - the emergence of internationalist *agents*:

In the Comintern period these international cadres became institutionalised... Under the impact of the collapse of 1914 the Comintern deliberately developed this form of internationalism...in the form of loyalty to the international party line and the USSR.

Hobsbawm is talking here of the (almost dead now) world of Communism, but many of the same attributes of the internationalist agent were produced by social democracy, populist movements, business unionism and so on in the years between the two world wars. Agents (to pick up Waterman's term) in this era were more likely to be functionaries, professionalised internationalists, owing loyalties to highly structured organisations. The relevance of this typology will become clear later.

Multiple internationalisms

There were multiple worker, union and radical internationalisms present in the period 1900-1940. The most heavily researched current of labour internationalism in the pre-1945 period was the interest of the US State Department and anti-communist labour groups in shaping development of the Latin American labour movement in a class-collaborationist and anti-Communist direction.⁴ But, however strong and (occasionally) effective the aspirations of US 'labour imperialism' were, there was always an element of competition at play. Especially before the mid 1940s - anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist currents drew US actors south (mainly to Mexico but occasionally even further south) to aid, consolidate and express solidarity with what were widely seen to be 'progressive' movements. At the same time networks of radical Latin Americans were constructed within the borders of the USA bringing the experiences of 'southern' activists to radical projects - such as union organisation, anti-imperialist campaigning and the defense of civil rights - in the North American region.

A tradition of long-standing repression of worker activism in dictatorial and oligarchic Latin American regimes also helped to promote the internationalisation of dissent, generating a set of complex circuits along which worker and radical activist refugees migrated, and agitated. The repression unleashed in Mexico by its President Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911), for example, sent thousands of anarchist sympathisers

(*magonistas* they were called after their leaders, the Flores Magon brothers) to the US where they participated in American social and worker movements.⁵ The *magonista* Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) had 6,000 affiliates in the USA in 1914 and worked closely with the 'Wobblies' - Industrial Workers of the World or IWW - on both sides of the US-Mexican border - in mining areas of the north-western Mexican state of Sonora and in the mines of Arizona and in the Texas cotton belt.⁶ In a parallel case in the 1880s and 1890s Cuban worker exiles and their US-born allies in Florida contributed both to the building of a labour movement in exile and the promotion of Cuban independence from Spain.⁷ Later, in the 1920s and 1930s, exile and cross-border wanderings were a permanent feature in the lives of virtually all Latin American radicals. One thinks of the Cuban revolutionaries of the Association of Revolutionary Cuban New Emigrants (ANERC) who fought against the dictator Gerardo Machado (1925-1933) active in their radical communities in New York, Tampa, Miami, Mexico City and Paris, and of the career of the founder of the Cuban Communist Party, Julio Antonio Mella who fled via Guatemala to Mexico City in 1926. There were important communities of Venezuelan, Peruvian and Bolivian radical exiles in the USA, Mexico and Cuba throughout the 1920s while the Sandino movement of the second half of the 1920s in Nicaragua was sustained by an elaborate network of cross-border exiles and solidarity networks active throughout Mexico and the United States. Indeed, the radical careers of Augusto César Sandino himself and of the Salvadoran revolutionary Agustín Farabundo Martí included periods of varying length spent in virtually all the countries of Central America and Mexico.⁸ The contacts which Sandino established between 1923 and 1926 with anti-imperialist politics and US capital in the Mexican oil city of Tampico (a pole of attraction for radicals from all over the USA, the Caribbean and the Central American regions) greatly shaped the development of his political and social ideas.⁹

Certain groups of workers have also played a major role in carrying the seeds of internationalism in the Americas; railway workers and maritime workers are a case in point. Mobility and a capacity for internationalist work was built into the nature of particular work processes; for sailors, for example, particularly those who were members of radical maritime unions. These, unlike most unions in the early American Federation of Labor (AFL), were open to non-whites, women and the foreign-born. The Maritime Transport Workers Union (MTWU), affiliated to the IWW, spread the Wobbly message and the principles of industrial unionism throughout the period of its existence - from 1913 to the mid 1920s. Spanish-speaking members of the IWW based in east-coast US ports were active in carrying propaganda and forming MTWU branches in cities all over the Caribbean, Mexico, Central and South America; Locals were established in Chile, Ecuador and Argentina. In 1919, the MTWU founded a regional Latin American headquarters in Buenos Aires.¹⁰ A particularly vivid Mexican example was the Wobbly presence in the port city of Tampico and the petroleum camps in the States of Veracruz and Tamaulipas in north-eastern Mexico. There were even links between Australian IWW members and their Latin American counterparts.

In the 1930s, this internationalist crusade was picked up by the Marine Workers Industrial Union MWIU (affiliated to the Communist Party of the USA's 'Third Period' Trade Union Unity League) and, later, the Congress of Industrial Organisations (CIO).¹¹ Unions within the Mexican labour confederation (CTM) assisted CIO locals in organising Mexican workers on the US west coast and southwest, and the Mexican Confederation blocked the unloading of cargo in Mexican ports during a CIO maritime

workers' strike. The west coast International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union (ILWU) was also a key internationalist actor under the leadership of the Australian Harry Bridges 'whose affinity for Mexican labor stemmed from the early 1920s when he jumped ship in Mexico and was "thrilled" by organised labor's gains there'.¹²

The IWW also organised and carried out propaganda work among oil workers (Tampico), smelters (Torreón) and coal miners (in Coahuila and Chihuahua); its activists had long moved clandestinely across borders connecting Wobbly strongholds in Arizona and Tampico for example in the immediate pre-1910 period as well as during the epic Mexican Revolution and in the early 1920s.¹³

US railway worker brotherhoods also played a significant role in extending trade union organisation beyond the borders of the US before the outbreak of the 1910-1911 Mexican Revolution, although the racism and ethnic exclusivity shown by the American railway workers employed in Mexico were almost as striking as their union proselitisation.¹⁴

Another important zone in which links developed between workers in Mexico and the United States at an early stage was in the geographically contiguous border regions of the two countries - and in particular Sonora, Chihuahua, California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. The background dynamic here was the agricultural, mining and industrial expansion of the US westward and south-westward and the (in many ways linked) economic and demographic expansion of northern Mexico in the period before the Second World War. These economic developments provided the material base upon which a new bloc of 'border proletarians' or 'border-less workers' (*obreros sin fronteras*) could develop.

There were many sites of transborder union cooperation. Two particularly important areas were the Imperial and San Joaquín agricultural zones of California. In the 1920s Mexicans constituted 70-80 per cent of the workforce in cotton in the San Joaquín Valley of California with many of the Mexican migrants having prior experience in the Laguna region and in cotton-producing areas of Baja California where they had joined the various armed currents of the Mexican Revolution and participated in peasant and labour unions and agrarian uprisings. Spurned by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) Mexican workers in the US 'organised ethnic unions or allied with the sympathetic IWW and, later, affiliates of the Communist party'.¹⁵

In the Californian agricultural mobilisations Devra Weber notes that 'experience and consciousness forged on the mines, on the railroads, and in the fields of Mexico... were transferred to the cotton fields of the San Joaquín Valley and Imperial Valleys'.¹⁶ The traditions imported included those of assistance organised through mutual aid societies and ideas of mutuality, solidarity and reciprocity originating in ranches and towns in Mexico. The sub-communities from Mexico recreated in the US provided networks that were valuable to workers coping with poverty and/or family crises, but also with labour resistance. Mexican workers also appropriated elements of the iconography and collective memory of the Mexican Revolution during the struggle. 'Workers named the camp streets after Mexican towns or Mexican heroes of the Revolution... People told and retold its stories and sang its *corridos*... memories stressed commonality, through class, nationality and a historical antipathy towards the United States'.¹⁷

The Arizona and Sonora copper mining zone was another region of intense transnational union and worker activity. Mexican-US worker links first emerged in the

period when the Western Federation of Miners and the exiled Mexican Liberal Party (PLM) assisted Mexican miners at the US-owned Cananea copper mines. These links, which were facilitated by the size of the Spanish-speaking work force in mine companies, operated intermittently right through until the late 1940s when the Cold War destroyed the last carriers of this tradition, the leftist International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers.¹⁸

The 'slackers'

A fascinating if little studied source of leftist intellectuals attracted south by the events of the Mexican revolution is centred in the world of American socialism and bohemianism, with New York, particularly Greenwich Village, being a key location for the production of what, in Hobsbawm's periodisation, would be called 'agitators'.¹⁹ The Mexican Revolution figured prominently in such key radical magazines as *The Masses* which 'viewed events in the world through radical Bohemianism'. John Reed and Lincoln Steffens were among the first such intellectuals to travel to Mexico and send back reports on revolutionary events. The travellers' readings of Mexican events were rarely sophisticated and often wildly inaccurate with figures such as Pancho Villa admitted to the category of anarchist Bohemian ('a Mexican version of the Wobbly').²⁰ But there was no doubting the extent to which the course of the Mexican Revolution was entering the American imaginary.

American radical organisations such as the Socialist Party led vigorous campaigns to halt US intervention in Mexico and to demand the withdrawal of US troops during the Pershing invasion of 1916.²¹ Many hundreds who opposed US entry into the First World War crossed the Rio Grande in spite of hastily introduced US government passport requirements designed to break the 'escape of slackers'.²² A minority of these 'slackers' (the pejorative term applied for war-resisters or draft evaders) had been involved in socialist and left-wing activities in the US. Some of them found their way by accident, or design, into the world of the Mexican worker and socialist movement from which the Mexican Communist party emerged at the end of 1919.²³ Among the radical wing of the slackers was Irving Granich (later known Mike Gold, a novelist and author of the well-known *Jews Without Money* and literary czar within the US Communist party - 'a rough-hewn dark chap, earthy, elemental, brooding but devil-may-care'.²⁴ After his departure from Mexico in January 1921, Gold became a contributing editor to the anti-imperialist and socialist *Liberator* magazine in which he published a short story based on his exploits in Mexico in 1918 and 1919.²⁵ Even better known was the socialist journalist and author Carleton Beals, whose writings on Latin America in the 1920s, 30s and 40s provided a radical window on the continent, and Charles Philips. Philips (also known as Frank Seaman) was a former Columbia University student who later adopted the pseudonym of Manuel Gómez while carrying out his duties as a Latin American specialist within the CPUSA and founder of the American section of the Anti-Imperialist League in 1927.²⁶

The slacker adventure was short-lived but it foreshadowed a much more durable phenomenon in which networks were established in the 1920s and 30s binding the US and such countries as Mexico, Cuba and Nicaragua in a celebration of revolution, brave fights against dictatorship, struggles for national self determination, and the exploration of radical cultural and social alternatives. Mexico again was an important site. One thinks of the social scientists, writers, painters, intellectuals and radical nomads captured by Helen Delpar's *Enormous Vogue of Things Mexican*.²⁷ Most of

these political pilgrims (Ernest Gruening, Frank Tannenbaum are other examples) were independent liberals or people with a broad, non-party progressive outlook. A minority, however, were men and women with a firmer commitment to radical social transformation and ties to disciplined, centralised organisations, 'agents' rather than 'agitators' to return to Hobsbawm's terminology. Some were 'agents' allied to reformist organisations like the Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers (CROM), 'labour diplomats' like Roberto Haberman and Joseph Retinger, while others were envoys of the Communist Party of the United States, like Bertram and Ella Wolfe.

The Wolfes were the best known of a stream of American communists who spent periods ranging from a few weeks to several years in the 1920s and 30s attached to the Mexican Communist Party, 'advising' their Mexican comrades or reporting on Mexican developments for the Communist press in the USA. Relations with the CPUSA were extremely close during the 20s and 30s. Indeed, the US party was from 1920 entrusted by the Comintern with special 'supervisory' obligations towards its sister parties all over Latin America and the Caribbean. CPUSA figures became members of the Mexican party's directing bodies, guiding the decisions at key plenums of the Central Committee or acting as arbiters on the great issues of the time. This almost 'tutelary' relationship was particularly in evidence in Mexico but its presence was also felt in Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil and Chile.

The history of the North American movements of solidarity with Sandino (1927-1930) and the anti-Machado movements in Cuba (1930-1933) has still to be written. Carleton Beals, very much 'agitator' rather than 'agent', was a key activist in both campaigns, writing a series of influential books and sending a stream of news reports to radical and liberal organs in the United States such as *The Nation*. But the Hands Off Nicaragua movement and the movement of solidarity with opponents of the *machadato* in Cuba were also deeply intertwined with the master narratives of the international, and especially US, communist movement.

The *Daily Worker* covered Sandino's military campaign in great detail, recounting all his victories and the counter actions of the US Marine forces. Sandino's largely peasant base became 'the Nicaraguan working masses' and Sandino himself a leader of the 'world proletariat'. Sandino's half-brother Socrates spoke on Sandino's behalf at protests and meetings of the All-America Anti-Imperialist League AAAIL (another Comintern-inspired organisation with branches throughout the Americas) in the US in January 1928. As part of its fund-raising exercise the AAAIL created a 'Sandino stamp' and the *Daily Worker* and other organs of the radical left (such as *Labor Defender* the official organ of the International Labor Defence) urged readers to place it next to postage stamps on letters, thus displaying the sender's support for Sandino. There was substantial news coverage when articles bearing the Sandino stamps were barred by the US postal authorities; the *Daily Worker* criticised 'mail censorship' in front-page headlines in January 1928.²⁸

Pro-Sandino material was also featured strongly in sections of the US black press, most interestingly in *Negro World*, the organ of Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA).²⁹ Copies of *Negro World* circulated widely throughout the US, Caribbean and Central American branches of what was, in effect, the earliest transnational network created by a black consciousness movement, albeit one with a history of both opposition to and accommodation of capitalism.³⁰

Conclusion

The earliest examples of labour internationalism outlined here were often sustained by commitments to radical, transformative and emancipatory politics - 'grand narrative internationalisms.' The protagonists of this internationalism were a wide-ranging bunch - including the communist parties of Mexico and the USA, anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist bodies such as the *magonistas* (PLM) and IWW, labour confederations such as the CROM, CTM and CIO. The cooperation and solidarities practised by these organisations were anchored in two main bodies of commitment: to proletarian emancipation (in its self-managed or state socialist versions), and to solidarity with the nationalist, agrarianist and anti-imperialist banners of the Mexican Revolution. Mexico, far from representing a 'threat' to the living standards and future well-being of working peoples in the Americas, appeared rather as a beacon of progress and a repository of ideas and strategies on which the social transformation of the larger American region might be modelled.

