President's Report

Through the National Academies Forum, we have joined with the other Learned Academies to seek implementation of the funding recommendations of the Review of the Learned Academies, in the 2007-2008 Commonwealth budget.

In October, the four Presidents dined at Parliament House with Minister Julie Bishop, to press our case. The relatively informal environment gave us an opportunity to describe some of the more important examples of what the Academies do that is of value beyond our membership. The Minister was interested in the examples that I gave of our work with the Australian Mobile Telephone Association, and our new arrangement with the Australian Bureau of Statistics to tell stories based on the 2006 Census. These are two examples of the ability of the Academy to identify what the social sciences could do to assist the other party, and identify skilled social scientists to do it. They are good examples of the dimensions of the Academies that we wished to emphasise - that between us we represent 2000 of 'Australia's leading experts at the service of the nation', to quote a brochure produced by NAF for the occasion. The brochure highlights the public interest role played by the Academies, including providing expert members for advisory bodies, making submissions to inquiries and conducting public interest research. We argued that the Academies are invaluable for 'collecting, validating and disseminating the critical knowledge that the public and the nation need for wise decision-making'. The Minister said she appreciated learning more of what the Academies do, that she supported the Academies, and that she would do what she could to see the funding recommendations of the Review were implemented. She advised us that the Academies were not as well understood or known as they should be, and we should take steps to brief other key ministers and departmental leaders.

Following this advice, we arranged dinner with the Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Dr Peter Shergold. Dr Shergold was elected a Fellow of our Academy in 2005, and has a former life as an economic historian. He thus knows more than most about the social sciences and the Academies. Nonetheless, he indicated that it was helpful to have a more systematic briefing on the capacities and programs of the Academies. He expressed support and gave some helpful advice on steps that we could take to advance our case. These steps have been implemented.

If nothing else, these two meetings have been valuable in having the Academies better understood, and I believe, better appreciated, at the highest level of government.

For 2006-07, our Academy has to manage a cut in our grant-in-aid of $115,000, being the former Higher Education Innovation Program grant that came to an end last year. The Executive has decided to keep our main programs at their current levels, and to budget for a deficit of about $50,000 in order to do so. We have reserves to cover such a contingency. We remain hopeful that our grant-in-aid will be increased in the next budget. If it is, we look forward to the opportunity to implement the creative ideas for advancement of our contribution to the public interest that we detailed and explained in our submission to the Review.

As Fellows will be aware, the precise boundaries between the roles of the Academy and the roles of the Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences (CHASS) are still evolving. The Academies of Social Sciences and of Humanities have no automatic place on the 10-person board of CHASS, although representatives of our disciplines are included. The foundation President of CHASS, Malcolm Gillies, is a former President of the Academy of Humanities. In September, a new CHASS board was elected. Stuart Cunningham, from Queensland University of Technology, is the new President. I was pleased to accept a position on the Board, both to promote the activities of CHASS and to assist if I can, in producing harmonious and mutually beneficial relations between CHASS and our Academy.

This is my last *Dialogue* report as President, my three year term coming to an end with the AGM in November. It has been a privilege to serve and to represent the social sciences and the Fellows over the past three years. It has also been a great pleasure to work with the many Fellows who have responded to the call to contribute to the work of the Academy. It is indeed the Fellowship that is our strength. But the work of the Fellows can only be realised because of the outstanding efficiency and talent of the Secretariat. I am indebted to you all.

Sue Richardson
(retiring President)

The **new President of the Academy is Stuart Macintyre**, Ernest Scott Professor of History, and Laureate Professor at the University of Melbourne. He has recently stepped down as Dean.

Professor Macintyre is also a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities. His recent publications include *The Reds: the Communist Party of Australia from origins to illegality* (1999), *A Concise History of Australia* (2004), *The History Wars* (with Anna Clark, 2003) and *The Historian's Conscience* (2004). He will be Chair of Australian Studies at Harvard University for 2007–08, and during his absence, Sue Richardson will fulfil the role of President on his behalf.

Security and Democracy — A Fifty-Year Retrospective
Don Aitkin

I'm probably wrong, but I have no memory of any widespread use of the word 'security' half a century ago. My family's Depression stories told me that 'security' was something that you needed when you were old, but exactly what it meant I didn't know. 'Security doors' came later, as did 'security men', at universities and elsewhere. Shares in companies, and bonds, were 'securities', but only a small proportion of the population had any of them. 'Democracy' was more widely employed, but not especially about ourselves. It was a cant word, meaning a member nation of 'the free world', a cant phrase. People who lived in the other, putatively non-free, world, however, belonged to countries that would often call themselves a 'People's Democracy'. Ten or twenty years would pass before universities taught courses with names like 'Theories of Democracy', and it became plainer that 'democracy' could mean almost anything, and had done. Today there may be greater use of both words in our much better educated society, but as descriptors they are still rather empty of meaning. What follows is a kind of retrospective that considers both, and suggests a path for the next fifty years that might improve the quality of each.

What was security like when we had it?

It is late October 1956, and I am preparing for my third-year exams at the University of New England. The radio news tells me that the Soviet Union has invaded Hungary. This sounds pretty serious, and I look somewhat apprehensively at my greatcoat, slouch hat and Lee Enfield .303, attached to or stacked behind the door of my room in 'Beta', my university residence. A few days later I learn that Britain, France and Israel have attacked Egypt, in order to secure the Suez Canal. 'It's on again,' we of New England Company of the SUR (Sydney University Regiment) say to each other, with nervous bravado. A student of History, I puzzle at the thought that for the third time in fifty years, Australian troops will be in the Middle East, and that I am likely to be among them. Will the Bomb be dropped again, I wonder. Where? On whom? One of my mates says it will be safer in the front line than at home. That doesn't cheer me up, and it probably didn't cheer him either. The world is in a mess, and I haven't the faintest idea what can be done about it.

As it happened, my exams passed without further incident. Our Prime Minister did not say (as he had done when I was two) that it was his melancholy duty to tell us that since Britain was at war, Australia was at war too; the rebellious Hungarians waited in vain for the West to come to their aid. We in the SUR certainly didn't help them. Our next army camp was quite unconcerned with how to deal with a Russian invasion and, bit by bit, I became used to the idea that these events occurred elsewhere, and were not part of the development of Australia. Indeed, within a couple of years I passed out of the SUR altogether; we referred to it affectionately as 'Russia's Secret Weapon', not because it was any kind of a fifth column, but because we felt that real soldiers would have to be more competent than us. I went off to graduate study, Oxford, the USA and an academic career.

Ten years or so pass, and in 1968 the Russians invade Czechoslovakia, a re-run of 1956. Now I am a member of the Australasian Political Studies Association, and the invasion occurs more or less during our annual conference. I think we passed a resolution about it, but can't remember quite what it was. The world was in a mess,

and I still had no idea what could be done about it. But I now knew something about passing resolutions.

Throughout this time the possibility of a nuclear holocaust (yes, we used that term) was ever-present. Anxiety about it probably didn't ever entirely disappear, though it diminished in the 1980s. When people tell me today that the world has never been more uncertain and more worrying I tend to think back to that time, but I usually don't deny their claim. There is no arguing about another person's anxiety. Many conflicts did take place but they did not involve a head-to-head confrontation between the two super-powers, and that good fortune allowed Australia to get on with the business of developing its own version of the Good Society. The Australian nation-building of the second half of the 20th century was remarkable in its reach and its effects. It was based on three great drivers: initial wealth, used wisely; immigration; and education. All were important, and their interaction was even more important. No wise person, or group of wise people, was responsible for marshalling these policy assets, but they have transformed our nation and our society, overwhelmingly for the better.

Human beings cannot do anything perfectly, and even our society's great advances have come with costs of various kinds. One of them is our somewhat complacent view that we are part of an international group, one that might be called 'the goodies', which is always opposing another group that might be called 'the baddies'. In the second half of the 20th century the baddies were the Soviet Union and its 'satellites' or 'stooges', which included at various times the conquered countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 'Red' China, North Korea, 'North' Vietnam, and various national entities suspected of a 'Leftist' persuasion in South East Asia, Central and South America, and Africa. I may have been the only person to think in these terms, and if that were true I would put it down to an unremitting diet of Westerns between the ages of 5 and 15. Today, and I am not the only person who can construe the world thus, the baddies are variously 'terrorists' (or, as some of our leaders say, 'terris'), 'rogue and failing states', and of course 'al Qaeda'. My guess is that many of our fellow citizens have some such view of Australia in the world.

In the 1940s, however, there was the possibility of our developing another, different, individual and 'Australian' view of the world, one in which we showed some sympathy for newly independent countries, and for colonial societies that would like to be independent. We showed that sympathy towards Indonesia, and to a degree towards India and Pakistan. We were beginning to be prepared to show it towards the new communist regime of China, which had by early 1949 attained control over virtually all the mainland of China. But the victory of the Liberal and Country Parties at the federal elections of 1949 in Australia brought the question of Australia's future foreign and defence policy to the fore. Sympathy for a former colony, and for all newly independent nations, was fairly quickly replaced by the feeling that the world was a dangerous place, and we had better have some strong friends. And what better friends than the ones who had supported us (and whom we had supported) during the recent world war? The Royal Navy may no longer have been up to the job, but the US Navy's Pacific Fleet certainly looked able.

This is not a denunciation of the Menzies Government. The world was a dangerous place, and our leaders saw us as needing 'great and powerful friends'. The Soviet Union had tested its own atomic bomb in 1949, and both the USSR and the USA had

exploded hydrogen bombs by the mid 1950s. The British, with our government's active agreement and support, had carried out nuclear tests in Australia between 1952 and 1963. The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles during the 1950s meant that in the 1960s both super-powers had the capacity to send nuclear warheads more or less anywhere. The Cuban missile crisis in 1963 brought such a confrontation very close, and there were other, false, alarms that appear to have been the product of faulty warning systems. Although I would have liked Australia to follow the Swedish model of armed neutrality, and to stay out of the goodies vs baddies stand-off, I wrote in this way only briefly, and found little support. Where it occurred it was mostly private, and some of it came from within the armed forces, where such debates went on all the time. In consequence, we went into Vietnam on the side of the Americans, almost as though we were paying an instalment of our long-term defensive insurance policy. We keep on doing it, most recently in Iraq.