Grand narrative internationalism, much of it fuelled by the communist parties and their allies, peaked during the Popular Front (1935-1939) which coincided with the sharp leftward move in the Mexican Revolution under President Lázaro Cárdenas and the Rooseveltian 'New Deal'. During this period, the newly-established CTM national labour confederation worked closely with the CIO and embarked on a campaign to win US labour and progressive support for the reformist project of the Cárdenas administration. The 'common interests' of Mexican and US labour could be easily identified as the need to fight domestic and foreign fascism and to promote cross-border solidarities.

The grand narrative internationalisms and networks sampled here, heroic though they may have been, rested, therefore, on some rather fragile bases. For a start they were made possible by the existence of a temporary symmetry in the composition of the labour movements in the United States and Mexico, in particular the presence of a significant Left within labour's peak bodies. Second, the cooperation between Mexican and US workers during the 1920s and especially the 1930s often received the endorsement of governments of the Mexican Revolution that saw the strengthening of transnational labour links as a way of neutralising hostility to their reformist programs. But by the middle of the 1940s, Mexican government interest in transborder contacts had almost disappeared. When the Mexican state's interest in the international labour arena revived in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was marshalled in support of a rather different set of goals driven this time by the Cold War diplomacy of the AFL-CIO and US State Department.


The histories recounted still resonate in our own days. Regional economic integration projects such as NAFTA (1994) have encouraged a large number of activists in the Mexican, US and Canadian union, environmental and human rights arenas to exploit the new projects to build cross-border alliances and promote a new form of politics that challenges top down visions of economic integration.

Australian unions have had a long, if uneven, history of international solidarity, beginning with maritime union support for the Indonesian independence struggles during the immediate post Second World War period. Over the past 20 years there have been several interesting attempts to construct networks of solidarity between labour activists in the southeast and east Asian area; the earliest being Australia-Asia Workers Links. The establishment of APEC has generated a series of, so far, rather

weak efforts to develop a parallel network of 'People's Forums' and 'People's Summits' in an attempt to promote mutual cooperation and coordination among non governmental organisations and social movements. A trade union response has been the Asia Pacific Labour Network (APLN) established in Melbourne in 1995.³¹

Historically there have been important links between Australian and North American labour movements. The IWW experience in both countries in the 1917-1918 period and the trans-pacific career of Harry Bridges in the 1930s, 40s and 50s are just two examples of the radical version of this transnational heritage. In the post Second World War period the US-Australian international worker and union connection took on a much more conservative complexion. But the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) struggle on the waterfront in 1998 briefly resurrected trans-pacific union solidarity between Australian and US maritime workers and the anti-globalisation mobilisations of the post-Seattle era have created new and often influential forms of cross-border collaboration. Neither APEC nor the recently established US-Australia Free Trade Agreement have labour 'side agreements' of the kind that have been employed (with very mixed results it must be admitted) by Mexican, Canadian and US labour organisations and social movements over the past decade. Thus organisations such as the APLN have had to work outside of the formal structure and processes of APEC.

The signing of the Australia-US FTA has provoked strong criticism of its provisions from Australian labour and social movements just as NAFTA did in Canada and the United States. Overturning or even radically renegotiating FTAs is most unlikely. But just as NAFTA, entirely unexpectedly, deepened and enriched social, environmental and labour movement cooperation and initiative between groups in the three member countries it might be wise to reflect on the possibility that the US-Australia Agreement, too, might create opportunities for greater transnational social and labour movement cooperation between the two countries.



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Paul Allatson

*Today we march, tomorrow we vote

In his now foundational 1964 study of the Australian national character, *The Lucky Country*, Donald Horne described the trans-Pacific 'strategic relation' between Australia and the United States of America (USA) and its importance for Australian imaginaries of place in the following terms:

Australians have lived with the recognition of American world power longer than any other nation outside the Western Hemisphere—since early 1942 when General MacArthur escaped from the Philippines to Darwin. Australia was the first country in the contemporary world to be saved by the Americans. It is one of the few that will admit that it was saved by the Americans. It has even forgiven the Americans for saving it.¹

Horne attributes this unusual, perhaps unique, relationship to the fact that Australia never received US economic aid, and speculates, rather presciently in the light of post 9/11 military events and coalitions, that 'it seems likely that Australia could enter into a quite massive relationship with America without generating any politically effective anti-Americanism among ordinary Australians.'² Some four decades after Horne wrote these words, few Australians would dispute the historical truism that since World War II, Australia and the USA have enjoyed deep and abiding political ties. With neither compunction nor qualm, successive Australian governments have allied Australia to the superpower across the Pacific with whom we share our predominant language. Those ties, of course, are rarely troubled by shifts between Liberal and Labor administrations at federal level. Moreover, Australia has indeed entered 'into a quite massive relationship' with the USA under the current Liberal government, as exemplified by Howard's unequivocal support of the US-led War on Terror and concomitant military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the coming into force of the Australia-USA Free trade Agreement (AUSFTA) on 1 January 2005. To these historical links should be added the enormous cultural influence of the USA on local cultural habits, practices of consumption, and worldviews. Despite considerable local opposition to Australian involvement in the invasion of Iraq, and despite the undeniable ambivalence, and at times visceral antipathy, with which 'America' and 'Americans' are often regarded in Australian popular imaginations, it would be difficult to identify a widespread anti-Americanism in Australia today.

Having said that, however, I would hazard the guess that most Australians irrespective of political persuasion remain largely uninformed about the country with which Australia's current and future fortunes are so closely yoked. And I want to illustrate this premise with a readerly test:

1. Mexico is currently the world's most populous Spanish-speaking country; which country ranks number two?
2. Which country was the single largest source of immigrants to the USA in the twentieth century, and continues to be in the twenty-first?
3. What is the largest minority population in the USA, and what percentage of the overall population?

4. When did the largest political demonstrations in US history since the civil rights' era occur, and what issue inspired that mass mobilisation?

I ask these questions as a way of indicating that a revolution of sorts is inexorably transforming the USA from within, with enormous domestic and international ramifications. My point here is that the Australian-US relationship is not served well by a national failure on the part of Australians to understand and come to terms with that transformation.

The quiet revolution to which I am referring is heralded by the dramatic demographic increase in the country's Latino (Hispanic) populations,³ or what has been dubbed the 'latinisation' of the USA. This term designates the demographic, linguistic, sociocultural, political and economic impact on the USA of mass migration from Hispanophone Latin American countries, primarily but not exclusively Mexico (the most important national source of immigrants in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries), and of the intermixing of such immigrants with the three Latino historical minorities, Chicanos and/or Mexican Americans (from 1848), Puerto Ricans (from 1898), and Cubans (from 1959).⁴ To put latinisation in statistical perspective, by 2000 Latinos (35,305,818 people, or 12.5 per cent of the total US population) had displaced African Americans from their historical position as the most numerous US minority.⁵ The last figures released by the US Census Bureau in July 2004 counted the US Latino population at 41.3 million (14.2 per cent).⁶

Census figures, however, do not provide the complete picture. They do not include the 12-plus million so-called 'illegal aliens' or undocumented workers, the majority from Mexico and other Latin American states, who reside in the country, most permanently or semi-permanently. Nor does Census data about the US national population include the 3.5 million residents of Puerto Rico, an Estado Libre Asociado (Free Associated State) of the USA. That political arrangement bestows on Puerto Ricans de facto US citizenship, access to US passports, and employment in the US armed services, but withholds the right to vote in presidential elections. When these sectors are combined with the 'legal' Latino populations, the USA is clearly the world's second most populous Spanish-speaking country after Mexico. The Census Bureau also estimates that the USA's Latino population will represent 25 per cent of the total national population by the middle of the twenty-first century, at which time 'white' Americans will become a national minority in their own right. Yet, given the consistent undercounting of Latinos by the Census Bureau in the past, it is highly likely that Latinos will reach, and exceed, that percentage well before 2050. Some critics hypothesise that the maintenance of 1990s birth and migration rates over the next few decades will ensure that the Latino population exceeds 50 per cent of the total US population at some stage in the twenty-first century.⁷

To note these developments is not intended to replicate what Juan Flores calls the demographic mentality that reduces the realities of Latino 'unity and diversity' to a statistical subset or homogeneous constituency.⁸ Rather, it is to suggest that the demographic rise in the Latino population has enormous ramifications for the USA in the twenty-first century, not simply in terms of the country's internal sociocultural, economic and political contours, but also in terms of how the rest of the world, including Australia, relates to, and perceives, the US superpower. On this score, the editors of the important essay collection, *Latin@s in the World-System: Decolonization Struggles in the 21st Century US Empire*, argue that one of the key but widely overlooked features of the current globalised epoch 'is the significant growth

and political/cultural impact of Latin@ populations within the United States, the most powerful core country in the capitalist world-system today'.⁹ The editors further suggest that the internal transformations and potential conflicts associated with latinisation, and with the Latino potential to 'decolonise' the US empire from within, have yet to be taken seriously by federal administrations in the USA. Echoing that reading of the USA's demographic transformation, Francisco Vázquez and Rodolfo Torres deem latinisation to be a political revolution by which Latinos have 'become active participants in the political process' in unprecedented numbers, with as yet unforeseen consequences for the US political landscape at local, state and federal levels.¹⁰ It is surprising, therefore, that the potential impact of latinisation is so often overlooked in the post-September 11 era in which international media and political attention to matters 'American' has focused almost exclusively on the current Bush administration's foreign policy initiatives, the US-led War on Terrorism, the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the attendant rise in worldwide anti-Americanism. The global media has ignored, or simply failed to notice, the multivalent ways by which latinisation has been inexorably changing what 'America' means inside the USA's borders, and beyond. It has also failed to fully attend to the national crisis that has accompanied the rise of the Latino population since the early 1980s, a crisis manifest in the growing and increasingly xenophobic nativist attacks on Mexican and Latin American immigration, and in the anxieties among many 'white' Americans when confronted by the highly public presence of Latinos, and the Spanish language, in the media, political debates, and in the streets and shopping centres of towns and cities across the USA.

A case in point is provided by the unprecedented political demonstrations that began in March and continued into May 2006. Despite being the largest in the USA's modern history since the 1960s civil rights era, or, according to US Spanish-language media outlets, the largest in the country's history, the numbers involved were consistently underreported by police and the English-language media, and received minimal or cursory coverage in the Australian media. Involving millions of undocumented workers and their supporters in cities and towns across the USA, the demonstrators had mobilised against the Republican sponsored Sensenbrenner Bill (or HR4437), which passed through the House of Representatives on 16 December 2005, and was sent to the US Senate for ratification or amendment. The Bill aimed to criminalise all undocumented workers in the USA (the vast majority Mexican and Central American), proposed fines for people who employed or assisted such workers, and advocated the extension of the border wall between Arizona and Mexico as a means of further limiting undocumented cross-border immigration. The first demonstration occurred in Washington, DC, on 7 March. Three days later, Chicago witnessed the largest demonstration in the city's history, while on 26 March, Los Angeles hosted a demonstration involving between 1 and 2 million people. Between March and 1 May, demonstrations occurred in cities and towns in numerous states across the country, many of which had never before experienced such political mobilisation. On 1 May, millions of Mexican and other Latino and immigrant workers, legal and undocumented, effectively shut down businesses across the country with a mass day of protests and boycotts. Interestingly, more media and political attention was paid in the USA to the release on 28 April 2006, of a Spanish-language version of the 'Star Spangled Banner', entitled 'Nuestro Himno' (Our Hymn). Intended to support the demonstrations, and involving Cuban American, Puerto Rican and Haitian American

artists united in pan-ethnic solidarity, the Spanish version was widely attacked by conservative politicians as a desecration of the US national anthem, and reignited calls to make English the national language. As with the English Only movement that began in Miami in 1980 in a bid to end the city's pioneering of bilingualism at local government levels, critics of the song in the media and the federal government denounced Spanish as a 'foreign' idiom, their arguments confirming that the language issue cannot be disentangled from broader discourses of national belonging and citizenship.

Assessing the indignation with which the Spanish version of the national anthem was greeted, Ariel Dorfman wrote in the *Washington Post*:

It was a reminder that, along with their swarthy and labouring bodies, those immigrants had smuggled into El Norte the extremely vivacious language of Miguel de Cervantes and Octavio Paz. They weren't coming here merely to work, bake bread, lay bricks, change diapers, wash dishes, pick strawberries, work, work, work; Dios mío, they might decide to speak! And not necessarily in English.¹¹

More significantly, perhaps, these demonstrating workers were announcing that they were in the USA as productive socio-economic and political agents now prepared to speak out and defy anti-Latino and anti-immigrant policies. The Spanish version also confirmed that members of disparate Latino communities were united, perhaps for the first time, in a political movement aimed not simply at guaranteeing immigrant worker rights, but also at insisting on the 'American' credentials of Latinos, a heterogeneous collective of peoples historically regarded as somehow non-, anti- and even un-'American'. Carrying both the US flags and the flags of national origin, chanting in Spanish and English, and wielding banners that declared 'We are workers, not terrorists,' 'We are part of the American Dream,' and 'Hoy marchamos, mañana votamos' [Today we march, Tomorrow we vote], the demonstrators were evincing a canny understanding of their own capacity to resemanticise American Dream logics in their favour, to alter the terrains of US political debate and to influence future election outcomes. At the same time, the protestors were disputing the widespread conflation of the immigration issue with the issues of border security and terrorism on the part of conservative and anti-immigrant spokespeople. A sign that the demonstrations may have had some legislative effect came on 25 May 2006, with the passing of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act (Senate Bill 2611), which differed from the Sensenbrenner Bill in permitting undocumented workers with five or more years of residency in the USA to gain US citizenship. Once implemented, this Bill could see some 7 to 8 million Latin American-origin workers, and many more millions of sponsored family members, augment the existing Latino population in the next few decades.