We like to think of Australia as peaceful, but we seem uncommonly aggressive in the number of conflicts in which our governments have involved us. Troops from the Australian colonies were involved in the Sudan War and the Boer War, with the Australian armed forces taking part in the First and Second World Wars, the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation with Indonesia, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Afghanistan and most recently Iraq. Some would include the Boxer Rebellion in China. That's a fair list. Our sister Dominion, Canada, has managed to avoid some of them, most notably Vietnam and Iraq. Our involvement in 'minor' events (East Timor, UN peace-keeping, police involvement, the Solomons etc) seems generally supported by most Australians. Wars, like Vietnam and Iraq, are another matter. The Great War was not universally supported, and until the Japanese entered the Second World War there was some opposition to Australian involvement in that conflict as well. The major parties have in the last century agreed on our taking part in wars, though they disagreed on many aspects of our involvement. That agreement, based in part on a bipartisan acceptance that our alliance with the United States of America is the central element in our foreign policy, makes it difficult for Australians as citizens to propose alternative policies that could be widely accepted. When they do put them forward, both the policies and the proposers tend to be dismissed.

And what sort of democracy?

That outcome points to the kind of democracy we have and have had. We Australians like to think that we live in a democracy, and indeed our political leaders constantly tell us so. Those who live in the USA also like to think that they live in a democracy, and they too are constantly told so. But the two democracies are different in many ways. Insofar as I can judge, Americans stress 'freedom' and 'liberty' as the essential components of democracy, while Australians prize elections and voting, the right to keep the bastards honest and to kick them out if needs be. Neither country functions as an Athenian democracy, with a large and continually concerned citizenry. Strong and disciplined political parties have dominated Australian politics for the last century, and we think that is the natural state of affairs and what politics is about. The USA also has political parties, but they are not like ours, either ideologically or in structure, and the proportion of the population that votes can fall well below fifty per cent; in the USA politics is very much about what the President is doing.

Foreign and defence policies are matters which the parties in Australia, whether in government or in opposition, see as being something that ordinary citizens do not know much about and should leave to the politicians themselves. There has been an Australian Institute of International Affairs since 1933, but it has been an 'elite' rather than a popular organisation, and its meetings are neither frequent nor widely attended. Foreign affairs, for Australians, happen elsewhere, a point of view not widely shared by Europeans, Asians or Africans. While it might seem that this is a point of view that links us to Americans, who also live a long way from most 'trouble spots', the Australian-American alliance has an odd character that is of little daily consequence because we also live a long way from each other. In brief, Australia is a land of secular realists, while the US is a land of utopian moralists; I own that I have borrowed these terms from someone else, but I think there is a lot to them. We understate our nationalism, while Americans overstate theirs. We are relatively subdued flag-wavers, though it is a more common behaviour than it once was. We have no great wish to export our form of political democracy, and have some difficulty still in saying who we are (though much less difficulty in saying who we are not).

There is not much sign that we are 'anti-American', at least in the surveys of opinion that are common. But it is probably true that there will be general Australian relief when President George W Bush comes to the end of his term. He is something of an embarrassment personally, and his decision to invade Iraq, along with the emptiness of the pretext and the failure to think through what to do once there, and how and when to leave, has done great disservice to Iraq, to his own country and to ours. The 'war on terror' that we are now apparently engaged in can hardly have a proper end such as a peace treaty, but it leaves us in a nervous state, alarmed rather more than alert. Our multi-cultural relative harmony, one of our greatest strengths as we entered the 21st century, is in a mess, and there seems little sign that our government has much sense of what to do about it. Just as we did in the 1950s, we need to develop a common sense of what Australia is for, and to act over time to produce a good version of the dream.

In the 1950s and 1960s we were, as a Deputy Prime Minister, John McEwen, liked to tell the rest of the world, a 'developing country', by which he meant that we were still putting the infrastructure in place, though no one used that term then. We welcomed immigrants, and didn't ask them to subscribe to any values other than hard work and peacefulness. The assumption was that they would fit in, and if they didn't, their children would. These were virtuous assumptions, and by and large they proved to be accurate. But the world of 2006 is different. The infrastructure is mostly in place. No one talks any longer about our being a developing country, let alone about 'nation-building', a widely used term fifty years ago. We are very much more individualistic as a society than we were in the 1950s. And we are uneasy about diversity, whereas we once rejoiced in it, or at least took it for granted.

In earlier writings I argued that 'democracy' for Australians was akin to a habit, and was not much reflected on by the democrats themselves. Thirty years later I think that judgement is still accurate, though a lot has changed. Political party membership is proportionately only half of what it was thirty years ago and probably only a quarter of what it was in the 1950s. The notion that politics is there to achieve good outcomes for the nation has largely gone. That now seems to be the responsibility of the market,

or more widely, of the economy. Our 'representatives' in Parliament are much less representative than they used to be. Well-known figures, like sex discrimination or rural fire service commissioners, are welcomed into political parties to run as candidates in the party's interest. If successful they join MPs many of whom learned about politics through being members of a Minister's private staff. The seats they hold are much less likely to be the seats they lived in before election. Ministers no longer resign because of serious problems in their handling of issues (not that they were prone to do so in the past), and both the Iraq war and the Australian Wheat Board inquiry point to almost unbelievable lapses of memory and of judgment in Ministers for which I find it hard to provide earlier counterparts, unless it was Rex Connors' reliance on Tirath Khemlani in 1975.

We the citizens, however, are plainly hard to amaze. We still seem to regard voting as important, and support for compulsory voting has remained at much the same high level for fifty years. It is almost as though voting were simply a democratic duty: one does it, and moves on to other, more important things. Both Government and Opposition have been worried about this state of affairs, and have supported programs intended to make us, and our children and grandchildren, better citizens. This has not led either major party, however, to propose abolishing compulsory voting, a change that would force the parties to go out to the people to find supporters, if only to man the polling booths and get people to come to them on election day. Our contemporary situation was neatly summed up by a former schoolmate of mine, who thought we were now better regarded as shareholders in Australia Limited, and as long as the share price remained high and the dividends kept coming in, the CEO (John Howard) could keep his job, whether or not people liked him or agreed with his foreign and defence policies.

Where to now?

I became a political scientist rather than a historian because I found that it was the present and the recent past that most interested me, though I now define the recent past as the period since the Industrial, American and French Revolutions. For some twenty years I was deeply involved in the research policy business, and found it hard to imagine what 'pure' research might be in the social sciences. For me, the point of all our research was a better society for everyone, even if we disagreed about what that might be and how we might arrive there. While I think that Australia today, in its educational levels, creativity, curiosity, relative toleration and capacity for hard work, is very much better as a society than was its counterpart in the 1950s, there is still much that could be improved. That will always be the case, in my view, since, to say it again, human beings are not able to construct anything perfectly.

I may be an idealist, but I am not a utopian. We need to start with the diverse, multi-ethnic and individualistic society we have, and it has a lot going for it. If the task is to improve its real and felt security, on the one hand, and its democratic forms and processes, on the other, then I offer a way forward. It is not a set of policies, in the manner of our political leaders, whose ambition seems to go no further than managing better, or in a different way, what we already have. Rather, it is a kind of challenge. It begins with the fact that we secular realists need an ethical framework both to guide our own lives and to help shape the society we live in. It has to be based on the individual, partly because a society's patterns of behaviour are to a large degree an

extension of the behaviours of individuals. We cannot return to the solidary kind of society we had in the 1950s, when doors were not locked, and parents told children not to draw attention to themselves. Ours is a society of aspiring individuals, materialist, and non-religious yet still puzzled about the meaning of life.

But the news is not all bad. I would argue that there can be a confident 'Western' (but hereafter, Australian) approach to life and living together. It should be built on the discovery that everyone is educable to a high level — that intelligence is a gift to everyone. It follows that what differentiates us is not our native intelligence but the various conditions of life that we experience, the amount of love, encouragement and preparation we are given as children, variables like sex, sibling order, will, determination and so on — each of them affected to some degree by the same love, encouragement and preparation — and of course the wealth and sensitivity of our parents. The discovery of 'multiple intelligences' has been a social science triumph, and its implications now underpin many previous assumptions about democracy, such as the presumed natural equality of human beings, their deserving of equal treatment not just before the law, their equal entitlement to good education, and so on. We need to add as well a growing belief of the last generation or so that women are equal to men, and more generally that human beings are never the possessions of other human beings; wives of husbands, or children of parents. Our society is still sorting all this out. The much-vaunted 'Judaeo-Christian tradition', after all, has wives subject to their husbands. Among God's punishments to Eve, for having lured Adam away from the straight and narrow, was that 'he shall rule over thee' (Genesis 3:16, King James Version, *The Bible*).

There is still more to add: we are all creative. Some will find their pleasure in painting, some in music, some in words, some in sport, some in pottery, some in more than one of these activities. Exploring our creative capacities, gaining proper self-esteem in doing so, finding other people with similar interests, cooperating with them and learning from them — and having the wherewithal and the leisure to do so — these are the possibilities for the Good Life that people yearn for. This aspect of the Good Life is available now, and indeed it is what very many Australians do. Estimates vary, but the statistically minded might note that there are about 180 orchestras in Australia, classes in almost every conceivable creative pursuit, the Australian Sports Commission recognises 125 sporting organisations, and the number of people painting is measured in millions.

The ethical framework I propose fits comfortably with all this, and is nothing more than the Golden Rule. This precept is older than Christianity but certainly embraced by it: Matthew 7:12 '[T]herefore all things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets' (King James Version, *The Bible*). It is in any case a commonsense approach to living socially. Many Australian try to live by it now, and I believe that it is the way forward for us collectively as well. Adopting it both individually and collectively would lead to a slow but steady change in very many of our rules, policies and conventions. It would, I think, lead to a reduction of what I call 'band-aid' social welfare expenditure (dealing with symptoms, and a substantial element in our $55 billion social welfare expenditure), a reduction in the expenditure on criminal justice (police and prisons, now running at over $7 billion a year), but an increase in expenditure on education, sport, the arts, and creativity

generally. Well-educated, creatively interested people are conspicuously absent from prisons, and are contributors to the national welfare system, not (for the most part) suppliants at its door.

Moving along this path would lead us, I think, to a better functioning democracy. We have learned that educating people to a high level provides them with some self-confidence about their capacity to think, act and judge. Our politics today is more fragmented and more argumentative than it was fifty years ago, and fewer Australians are inclined to think that things are as they are either because the Prime Minister has said so or because they read it in the newspaper. But I believe we need a return to the view that the political realm is important and that Australians should take part in it as naturally as they take part in the economy, That will come if individuals recognise not only that they need to develop an explicit ethical framework for themselves, but also that the logical extension of that effort is a comparable ethical framework for the society.

I have said little about the economy, and that is of course a major error today, where the economy is thought to have almost magical powers. It is as though the entire object of life is to be wealthier, however wealthy you are. The instant response is dismissal. How could we afford all this? Where will the money come from? This form of the question was used to deflate Dr Evatt, when he was leader of the Labor Party in the 1950s, and is used today any time a politician proposes a new program. We are among the lowest taxed societies in the OECD, along with the USA, Japan and Turkey, so one answer is plain enough. Another is almost as obvious: we had better get used to a relatively static population and relatively static economy. Both look like becoming an important part of the future of Western countries, and Japan has been living with both for a decade or more without apparent harm. Using one's creativity is cheaper by far than going in for material acquisition or 'retail therapy', and seems to lead to happier human beings, as well.

I am not someone who looks forward eagerly to world government; I think we have a long way to go in equalising conditions in nation-states before such an outcome is practical. But an Australian society imbued with an understanding that all of its people are intelligent, capable of great skill and productivity, and interested in exploring their own creativity, would seem to be a good model for other countries. We could assist them in attaining a similar social condition by developing a foreign policy that was based on the same understanding, and by giving aid which had explicit values attached to it. For example, Australia would assist other countries to develop family planning programs that arise from the assumption that women must be in control of their own fertility. It would assist universal education programs, and the development of the arts, music, sport and so on. The faster the world's poorer countries get past the subsistence level and into the productive development of the talents of their people, the better for us all.

Does that mean we would have no defence forces? Not at all. Over time we would spend more, not less on defence, extricating ourselves from an imperial alliance that has had great costs for us, but at the same time building up our armed forces to make it clear not only that we have an improving, peaceful and materially prosperous country but that we will defend it too. Sweden has stayed free of wars in the past century, to the great good of its people and, arguably, of the world, since Sweden is a

notable aid donor. My own view is that over time strong Australian armed forces will be less necessary, as the countries in our region gain greater self-confidence and respect for what we are doing and how we are doing it, but that time might be a good many years off. In any case, the picture I am building relies on a lot of 'givens' or constants, and I am old enough to think that insurance is good policy.

Does it all sound airy-fairy? It shouldn't. One of the great weaknesses of our polity is its reluctance to engage in 'what if?' discussions, and its preference always for the pragmatic, the apparently realistic, and the status quo. I accept that what I am proposing will take time, and indeed that it will not be picked up quickly by the major parties. But in a slow fashion it is already occurring, and if it is discussed, and argued about, and adopted by more individuals, then it will have some effect. That is, after all, why we write books, and why each generation has to revisit what the nation is for, and what should be done about it. My coming book is not written in any conscious way for members of the Academy. Rather, it is written for my children and my grandchildren, and for their respective generations. I do detect in the electorate an impatience with what passes for 'politics' in our country, and a wish that we could all move past it. But it is quite possible that what will happen is something rather different from what I am suggesting. If it is better, I won't mind at all.

Emeritus Professor Don Aitkin AO, *a historian and political scientist, is a former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Canberra, and a long-term columnist and commentator on Australian politics and society.*

This essay incorporates ideas developed in my recent *What Was It All For? The Reshaping of Australia* (Allen & Unwin, 2005) and its sequel *Legacy and Challenge. Building a Better Australia*, which should be out in late 2007 or in 2008.

While it was de Tocqueville who referred to the USA as a society of utopian moralists, it was Dr Michael Evans, in an essay in the October 2006 *Quadrant* ('The Essential Alliance') who contrasted that term to an Australian society of secular realists, a neat opposition that I have gratefully used here.

The notion that Australians are habitual rather than reflective democrats was advanced at the end of the first edition of my *Stability and Change in Australian Politics* (ANU Press, 1977).

Those for whom the concept of 'multiple intelligences' is unfamiliar are urged to read Howard Gardner's *Frame of Mind*, originally published in New York in 1983, and now revised and reprinted many times.

Terrorism as the Politics of Dashed Expectations
David Wright-Neville

'*The trajectory by which normal people become capable of doing terrible things is usually gradual, perhaps imperceptible to the individual*'.[1]

'*The events of 11 September 2001 showed the disorder, paradox, the unexpected and the revenge of the repressed*'.[2]

Introduction

Almost five years after the tragedy of 11 September 2001 and George W Bush's declaration of the increasingly discredited concept of a 'War on Terror', the threat of terrorism seems more pervasive than ever. In the brief interregnum since 9/11, high profile attacks have occurred against commercial and civilian targets across a diverse geographic terrain that includes Britain, Jordan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Spain and Turkey. At the same time, although generating less international attention, a series of smaller attacks in other parts of the world have imposed similarly serious economic, social and psychological costs on various societies. The net effect of this escalating pattern of violence has been a steady supply of media-friendly outrages that have kept terrorism at the forefront of the Western imagination and turned this once distant national security issue into a new organising principle within domestic and international politics.[3]

The dynamics driving the geographic spread and increasing lethality of terrorist violence are too numerous and too multifaceted to explain in detail in this brief article. Suffice to say, the interpretation of terrorism that informs my argument begins with the superficially obvious contention that no one is born a terrorist and that those who eventually become in terrorism do so after passing through an evolutionary progression involving a complex mix of social, political and psychological forces. Putting the argument slightly differently, terrorism is a form of learned behaviour and as such it rests upon a highly personal and symbiotic relationship between potential and actual terrorists and the society in which he or she exists. More controversially, I argue that conceived in this way it is possible understand terrorism as an extreme form of human frustration with the inability or refusal of the 'system' and its guardians to account for the aspirations of particular group of people. More exactly, to the extent that violence is almost always an extension of frustration, and that frustration in turn results from the failure to receive expected rewards, terrorism and the ideologies that underpin it can be viewed as a 'politics of dashed expectations'; a violent response among a small group of those who feel abandoned and whose personal and/or political and social ambitions remain unfulfilled.

The contentious nature of this conception rests on several factors, only a few of which will be addressed in this paper. The first relates to the inevitable criticism that attributing terrorism to a set of real or perceived grievances sails close to the ethically dubious position of viewing terrorist violence as a legitimate form of political agency. This is a common criticism (occasionally couched as abuse) experienced regularly by those whose public comments on issues such as the daily tragedies that unfold in the Palestinian territories, Sri Lanka, and many other parts of the world transcend the banal but politically convenient view that only one set of protagonists is to blame for the violence. Couched in polite terms, the search for 'root causes' for terrorism and the related idea that as a political phenomenon violence is a dynamic that involves more than one actor are controversial only because they are perceived to undermine

the consensual moral clarity that many feel is essential for any community to defeat the threat posed by terrorism.[4] But as Silke has pointed out, it is far easier to condemn terrorism than it is to understand what causes it.[5] Allowing our justifiable outrage at the murder of innocent human beings to divert us from the search for an understanding of the phenomenon is to ignore the obvious point that to effectively manage a threat we first need to understand it. Too often is the notion of an *understanding of terrorism* conflated with the notion of an *understanding with terrorism*.

Secondly, conceiving of terrorism as a phenomenon with its roots deeply embedded in the society in which it takes place presages a need to address the vexed issue of what constitutes 'society'. This is not the place to interrogate the various ways in which the concept has been and is currently being debated. Suffice to say, in earlier epochs 'society' was a less complex idea conceived largely through a rather parochial lens. This meant that to the extent that an individual might have felt alienated, disempowered and inclined to lash out violently against the perceived source of anger, the targets were mostly local symbols – the national government, police, or a neighbouring ethnic group. Because of globalisation the conceptual of 'society' has today become far less parochial and, as a result, more complex.[6]

It is this aspect of the contemporary world that lies at the heart of what scholars such as Hoffman and Laqueur have referred to as 'new terrorism' as a hybridised version of a phenomenon which has its roots in human antiquity.[7] New terrorism is global in that terrorists have broken free of the parochial and now play out their anger on a global stage. At the same time, the outward appearance of new terrorism is also more overtly cultural in that identity markers (such as tribe and religion) are displacing secular ideologies as the rhetorical organising principles around which the terrorist movement coheres. In other words, just as local and national communities have come to reflect a greater global content, so too have human grievances and associated forms of political agency been infused with global themes.

The third issue which needs to be clarified emerges from merging the idea of terrorism as a psychological process driven by a combination of social and political forces with the idea that these forces that are increasingly global in character. In other words, conceptualising terrorism as the outcome of a mix of increasingly global political, social and psychological forces is not a licence to retreat into a form of political determinism. The fact that terrorism is an 'acting out' of anger and frustration and an attempt at re-empowerment directed against more powerful forces does not mean that every person who experiences such feelings will become a terrorist or even sympathise with terrorist causes. There is no single avenue along which all terrorists have travelled in their journey towards violence. Rather, to paraphrase Taylor and Horgan, there are only 'individual routes to terrorism, and furthermore those routes and activities as experienced by the individual *change* over time'.[8]

However, although there are only individual routes to terrorism, there are common experiential and emotional attributes that are common among almost all terrorists. Interviews with and biographies of terrorists reveal that especially important in this regard are feelings of alienation, anger, and a sense of powerlessness in the face of real or perceived overwhelming obstacles to the realisation of both individual and group fulfilment.[9] Consistent with the highly personal nature of an individual terrorist's journey towards violence, this same research points to the variegated ways in which

different individuals respond to perceived marginalisation and political disempowerment. In other words, people interpret and respond to personal, social, and political disappointments in different ways. For example, as has been pointed out by many authors, prolonged exposure to the deprivations of an authoritarian state might breed a deep sense of non-violent anomie in some people, while a shorter exposure can inculcate an energised embrace of violence in others.[10]

Unfortunately, the highly personal nature of terrorism is a facet of the phenomenon that continues to elude many scholars and commentators. As a result the field is replete with accounts that reduce terrorism to causal factors that lie outside the control of mainstream politics. Terrorists are still cast overwhelmingly as 'mad', 'insane' or as motivated by an irrational hatred of 'our way of life'.[11] Although these fictions might be convenient for political and economic elites, they are usually based on problematically small samples or on grand generalisations extrapolated from the specific to the general and as such they form part of a larger social discourse in which terrorists are constructed as beyond reason.[12] The value of such constructions to incumbent political hierarchies and is clear. Firstly, constructing terrorists as motivated by irrational hatreds distracts the public's attention from the possibility that, to paraphrase Kapitan and Schulte, one's own policies might have contributed to their anger. At the same time, such constructions militate against the possibility that the violence perpetrated by terrorists might stimulate wider public interest in the history and legitimacy of their grievances. Finally, successfully constructing terrorists as irrational creates a policy environment in which negotiation is fruitless and where the application of hard power – state sanctioned violence and intimidation – looms as the only viable policy option.[13]

Challenging popular myths

As mentioned above, the reluctance to accept that terrorism is a phenomenon the root causes of which might lie in the character of contemporary global society is not only the default position of conservatives, but is also a perspective rich in political potential. Constructed in this way, the terrorist – as somebody with an abnormal personal psychology – is a unique type of enemy and one who requires unique forms of policing and punishment. As Kapitan and Schulte argue, the perception of the terrorist as 'mad' or as devoid of the sort of moral and ethical reasoning capabilities that characterise mainstream society has had the effect of,

> ….shut[ting] off any meaningful examination of causes or debate on policies and has left only the path of violence to solve differences. Rather than promoting a free and open examination of the grievances of the group from which terrorists emerge, the 'terrorist' label nips all questioning and debate in the bud. Terrorists are 'evil' - as the US Administration has repeated on numerous occasions since September 11, 2001 - and are therefore to be eradicated.[14]

At a rhetorical level, this analytical perspective is encoded into a series of standard explanations repeated ad infinitum in political discourse and mainstream media. For the sake of simplicity, these three positions can be summarised as follows.