The unprecedented pan-ethnic Latino unity evident in the 2006 demonstrations should not, however, be regarded as a sign that Latinos form an amorphous, undifferentiated mass, or that latinisation itself simply designates either a mode of becoming 'American' within US geopolitical borders and national traditions, or a variant on traditional modes of immigrant assimilation. Chon Noriega points out that the strategic adoption of Latino arose in the 1980s as an alternative to the government-imposed Hispanic 'because—in the popular imagination, governmental classification, and mass media distribution—specific Latino groups are not understood in national terms'.¹² For Noriega Latino does not signify an ethnic identity that overrides the specific national or ethnic categories of Chicano/a,

Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, Colombian, and so on. Rather, Latino connotes 'the hilo/thread for a social movement to remap 'America,' and—in a more immediate sense—for negotiating the representation of specific histories/identities as part of the national culture'.¹³ The conglomerate of Latino populations derives from the legacies or pressures of war and invasion (the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848; the Spanish-American War of 1898; numerous US interventions in the Caribbean and Central America in the twentieth century), political crisis and military dictatorship, bourgeois cosmopolitanism, globalised economic imperatives, US desires for domestic servants and cheap agricultural and industrial labor, Latin American desires for socio-economic security or betterment, or any of these in combination. Latino sectors, then, are subject to the multiple signifying systems attributable to two sets of continental factors: first, the legacies of Spanish and US imperialism; and second, the USA's economic and cultural global power and Latin America's uneven experiences of modernisation and socio-economic dependency.

These historical complexities modulate the US experiences of divergent Latino communities. Thus, depending on the part of the USA in which the term latinisation arises or is applied, it may shift semantic register to identify the local transformations supposedly effected by specific Latino/a groups: Mexicanisation in California, the Southwest, Texas, and Chicago; Cubanisation in south Florida; Puerto Ricanisation in New York. In other contexts, latinisation refers to the demographic precondition for the formation of new pan-ethnic affiliations and identifications, or *latinidades*, across national-origin or historical minority identity lines. Manifest in this way, latinisation thus designates the possibility of 'a unity fashioned creatively on the basis of shared memory and desire, congruent histories of misery and struggle, and intertwining utopias'.¹⁴ That understanding of latinisation thus runs counter to that adopted by media, government, and academic research enterprises, which often define latinisation reductively as the process by which a new 'Hispanic' or 'Latino' constituency is constructed, one that may thus be regarded as a voting bloc, a community of consumers, or a coherent and cohesive population to be identified and studied as objective units.¹⁵ Furthermore, latinisation may denote the USA's new function as a geopolitical host or base for transnational processes and socioeconomic and transcultural patterns of integration and connection—satellite communities, transmigratory routes, bi-national identities and affiliations, maintenance of Spanish—in the American continent.

However, yet other commentators and observers, particularly those connected to anti-immigrant and nativist organisations, regard latinisation as a euphemism for an alien invasion from the Latin American or Mexican south, and thus as an historical force to be discredited, resisted, and ultimately turned back or stopped if 'America' is to survive intact and not be turned into 'Amexica', 'Mexamerica', or in the Californian case, 'Mexifornia'. In his *Who Are We?: The Challengers to America's National Identity* from 2004, Harvard academic and defender of purported 'American' values Samuel Huntington identified 'Hispanics' and their demographic rise as posing the most pressing challenge to 'American' civilisation in the twenty-first century:

When Americans talk about immigration and assimilation, they have tended to generalize about immigrants without discriminating among them. They have thus hidden from themselves the peculiar characteristics, challenge, and problems posed by Hispanics, primarily Mexican, immigration. By avoiding, at least until 2004, the issue of Mexican immigration and treating the overall relationship with their neighbor as if it did not differ from that with other countries, they also avoided the issue of whether America will continue to be a

country with a single national language and a common Anglo-Protestant mainstream culture. To ignore that question, however, is also to answer it and acquiesce in the eventual transformation of Americans into two peoples with two languages and two cultures.¹⁶

Similar claims were made by Victor David Hansen, a classicist and war historian who fears the 'looming nightmare of unassimilated Third-Worldism' embodied by Latin American-origin immigrants and facilitated by their interactions with established Latino communities in what he calls 'Mexifornia'.¹⁷

The anxieties and fear of hegemonic displacement underwriting such positions would seem to suggest that traditional ideals of 'Americanness' purportedly embodied by the English-speaking WASP are in crisis in the USA today. At the same time, the anti-'Hispanic' stance misreads the normative aspirations of many millions of people south of the US-Mexico border. For example, the circulation of such terms as *El norte*, which are common in Mexico and Central America, popularly connote a promised land or paradise worthy of enduring the hazards of undocumented migration in order to gain access. During the mass demonstrations of March 2006, protestors bearing Mexican and US flags also carried placards that stated, 'Do not exclude us from the God-given American Dream'. These agents of latinisation want an entry into the American Dream, and do not seek to destroy it as Huntington and others argue. However, their presence and resolve is inevitably transforming what 'America' signifies, what its 'mainstream' human face looks like, what language(s) it speaks, where its imagined borders may lie, and how it is perceived in other parts of the world.

One of my concerns as a teacher and researcher is to counter reductive and simplistic approaches (as typified by Huntington's and Hansen's polemical contributions) to a US 'minority' population more than double that of Australia's; another related concern is to counter assumptions and misconceptions about 'America' itself. The questions I posed earlier in this paper are similar to the ones I routinely ask of my students in 'Contemporary Latino USA', a core subject (along with Spanish language and culture) in the Latino USA major offered at UTS to students in the combined degree international studies program. This subject introduces students to the idea of latinisation canvased in this paper, but it has the additional aim of preparing those students for a year of in-country study at a US university in a Latino dominant part of the USA. The idea is that they will continue to learn Spanish, undertake on-the-ground research into local Latino community life, and return to Australia with a deeper awareness of how latinisation is being felt and managed.

The importance of that awareness for Australians today can be illustrated by one example, a student of El Salvadoran heritage who opted to spend her year of in-country study in Miami. Profoundly modulated by the Cuban exile community, Miami's Latino population represents some 70 per cent of the city total, hence the city is often called the 'Gateway,' 'Bridge' or 'Door' of the Americas, expressions that indicate Miami's economic and financial importance, and its unique cultural reputation, in the American hemisphere. Such expressions also reflect national and international perceptions of the city as a major centre and test-case of US latinisation, where mass migration from Latin American countries has profoundly changed the demographic, cultural, and linguistic landscape, and raised questions for many observers about where the purported national, cultural and linguistic boundaries of Anglophone and Hispanophone Americas begin and end. The student in question had little difficulty in recognising those boundary problematics, given that her own family history has led to

her relatives' dispersal to the US west coast as well as to Australia, with both branches maintaining abiding transnational links with the El Salvadoran home. For this student, however, the most pressing, yet personally transformative, issue raised by her time in Miami lay in aligning her new understandings of latinised 'America' with her sense of Australian place and identification in a transnational framework even wider than she had contemplated. She and the other students currently in 'Latino USA' are exceptions. Too few Australians are making similar efforts in coming to terms, and indeed, imagining, a future USA increasingly characterised by the economic, political and cultural strength of the country's heterogeneous Latino sectors.



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¹ Horne, Donald (1964). *The Lucky Country*, Penguin, Ringwood, Vic: 99.

² *Ibid*: 100.

³ My preference for Latino in this article accords with Latino Studies critical practice that rejects the term Hispanic, which is widely regarded by Latinos as imposed by the US government and such apparatuses as the Census Bureau, and deployed by the US media and business interests to define a purported market or consumer constituency. Latino in the US setting is not a synonym for a resident of a Latin American state; rather, it is best regarded as a general panethnic identity option opposed to Hispanic and that term's connotations of 'Spanishness'.

⁴ The dates here are important milestones in the USA's Latino history. 1848 marked the end of the Mexican-American war by which the USA acquired Mexico's northern half (the territory from California to Texas, the latter territory acquired by 1845) and a substantial population of Mexican and Native American subjects. In 1898, the US victory in the Spanish-American War led to the USA's annexation of Spain's last remaining overseas colonies: Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam and the Philippines. Puerto Rico and Guam remain US possessions today. US control over Puerto Rico and its imposition of a modernisation plan on the island in the post World War 11 period resulted in the eventual migration of nearly half the Puerto Rican population to New York and other north-eastern cities. 1959 marked the birth of the Cuban

- Revolution, and inaugurated the first significant wave of migration from the island to southern Florida on the part of the island's upper- and middle-class sectors.
- ⁵ Grieco, Elizabeth M, and Rachel C Cassidy (2001). 'Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: Census 2000 Brief', US Census Bureau, Washington, March: 1-11. While the 2000 Census registered the overtaking of African Americans by Latinos/Hispanics, the Census Bureau officially acknowledged the development in January 2003.
- ⁶ '2004 American Community Survey Data Profile Highlights' (2004). US Census Bureau. <http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet>.
- ⁷ Grosfoguel, Ramón, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (2005). 'Latin@s and the "Euro-American Menace": The Decolonization of the US Empire in the Twenty-First Century', in Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (eds), *Latin@s in the World-System: Decolonization Struggles in the Twenty-First Century*, Paradigm, Boulder, CO: 6. The use of Latin@ by the editors represents a recent orthographic alternative to the more common Latino, Latino/a, and Latina/o, the latter two options signalling an acknowledgement of gender differences that the masculine noun 'Latino' does not enable.
- ⁸ Flores, Juan (2000). *From Bomba to Hip-Hop: Puerto Rican Culture and Latino Identity*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- ⁹ Grosfoguel *et al*, *op cit*: 100.
- ¹⁰ Vázquez, Francisco H, and Rodolfo D Torres (eds) (2003). *Latino/a Thought: Culture, Politics and Society*, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland: 3.
- ¹¹ Dorfman, Ariel (2006). 'Waving the Star-Spanglish Banner', *Washington Post* (7 May): B02.
- ¹² Noriega, Chon A (1993). 'El hilo latino: Representation, Identity and National Culture', *Jump Cut* 38: 46.
- ¹³ *ibid*.
- ¹⁴ Flores, *op cit*: 198.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid*: 194-98.
- ¹⁶ Huntington, Samuel P (2004). *Who Are We? The Challengers to America's National Identity*, Simon & Schuster, New York: 318.
- ¹⁷ Hansen, Victor Davis (2003). *Mexifornia: A State of Becoming*, Encounter Books, San Francisco: 18.



Academy News

ASSA Annual Symposium and Cunningham Lecture 21 November 2006

Australians on the Move: *Internal Migration in Australia* is the theme for this year's Symposium and the venue is the Australian Academy of Science's Shine Dome in Canberra.

The Symposium will address the important issues of the continued growth of the big cities, the depopulation of inland Australia, the rapid growth of coastal settlements and the movement of indigenous people. Population mobility affects labour supply, environment, social cohesion, social capital, family and the lives of people of all ages. Speakers will include Martin Bell (University of Queensland), Peter McDonald (Australian National University), Graeme Hugo (University of Adelaide), Ann Larson (Combined Universities Centre for Rural Health, Geraldton), Maryann Wulff (Monash University), Jim Walmsley (University of New England), Dianne Rudd (University of Adelaide), John Taylor, Jeromey Temple and Don Rowland (ANU), Ian Burnley (University of NSW) and Tom Wilson (Charles Darwin University). Two international scholars will also participate: Phil Rees (Leeds University) and Tony Champion (Newcastle University).

The **2006 Cunningham Lecture** will be presented by Hilary Charlesworth and will examine 'Building Justice and Democracy after Conflict'.

Fellows' Colloquium

The Colloquium for this year will address the topic '*Who stole history? Current debates and new directions*' with speakers Ann McGrath (Director, Australian Centre for Indigenous Studies) and Peter Spearritt (The Brisbane Institute) and will take place in the Great Hall at University House on Monday 20 November from 7.30 pm.

Annual General Meeting

This year's AGM will be held at the Shine Dome on Wednesday 22 November 2006. Fellows with items for the agenda are kindly requested to send them to Robin Taylor in the Academy Secretariat.

International Program

Australia-China Exchange Program

Delegation from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS): CASS encourages its scholars to undertake international comparative studies. A research team was formed to undertake a comparative study of clean governance, between China and Australia. The key reason for selecting Australia is our second place ranking in terms of clean politics in a list of 150 countries, conducted by Transparency International. ASSA facilitated a visit to Australia by the CASS delegation, which took place from 30 May to 5 June 2006 and involved meetings with key Government Departments.

Wing On Lee, Professor of Education at the University of Sydney, has reported on his visit to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in March-April of this year. He writes: The visit was hosted by the Institute of Politics of the Academy, and I met with a wide

range of people, including senior management (such as Professors Wang Yicheng and Fang Ning, Head and Deputy Head of the Institute of Political Studies, Professor Huang Ping, Director of International Collaboration, and Professor Yang Tuan, Director of Centre for Social Policy Studies, Institute of Sociology), senior scholars within the Academy (such as Professor Wu Xiaoying of the Institute of Sociology and Professor Wang Xiaodong of the Institute of Youth Studies), senior academics outside the Academy (such as Professor Liu Jianjun of People's University of China), and senior government officials (such as Mr Liukai of the Chinese Communist Youth League and Mr Wu Qi of Beijing Youth League). The program is a well-managed arrangement, and the visit progressed with more than typical warmth and hospitality in China.

During the visit, I was invited by Beijing Normal University to deliver the 14th Lecture of the Beijing Teacher Education Lecture Series of the University. I was also invited to meet with Professor Xie Weihe, Vice-President of Tsinghua University and Professor Feng Jun, Vice-President of People's University of China. I also paid a one-day visit to the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, meeting with Professor Li Yi Hai, Director of International Collaboration.

Senior management, as well as both university Vice Presidents, expressed concerns about their roles: to remain in the forefront in research, to provide academic leadership nationwide and to serve the training needs of a host of government officials facing rapid policy changes. Funding is a major concern for senior management (particularly for such a huge organisation), and successes in bidding for national projects were celebrated with pride. The university Vice Presidents from Tsinghua and People's University both mentioned the need for internationalisation in Chinese universities. Both mentioned the expansion of their international open recruitment process, and their wish to see staff with diverse abilities from different places.

Despite coming from different disciplines, the various academics I met expressed common concerns that reflect several current tensions within the country. First is the gap between the rich and the poor and the concern about increased unemployment, especially among the higher education graduates. While China has recently experienced exponential economic growth, almost all academics expressed their worry about this situation. However, views diverge greatly in ways to handle this issue. There is support for the growing market economy, but most of the academics I met would prefer some regulation of the market, and some government intervention to narrow the rich-poor gap. For them, social equity and justice comprise their national and social ideals or ideologies. Second, which is closely related to their concern in economics, is political ideology; discussion with the academics also revealed ideological tensions within the country. There is support for focusing more on modernisation and economic development than on politics or political ideologies. However, there are also strong concerns about the 'ideology vacuum' at present. The scholars I met expressed some nostalgic reminiscence of the past, partly in the face of current social inequities in the distribution of wealth. A few explicitly mentioned the emergence of new leftist (or neo-leftist) in China, which has gained wide support among young people. The tension between neo-leftism and neo-liberalism has become very explicit, and I was told that there are vibrant ideological debates between the two camps.

While the academics were interested in the interpretation of the current situation in China, and suggesting ways forward from their own theoretical frameworks and

perspectives, the focus of discussion with the government officials was on youth problems and how to deal with them. I have broadly identified three approaches being taken.

- (i) The first approach is to place more emphasis on national (or patriotic) education. There is a strong belief that when people are public-minded, individual behaviours will be regulated. This coincides with the recent publication of 'The Socialist Views on Glory and Shame', also called 'Eight Glories, Eight Shames'. The glorified values and behaviour are: loving the motherland, serving the people, advocating science, hard work, honesty, law abiding, mutual support and perseverance. The shameful values and behaviours are: ignorance, laziness, harm to others, profit-making without justice, law breaking, arrogance, extravagance and promiscuity.
- (ii) The second approach is develop positive attitudes towards youth. Actually this is the view of a professor who considers that the present society has too negative a view of youths. The traditional view of seeing them as problems has to be changed, as this will only become a self-fulfilling prophecy, the professor said. Society needs to adopt a more positive view towards youths and work from there.
- (iii) A third approach very much represents the view: 'if you cannot beat them, join them'. The government official who holds this view told me that he has done his best to attract young people to do voluntary work especially in the Western regions of China, engage them in service learning, and develop websites and design internet games and activities that are both attractive and healthy. He said since we cannot stop people from being hooked to the internet, it is important for them to compete on the internet and promote healthy values on the internet.

From the above report, it is clear that the two weeks' visit to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was very busy, but fruitful. Every meeting was a serious discussion, touching upon current social, economic and political issues. The people I met were both reflective and proactive, struggling to find ways of interpreting the current situation, and about ways forward. In scholarly terms, this was a mind-opening trip, and on the personal side, I experienced great warmth and hospitality from the Chinese hosts.

Australia-Netherlands Exchange Program

Dr Julie Hatfield, Senior Research Fellow, Injury Risk Management Research Centre (IRMRC) at the University of NSW, has reported on her visit to the Netherlands in April 2006.

She visited Dr Irene van Kamp at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), which provided an opportunity to discuss several projects of ongoing collaboration, to prepare papers, and to develop a new project and associated application for funding from the Australian Research Council. She reports:

Studies relating to noise sensitivity

During Dr van Kamp's ASSA-funded visit to Australia in July 2002 we designed an international multi-centre laboratory study to compare the psychometric properties of several measures of noise sensitivity (so that the best of these may be used in communication about the health risks of noise). The research design has since been piloted in London. During my 2005 visit to the Netherlands (funded by NWO, Netherlands), we refined the research protocol, and met with colleagues from different

European research centres to further develop the project. Several issues were identified, and we called for comment from the potential research partners regarding these issues.

During the 2006 visit to the Netherlands we integrated comments from our potential research partners, revised the research protocol, and submitted an application for funding to RIVM. We also approached a further potential research partner, who is very interested in being involved, and met with several other potential partners, in order to finalise the details of the research program.

During Dr van Kamp's 2002 visit we also began our investigation of self-selection of noise sensitive residents out of high noise areas with analysis of data from three international airports. We had hoped to write a journal article based on this analysis, but the analysis convinced us that targeted research is required to adequately address the 'self-selection' issue. We drafted an appropriate research design during my 2005 visit to the Netherlands.

During this visit to the Netherlands we refined this draft research design.

Papers relating to noise sensitivity

In 2002 we planned a journal article on residential satisfaction in relation to noise annoyance and sensitivity. The manuscript has since been drafted and it was reviewed during my 2005 visit to the Netherlands. During this visit to the Netherlands we finalised additional analyses, so that the writing of the manuscript may now be completed.

Shortly before I left Australia, we were invited to submit a manuscript for a special issue of *Acta Acustica* on the influence of acoustical context on reaction to a target noise ('soundscape').

During this visit to the Netherlands we prepared and submitted the manuscript: 'Clarifying "soundscape": Effects of question format on reaction to noise from combined sources', which also considers the role of noise sensitivity.

Development of project and application for ARC International Linkage Fellowship

Before I left Australia I had been communicating with Dr van Kamp (via email) about developing a project and application for an ARC International Linkage Fellowship. Ideally, the project would reflect our shared interest and expertise in the effects of noise, Dr van Kamp's interest in residential environmental quality and health/wellbeing, and the priority of the IRMRC on injury control. During this visit we discussed both the project and the application extensively. We developed a project that aims to examine the association between health and residential environment in the elderly, particularly the effects of a) traffic-related pollution (air, noise) on health outcomes (eg, cardiovascular disease); and b) housing-design and -condition on falls. For three residential areas of Sydney with varying levels of traffic, SES and housing condition, we would obtain a) survey data using a WHO questionnaire and surveyor sheet; b) routinely-collected mortality and morbidity data; and c) air- and noise-pollution measures. Outcomes would include: improved understanding of environment-related health in the elderly, policy implications, and further development of survey tools with potential for (inter)national use. We prepared a draft funding application. The application was submitted in June 2006.

I would like to thank ASSA, KNAW, the IRMRC, and RIVM, for supporting myself and Dr van Kamp in this fruitful collaboration.

Association of Asian Social Science Research Councils (AASSREC)

Japan will host the 17th AASSREC Biennial Conference in Nagoya, Japan in November 2007. The theme for the conference will be the relationship between economic health and environmental sustainability.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has asked to join AASSREC and has invited John Beaton, in his role as Secretary General of AASSREC, to visit Pyongyang in September.

Key Dates for international programs in 2006

Applications are called for the following international programs which will be funded in 2007. Australia-Netherlands Exchange, 14 August 2006; Australia-India Exchange, 20 September 2006; Australia-Britain Special Joint Project Funding, 30 September 2006.

Research Program

ARC Linkage-Learned Academies Special Projects

All Fellows have been notified that proposals are now sought for the 2007 round of ARC funded Special Projects. Applicants should submit proposals to their panel chair by 4 August, comprising a 1-2 page outline of the research proposal, including title, the anticipated project management team (usually led by the proposer), a summary of the project and the project outcomes.

The Research Committee will short-list the successful project, which will then need to be developed as a full proposal before submission to the ARC in October.

Policy and Advocacy Program

A Policy Roundtable on the topic of 'Work and Family', chaired by Sue Richardson, was held on 12 May at the University of Melbourne. The Roundtable brought together social scientists from a range of disciplines and senior policy makers to examine the challenges and supports offered to working parents and how they can best be supported through both family and workplace policy. (See full report elsewhere in this issue of *Dialogue*.)

The next Policy Roundtable, on 'Wellbeing', will be chaired by Sue Richardson and held on 4 August at the Australian National University. The Roundtable will be dedicated to exploring the opportunities and challenges in extending our understanding of wellbeing in policy and program contexts. Lenore Manderson who edited the book *Rethinking Wellbeing* (API Network 2005) has invited some of her co-authors, Academy Fellows and other social scientists to join with government policy makers to explore conventional and innovative understandings and measures of wellbeing and how these can inform debates concerning resource allocation, policy development, and social welfare programs. Some key questions that will be posed at the Roundtable are: How adequate are current measures of wellbeing? To what extent do the indicators that derive from this work, and inform policy and programs, take account of the particularity of human experience and need at local and community levels? Who misses out in such approaches, and for what reasons?

Blake Dawson Waldron Prize for Business Literature

The winner of the annual \$30,000 Blake Dawson Waldron Prize for Business Literature was announced at a presentation dinner on Tuesday 4 April. Qantas Chief Executive Officer Geoff Dixon was Guest Speaker for the evening. A very topical book that examines the increasing trend for governments to fund public infrastructure facilities through private sector finance in partnership with government bodies won this year's Prize.

Public Private Partnerships – The worldwide revolution in infrastructure provision and project finance (Edward Elgar Publishing) by father and son-in-law writing team **Mervyn K Lewis** FASSA and Darrin Grimsey looks at the competing arguments and reasons for PPPs in Australia and other economies. (Professor Lewis is Professor of Banking and Finance at the University of South Australia).

Blake Dawson Waldron Chairman of Partners Mary Padbury said there was a very high standard of entries this year, but this one highlights a topic of great importance that will continue to generate community debate. 'This book outlines the range of reasons why government and the private sector are finding PPPs an attractive way to fund essential public infrastructure projects. This trend is likely to continue as evidenced by the Queensland Government's announcement last month that it is looking at \$5.6 billion in PPP projects.'

According to the judging panel, Mahla Pearlman AO, Alan Cameron AM, and business leader George Maltby AO, there was a strong field of business books this year. They were, however, particularly impressed with the thoroughness and readability of the winning title and the way it examined PPP developments in Australia.

Administered by the State Library of NSW, the Prize was established by Blake Dawson Waldron to encourage the highest standards of literary commentary on Australian business and financial affairs.

Belinda Hutchinson, President of the Library Council of NSW, noted that: '*Public Private Partnerships* is a fascinating read and a worthy winner, covering significant, topical issues. It also involved unique Australian research. The State Library of New South Wales is pleased to partner with Blake Dawson Waldron in supporting clear and informative business writing by way of the BDW Prize for Business Literature.'

Workshop Program

Forthcoming Workshops

Social capital and social justice: critical Australian perspectives. Geoff Woolcock (University of Queensland) July 2006.

In demand: childcare and working families. A policy framework for Australia. Barbara Pocock and Elizabeth Hill (University of Sydney) July 2006.

Australian Indigenous studies: Present and future. Mick Dodson, Peter Schnierer and Peter Read (Australian National University) September 2006.

Hate speech, free speech and human rights in Australia. Katharine Gelber and Adrienne Stone (Australian National University) September 2006.

Forms of sociality and digital media. Kathryn Robinson (Australian National University) September 2006.

ANZAC day in the new millennium: developing a multi-disciplinary vision. Anne-Marie Hede, Ruth Rentschler, Di Waddell, John Hall and Joan Beaumont (Deakin University) September 2006.

Migration challenges in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century. Amarjit Kaur, Tessa Morris and Ian Metcalfe (University of New England) November 2006.

Communicating the gendered impacts of economic policies. Siobhan Austen and Therese Jefferson (Curtin University of Technology) December 2006.

Reports from workshops conducted under the Workshop Program, including policy recommendations, are published in *Dialogue*, usually in the first issue following the workshop.

Emeritus Professor Kevin Marjoribanks, former Vice Chancellor and Dean of Education at the University of Adelaide, died in April.

His obituary will appear in the *Annual Report*.

Emeritus Professor John Ritchie AO, former Professor of History and General Editor of the *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, died in May.

His obituary will appear in the *Annual Report*.

The **2005 Academy Early Career Award** recipient is *Dr Thomas Suddendorf*, Senior Lecturer in the School of Psychology at the University of Queensland. He is currently in Africa, and will write for the next issue of *Dialogue* on his return.

Reports from Workshops

Fighting Crime Together: The Challenges of Policing and Security Networks

Jenny Fleming and Jennifer Wood

Contemporary processes of political, cultural and economic globalisation have generated a new world of security risks. These risks result from the illicit activities of 'nodes' and networks whose methods of organisation defy sovereign boundaries and require those involved with policing and security to develop more effective security networks both within and across these boundaries. This project focuses largely on networks as its central unit of analysis. It does so through a variety of disciplinary lenses from academia as well as the practitioner community. In general terms, networks are characterised by interdependence between organisations, continuing interactions between network members; (caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes) and game-like behaviour, rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network participants. While such attributes are key features of networks, and as such are useful for diagnostic purposes, they should not obscure the fact that networks take many forms and mean different things to different actors. Variations in the distribution of resources and in the bargaining skills of participants help explain both differences in outcomes in a network and variations between networks. As well, networks often have a significant degree of autonomy from government and are often not directly accountable to the state.

While the strategic appeal of governance networks is widely accepted, they inevitably pose challenges for those seeking to establish and maintain such structures. While acknowledging that resource allocation, conflictual governing structures, political inertia and cultural differences can represent significant challenges for successful networking, project researchers explore new strategies for integrating the knowledge, capacities and resources of different security providers and recognise that what is required is a better understanding of the conditions that allow for effective and successful governance networks. This project addresses the challenges of policing and security networks from a police, practice and research perspective. It is intended as a way of bridging the gap in knowledge that exists regarding what police do, how they address security issues and how they seek to serve their communities.