Religion (particularly Islam) causes terrorism. There is little credible research to support the assertion that some cultures and religions (especially Islam) contain a higher propensity to violence. Those who do argue the religion-causes-terrorism line usually base their analysis on terrorist rhetoric; terrorists claim to be acting in the name of religion so we should believe them.

The personal biographies of terrorists who claim to be acting in the name of religion reveal an extraordinarily small number who have been pious since childhood. Contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of terrorists are radicalised and embrace the emancipatory potential of violence *prior to becoming religious.* Biographical surveys of members of violent Islamist, Christian, and Hindu groups suggest that fundamentalist interpretations of religion appeal mostly to individuals who are already radicalised. Such religious doctrines appeal because they provide a pseudo-ethical justification for a *pre-existing urge to act out violently* against those who are perceived to have acted unjustly against the individual concerned and his/her 'in-group'. For McCauley this emphasises the fact that, 'terrorists kill for the same reasons that groups have killed other groups for centuries. They kill for cause and comrades, that is, with a combination of ideology and intense small-group dynamics'.[15]

Terrorists are irrational. A second misperception about terrorists is that they are 'mad', 'insane', or suffer from some form of psychopathological condition that impairs their capacity to make informed rational judgments. Indeed, of all of the many myths that surround the terrorist phenomenon, it is this view that stands as the most difficult to debunk. Sustained by the sensationalist character of mass media and the rhetorical instincts of political leaders, the mistaken assumption that terrorists are 'mad' has led to a series of poorly calibrated counter-terrorism policies that habitually underestimate the operational and strategic intelligence of the vast majority of terrorists. While it is impossible to speak of a single terrorist personality type, there exists a growing body of evidence that terrorists possess high levels of political and social literacy and are directed by a clear capacity for rational decision-making. In short, most terrorists are 'dangerously normal'. As Horgan points out, '[w]hile terrorism is often vicious, it is rarely frenzied and uncontrolled, and as Hoffman notes, no terrorist group 'commits actions randomly or senselessly'.[16]

Terrorists 'hate us for our way of life'. A final misperception is the oft-repeated claim that terrorists 'hate us for our way of life' – most notably for the secular liberalism and democracy that characterises Western societies. This oversimplified analysis is also articulated clearly in the Australian government's White Paper, which explains terrorist behaviour in the following terms,

> [t]hey [the terrorists] feel threatened by our values and the place we take in the world. Our international alliances and our robust foreign policy are opportunistically invoked in the name of their 'war'. Our conspicuous example of economic and social prosperity is deemed a threat to their cause. We hear our values and social fabric attacked.[17]

As above, those who make this claim tend to ground their analysis in the rhetoric of terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden and in the unproven assumption that his utterances are taken as gospel by all terrorists who might act in his name. A more powerful causal dynamic – and one that manifests before the rhetorical disavowal of Western lifestyles – results from feelings of alienation, frustration and resentment caused by the terrorist's perception that he/she has been excluded from enjoying similar levels cultural and social freedom. Indeed, to the extent that Western governments are increasingly worried about the spread of what has become popularly known as 'home-grown jihadists', remarkably little attention has been given to the social conditions within which violent ideologies have been able to take root. In particular, there has been surprisingly little focus on patterns of exclusion from the

Western dream and how this exclusion has provided the impetus to alternative identities that construct themselves as the antithesis of those which are perceived to have excluded them. For example, Wieviorka has identified a powerful reactive logic to emerging Islamist identities in France.

> I have often met young Muslims in France who say two things. In the first instance, they explain that their choice of Islam is personal and deliberate. Second, they consider that Islam enables them to keep going when confronted with a racist society and one in which their living conditions are particularly difficult. In this case, Islam does not keep them apart from society; on the contrary, it is Islam which enables them to be satisfied with limited access to resources, or in any case to bear this while waiting for something better in the future.[18]

This interpretation of terrorist motives is confirmed by extensive psychological research undertaken in the 1980s, in particular the work by Wright, Taylor and Moghaddam which concluded that, 'attempts at individual upward social mobility … are always the first strategy attempted by members of [a] disadvantaged group. It is only when these individual attempts are blocked that the overriding social philosophy is questioned and the advantaged group is perceived as closed to the disadvantaged group members. And it is only then that collective action will be initiated'.[19]

Terrorism as a process

Against this view, a growing amount of scholarship stresses the need to perceive of terrorism as a process; as a form of human agency that people embrace not by dint of their culture or religion but which is inculcated through social processes and internalised over time. One of the leading researchers in this field is John Horgan, whose work offers especially persuasive explanations as to why a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to understanding terrorism is to view it as a 'process comprising discrete phases'.[20] These phases work at the individual, group, and social psychological levels. More importantly, it is important to understand that this mix of psychological, social and political forces is symbiotic. Neither the psychological, the social nor political influences should be considered as discrete. In reality, personal psychologies influence the way in which in individual interprets and responds to wider social conditions. At the same time, these wider socio-political conditions can influence personal psychology. Further complicating the picture is that individual psychologies and readings of the outside world are simultaneously influenced by group dynamics within the family, peer group, and within a wider social milieu. All these forces conspire and collide in differing ways on different people. In the case of terrorists, these dynamics merge to create an existential framework within which violence looms as a rational and logical choice for addressing perceived injustices against the self and against one's fraternal unit. Put more simply, the causes of terrorism are rooted mainly in what Richardson has called 'subjective perceptions, in a lethal cocktail containing a disaffected individual, an enabling community and a legitimizing ideology'.[21]

This conception of terrorism as a dynamic phenomenon that involves a transitional psychological state before reaching the point of 'acting out' is represented in the diagram below. Admittedly, capturing the array of emotions and vast repertoire of personal histories and experiences that have led different individuals to embrace terrorism as a perceived legitimate form of political action remains extraordinarily difficult. Even so, as argued above, there remain some useful reference points that

appear regularly across the variegated life histories of terrorists motivated at different times by a range of different political and ideological goals.

The Evolution of a Terrorist

The extreme left of the diagram represents a level of social engagement indicative of most members of society. At this point, despite obvious traumas associated with every day life and work, few people feel any deep need to disengage or to view society as a whole as irredeemably hostile to their interests. Everyday frustrations are countered by a deeper understanding that there exist multiple channels for expressing or addressing life's frustrations and for pursuing one's own life choices.

The first step along the path towards becoming a terrorist involves the gradual (and often inadvertent) alienation of an individual from mainstream society. Feelings of rejection and a lack of acceptance, coupled with a steadily intensifying sense of disempowerment (defined as an inability to change ones own circumstances) are common to many people at some stage in their lives. However, in the case of the would-be terrorist these feelings are never redressed through positive socio-cultural affirmation. Rather, the individual feels progressively detached from mainstream society and increasingly frustrated at their perceived inability to do anything about it. The brief life histories of the four young men responsible for the bombing attacks on the London public transport system on 7 July 2005 provide just several of many other examples of this progressive and sometimes silent alienation from society. Three of the bombers, Mohammad Siddique Khan, Shehzad Tanweer and Hasib Hussain, grew up in Beeston and the neighbouring district of Holbeck on the urban fringe of

Leeds. Although they were not desperately poor (Tanweer's father was a prosperous local businessman by local standards) more than half the region's residents endure living standards that are among the worst 3 per cent in Britain.[22] Khan was remembered as a quiet young man who was bullied at school, and on graduating drifted between clerical jobs until finding a vocation working with disadvantaged young people. Tanweer, a talented sportsman, failed to complete a BSc course at Leeds Metropolitan University and in 2003 left study to work part-time in his parent's fish and chip shop. Hussain is also remembered as a quiet young man who had briefly become involved in racial tensions at his school but who otherwise kept to himself.[23]

The fourth bomber, Jermaine Lindsay, had perhaps the most troubled life. Born in Jamaica, his mother took him to the UK as a young child. His first stepfather was harsh with the young man, although his second stepfather was reported to have been kinder. Lindsay converted to Islam with his mother in 2000, but in 2002 she moved to the US to live with another man, leaving her seventeen year old son alone in the family home in the UK. It is reported that Lindsay found this a traumatic event.[24]

Of particular interest is the extent to which alienation experienced by these four young men and associated with their immediate environment intensified gradually. It is also interesting to note how events external to their immediate environment, in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Iraq, began to encroach into their perceptions of the world and in so doing fomented a steady disengagement with the world more generally. However, the critical point in the violent evolution of these men appears to have been their immersion in a group of like minded individuals. In the diagram above this point is designated as the Alienation Threshold, and after crossing this point almost all forms of public engagement become routine and devoid of any existential significance. In the workplace, school and even in the home, the individual's outward participation in social rituals masks a deep sense of rage and psychological disconnection from wider society. It is interesting, for instance, that Khan's immersion in a small tight-knit group espousing extremist Islamist views coincided with a deteriorating attendance record at the school where he worked as a mentor for children with special needs while association with the same group coincided with his early departure from his studies.

Although they might still attend work and participate in other public activities, once a person crosses the Alienation Threshold they have withdrawn emotionally from mainstream society. In this state, an enduring need for companionship and affirmation draws them towards likeminded individuals. It is also at this stage that alienated individuals coalesce into alienated groups. More importantly, it is within the group that the individual's sense of alienation and anger is affirmed and where prior feelings of disempowerment begin to be replaced by feelings of confidence and an urge to act out against those responsible for the perceived personal injustices and slights experienced in the past. More importantly, it is within this close-knit group that the ideologies that justify violence take root, providing both a sense of existential purpose and an organising principle that helps bind the group into a cohesive unit.[25]

Once incorporated into such a network, the individual derives a sense of satisfaction by being around like-minded people. This dilutes the sense of impotence that manifested when the individual felt that alone he/she was unable to change the system. Where there was once a sense of irrelevance, there is now a sense of importance derived from being part of a larger collective effort against the adversary. The ability of the group to redress the individual's previous sense of powerlessness prompts the individual to associate their spiritual wellbeing with the group. Everything

inside the group is affirming – everything outside the group is corrupt and hostile. Hence, it is usually within the group that the individual begins to dehumanise the enemy. In the case of the London bombers, they seemed to derive fresh energy from participating in a range of indoor and outdoor activities that focused on physical fitness and which were organised exclusively for this select group.