Bringing together practitioners who are active in the field with those who are involved in academic research is essential for innovative police work. At a two day workshop conducted in June 2005 at the Australian National University, practitioners and researchers from both the academy and the fields of policing and security practice and policy came together to consider the 'wicked issue' of security and policing and the nature of networks in the governance of these policy areas. Other points of debate that participants were asked to consider were: what are the weaknesses and limitations of existing institutions and practices of policing and security in relation to networks? What are the challenges for public police organisations in the context of networks? What new institutional and strategic models should be designed, implemented and evaluated? How do we design, assess and manage these new networks? How do we ensure these networks are instrumentally effective as well as

democratic? The participants were not all primarily involved in criminology. Political scientists, sociologists, lawyers and those well versed in public administration and management provided a multi-disciplinary voice at the workshop.

Each paper at the workshop contributed to an understanding of the nuances and complexities that surround networks as a concept and as a practical ideal, as well as the various ways they are used in policing and security environments. The papers demonstrated the multifaceted perspectives of the various actors involved in networks. In many cases they pointed to the unlimited potential of networks and nodal arrangements to clarify and manage complex issues that constitute the governance of security on a number of levels. Many of the papers identified the 'pros and cons' of network formation in policing and security and provided an opportunity for participants to assess the various roles that agencies, individuals and organisations play in their respective networking agendas.

The papers were delivered in a three part format. The first group of papers looked specifically at the key explanatory concepts, themes and debates surrounding networks and networking behaviour generally. Rod Rhodes' view of the basic principles of network practice, and guidelines for 'thriving networks' was the opening paper and provided the context for the other papers in this section to follow. Written from a public administration perspective, Rhodes' paper challenged 'the dominant, instrumental or tool view of networks' and argued that 'the lessons of public sector reform over the past twenty years are as applicable in police and security studies as anywhere else'. The paper demonstrated that networks are no longer a metaphor or a site for arcane theoretical disputes, but a live reform issue for governments that are increasingly aware of the pertinence of resource allocation and the importance of collaboration and partnerships generally.

The growing body of literature on the features and organisation of security networks, and the normative contribution of these publications, can only benefit from the development and analysis of more detailed datasets. Benoit Dupont's (from Montreal) paper introduced workshop participants to some considerations of the methodological tools that can be mobilised to map and model complex organisational networks. Dupont demonstrated how different types of networks can be mapped, what challenges must be faced in the process, and what data such exercises can yield. He was particularly interested in assessing whether the mapping of security networks can provide us with new insights into the governance of security (confirming or contradicting existing theories) as well as improving our understanding of contemporary security provision in Western societies.

In their discussion of resource networks, Ayling, Grabosky and Shearing looked at the integration of state and civil resources and the mechanisms of 'coercion', 'sale' and 'gift' that work to 'pull in', and thus network, the physical, financial, technical, informational and human resources necessary for effective public policing. The authors tackled the somewhat thorny issues of accountability, regulation and democratic practice in managing resource integration and allocation and identified the central challenge as managing such practices, consistently, fairly and with the result of overall effective outcomes for society'.

The final paper in this section of the workshop addressed the challenges associated with multi-agency networks in police organisations and provided an 'inside' perspective of how police view networks and 'make sense' of a governing structure

that they perceive as being in conflict with command and control strategies, the contracting out of police services and performance measurement mechanisms. Jenny Fleming suggested that the attributes that are purported to promote thriving networks provide significant challenges for police officers seeking to establish and maintain effective networks with other public agencies. This paper dealing with a strong practitioner perspective was an appropriate precursor to the second section of the workshop that allowed three senior police practitioners to reflect on the various challenges that confront them in their everyday practice.

Commissioner Mick Keelty is the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Internationally, the AFP's networks with international agencies and its subsequent liaison work are increasingly integral elements in the investigation of transnational crime. Its role in regional engagement and its international peacekeeping missions are also strategic priorities. In his discussion of the challenges associated with international networking, Commissioner Keelty emphasised the importance of context and identified the ongoing maintenance of network facilitation as vital to successful network practice. He pointed to the challenges of imposing a country's own values and cultures on other jurisdictions when facilitating such networks and points to the importance of firm political commitment and ongoing support of national governments.

Grant Wardlaw is the AFP's National Manager for Intelligence Services. He picked up Keelty's theme of the importance of international liaison networks in the context of intelligence gathering and sharing, and he argued for a more proactive networked approach to law enforcement. He identified the central importance of effective internal networks for intelligence gathering and analysis but conceded that the widening sphere of influence of global events on practitioners' daily activities will always pose a challenge.

Mark Burgess, formerly a New South Wales police officer, is now Chief Executive Officer of the Police Federation of Australia (PFA), an umbrella body that represents Australian police unions. Burgess also emphasises the importance of internal networks to the success of external networks and strategic alliances. One of the most significant challenges recognised by Burgess is how to meet the local (and often insular) needs of the organisation's constituents while establishing national networks that address more global issues. Burgess suggests that there needs to be a more integrated, networked approach to local law enforcement and crime reduction and like many of the participants identified the importance of recognising security issues as being 'national' concerns, deserving 'national responsibility, attention, and resourcing' for successful networks, particularly those that involve the community.

Fittingly, practitioners and an academic came together for the final paper in this section. Bradley, Nixon (Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police) and Marks reflect on the research partnership between police and academics and argue for a supportive professional network that would comprise police and researchers working together in participative action research to address ways in which research might inform network practice. There is much about the history of police-academic relationships as well as the current ways in which joint research and innovation is governed that makes this a daunting task. Nevertheless, the authors contend that such collaboration is vital to the advancement of progressive, professional and democratic policing.

The final three presentations reflected on the future of networking practices and arrangements in the delivery of policing and security services as well as in the governance

of this provision. In his presentation on 'Peacemaking Networks and Restorative Justice', Braithwaite argued that police peacekeepers have an important role in building peace in nations that have been riven by armed conflict and that the role of such peacekeepers may be conceived in terms of participating in and sustaining networks for the governance of peace. Braithwaite maintained that at the core of effective peace-keeping endeavours is a humanitarian ethic concerned with the safety of civilians and non-combatants in times of war and conflict. Beyond this dimension however there is a more pressing long-term requirement to promote security through peace-keeping efforts, to address deeper structural conditions at the levels of society, economy and ecology - conditions that generate the violence and conflict in the first instance. This deeper emphasis assists in the production, identification, nurturing and protection of 'islands of civility' deemed to be present in even the most war-torn environments.

Lewis and Wood examined some key challenges associated with governing nodes and networks of policing and security provision. Traditionally, questions of accountability and governance have centred on the activities of public policing organisations and in particular on the potential for police to be unduly invasive, coercive and partial in their dealings with members of the public. This traditional framing of the governance problem remains an important one in light of the extraordinary powers and authority being granted to police and other state security institutions in the context of the 'war on terror'. Notwithstanding, Lewis and Wood began with the premise that this conceptualisation of the governance problem is much too narrow in light of the changing field of policing and security delivery. They pointed out that it is no longer acceptable to assume that mechanisms developed to govern the conduct of public actors are naturally more desirable or effective than those established to govern the conduct of private actors. The future of governance thus rests on the development of new 'hybrids' that shape, through different strategies, the behaviour of diverse policing and security providers toward democratic ends.

'Dark networks' was the focus of the final presentation. Jennifer Wood pointed out that what the current governance problem raises is the potential for seemingly 'bright' networks of policing and security delivery to have a 'dark side'. She argued that the public police and others involved in security policy and practice must participate in the formation of networks that at least meet, or ideally exceed, the competence of 'dark networks' involved in complex activities like organised crime and terrorism. Even at local levels police are required to forge all manner of partnerships to tackle the wicked problems of crime and disorder. Wood argues that the question of how precisely the police should *normatively* position themselves in local, national and transnational networks, should be given careful consideration in the future. What could be at stake is the very identity of the public police as a symbolically important institution, with the authority and legitimacy that comes with that symbolism, as well as a professional institution that has carved out, and will continue to carve out, an 'exclusive domain of practice'. The positioning of the police within networks is not simply about engaging in power struggles; the positioning of the police is more fundamentally about the responsibility that police have to advance the democratisation of the policing and security field generally.

A collection of essays, based on the papers delivered in this workshop, is now in press with the University of New South Wales Press (in association with the Australian and New Zealand School of Governance) and is expected to be in print by September 2006. The collection has been aptly titled: *Fighting Crime Together: The challenges of policing and security networks* and is edited by Jenny Fleming and Jennifer Wood.

The robust discussions that took place in this workshop contributed significantly to the shape of this collection.

Workshops don't happen by themselves, the editors were extremely grateful for the talents of Jessica Robertson who administered the workshop with apparent ease and ensured a smooth and efficient two days. There were three discussants who took pains to read the papers and offer some valuable insights into themes and ideas that emerged from groups of papers. Special thanks to Rob McCusker from the Australian Institute of Criminology, Andrew Goldsmith from Flinders University and Rob Floyd from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Professor John Wanna from the Australian National University and Benoit Dupont for making the seemingly endless journey from North America. We would also like to thank the contributors for their goodwill, cooperation and punctuality and for their general participation in this project.

The project was made possible by the generous sponsorship of the National Institute of Social Sciences and Law from the Australian National University and the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia. The Regulatory Institutions Network at the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University has also been very supportive both financially and by providing the venue and infrastructure for the workshop.



Ensuring Accountability – Terrorist Challenges and State Responses in a Free Society

Mark Nolan (on behalf of the organising committee)

Background

The workshop forms part of the work being carried out under an ARC-funded Discovery Project based at the Australian National University College of Law and entitled 'Terrorism and the Non-State Actor: the Role of Law in Search for Security After September 11' (see <http://law.anu.edu.au/terrorismlaw/>). Participants in the project are: Andrew Byrnes (UNSW), Simon Bronitt, Miriam Gani, Russell Hogg (UNE), Penelope Mathew, Mark Nolan, Gabriele Porretto and Gregor Urbas, all from the ANU apart from those indicated, who were both formerly at the ANU.

Since the beginning of the research project, the participants have been involved in seminars and workshops with Australian scholars and experts dealing with counter-terrorism from a social science and law reform perspective. This workshop, held at the National Europe Centre of the Australian National University on 20-21 April 2006, was convened by Simon Bronitt and Andrew Byrnes, assisted by Gabriele Porretto.

The workshop was organised in order to consolidate these existing networks of counter-terrorism scholars and experts, by providing this community with a forum for further critical thinking about counter-terrorism responses. Workshop discussion involved legal analyses, public policy analyses, comparative research, criminological

analyses, empirical social psychological work, historical research, political and international relations aspects, and assessment of operational responses.

Apart from the members of the Research team, the list of participants included experts (mostly scholars) from Australia, Europe and Canada. Many of these are established academics with expertise in different fields of the social sciences; others are younger researchers with an interest in counter-terrorism issues. They were informed by senior public servants from the Commonwealth, the Queensland Public Interest Monitor, as well as by a legal officer from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights).

Participants from Australia included: Greg Carne, UTas; Colin Forrest, Qld Public Interest Monitor; Andrew Goldsmith, Flinders U; Andrew Goledzinowski, Assistant Secretary, Counter Terrorism Branch, Dept of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Peter Grabosky, RegNet; Andrew Lynch, UNSW; Gabrielle McKinnon, RegNet; Andrew O'Neil, Flinders U; Richard Refshauge, Dept Public Prosecutions, ACT; Ben Saul, UNSW; Clive Williams, ANU Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies.

From Europe: Saskia Hufnagel, Lawyer in Düsseldorf and visiting fellow at the NEC; Christopher Michaelsen, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; Jörg Monar, University of Sussex and Université Robert Schuman (Strasbourg); Colm O'Cinneide, UCL; John Strawson, University of East London.

From Canada: Desmond Manderson, McGill University (Montreal); Wesley Pue, UBC.

Description of the workshop

The workshop was interdisciplinary and discussion-oriented:

- Counter-terrorism issues were examined and discussed from different perspectives by seven panels, bringing together experts with different backgrounds and professional interests. The purpose of such an interdisciplinary examination was to enhance understanding of the processes that have shaped the Australian counter-terrorism political and legal strategy, its substantive merits and utility, and its broader impact on community life.
- Each contributor was asked to speak for no more than fifteen or twenty minutes, in order to allocate a significant amount of time in each panel to an in-depth discussion.

Peter Grabosky (FASSA) welcomed all participants on behalf of ASSA and highlighted the importance of mobilising the social sciences to address key issues of our time, amongst them, safeguarding Australia. He concluded that the question of ensuring accountability in the context of counter-terrorism responses adopted by a free society like Australia is undoubtedly a national research priority.

Panel 1 was devoted to a review of international legal and political developments in relation to terrorism. The events of 11 September 2001, and the subsequent attacks in various parts of the world, have elicited a range of responses from various governments, under the overarching slogan of a 'war on terror', to be waged on the international and national levels by many different means. The armed attack launched against Afghanistan in 2001, the armed intervention in Iraq, the capture and imprisonment of many alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Guantánamo Bay, heightened security in airports and other public places, the expansion of international efforts to cooperate in the detection and apprehension of suspected terrorists, are just some of the ways in which international organisations and States have responded to

those attacks and taken steps to minimise the risk from possible future attacks by terrorist groups. The participants were informed by a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade legal officer on some current cutting-edge developments in counter-terrorism policy in the Asia-Pacific, in particular with an eye on the relationship between Australia and other States of the region. The analysis of the panelists was focused, amongst other elements, on the role of international law in the struggle against terrorism and on issues of legality of detention, deportation and diplomatic assurances.

Speakers in *Panel 2* reported on recent developments in counter-terrorism legislation in Australia. Australia has responded actively to international terrorism, not only by supporting military action against those suspected of being involved in terrorist activities and by adopting a number of international treaties dealing with terrorism; at the national level, the Commonwealth as well as various State governments have, with a sense of urgency, introduced many specific anti-terrorist measures, including wide-ranging new laws. Panel 2 assessed the public law and criminal law implications of Australia's counter-terrorism legislation, including the question as to how such laws deal with the issue of human security.

Panels 3 to 7 explored a number of thematic issues through the international and national lens, including comparative legal, social scientific and operational perspectives. *Panel 3* in many respects set the framework for the following panels, by focusing on theoretical perspectives on terrorism, policy and law. Issues analysed included the coherence and consistency of Australian counter-terrorist strategy; the effectiveness with which the Australian government has managed to integrate its domestic counter-terrorism policy with its international approach to terrorism; the legitimacy of security measures in the protection of the State; the scholarly discussion of the possible justification of torture and academic responsibility for the relationship of ideas to political action.

Panel 4 dealt with trans-national and cross-border perspectives on counter-terrorism, and most notably with four case-studies: (i) the impact upon UK anti-terrorist law and policy of the *Human Rights Act 1998* (UK) and international law norms; (ii) the role of the *Human Rights Act* (ACT) in the Australian anti-terrorism law debate; (iii) the *German Aviation Security Act* tested against the protection of human dignity; and (iv) the European Union's response to international terrorism, as an example of a coordinated and integrated response by a trans-national actor.

Panel 5 focused on issues relating to immunity and impunity in the international and national struggle against terrorism. The panelists highlighted how the strategies for managing the interface between crime and politics are less efficacious in the context of the war on terror and discussed some of the implications of what is defined as a reconfiguring of liberal States in the post 9/11 world. Attention was particularly devoted to the issue of amnesties, pardons and immunities for terrorists. Despite the maxim of some States 'never to negotiate with terrorists', *Realpolitik* sometimes forces States to adopt a less stringent path. Within this framework, the speakers explored both the national and international implications of the issue as to whether amnesties, pardons or immunities for terrorists are legitimate, permissible and, overall, desirable.

Panel 6 analysed the keywords 'risk' and 'precautionary principle' in the light of counter-terrorism law and policy. Proportionality has been a key question in the political and academic discourse on the response to the threat of international terrorism, especially because State governments inevitably put forward the argument

of necessity. Panelists therefore examined ways of conceptualising the terrorist threat, drawing upon notions of risk, fear and precaution, in order to make sense of law reform processes in counter-terrorism. The panel also included a social psychological and empirical perspective on the issue of support for Australian counter-terrorism initiatives and human rights, exploring how public attitudes in relation to law and security and collective emotional responses are influenced by the threat of terrorism.

Panel 7 was dedicated to policing, intelligence and terrorism. Issues discussed include: democratic accountability of intelligence agencies in the new national security environment in Australia; the role of the Queensland Public Interest Monitor (PIM) in some of the processes of the recently-established counter-terrorism regime, at least in so far as they relate to Queensland; and the role of Muslims and Islam in the war against terror.

Panel 8 was a wrap up session where participants discussed options for publication that are now being developed by the organising committee.

Assessment

In line with the purposes of the Academy's workshop program, our workshop aimed 'to advance knowledge through in-depth discussion and to promote its application by the dissemination of workshop outcomes through publication'. Participants benefited from comments on each other's work and the opportunity to forge collaborations between each other. A key feature of the gathering was the opportunity for those from within the academy (social scientists, lawyers etc) to discuss their work with those outside the academy who are working on terrorism policy and counter-terrorism measures.

It is a widely-held perception that 11 September 2001, and the threat of globalised terrorism it embodies, represents the advent of a new era and that the exceptional threat posed by global non-State terrorism justifies far-reaching measures. The threat is that of the unpredictable use of terror-based political violence across national boundaries by a non-State actor, organised outside traditional State structures and whose operatives are limited by few constraints on the targets against which they direct their acts of violence or the methods which they are prepared to use.

Proponents of new counter-terrorism measures have argued that existing strategies, laws and resources for dealing with this type of political violence are deficient and need to be supplemented by measures that introduce new solutions, some of which may not be consistent with earlier values or practices – indeed cannot be, if they are to succeed in their goal. The new anti-terrorist measures have been portrayed as legitimate and appropriate responses to exceptional circumstances, justifying limitations on accepted standards of human rights and due process.

Our workshop, in line with the philosophy of our research project, constituted an occasion to challenge these assumptions. It was a contribution towards relocating the conceptual boundaries of discussion about anti-terrorism law and policy in Australia, through an analysis of national as well as international developments in the 'war on terror' from a comparative and interdisciplinary perspective.

Publication

The outcome of the workshop is likely to be of great interest to academics and non-academics alike. We are therefore currently working towards the publication of the papers presented, and the discussion generated. Revised versions of the papers

discussed will be published in an edited volume published by a commercial publisher. We know that this publication will be of value not only to scholars with an interest in counter-terrorism, but also to policy makers and to the community generally.

Further contact with the organisers can be made via Dr Gabriele Porretto in the first instance (gabriele.porretto@anu.edu.au).



Paid Care: Now and in the Future

Bill Martin, Debra King and Sue Richardson

The workshop, 'Paid Care: Now and in the Future', was held at Flinders University on April 10-11 2006. It provided an opportunity for 12 researchers from various disciplinary areas to discuss their work and present it to an audience which included decision-makers in policy and industry, as well as several early career researchers. The workshop was developed out of discussions between members of the Flinders Social Monitoring and Policy Futures Network on the employment and labour market issues relating to the provision of low paid care-work in Australia.

The main focus of the workshop was on exploring the meaning and nature of paid care in Australia and how this relates to the policy framework within which care provision takes place. A range of issues were explored, including:

- Identifying what is distinctive about paid care services, and the assumptions; underlying normative and empirical debates;
- The different arrangements that enable the provision of different types of care, eg, private agreements, government services, corporate ownership;
- The ways in which the relational, emotional and moral aspects of care are enabled or not when care is provided by paid carers;
- The organisational structures that support the provision of different aspects of care (eg, physical, health, emotional, relational);
- Paid carers' experiences of the work they do; and
- The link between paid and unpaid care.

The workshop was opened by Sue Richardson, Director of the National Institute of Labour Studies (NILS) and President of ASSA, who noted the complexity of the issues relating to the provision of paid care and the need for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding these issues. Chaired by Bill Martin, Leader of the Flinders Social Monitoring and Policy Futures Network and Deputy Director of NILS, the presentations stimulated wide ranging discussions. The level of discussion was enhanced by the requirement that each paper be presented by a reviewer, with the author being given a short right of reply before discussion was opened up.

The first day began with Graeme Hugo's demographic perspective on contextualising the crisis in care. Through his explication of the shifts in population which are likely to result in an unprecedented proportion of people over 75 the next three decades, some of the implications for paid care were revealed. This included the challenge for the labour market to meet increased demands for paid carers in aged accommodation and in supporting older people to remain in independent living situations.

Bettina Cass drew on feminist critiques of the formal/informal, commodified/non-commodified dichotomies in the provision of care services to argue for the more longitudinal approach to care conceptualised by 'social care'. Referring to care provision at two life-course stages – young carers and grandparent carers – she illustrated how relations of care and the interconnections between formal and informal care provision are influenced by various policy frameworks.

In exploring the comparatively low wages received by paid care workers, philosopher Ian Ravenscroft turned to the work of Cornell economist Robert Frank who found that the total remuneration for labour is composed of both monetary and moral reward. The corollary to this is that when demand for care is high and wage rates for carers inevitably rise, it will be difficult to maintain (let alone improve) standards of care. For standards to be maintained, Ian argued that policies will need to shift from the regulation of caring institutions to focus more on the internalisation of caring norms by the professional training of carers.

Michael Bittman presented a paper based on his research with Trish Hill and Cathy Thomson on the impact of caring on wellbeing and earnings. Demonstrating that unpaid caring competes with demands of the labour market for the time of carers, he argued that particular cohorts of carers find that caring leads to a loss of income, susceptibility to financial distress and social deprivation, and potential difficulties in returning to employment (especially at the former rate of earnings). The research indicated that more information is required about the ways in which some unpaid carers manage to sustain employment, in order to provide support for them in appropriate ways.

Gabriel Meagher's analysis of the paid care workforce in Australia presented a picture of de-institutionalisation, de-professionalisation, functional underemployment and relatively poor pay. Focusing on how these issues impact on workforce planning requires redressing the ageing of the care workforce, the devaluation of care work, the lack of culturally appropriate services for Indigenous people and the lack of employment of Indigenous people in the care work sector. With the characteristics of workers being strongly linked to service outcomes and service quality, recruitment and retention of care workers become paramount, as does the need to maintain and enhance the qualifications of care workers.

Using empirical research on workers in Australian residential aged care facilities, Bill Martin questioned the assumption that paid care work is 'bad'. He argued that, in comparison with non-care work undertaken by people with similar human capital, the subjective experience of care work is positive – possibly because of the general character of 'caring' and the deeply positive cultural coding of this activity. However, as he noted, pay levels remain a major source of dissatisfaction amongst the care workers.

On the second day Debra King shifted the focus of discussion toward those organisations involved in the provision of care services. Identifying several tensions between the provision of care under a managerialist-market logic and the provision of

care within a relational logic, she questioned the capacity for organisations to support the kinds of care required by their key stakeholders: care recipients, unpaid family carers and paid care workers.

Sue Dodds' paper challenged the provision of care based on the dominant theoretical understanding of the citizen as an adult, self-reliant individual. Such understandings of care, she argued, have led to a deficit model of the care recipient, the devaluation of care giving and a paternalistic approach to care service provision. In contrast, viewing humans as innately dependent beings facilitates a refocusing on the mutuality of many care relationships and the skills required to deliver the relational aspects of care.

Michael Fine focused on the new social divisions that are emerging from changes and expansion in the public provision of care services. Reflected in the struggles to name, define and claim 'care', these divisions were seen to be linked to broader social, economic and political changes.

Maria Zadoroznyj used a case study of Mothercarers (young women who provide home care services for postnatal women) to illustrate the ambiguous trajectory of a new occupational group. The liminal position occupied by the carers influenced the success of the program, and demonstrated the need for further research into the different kinds of care services being provided. Of particular interest in the Mothercare research were the reasons why care recipients found the program acceptable/not acceptable, the issues in matching the labour force to the carer needs, and the level of structural flexibility and responsiveness that affected the program's capacity to meet the needs of the recipients as well as the care workers.

Deborah Brennan's analysis of childcare policy since 1996 covered assistance with the costs of childcare, access to maternity and parental leave, and subsidies for extended parental care. Her paper highlighted the ways in which the lack of integration between Commonwealth and State governments has created inconsistencies in the quality of care between states. In addition, she argued that addressing widespread community concern regarding the quality of long day care will require robust regulatory mechanisms and an end to the reliance on the market to determine the location of centres.

Operating within the constraints of available data, Diane Gibson's research (conducted with Ken Tallis) outlined the shape and nature of the caring workforce. Identifying five categories of care givers ranging across the divisions of formal/informal, and commodified/ uncommodified, the analysis focused on constructing an 'ideal' information base that incorporated four perspectives: demographic, activity, expenditure and fiscal.

From discussions throughout the two days it was evident that while the field of paid care research is emerging, it is doing so quite rapidly. A continued focus on the field is necessary to not only shape policy debates and influence labour market issues, but also to understand and improve care relationships and the organisation of care.

The workshop received excellent feedback from the participants and there was enthusiasm to continue sharing ideas. One outcome is therefore the development of a national network of academics and non-academics involved in research on paid care. Initial discussions have taken place via email and we are currently pursuing ideas for taking this forward. In addition we have secured a special issue of the *Australian Journal of Social Issues* dedicated to a selection of the workshop papers.

Policy and Advocacy Reports

Social Science and Public Policy: Connecting the Ivory Tower to the Corridors of Power

Peter Saunders

When Peter Shergold launched *Ideas and Influence: Social Science and Public Policy in Australia*¹ at last year's ASSA Symposium (reprinted in Dialogue 3/2005), he suggested that the prospects for bringing social scientists and policy makers closer together are good. However, some of his comments also illustrate why the interface between research and policy is characterised by what James Walter and I described in our Introduction to the book as an 'uneasy relationship'. Thus, Shergold began by noting that many academic researchers, even those working in areas at the forefront of policy debate,

... appear uncomfortable when asked directly what policy changes they would implement. This is seen as a matter for others. Practical policy which reflects people's lives seems to be regarded as a trade skill, sullied by the dirt and grime of political compromise.²

This image of researcher as removed from the 'practical affairs of state' is common amongst politicians and their policy advisors.

While there is an undoubted element of truth in this characterisation, it also illustrates the kinds of perceptions that help to perpetuate the divide that exists between research and policy. Most research, even when it is policy relevant, only addresses one aspect of an issue and thus rarely provides guidance for action. Other research is generally needed, and a judgement has to be made about the policy implications of all of the evidence, yet few researchers have the training or expertise to make this latter judgement, and thus refrain from doing so.

Writing two decades ago, US academic Carol Weiss³ made the obvious but important point that before research can contribute to policy, researchers must be able to communicate with policy makers. This requires venues that allow this to happen – places of engagement that allow conversations to develop in which views are exchanged and ideas discussed. But having common topics to discuss is also crucial, Weiss noting that:

Research has to address issues that policy-makers care about. It has to be relevant to the institutional structures and the cultural themes that order the making of policy. It has to take account of the contours of social discourse.

But she went on to note that where research has made a contribution:

The critical ingredients are independence of thought, conceptual sophistication, understanding of policy issues and methodological rigour.

The features highlighted in the former statement would have policy makers nodding in agreement (while secretly bemoaning their absence in today's social science research community), while the latter sentiments would be received warmly by researchers (but seen as largely absent in the policy process). These different

perceptions reflect an underlying difference in the approach to the acquisition of knowledge. Researchers see the acquisition of knowledge as an end in itself (and their prime motivation), whereas policy makers seek knowledge in order to guide action and thus expect those who generate it to spell out its implications. This also explains why publication is so important to researchers (who see knowledge as a classical public good), yet creates difficulties for those setting policy (who wish to keep their detailed reasoning private).