Compared to the sense of helplessness that engulfs the isolated angry individual, in a group environment the individual begins to experience a sense of control, an inflated sense of collective power, and an urge to strike at the enemy. At this point the individual's tendency to self-sanction begins to disintegrate and forms of behaviour which they may have earlier considered to be morally repugnant begin to figure as viable acts, sometimes even obligatory. Indeed, research shows that individuals are prone to acting more cruelly under conditions of group responsibility than when forced to hold themselves individually responsible for their actions.[26] It is at this juncture that an individual can be considered to have crossed a point that in the diagram below is signified as the Violence Threshold after which '[e]ffective moral disengagement creates a sense of social rectitude and self-righteousness that breeds ruminative hostility and retaliatory thoughts for perceived grievances. People often ruminate hostilely but do not act on their feelings. However, freed from the restraint of moral self-sanctions, they are more likely to act out their resentments'.[27] As the French criminologist Xavier Raufer has argued,

> …. behind all ideology, all plans, projects and conspiracies, beyond human greed, rage and fury, there lies that one essential ingredient: 'acting out' or behaviour. … [and] if we look for the source of 'acting out' we will find a dark pool of silence that remains a secret sealed off from the conscious self. If we are to understand the secret nature of this 'acting out' and other decisive and central concepts, we need to turn to psychology.[28]

Identity politics and 'enabling communities'

The failure to appreciate the complex mix of personal and social circumstances that draw individuals towards terrorism and to see instead as simply the violent actions of maniacal zealots who 'hate us for our way of life' constitutes a form of policy myopia with profoundly dangerous implications. In particular, this short-sighted approach to terrorism has manifested in a policy environment that carries a significant risk of intensifying the threat and heightening the risk of further violence. At an easily verifiable empirical level, the persistent implication encoded into the political rhetoric of Western leaders and mass media that contemporary terrorism is essentially a religious phenomenon inherent to Islam has fed unfounded public fears and is placing dangerous strains on the social cohesion of multicultural societies, most obviously in those with significant Muslim populations. More difficult to measure is the extent to which growing Muslim-non-Muslim tensions have contributed to spreading 'jihadist' ideologies and the transmogrification of al Qaeda into a global mass movement.[29] In the latter sense, public hostility towards Muslim minorities and the demonisation of the Islamic religion through mass media constitutes a form of structural violence which risks alienating a growing number of Muslims and forcing them into a defensive retreat from mainstream society, or in terms of the diagram above, driving them further to the right and closer to the alienation threshold at which point they become more open to the violent ideologies of resistance peddled by followers of demagogues such as bin Laden.[30] Reinforcing this potential has been the wave of counter-terrorism law reform,

the collective result of which has been an unprecedented growth in the power of the state to impose itself into the private lives of individuals and deny suspect individuals core civil and political rights. This development is especially concerning when we remember that the application of law always occurs within a wider social context, and in an environment marked by fear and crude cultural stereotypes the weight of these new powers falls disproportionately upon Muslims. The net effect has been a shrinking of the democratic space for Muslim citizens of Western societies and the gradual emergence of a bifurcated democracy wherein non-Muslims enjoy greater freedom from state power than the fellow citizens who happen to be Muslim.[31]

Against this background it is not surprising that feelings of humiliation and powerlessness have become more widespread among Muslim communities within the West, but also on a wider global level. This represents an especially worrying development, not only because of the denial of human dignity that these policies impose upon Muslims, but also because the feelings of alienation and humiliation that they inspire plays into the hands of those seeking to spread terrorist ideologies. As Richardson observes, bin Laden's 'statements and interviews constantly reassert his desire to redress Muslim humiliation. Declaring to his followers 'Death is better than life in humiliation,' bin Laden calls on his Muslim brothers 'to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctuaries of Islam'.[32] There is little doubt that, five years after the declaration of the ineptly named War on Terror, this call resonates with a wider audience than it might have in the pre-9/11 period, a point that is now recognised even by those instrumental in its formulation and prosecution. For example, in his suicide video Shehzad Tanweer addresses himself to,

> …. the non-Muslims of Britain, you may wonder what you have done to deserve this. You have those who have (sic) voted in your government who in turn have and still continue to this day continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters from the east to the west in Palestine ... Iraq and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 50,000 innocent Muslims … You've offered financial administrative support to the US and Israel in the massacre of our children in Palestine. You are directly responsible for the problems in Palestine and Iraq to this day. You have openly declared war on Islam and other foreigners in the crusade against the Muslims. … All Muslims of Britain you day in and day out on your TV sets see and hear about the oppression of the Muslims from the east to the west but yet you turn a blind eye and carry on with your lives as if you never heard anything or as if it does not concern you. What is the matter with you that you turn back not to the religion that Allah ... has chosen for you?[33]

Not surprisingly, similar themes informed the suicide video of Tanweer's co-conspirator Mohammad Sidique Khan, whose suicide video included the following statement.

> Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. … And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. … Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. … We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.[34]

It is erroneous, however, to associate these attitudes with Islam. Strip away the religious rhetoric, and at the core of these statements are a set of deeply felt grievances and a pervasive sense of individual and group humiliation. From the point of view of understanding the motivation of the terrorist it is almost insignificant that these grievances might or might not be imagined rather being grounded in any material reality. What does matter is that for the individual concerned the grievances are real. Hence, there are important similarities between Tanweer and Khan's status as alienated individuals who perceived themselves as representatives of a larger victimised social and cultural group and the attitudes of leftist terrorists in Western Europe a generation earlier and with terrorist groups stretching back to antiquity. For example, in her study of Italian and West German terrorist groups della Porta observed that in many cases radicalisation was 'encouraged less by direct experiences with violence than by the sense of being violently rejected by mainstream society.' She quotes Bommi Baumann, a member of the Second of June Movement, as recalling that,

> For someone like me, with my long hair, when I went out in Berlin, it was like being in the skin of a Negro. They threw us out of public places, they spit on us, they insulted us, they annoyed us … completely unknown people, people you had ever done anything to ....[35]

This observation echoes Wieviorka's observation outlined above on the social dynamics that have led to the formation of belligerently Islamist sub-national identities in France. These patterns of identity and cultural formation are simultaneously reactive in the sense that they are a response to feelings of exclusion and powerlessness, and proactive in the sense that they constitute an attempt to carve out an autonomous community independent of the society they feel has excluded and disempowered them.[36] From a counter-terrorism perspective, it is these communities, constituted by those who perceive themselves to be similarly disenfranchised, marginalised and victimised that the terrorists believe themselves to be fighting for. Referring to these as 'enabling communities', Richardson, Horgan and others contend that it is these groups that the terrorists strive to 'awaken', 'liberate', or 'defend' and as such they are a core ingredient in the psycho-dynamics of terrorism.

Conclusion: The dangerous assault on multiculturalism

The notion that terrorists or even the communities they seek to represent might have some basis for their anger and frustration is almost completely lacking from mainstream political discourse, reportage, and scholarship. A central theme that permeates most political and media generated discourse is that it is the existence in Western countries of pockets of Muslims who have chosen not to integrate which constitutes a critical point of vulnerability to the spread of Islamist terrorism. The revival of the language of assimilation, national values, and the assault on the principle of multiculturalism all speak to this fear that within Western societies there exist pockets of Muslim fifth columnists, whose innate cultural hostility to so-called Western values means that they are ever vulnerable to the violent demagoguery of the bin Ladens of the world.

Applied to the status of Muslim communities in particular, this discourse implies that the presence of Muslims within Western societies weakens the state's ability to protect the dominant community from terrorist attack. Thus configured, the argument reflects an inter-connected series of fundamental attribution errors such as those

outlined above; that Islam is an inherently violent religion the core beliefs of which cannot be reconciled with the Western tradition of secular liberalism; that the majority of Muslims are uncomfortable with Western values and will therefore never exist comfortably as part of the broad Western mainstream; and that these religious and cultural impediments to co-existence with Western values renders all Muslims as potential 'fifth columnists' whose loyalty to their host nations can never be taken for granted.

However, against the background provided by the preceding discussion, to the extent that such pockets of potentially violent individuals exist they do so not because of any innately malevolent cultural instincts but through the failure of existing policies to integrate successfully certain segments of immigrant populations. In fact, a clear subtext running through the discourse of many emerging sub-national immigrant cultures is what for want of a better term might be called 'a politics of dashed expectations.' The recurring themes of exclusion, insult, and humiliation speak to the existence of feelings of rejection, an emotional state that seems especially evident among young second or third generation immigrants.

Underlying this whole process, however, is a pervasive sense of anger. In terms of psychology, the existence of anger provides important clues into the deeper causes of both terrorism and the spread of enabling ideologies and communities. As McCauley points out, 'anger is the emotional reaction to pain, especially the pain of frustration. Frustration is understood as the failure to receive an expected reward'.[37] With this insight from analytical psychology in mind, it is pertinent to ask whether or not we might therefore look for the roots of violent terrorist ideologies in the anger felt by some groups of individuals at the failure to receive the same rewards (measured in terms of social acceptance, political power, and economic opportunity) afforded to others born within the same socio-political environment but who by dint of their cultural, national or religious pedigree draw upon greater reservoirs of cultural capital to reap disproportionately greater material or political returns.

Hence, there is a significant danger in the post-9/11 Western world, where terrorism is persistently and erroneously cast as rooted in religion or culture, that the demonisation of entire cultures and communities will feed the more potent drivers of terrorist dynamics that lie in a sub-group's perceptions and experiences of marginalisation and humiliation. At a tangible level, the marginalisation and disempowerment of select cultural and religious groups is evident in the informal practice of profiling whereby dark skinned people are more likely to experience the sharp end of the state's new counter-terrorism powers. At a less tangible level these strains are evident in a disturbing rise in hate crimes against Muslims or individuals assumed to be Muslims.[38] Peaking in the weeks and months immediately after a terrorist incident, these crimes manifest as a form of vigilantism in that they reflect a well documented socio-psychological phenomenon whereby public fears aroused by the existence of an uncontrollable external threat elicits an urge to boost public safety by eliminating the 'threat from within'.[39]

However, to reiterate, there is a real danger that such phenomena will exaggerate a dangerous social dynamic with the potential to spread rather than shrink the communities of support upon which terrorists feed. Accordingly, policy makers should heed Horgan's warning that,

> For the same reason that the head-counting of captured or killed terrorists tells
> us relatively little about the progress of a broad counter-insurgency campaign,

shooting terrorists, infringing basic human rights, or corrupting the democratic process will not work because it only feeds into and engages with the processes inherent in political violence by sustaining the legitimization of the imperative strategy of terrorism at all junctures.[40]

Associate Professor David Wright-Neville *is in the Global Terrorism Research Centre at Monash University. He is also currently a Visiting Fellow at St. Antony's College, Oxford.*

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[1] McCauley, Clark (2006). 'Psychological issues in understanding terrorism and the response to terrorism', in Bruce Bongar *et al. Psychology of Terrorism,* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press:19.