Although few would deny that differences exist between academic researchers and policy makers, both are increasingly operating in a climate that ought to be causing their interests to converge. Thus, there is growing pressure on academics to demonstrate that their research not only generates outputs in terms of publications and competitive grants, but also to show that the research has an impact – not just in terms of the number of academic citations but, largely through policy, on society in general. There is also increased pressure on politicians (and thus on their policy advisors) to show that their policies are based on evidence, which involves demonstrating that the actions they propose are supported by research.

But a number of factors are acting against convergence. Most important among these is the fact that the currency of success among researchers is increasingly driven by DEST points allocated to activities such as postgraduate completion, competitive (ARC/NHMRC) grant success and refereed publications – none of which feature highly (if at all) on most policy-focused projects. If DEST points are the currency of academic status and (more importantly) career progression, it is imperative that contributing to policy research is rewarded appropriately. (Incidentally, this is an outcome that government has the ability to achieve when it sets its new Research Quality Framework, if it adopts a 'whole of government' approach to the issue). Another factor driving a wedge between research and policy is the 'politicisation of the public service', which has placed policy makers under increasing pressure from their political masters to provide evidence that supports decisions already taken for largely ideological reasons. Finally, both academics and policy makers must deal with (and often communicate through) the increasing numbers of Ministerial Advisors who stand outside of the conventional research-policy interface but exert a growing influence on it.

These factors make it harder to bring social scientists closer to policy, but the goal is still achievable. From a researcher perspective, the task would be made easier if there was a better understanding from policy makers of what social science can contribute to policy, and increased awareness of what actions are needed to ensure that it does contribute. One of the most common complaints heard from policy makers about researchers is their inability to focus on the key policy questions and provide unambiguous answers: 'Give us the bottom line, not the pages of qualification and argument that precede it.'

The thinking that underlies such demands reveals a misconception about the nature of social science practise that has important implications for the use of social science knowledge. Social science is not characterised by 'grand theories' that all agree can provide the 'best' answer to any question, and social science knowledge is thus not a given bundle of ideas, techniques or findings, but a dynamic set of understandings

that are in a constant state of flux. (Incidentally, this can at times make the 'evidence base' a potentially very unstable foundation on which to build policy).

While policy makers are keen to know 'What works best?', from a research perspective such a question raises a whole host of subsidiary questions: How is 'best' defined? What does 'works' mean? Indeed, what does 'What' imply? I could go on, but at the risk of sounding too postmodernist, I will simply make the point that whereas policy makers are always trying to 'cut to the chase' researchers are trained to reflect on the broader issues in order to provide a context within which to provide answers. Research may thus be able to support statements like: 'Intervention A will produce these kinds of effects if applied in these kinds of circumstances in these kinds of ways to groups that have these kinds of characteristics, and it will maximise the effective use of resources as measured in these kinds of ways'. The important point is that the qualifications are an inherent part of the evidence, not matters of detail that can be omitted from the one-page Ministerial Briefing Paper.

The emergence of the 'evidence based policy' movement might be expected to bring about closer collaboration between researchers and policy makers. The phrase 'evidence based policy' embodies two important and reinforcing ideas: first, that we should base what we do (policy) on what we know (evidence); and second, that the kind of evidence that we collect should (at least in part) be dictated by what we want to do with it. The evidence helps to generate the policy, but the policy will also influence the evidence ('policy based evidence'), in a synergetic relationship.

However, evidence based policy involves much more than being able to 'cherry pick' among the vast array of evidence in order to demonstrate that someone, somewhere has done or said something that is consistent with policy. It involves a commitment to using the weight of the evidence to support policy decisions. This in turn involves being confident that one has all of the evidence to hand, and being able to make a judgement about what it shows, on balance, about the existing state of knowledge in the field. Researchers are trained to conduct comprehensive literature reviews and make the academic judgements about 'what 'the evidence shows'. But how this judgement relates to policy often requires a political judgement, which policy makers are usually better equipped to make.

To date, Australian governments have shown no commitment to provide the funding required to make a reality of the notion of evidence based policy. Implicit in that notion is the belief that more has to be done to bring evidence and policy closer together. This will not happen without extra resources: there is no free lunch – no matter how willing both sides are to come to the table.

We need to develop structures and processes that facilitate interactions between researchers and policy makers at many levels, focused around the development of an 'evidence-based' knowledge base and a pool of researchers and policy analysts with the skills and commitment to support it. The key to setting up the right kind of structures is to ensure that they give both sides a legitimate interest in participating in a process that, in serving their separate interests, will also help to promote shared goals.

An obvious first step would involve bringing the two sides together so that they can get a better understanding of what each can contribute, and how each is constrained.


There is a lot of common ground, but we need to become better at identifying where it lies and deciding how best to exploit it. In order to have maximum impact, we need an on-going dialogue rather than a series of one-off events. It needs to be a legitimate part of 'regular business' if it is to find its way into the diaries of busy people on both sides. In my experience, the best way to make this happen is if there is some concrete activity of interest to both parties with clearly identified outcomes (from which each can see benefits), backed up by a commitment of resources – nothing focuses the mind like 'deadlines and dollars'. ASSA is making an important contribution to this task, through its workshop program and the policy roundtables that have brought together key federal and state policy makers and senior academics to discuss policy and research issues in various areas.

Staff exchanges (in both directions) can help to overcome existing differences in the cultures in which researchers and policy makers operate. There is no better way of making each side aware of the interests and concerns of the other than to experience these directly in the workplace. We need to provide such opportunities for those who are already established, and for those at an earlier stage of their career.

More use should also be made of bodies like the ARC and NHMRC when allocating funds for policy related research. Bureaucrats are often too risk averse when it comes to funding research and end up being so intrusive and heavy-handed that they can stifle creativity and drive out the best players. They want to micro-manage both the scope of the research and its methods, in order to minimise the perceived risks. It would be far better to channel funds through the ARC/NHMRC and let them use their peer-review processes (like the ASSA Fellowship, another enormously valuable national asset) to select between competing bids in an open and transparent manner. This is not inconsistent with allowing policy makers to ensure that their funds are used wisely for agreed purposes once the successful bidder has been selected, but it will increase the quality of the bids because it will tap directly into the currency of academic prestige.

Another important contribution involves providing researchers with access to data or other research inputs (eg, access to clients as subjects of surveys or in-depth interviews) that they would not otherwise have. This gives researchers an opportunity to test their theoretical and methodological techniques in areas of policy related research, while importantly holding out the prospect of peer-review publication. The Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) and Longitudinal Study of Australia's Children (LSAC) surveys are obvious examples where this approach has been very successful in giving researchers and policy makers a common purpose.

Most of today's policy challenges require a social science input, and many social scientists are committed to developing a better understanding of these challenges and opportunities in ways that can better inform policy responses. This will happen only if there is an on-going dialogue between researchers and policy makers, set within appropriate structures and adequately resourced. The 'policy sciences' are alive and well within the halls of academe. We now need to ensure that the ideas of social science can exert more of an influence in the corridors of power.



Professor Peter Saunders is Director of the Social Policy Research Centre at the University of New South Wales. This is an edited version of the author's presentation to the Senior Executive Service (SES) Breakfast Series on 11 April 2005 and his Plenary Address to the Colloquium on 'Policy and Practice in Ageing: Informed by Evidence' on 4 July 2005.

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- ¹ Saunders, P and Walter, J (eds) (2005). *Ideas and Influence. Social Science and Public Policy in Australia*, UNSW Press, Sydney.
 - ² Shergold, P (2005). 'Book Launch at Annual Symposium' *Dialogue*, 24, 3/2005: 1-3.
 - ³ Weiss, C (1986). 'Research and Policy-Making: A Limited Partnership', in F Heller (ed), *The Use and Abuse of Social Science*, Sage, London: 214-35.



Children, Work and Family
Roundtable held on Friday 12 May 2006

Convenor: Margot Prior
Chair: Sue Richardson

Welcome and introduction

Sue Richardson welcomed participants and introduced the Policy Roundtable initiative as an opportunity for genuine dialogue between both federal and state policy makers and academics. For their support of both the work that underpinned the workshop, and for the workshop itself, she thanked the Australian Research Alliance for Children and Youth, the Australian Research Council, and the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia.

The question posed was: How, as a community, do we get the best outcomes for our children in a time of major social change? It was suggested that while there have been enormous changes for women with the movement out of the private domain into public life, little else has changed, so the revolution is, as yet, unfinished. Many indicators of wellbeing for children in Australia are going backwards, despite our unprecedented prosperity.

Professor Richardson explained that there is currently a dissonance in Australian policy: the efforts on behalf of the federal and state governments to direct resources and money to families have been substantial, but the approach in the workplace is 180° in the opposing direction. The challenge was thus described as how to have a highly productive labour market and economy, without that being at the expense of the wellbeing of children.

Brief lessons from history

Janet McCalman, *University of Melbourne*

Professor McCalman explained that history can give an insight into what is likely to happen in the future as to the intended and unintended effects of policies on social change.

The wellbeing of children has increased since the 1860s with, first, the better survival rates of children, followed by increased survival rates of young adults, and finally, those of babies. The causal factors for this improvement are complex, with a combination of state policy towards child labour and rescue, improved medicine and the gradual contraction of the large working class casual labour market.

The improvement in economic conditions for families after World War II was a result of the increase in government infrastructure and service industries which began to employ permanent workers. The unions were also able to exert some muscle and improve conditions in the blue-collar trades. The result of these fundamental changes was that poor people began to have more control over the future of their households, and by implication, the wellbeing of children in these households.

Discussion

Raising children requires a longterm view to cater for the longterm prospects of children. For parents it is often necessary to give up something today for the future wellbeing and prospects for their children. For those who are only just managing in their daily lives, it is hardly possible to plan adequately to ensure their children's future wellbeing.

It is possible to see generational changes in the fortunes of families, particularly since the 1950s when essentials became affordable. Entitlements such as the return servicemen's benefits and Commonwealth scholarships, for instance changed the fortunes of many families and, in effect, remade the middleclass.

From the 1970s there was increasing support for the view that social security payments were not solely welfare safety nets, but part of an entitlement structure. The introduction in 1941 of child endowments marked increasing recognition that the State had a role in providing for families and government housing policies moved to focus on public housing as opposed to welfare housing. It was noted that housing did not feature in the 2006-07 budget, despite its importance in the work and family debate.

The undermining of the living wage concept in recent times has eroded the safety net for families with children and raised the question of whether there is a need to set the minimum wage in accordance with social policy. The current debate as to whether employers are responsible for the living wage has raised many questions as to where the responsibility for social welfare lies.

Secure work is particularly important in light of the evolving nature of the workplace. Secure work is becoming less centred on the standard working hours of 9-5, and more on a flexible workforce. The challenge was described as the ability to maintain the concept of family in order that a sense of family is not destroyed in the face of the deregulation of the workforce.

What do children need that policy can provide?

Stephen Zubrick, Curtin University of Technology

Professor Zubrick posed the question: *What has policy provided for children?* Current policy is still based on 19th and 20th century conditions and the extent to which these policies are appropriate now needs to be reassessed in the light of the changing notions of work.

The question *what do children need for what?* was asked in conjunction with the question of whether there is a goal in relation to balancing work and family. Possible answers to these questions should be asked in the context of children conceived as being a means to an end. The betterment of human society as a goal means that what children need are the things that will equip them to contribute to the economic, social and civic realms of society as adults.

The current policy environment is characterised as having a better appetite for ideas about children, but these need to be in the form of facts to be accessible in the policy environment. Policies for children need coherence and fidelity that create good opportunities and expectations for children. These policies need to be aimed at buffering families against high levels of chaos and stress and balanced by concern for issues of social inequality and exclusion.

Gillian Calvert, NSW Commissioner for Children and Young People

Ms Calvert explained that what children say they need most are the relationships in their life, and of those relationships, the ones with their family members are the most important. What policy can provide is what families need to nurture and raise children. Policy can directly provide for families through policy levers or indirectly through intervention in the market place.

Families need both time and money to raise children, which means that work conditions is a crucial policy issue. The issues in need of attention were noted as:

- Paid maternity leave (up to two years);
- Part-time work as a right;
- Flexibility and predictability of work hours at the choice of the employee;
- Reduction in long work hours;
- Housing;
- Transport (particularly in outer suburb and rural areas); and
- Maternal and child health

Services that can provide direct benefit to children are quality child care and schooling. The elements to look at in terms of quality of childcare are staff to child ratios, staff qualifications and whether the centre is commercial or non-commercial. The maintenance of quality in all of these areas requires a strong regulatory system.

Above all there is a need to insist on the importance of childhood and the notion that children are our common wealth - for both the community and policy makers.

Discussion

It was agreed that maternity leave should not be income contingent and that paid maternity leave has both symbolic and real value, as the cost of extended leave without pay is a serious financial issue for many families. The minimum amount of time that is required for maternity leave based on the health of the mother and child is six months.

It was explained that in those countries where parental leave is part of labour force history, there is greater continuity of employment and workforce participation as a result.

There is an important distinction between casual and permanent workforce groups; however, for both groups, leave has been specified as a bargaining chip. Productivity arguments in relation to leave, it was noted, do not take into account the cost to children.

In the Federal Public Service, where there is access to conditions such as purchased leave, people often do not take advantage of it. This was identified as an important issue, and one that is of significance to policy makers. It was suggested that more academic research on this issue is required.

Workers in high paid jobs also generally have access to regular good quality child care. Because their daily needs are being met, the need to take extended leave may not be important. Although there are formal entitlements in the work place, there is often an informal culture of not taking leave, particularly for senior employees.

Of the group of workers that does take leave, most of these are women and parents who are on low incomes. A reason for this is often that individuals who are on a low rate of pay and do not see their job as part of a career are more likely to embrace leave.

There is greater scope to inform parents about choices and child development, but information needs to be simultaneously universal while catering for the diversity in parents' needs across socio-economic groups. There is a particular need for information that makes it easier for parents to choose a quality school or childcare facility and this market only works if there is good information for both parents and childcare centre administrators.

Family policy that supports what children need

Liza Carroll, Department of Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs

Ms Carroll suggested that there is currently a convergence of social and economic interaction and an emerging focus on wellbeing. The Australian Government Treasury is looking at both social and economic indicators as a way of measuring wellbeing and the wellbeing of children is a good signpost for both of these indicators.

The Department of Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs is currently revising its agenda and goals in relation to children's wellbeing, given the extended child payments provided for in the 2006-07 budget. To effectively target different socio-economic groups, the government is involved in a debate to answer the question: *What payments are needed to get quality?* It was noted that the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is currently moving forward on early childhood education and that the results will be evident in the next 6-9 months.

Bettina Cass, University of New South Wales

Professor Cass indicated that countries in which there are the fewest families living in poverty are those which have systems where the greatest proportion of the total income package of families is from market income. The Family Tax Benefits scheme in Australia is partially effective but overcoming family poverty is still a challenge. It is important to monitor the progress of the Work Choices changes. Of particular concern is the lack of entitlement to vary working hours, and not solely during the early years of childhood. For systems of social incomes, including the Family Tax Benefits system, the issue that remains crucial is high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs).

Discussion

Regulation is only one aspect of what is necessary to achieve quality in the daycare market. Planning is an important feature and it is necessary to grow a critical mass of quality day care centres that can provide the example for others.

Agreement needs to be sought on some indicators which childcare facilities can use as a basis to inform parents of their standards in quality. Enforcing quality indicators will drive the market in the direction of quality, and only a small surplus of childcare providers will tip the balance in the direction of childcare providers catering to parents' needs instead of the other way around.

The benefits of private and public partnerships in childcare facilities were discussed and it was queried whether it is possible to have governments supporting preschool facilities in partnership with private institutions as an extension of the government's education mandate. Community based childcare depends greatly on the availability and participation of the community, whereas this is not a limiting factor for private centres, which suggests that there is scope for public and private collaboration.

Existing policies of the Victorian Government to provide subsidies for children to attend long daycare instead of kindergarten is a good example to study as it raises a number of issues and further clarity is needed regarding how pre-schooling interacts with childcare benefits. One issue to take into account is that formally funded long daycare centres are overwhelmingly centered in the core of cities rather than in areas where, from a social policy perspective, quality is most needed.

There needs to be an increase in activity around employing quality people in daycare, such as teachers, and providing professional development. From a policy point of view it is necessary to have an ongoing support structure for daycare centres which links with the regulatory system.

The expense involved in lowering EMTRs suggests that emphasis should be placed on training to increase workforce participation. There is a need to look at programs which address competencies for primary and secondary education to counter the issues which are undermining the capacity of children and adolescents to remain in education institutions.

A workplace that children would design

Margot Prior, University of Melbourne

Professor Prior explained that there is a need for parents to have:

- flexible work hours, at the choice of the parent
- their workplace close to home
- free weekends
- the workplace to reflect the principle of sharing the responsibility for childrearing between mothers and fathers

There is evidence that there has been an increase in fathers taking a greater role in child rearing, but there is still a long way to go to achieve equal access for children to both parents. Work hours for fathers are inimical for child rearing and yet there is no acknowledgement, beyond rhetoric, politically, socially or in the workplace, for the critical role of fathers.

Father contributions to child rearing are essential as they teach skills, values and ethics which lead to the better psychosocial adjustment of children. Studies have shown father contributions leading to higher levels of academic achievement, yet only 7 per cent of the time fathers spend with their children is solo care. Father contributions to childrearing are good for mother–father relationships, which in turn is good for children.

Predictors of father involvement in child rearing are having the time, feelings of competence, self esteem and efficacy. Fathers need to be given the opportunity to father, which involves changing social views of parenting, and fathering in particular.

Sue Richardson, Flinders University

Professor Richardson highlighted that the shape of labour markets and their characteristics are diverse across equally affluent countries around the world, which indicates that there are still real choices in the face of globalisation and other world forces. It was noted that material prosperity plays a large role in these choices and it is encouraging to see that the Federal Department of Treasury is taking an interest in the notion of wellbeing as being over and above just GDP per capita.

In the Anglo-Saxon labour markets in particular it is hard to be both a good worker and a good parent and the choice is often, therefore, not to have children. Bringing up a good child is a very positive contribution to society, which is a good economic rationale for government engagement in making it possible to bring up a good child. The current debate as to who is responsible for making it compatible to care for children while participating in the workforce brings to light a reluctance on behalf of employers to take responsibility for children's needs. Rather, for employers to make the necessary changes, it takes either market forces, such as a shortage of good workers, or government policies, to force greater compatibility of work and child rearing. It is therefore necessary to identify the social costs of employers expecting employees to work long hours.

Of the number of jobs which have been created in the Australian economy in the last 10 years, only 12 per cent were for men in permanent full-time positions and another 12 per cent were for men in full-time casual positions. Self esteem for men often comes from their place in the workforce and there is a certain level of anxiety about being successful in the workplace. This could be a possible factor for fathers opting not to take leave.

The ageing workforce is a significant issue and there is a need to invest in the capacity of both parents (especially mothers) and children to accommodate changes in the work structure. There could be a Returned Mums' model based on the Returned Soldiers' model which offers a range of pathways, supported by the taxpayer, for mums to re-enter the workforce.

Discussion

Factors affecting work and family have deeply seated roots in social norms and it is important to look at community and the values that are shaping attitudes to work and family. There is a particular need to re-examine masculinity in the context of paid and unpaid work.

Availability of time is not always the best predictor of the time parents spend with their children; rather it relates more to priorities. It was suggested that there is a decline in personal responsibility and that there is a need to look at policy levers that can influence this trend.

The unintended consequence of having 12 months of unpaid maternity leave is that women are compelled to exit the workforce and re-enter the workforce, often at a lower rate of pay, with less stable work options. It was agreed that there is not enough known about the positive and negative sides of casual versus part-time work. For a mother with young children, having casual work tends to have a positive effect on the family, while for the father, casual work tends to have a negative effect.

From a policy point of view, it is important to recognise that people are in and out of dependency throughout the course of their lives, and children, although dependent, will contribute to the community at a later stage in their life.

What policy can do to help the workplace meet children's needs

Alison Morehead, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations

Dr Morehead explained that at June 2005, around 600,000 dependent children under 15 lived in jobless families, and around three quarters of these (72 per cent) in single parent families. Around 43 per cent of single parents on income support have earnings. Survey information indicates that they work an average of around 20 hours per week. The majority of those working less than 20 hours a week would prefer to work more hours, most commonly between 20 and 30 hours per week.

Survey information also indicates that of those in paid work, 85 per cent are satisfied or very satisfied with their jobs. And these are not 'elite' Parenting Payment recipients - those in paid work are most commonly intermediate or elementary clerical, sales or service workers, or labourers. And while those with Year 10 or less education were slightly less likely than others to be working (28 per cent compared with 35 per cent overall in 2002 cohort), those with Year 10 or less education still comprised 31 per cent of those in paid work.

The Government's 'work first' approach is intended to reduce the generational implications of long term unemployment. Government policies are aimed, therefore, at

increasing workforce participation among principle carer parents on income support. Principle carer parents claiming income support from 1 July 2006 will need to look for part time work of at least 15 hours per week once their youngest child turns 6. They will be entitled to Parenting Payment until their youngest child turns 8 if they are single, or 6 if they are partnered. After this they will be required to move to another income support payment, usually Newstart Allowance.

Principle carer parents already on Parenting Payment at 30 June 2006 will need to look for part-time work of at least 15 hours per week from 1 July 2007, or once their youngest child turns 7 (whichever is later), but they will be able to remain on Parenting Payment until their youngest child turns 16.

With the Welfare to Work reforms, the financial aim of that policy is that the mother on welfare receiving \$26,600 a year from Government payments increases that to around \$31,100 a year by contributing labour of 15 hours a week on the federal minimum wage to her overall earnings – and encouraging parents into the workforce is what the policy is all about.

The government's policies take into account factors that make it difficult to be absent from either the workforce or the home:

- if a family has more than four children, is doing foster care, home schooling, or distance education;
- if there are other special family circumstances that prevent them from working if the job involves work outside school hours and there is no appropriate care and supervision available for children during that time;
- if travel time to and from the place of work (including to childcare) would take more than one hour each way; and
- if there is no financial gain from working.

Matthew Gray, Institute of Family Studies

Dr Gray discussed the role that employers can play in creating workplaces that assist parents to raise the healthiest possible children. Employers have a number of roles to play including providing employment and family-friendly work conditions. Dr Gray argued that while employers have an important role to play, the extent to which there are unexploited gains to employers from providing greater access to family-friendly work practices is unclear.

An important economic argument for government involvement is that there are externalities associated with bearing and raising children. Public policy can influence employers through: regulation of the conditions of employment; information campaigns aimed at raising the awareness of employers to the potential workplace benefits of offering family-friendly work practices; and increasing the attractiveness to employers of creating a more family-friendly work environment.

Dr Gray noted that 90 per cent of fathers with an infant are employed, and on average work 46 hours per week.

Due to the ageing population, there will be an increasing need for both child and aged care. For parents who are trying to care for both their children and their parents, this is likely to result in increased difficulties in balancing family and work responsibilities.

Discussion

The business case which has been put forward in regards to the benefits of balancing family and work has neither been recognised nor implemented by businesses

because changing the culture of work is too difficult when it is implicitly tied to changing the culture of society. It is necessary to invest in making the business case for reconciling work and family and demonstrate to businesses that there are gains and profits to be made. The business case for a work and family balance has traditionally been based on class lines and changing employment rates, which represents a limitation to the applicability of benefits to all businesses, whether big or small.

With the shift towards individual contracts between employees and employers, as opposed to collective bargaining, there has been decreased regulation and an abolition of overtime pay and other conditions. Matching external and internal regulation is difficult and often leads to workers undermining the needs of other groups.

In the household there are no laws that govern distribution of labour, whereas in the workplace there are a multitude of laws in relation to work conditions. It was suggested that government has a role in influencing the division of labour in households by addressing issues such as housing affordability and working hours.

The model in Nordic countries utilises a *use it or lose it* approach to men taking leave, there has been an increase in the number of men taking leave as a result.

Women who have children work more hours if their rate of pay is high which makes pay equity a crucial issue. In Australia the jobs on offer for men of a fathering age are often long hour jobs and men's working hours are often not affected by having children. There is an increasing incidence of families where the mothers are in white collar positions, and believe they cannot afford to take leave from their jobs, while the father is in a blue-collar position.

There is a career risk for women to take time out from their job as there is a decreasing tendency for loyalty between employers and employees and an increasing tendency for current pay to be the sole gain from work.

The French experiment with the 35 hour week appears to have had negative effects on the French economy and did not create jobs. Therefore, achieving balance between work and family requires industry reforms for changes in hour structures to work.

The exchange of views enjoyed during the four hours of discussion perhaps raised more questions than were posed. But this exchange clearly illustrated both the need, and the benefit, of such roundtables in bringing together those who make policy and those engaged in scholarly research. It is hoped that this dialogue will be mutually beneficial in assisting policy advisors to access the latest research by scholars and that it will also improve the policy relevance of future research.



Council of the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) Report on Progress

I send greetings to Fellows of the Academy of the Social Sciences!

The Council of the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) was founded in 2004, with much support from both the Social Sciences and the Humanities Academies. Our relations remain strong as we all argue for greater recognition of the role of our disciplines in research, education and community life. The Academy of the Humanities oversaw the legal and financial birth of CHASS, while the Academy of Social Sciences has housed CHASS within its offices in Balmain Crescent at the Australian National University.

Advocacy and training are central to CHASS's current purposes. Through sustained work with the press, frequent forums, parliamentary dinners and research projects, CHASS has highlighted key examples of where the humanities, arts and the social sciences are indispensable to the nation, and where we have more to contribute. Our parliamentary dinners, for example, have unveiled to willing MPs new perspectives on ageing, income-contingent loans, indigenous health and philanthropy through featuring the work of leading Australian commentators on each of these topics.

Training is equally vital if the skills of advocacy are to spread among our numbers. The 'Expanding Horizons' conference in March brought nearly two hundred early-career researchers and young professionals together in Canberra to explore areas of mutual collaboration and professional development. Some of the projects forged in the heat of that conference have now developed into fully-fledged research applications. The second CHASS Research Centre Directors forum, held in July at the University of Technology, Sydney (UTS), provided over one hundred directors from Australia and New Zealand with detailed workshops on 'Scaling up for Greater Impact'. Impact here referred to current debates about research quality frameworks, as well as to learning the skills of gaining greater public exposure for what we do so well in our research centres.

Over the last two years CHASS has engaged in three detailed research projects, each of them using web technology and focus groups to connect with hundreds of scholars across all HASS disciplines. After an initial study of commercialisation (2004), and a ground-breaking study of research quality and impact (2005), CHASS has almost concluded its 2006 study of the relationship between the HASS and science, technology, engineering and medicine (STEM). Why would we engage in such a broad study, you might ask. To my mind there are two reasons:

1. Because interdisciplinary work across this traditional disciplinary divide - so eloquently depicted by CP Snow - is ever growing. The forthcoming CHASS study will provide over a dozen case studies of effective working across the sectors, and suggest some of the key ingredients for effective (and also, ineffective) collaboration.
2. Because HASS has often been marginalised in debates about research, information and infrastructure through an enduring notion that somehow research equals science. This study looks at how HASS disciplines can enter more fully into the mainstream of Australian research, both in leading and supportive roles to STEM.

CHASS's many activities, its policy platform and its publications are found on the website www.chass.org.au. I commend it to you.

Malcolm Gillies FAAH, President, CHASS

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A Anthropology, demography, geography, linguistics, sociology.

Chair: Dr Diane Gibson

B Accounting, economics, economic history, statistics.

Chair: Professor Amarjit Kaur

C History, law, philosophy, political science.

Chair: Professor Marian Sawer

D Education, psychology, social medicine.

Chair: Professor Max Coltheart

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