[2] Urry, John (2005). 'The complexities of the global', *Theory, Culture and Society* 22, 5: 244.

[3] The table below provides statistical data for the total numbers of terrorist incidents that have occurred – and the number of fatalities and injuries they have caused – for each calendar year since 2001. The figures cited are obtained from the RAND–MIPT Terrorism Incident database. Data is based on information from open source materials, such as newspapers. It should be noted figures cited here differ from those listed in the National Counter-Terrorism Centre's (NCTC) *Country Reports on Terrorism* and for years prior to 2005 the US State Department's series *Patterns of Global Terrorism.*

Recent Trends in Terrorist Violence

	Terrorist Incidents	Injuries	Fatalities
2001	1,733	6,403	4,571
2002	2,649	7,349	2,763
2003	1,898	6,203	2,347
2004	2,647	10,861	5,068
2005	4,925	15,015	8,161

[4] See the discussion by Edward Newman (2006). 'Exploring the 'root causes' of terrorism' *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, 8: 749-751.

[5] Silke, Andrew (2004). 'Courage in dark places: reflections on terrorist psychology', *Social Research,* 71, 1: 178.

[6] Urry (2005) *op cit:* 235-254. See also Zygmunt Bauman (2000). *Liquid Modernity,* Cambridge: Polity and Ulrich Beck (2006). *Cosmopolitan Vision,* Cambridge: Polity.

[7] Lesser, Ian O *et al* (1999). *Countering the New Terrorism,* Washington DC: Rand Corporation; Laqueur, Walter (1999). *The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction,* Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

8   Taylor, Max and Horgan, John (2006) 'A conceptual framework for addressing psychological process in the development of a terrorist' *Terrorism and Political Violence* 18, 6: 597.

9   See Joyce Davis (2004). *Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance, and Despair in the Middle East*, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan; Barbara Victor (2003). *Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Suicide Bombers,* Rodale Books; Marc Sageman (2004). *Understanding Terror Networks,* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; C Christine Fair and Bryan Shepherd (2006). 'Who supports terrorism? Evidence from fourteen Muslim countries', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29, 1: 51-74; Jerrold M Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Lauita M Denny (2003). 'The terrorists in their own words: interviews with thirty five incarcerated Middle Eastern terrorists' *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 15, 1: 171-184; Andrew Silke (2003). 'Becoming a terrorist', in Andrew Silke (ed) *Terrorists, Victims and Society: Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism and its Consequences,* Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd: 29-54.

10   A classic study of this paradox is Hannah Arendt (1964). *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evi,l* New York: Penguin Books.

11   For an overview of the debates surrounding terrorist abnormality, see Andrew Silke (1998) 'Cheshire cat logic: the recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in psychological research' in *Psychology, Crime and Law*, 4, 1: 51-69. Also, Charles Ruby (2002). 'Are terrorists mentally deranged?' in *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 2, 1: 15-26.

12   One of the most common generalisations is that poverty does not cause terrorism. See Alan B Krueger and Jitka Malečková (2003). 'Education, poverty and terrorism: is there a causal connection?' *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* 17, 4: 119-144; Walter Laqueur (2004). 'The terrorism to come', *Policy Review* 126: 49-64. This view has achieved almost axiomatic status within some terrorism studies circles and as such it is an observation that has been readily embraced by Western political elites for whom the contrary position – that relative or absolute poverty might have a positive causal relationship with terrorism – raises some uncomfortable and inconvenient political choices regarding the relative spread of income and opportunity both within nations and globally.

13   Tomis Kapitan and Erich Schulte (2002). 'The rhetoric of "terrorism" and its consequences' *Journal of Political and Military Sociology,* 30, 1: 179.

14   *Ibid*: 184.

15   McCauley (2006) *op cit:* 19.

16   Horgan, John (2005). *The Psychology of Terrorism,* London: Routledge: 16.

17   Australian Government (2004). *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia: xi.

18   Michel Wieviorka (2004). 'The making of difference', *International Sociology,* 19, 3: 290.

19   Wright, Stephen C, Donald M Taylor and Fathali M Moghaddam (1990). 'Responding to membership in a disadvantaged Group: from acceptance to collective protest', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 58, 6: 996.

20   Horgan (2005) *op cit*: 81.

21   Richardson, Louise (2006). *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Terrorist Threat,* London: John Murray Publishers: 14.

22   House of Commons (2006). *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* London: The Stationary Office. 11 May: 16.

23   *ibid*: 6-17.

24   *ibid*: 17-18.

25   Horgan (2005) *op cit*: 137.

26   See Albert Bandura, Claudio Barbaranelli, Gian Vittorio Caprara and Concetta Pastorelli (1996). 'Mechanisms of moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency' *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 71, 2: 364-374; Albert Bandura (1990). 'Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement', in Walter Reich (ed) *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind,* Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Centre.

27   Bandura *et al* (1996) op cit: 366.

28   Raufer, Xavier (2005). 'Foreword: Terrorism, scientific methods, and the fog of media warfare', in Horgan (2005) *op cit*. x.

29   Burke, Jason (2004). 'al Qaeda', *Foreign Policy,* 142, May/June: 18-24; Bruce Hoffman (2004). 'The changing face of al Qaeda and the global war on terrorism', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 27, 6: 549-560.

30   On the relationship between media stereotypes of Muslims and structural violence see Karim H Karim (2003). *Islamic Peril: Media and Global Violence* (Updated Edition), Montreal: Black Rose Books.

31   For a fuller discussion of this phenomenon from an Australian perspective see David Wright-Neville (2006). *The Politics of Fear: Counter-Terrorism and Australian Democracy,* Working Paper Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios Internacionales y Estrategicos. Available at: http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/267.asp

32   Richardson (2006) *op cit*. 126.

33   'Extracts of Tanweer's speech' *The (UK) Observer* 16 October 2006. Available at: http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,,1922641,00.html. Accessed: 18 October 2006.

34   'London bomber: Text in full' *BBC News Online* 1 September 2005. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4206800.stm. Accessed: 5 September 2005.

35   della Porta, Donatella (1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State: A Comparative Study of Italy and Germany,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 157.

36   For example see Wieviorka (2004) *op cit*: 281-297.

37   McCauley (2006) *op cit*: 16.

38   A useful distinction between a 'hate incident' and a 'hate crime' can be found in a March 2005 report prepared by the Police Standards Unit of the UK Home Office. The Report defines a hate incident as 'Any incident, which may or may not constitute a criminal offence, which is perceived by the victim or any other person, as being motivated by prejudice or hate.' A 'hate crime' is defined as 'Any hate incident, which constitutes a criminal offence, perceived by the victim or any other person, as being motivated by prejudice or hate.' See Police Standards Unit, UK Home Office and The Association of Chief Police Officers (2005). *Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service,* London: UK Home Office: 9.

39   For example, see Otto F Kernberg (2003). 'Sanctioned Social Violence: A Psychoanalytic View Part I', *International Journal of Psychoanalysis,* 84, 3: 683-698; Vamik Volkan (1988). *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships,* Northvale NJ: Jason Aronson.

40   Horgan, John (2005). 'The social and psychological characteristics of terrorism and terrorists', in Tore Bjørgo (ed) *The Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward* London: Routledge: 50.

Justice, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism[1]
C A J Coady

There are many aspects of terrorism that raise issues of justice that transcend national borders. Terrorist groups often train in one country to carry out their lethal attacks in another, or, where they operate entirely domestically, they often gain inspiration and material support from elsewhere. Anti-terrorist measures also impact on the capacity of national and international agencies to deal with many of the problem of inequities and iniquities in our world that seem to call for international response. It is important to address the philosophical and moral dimensions of contemporary terrorism and reactions to it when our concern is with questions of justice.

The topic of terrorism has the capacity to surprise in many different ways. One that has often been remarked is that the widespread fear and anxiety about terrorism is out of proportion to the damage that terrorists actually inflict. This is true of the majority of terrorist attacks perpetrated by sub-state groups, though it is hardly true of state terrorism. Many people fail to consider state terrorism, and some even think it a contradiction in terms. This is one of several reasons why we need to consider the definition of terrorism before proceeding further with the discussion of its normative dimensions and of the moral problems involved in reactions to it.

Victims or potential victims of contemporary terrorism are also surprised by it because they find its motivations incomprehensible. In particular, citizens of the affluent democratic nations find the hostility directed at them hard to understand and they are specially baffled by the phenomenon of suicide bombing. I would not want to deny that there may be elements of strangeness in the motivations of those who blow themselves up in crowded Bali bars or fly captured aeroplanes into Manhattan buildings, but, as I shall argue below, terrorism is best viewed as a violent tactic in pursuit of political or quasi-political ends, and much of the astonishment that 'they' are attacking 'us' results from a failure to contemplate the perspective of others. When President Bush told some American schoolchildren that the terrorists of 9/11 'hate us because we're so good' he was not merely sentimentalising the moral status of the American people, he was also ignoring the contentious role of American military and economic power throughout the world. In this, he reflected a general local perception that the widespread military, intelligence and economic network maintained by the US government throughout the world has an entirely benign function.[2]

This sort of perception is not unique to the USA: it has been present among the ruling elites and the common people of every imperial power. Even a philosopher as intelligent and enlightened as John Stuart Mill had a similar blind spot about the workings of the British Empire. Writing in 1859, Mill found critics of British Imperial policy to be incomprehensibly blind to the outstanding virtues of that policy. He thought that Britain's altruistic behaviour in foreign affairs was 'a novelty in the world' since its 'declared principle of policy' was 'to let other nations alone'. He asserts that: 'Any attempt it makes to exert influence over (other nations), even by persuasion, is rather in the service of others than of itself…' And there is much more in the same lofty vein. Mill is genuinely astonished that foreigners take a different view of Britain's imperial progress, but we can now see the elements of exploitation, domination and injustice that eluded him, just as many others on the receiving end of imperial power saw it then. Similarly today, with the hegemonic sway of the United States and, in lesser degree, with the activities of its powerful allies. Indeed, the more integrated the

world becomes in terms of communications, economics, and technology, the more scope there is for the perception, articulation and growth of resentment at the real and imagined injustices of the world order that the great powers and their allies are widely seen to support - or at least benefit from. When people insist on understanding the root causes of contemporary terrorism as part of the response to it, they are pointing in part to this widespread phenomenon. They are not trying to justify or even excuse terrorism, rather they want the comfortable world to abandon the blinkers that make possible President Bush's remark and which earlier distorted Mill's vision of the British Empire. It is no response to point out that most of the leaders of terrorist campaigns are not themselves desperately poor, malnourished, persecuted or uneducated. Indeed not, but they see themselves, and, more importantly, are seen by many who do suffer, as speaking and acting on their behalf.

A sense of grievance or outrage at the persistent operation of injustice (real or perceived) has always been a powerful motivation for resort to retaliatory or corrective violence. Those who take this route will always be perceived as heroes amongst the many on whose behalf they purport to act. Of course, not all resort to politically and morally motivated violence need be terrorist, as I shall argue below, but the motivations for, and supportive reactions to terrorist and non-terrorist violence will often overlap. Suicide bombing, for instance, is often perceived by its target populations and governments as a wholly novel phenomenon, motivated by opaque religious fanaticism, unrelated to comprehensible political objectives. Yet this is mostly misperception. Japanese kamikaze pilots, who sought to halt the Allied advance in the Pacific, predated Palestinian and al Qaeda suicide bombers by 50 to 60 years. They had clear military and political objectives and were principally motivated by nationalist ideology rather than religion. Similarly, as Robert Pape has argued persuasively, a great deal of contemporary suicide bombing is directly correlated with resistance to military occupation or to the military presence of foreign troops. There are undoubtedly religious factors involved in many such attacks but they cannot be considered in isolation from the perceptions of grievance against the global reach of foreign military and economic power, especially (though not exclusively) that of the United States.[3] The kamikaze pilots were not, of course, attacking non-combatants and so, on the argument I present below, they were not terrorists. Neither are those contemporary suicide bombers who attack military or quasi-military targets, but this brings us to the definition of terrorism.

The definition of terrorism

At this point, we need to think more clearly about what terrorism is. After all, how can we talk sensibly about the topic unless we know what the topic is? Widespread disarray among theorists about what to count as 'terrorism' suggests the importance of declaring a definitional position at the outset and noting its major intellectual and moral implications.[4] This is particularly significant when the theoretical disarray also reflects confusion in public debates about the issues. We should not, however, expect that definition of such a contentious term will capture 'the concept' of terrorism as if there is only one understanding of the term at work in political discussions. What is important is to produce a definition that will do two things. First, it should cover some of the central features of the way the expression is widely used, and second, it should link the conceptual analysis to significant moral and political debates in a way that gives us some chance of advancing them.

My proposal, which I have defended more fully elsewhere,[5] is to concentrate on one key element exhibited by common responses to and fears about terrorism, namely the idea that it involves 'innocent' victims. This element features in various ways in many definitional proposals and in much of the heated debate about the evils of terrorism. It also usefully provides a point of connection with the moral apparatus of just war theory, specifically the principle of discrimination and its requirement of non-combatant immunity. Of course, terrorism does not always take place in the context of all-out international war, but it usually has a war-like dimension. I will define it as follows: *the organised use of violence to attack non-combatants or innocents (in a special sense) or their property for political purposes.*[6] I shall call this definition, and others like it, 'tactical definitions' because they focus on the means and intermediate goals used to pursue political ends. This is the core idea behind the concept of terrorism as I understand it. It is a pretty minimal definition because it leaves out certain things that some other theorists who are sympathetic to my approach would include. I say nothing of the further or instrumental purposes for which the tactic is used beyond the political orientation. Other theorists would include such elements as the aim of creating fear, the targeting of one group with the intention of influencing a second group and so on.[7] I avoid these further complications for reasons of theoretical economy and in order to leave as much room as possible for empirical investigation of terrorists' motives and purposes.[8] We could pursue these definitional issues further, but for now the core idea can be treated as a guidepost, to which more details can be added according to intellectual taste and the desire for more specific and contentious restrictions or expansions. By contrast, however, there are other approaches that are not expansions or restrictions of the tactical definition, but directly conflict with it. These approaches view terrorism essentially in terms of the use of political violence by those who are unauthorised to use it. I shall call these *political status* definitions. Some of these definitions make it clear that only sub-state agents can engage in terrorism, others are vaguer but tend to imply this.[9] The motivation behind political status definitions is the desire to locate terrorism as a phenomenon, or as an object of concern, in the arena of civic order and to present terrorism solely as a threat to the civic order maintained by states. Political status definitions often mention attacks upon the innocent as one important type of terrorism, but they treat this as incidental to the main point. It should be clear that I find this conceptual location unsatisfactory. This is not only because it makes unavailable the natural characterisation of 'terrorism' in the case of certain tactics involved in war between states, but also because it allows only for one-sided application of the term in conflicts between state authorities and sub-state revolutionary or resistance groups.

Defects of the 'political status' approach

By contrast, my version of a tactical definition (like others similar to it) has quite different consequences. One is that states can themselves use terrorism (either against other states or against sub-state groups), another is that much political violence by non-state agents will not be terrorist. Some are inclined to ignore or resist these possibilities, but if we see terrorism as a particular kind of employment of political violence then we should surely be impressed by analogies and identities between methods used rather than dissimilarities between the powers and standings of the agents using them. We should not hesitate to use the vocabulary of terrorism to describe Russian attacks upon innocent Chechens, just as Chechens have used terrorism in attacking innocent Russians. Germany and Japan made a practice of deliberate bombing and massacre of non-combatant populations during the Second

World War (and earlier in the case of Japan's massacres in China). For their part, the allies deliberately bombed German civilian population centres creating a colossal slaughter of innocents in World War II, as did the Americans in the fire-bombing of Japan culminating in the atom bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is a second consequence of the tactical definition that, unlike the political status approach, it allows that non-state political violence need not be terrorist. The conflict here between the tactical and the political status approaches has important moral and political implications because not only is there a widespread belief that terrorism is always wrong, but there are good arguments (as we shall see) to show that it is at least presumptively morally wrong and other arguments designed to show that it is always morally wrong. Hence, if states cannot engage in terrorism, and all political violence directed against the state by sub-state or non-state groups is terrorist, the moral odds are stacked against all revolutionary or dissenting violence. But this collapses the possibility of important distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate violent threats to civic order, between certain types of just and unjust revolutionary violence. Though I have no enthusiasm for revolutionary violence as such, I think it wise to preserve the possibility of justified revolutionary violence that can not only plead a just cause but also avoid the charge of terrorism. Countries like the United States that were founded on violent revolution should have an interest in distinguishing between revolutions that employ terrorism and those that do not. The status definition also renders illegitimate certain obvious complaints that revolutionaries, or, for that matter, innocent third parties themselves can make in the vocabulary of terrorism against certain violent activities of state authorities. It is natural to speak of state terrorism when the state attempts to stamp out revolutionary activity by threatening, harming or killing peasants, intellectuals, workers or villagers who are not themselves engaged in violence. It is particularly important to make this point in the current climate of the 'war against terrorism' since there are a variety of governments throughout the world who are using the anti-terrorist campaign to deal drastically with all internal or secessionist opposition - and often to deal with it in ways that raise the question of state terrorism, a point to which we shall return below. There is, of course, no need to deny that the use of terror by non-State groups rather than by the State raises special theoretical issues.[10]

Non-combatant status and the wrong of terrorism

I have used the term 'non-combatants' to signal a connection with just war theory, but the term might suggest that 'combatants' and 'non-combatants' can only refer to roles in a conventional war. My use of the term, however, does not mark some simple contrast between warrior and civilian. Following what seems to me the best interpretation of the just war tradition, I make the distinction between combatant/non-combatant or guilty/innocent hinge on answers to the question who is prosecuting the harms that are believed to legitimate resort to responsive violence, whether in interstate war or violent political insurrection. This interpretation avoids a complete equation between non-combatant (or innocent) and civilian, and rightly so, since there will be many civilians in armed conflicts who are engaged in prosecuting the conflict. A brief, illustrative list would include: scientists developing the weapons or delivery systems, political leaders directing the course of the war or violent human rights abuses related to the war, civilian conspirators who brought about the war for their own political or financial gain, and people working in munitions factories. So understood, the expression 'non-combatant' has some advantages over the word

'innocent', because the latter can misleadingly suggest a rich notion of moral innocence that might count many attacking soldiers as innocent if, for example, they had been coerced to fight. There are further complications of course around this issue, many of which I have addressed elsewhere and will not develop here.[11]

Granted that this is what terrorism is, we need to ask whether it is wrong. My answer is that it is wrong because it violates a basic condition for the conduct of armed hostilities – the principle of discrimination. This is a principle of just war theory that condemns deliberate attacks upon the innocent, or as it is usually put, non-combatants. The term 'innocent' here signals the fact that you can only have a warrant for directing violence against people who have done something to deserve it. That something has to be some grievous act, such as military aggression against you, or your neighbours or allies. When that occurs, you are licensed (according to the theory) to direct violence against those who have lost their immunity from lethal attack because of what they have done and are doing. Other members of their nation and population who are not involved in the wrongful attack, or in the chain of agency promoting it, are immune because they are not engaged in the harming. So, their immunity from attack is no mere conventional matter, it is intrinsic to any permission you might have to use violence at all. This is where the deep wrong of terrorism lies.[12]

Against this, terrorists, whether they be state or sub-state agents, often protest that no one is innocent. They invoke some primitive notion of collective guilt, as Churchill sometimes did about the German nation, and Osama bin Laden tends to do today about Americans. It is a partial refutation, but sufficient here, to point out the absurdity of including the thousands of German and Japanese babies and young children who were deliberately killed in the World War II city bombing in that guilty collectivity. The same point could be made about the idea that all Americans, including children, can be legitimate targets of al Qaeda violence merely because 'America' has allegedly done some wrong to the world of Islam. There indeed remain problems in the application of the distinction since there is a grey area in between the clear black and white cases. This means that there is room for argument and discussion about categories like slave labourers forced to work in military-related industries, or compliant civilians whom the enemy settles in occupied territory. That there are problem cases like these does nothing to undermine the distinction, indeed they merely serve to emphasise its importance and the need for sensitive attention to its application. Given the deep wrong of attacking non-combatants, we should, I believe, operate in such areas with something of a bias against counting doubtful cases as combatants.

Some of those who understand terrorism as I do, and reject it as immoral on similar grounds, nonetheless argue that it may sometimes in extreme circumstances be justified. Such people usually invoke the idea of 'supreme emergency' popularised by the American political theorist Michael Walzer. They regard terrorism as intrinsically wrong, so that ordinary good outcomes for the perpetrators' cause cannot justify it, but they think that recourse to terrorism may well be justifiable if it is effective in warding off a catastrophe. Walzer uses an argument of this sort to justify the Allied bombing of German cities in the early part of the strategic bombing campaign of World War II, though he thinks the 'supreme emergency' of Nazi victory was no longer available as a justification later in the war. Walzer's position is an instance of what he elsewhere calls 'dirty hands' for he thinks (somewhat in the tradition of Machiavelli) that sometimes politicians may have to do what is palpably morally wrong though it is

justified by an overriding 'necessity'. I reject the 'supreme emergency' story as applied to real-life terrorism – and indeed Walzer is himself inconsistent in his argument, as I have argued elsewhere[13] - because whatever the theoretical appeal of supreme emergency exemptions from the prohibition of terrorism, the practical consequences of allowing such exemptions as part of the public discourse on the morality (and possibly legality) of terrorist tactics is certain to be disastrous. The scope for contested interpretation of the opaque notion of 'supreme emergency' and the likely efficacy of terrorism to deal with it is far too great for it to be defensible as a public moral resort. The sanest moral response to terrorism is total rejection.

At this point, it is important to state clearly that terrorism is not the only wrong that political violence can bring about. Wars, revolutions, insurgencies and 'jihads' that have no just cause are themselves profoundly wrong and the combatants who are killed and maimed by the unjust warriors are done a great wrong. The German invaders who killed Polish troops were doing what was morally wrong even though, in this, they were not behaving as terrorists. The Nazi war leaders would have been guilty of a dreadful crime in initiating the immoral violence of their war, even if they had never attacked non-combatants. From this we can see that the issue of whether the initiation of political violence is itself right or wrong, justified or not, is generally irrelevant to the question of whether the violence so used is terrorist. People who use violence in a good cause can use terrorist means (when they violate the principle of discrimination) and those who use it in a bad cause may, though they often don't, scrupulously respect the principle and hence use no terrorism. The Allies were justified in trying to defeat the Axis powers in World War II but used terrorist means in their city bombings with conventional and nuclear weapons.

Morality and the response to terrorism

Given that terrorism is a genuine wrong and that its dimensions have escalated, in some respects, in recent years, we must ask whether the responses to it pose their own moral dangers. Apart from cross-national military efforts, a great deal of the response has been embodied in new legal regimes and practices across the world. Common problems with the legislative and policy reactions are: first, to see the terrorist threat as greater than it is, and second, to create conditions of life nationally and internationally that themselves threaten significant human rights and civil liberties.

As to the first, the kind of threat sub-state terrorism has so far posed to life and limb is hardly comparable to threats posed by other dangers in the world that excite nothing like the urgency and alarm provoked by the fear of terrorism. Things might be different if sub-state terrorists were able to secure and willing to use weapons of mass destruction, but, as it is, such terrorists pose a real but easily exaggerated risk to the democratic societies that are not already in something like a state of civil war.

Over a period of years the death and suffering caused by sub-state terrorism adds up to a substantial figure, and the destruction of the Twin Towers buildings in Manhattan in 2001 killed about 3,000 people in a very short space of time. Nonetheless, the deaths in that catastrophe were dwarfed by the annual road toll in the United States. Moreover, the estimated 1,000-7,000 yearly deaths world-wide from terrorism (estimates vary considerably partly because of different definitions of terrorism) pales into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every *day* from hunger, and the millions who die annually from diseases like influenza, HIV-AIDS, diarrhoea, and tuberculosis.[14] Certainly the staggering sums

spent on the 'war against terror' could save many more lives if even a proportion was diverted to the prevention of serious disease and alleviation of hunger.

The conclusion might be that people should be less anxious and afraid about terrorism, than they are.[15] This is an important conclusion, not only because of its potential effects upon the problems mentioned above, but also because the fear and anxiety provoked by terrorism is leading to the diminution of very important rights and conditions of living, at least in the comfortable nations of the world. This is the second problem mentioned above. It is worth emphasising that these rights are hard-won protections from the potential (and often actual) abuse of state power. Civil liberties are not fancy frills on living, but basic protections from the very real threat of state oppression. They are, or should be, part of what we mean by 'security' so threats to them are threats to our security. To this extent, the standard contrast of security with liberty can be profoundly misleading. Our right to life is one of our basic rights, but so is our right to protection from the excesses of state power. Democracy itself is a great advance on other forms of government, but the bare rule of the majority is insufficient to protect people from oppression. We also need enshrined protections, such as the right to counsel when arrested, the right to a speedy and fair hearing and to confront our accusers and hear all the evidence against us, rights not to be tortured or denied medical help, and so on. This list is only a list of very basic rights, but all are under threat in one way or another in counter-terrorism reactions. Moreover, the reduction of these rights in the advanced democracies also signals a setback to the spread of these rights elsewhere in the world. Nations with abysmal human rights records have been quick to join up to the war on terror and use its cover to suppress minority groups with legitimate grievances, even where they have had little or no recourse to terrorism. China's campaign against its nationalist Uirghurs is just one example of this depressing trend, a trend that is made to appear more respectable by confusions over the meaning of 'terrorism'.

The possibility of dramatic injustice in responses to terrorism in the established democracies is no mere speculation. In Britain police recently killed a defenceless and innocent Brazilian on unfounded suspicion of terrorist connections. In the 1970s, there were gross miscarriages of justice in the trials of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, and the Maguire Seven. These trials involved fraudulent convictions of innocent people in panic-reactions to IRA terrorist outrages. In the Birmingham Six case, 21 people were killed in a Provisional IRA bomb attack on a Birmingham pub in 1974. The six Irishmen arrested were tortured by police and made confessions which they later unsuccessfully renounced. They were sentenced to life imprisonment. After several appeals were dismissed, their third appeal was finally upheld in 1991 with the finding of police fabrication, suppression of evidence and unsafe confessions. The success of the appeal was partly due to a public campaign run by concerned civil libertarians, and was certainly not aided by the authorities, either political or judicial. The victims were released after serving 16 years in prison for crimes they did not commit; none of the police involved were ever prosecuted. If these injustices can happen in a country with strong constitutional and legal traditions, imagine what is likely in the authoritarian regimes that are joining up to the war against terror.

Another justice concern that arises from counter-terrorism measures is the practice of 'extraordinary rendition', whereby the leaders of established democracies send prisoners or detained suspects for interrogation in allied states where democracy is unknown or fragile and where torture is common practice. Exporting people for torture

in this way, or establishing torture centres of your own in foreign parts, is now clearly happening; indeed it appears to be a common practice with authorities in the United States. One shocking case was the arrest of the Syrian-born Canadian citizen Maher Arar at a stopover at Kennedy airport in New York in September 2002. He was held in US detention for two weeks then sent to Syria where he was, by his own account, severely tortured for months on end until his release without charge 13 months later, no links with terrorism having been discovered. He is now suing the US government who are trying to get the case dismissed on the grounds of 'state secrets'.

Moreover, even were the threat of sub-state terrorism much greater than it is, the state authorities would need to show that the danger can really be countered by the restriction of liberty. There is much talk these days about the need for a new 'balance' between liberty and security. I have already indicated one thing that is wrong with this—namely, that *our liberty is part of our security*. Another problem is that little effort is ever made by state authorities to show that the proposed changes to the balance will actually make us safer from terrorist attack. Often, it is simply assumed by the state authorities that drastic changes are needed for new threats, but such threats can often be managed by old techniques or minor adjustments, and terrorism is not a new phenomenon at all.

A major problem in dealing with governmental overreactions is that the damage caused seldom impacts directly - in the short term - upon the bulk of the population. Most people do not regard themselves as likely candidates for detention without charge or trial, deportation on mere suspicion, or subjection to extraordinary interrogation measures. But these or other new processes may well be directed at those deemed 'extremists' with no possibility of rebutting the label, or at strong critics of governmental policy in the war against terror, or groups with the relevant 'profile' like Muslims. We should not want to live in a community where poorly justified state powers endanger our fellow citizens (and visitors) in these ways. Moreover, the extension of arbitrary state power may well be hard to restrict. Our comfort as unlikely victims may be short lived. Martin Niemoller's famous comment on public inertia in Germany in the face of Nazi power is worth recalling:

> When the Nazis arrested the Communists,
> I said nothing; after all, I was not a Communist.
> When they locked up the Social Democrats,
> I said nothing; after all, I was not a Social Democrat.
> When they arrested the trade unionists,
> I said nothing; after all, I was not a trade unionist.
> When they arrested the Jews, I said nothing; after all, I was not a Jew.
> When they arrested me, there was no longer anyone who could protest.[16]

Professor C A J (Tony) Coady
is Professorial Fellow in Applied Philosophy at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the University of Melbourne. He was formerly Boyce Gibson Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne.

This paper is a modified version of (2006) 'Global justice and problems of terrorism and counter-terrorism', in Ronald Tinnevelt and Gert Verschraegen (eds) *Between Cosmopolitan Ideals and State Sovereignty: Studies in Global Justice*, Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York, and is used with permission of Palgrave MacMillan.

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1   At some points in this paper, I draw on material I have published elsewhere. See, for example, my papers (2002). 'Terrorism, Just War and Supreme Emergency' in CAJ Coady and Michael O'Keefe (eds) *Terrorism and Justice: Moral Argument in a Threatened World*, Melbourne University Press: Melbourne; (2004). 'Defining terrorism' in Igor Primoratz (ed), *Terrorism: the Philosophical Issues*, Palgrave: Basingstoke and New York; (1985). 'The morality of terrorism' *Philosophy*, 60: 47-69; and other papers mentioned elsewhere in these endnotes.

2   A stinging critique of the perception has most recently been made by the winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize for Literature, Harold Pinter, in his acceptance speech. A condensed version was published in newspapers around the world. *The Age,* published it under the heading, 'The Great American Hypnosis' and Pinter uses the term 'hypnotism' to refer to the misleading US projection of its benign intentions and achievements. Pinter fails, I think, to give due weight to the degree to which the United States has engaged in self-hypnotism in this respect and is projecting an image that many of its political leaders and followers believe wholeheartedly, whatever the contrary evidence. See *The Age*, December 9, 2005, Opinion: 15.

3   See Robert Pape (2005). *Dying to Win*, Scribe, Melbourne (also published by Random House). Pape's conclusions are summarised in the introduction. As he puts it: 'Rather, what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. Religion is rarely the root cause, although it is often used as a tool by terrorist organisations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective.' p 4.

4   It has been estimated that there are more than 100 definitions in the scholarly and political literature about terrorism and terrorist acts. See Alex P Schmid, *Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases, and Literature*: 119-58, cited in Walter Laquer (1987). *The Age of Terrorism,* Little, Brown & Co.: Boston: 143.

5   Coady (1985) *op cit* and (2001). 'Terrorism', in Lawrence C Becker and Charlotte C Becker (eds) *Encyclopedia of Ethics*, second edition, Routledge: London.

6   This might be thought too restrictive in one direction since the threat to use such violence, even where the violence does not result, would be regarded by some (including myself in an earlier essay) as itself an instance of terrorism. If you think that plausible, you could amend

the definition accordingly. (For my earlier argument for including threats see Coady (1985) *op cit.*

[7] See for example Igor Primoratz, 'What is terrorism?' in Primoratz (2004) *op cit*: 15-27.

[8] I have argued for this more fully elsewhere. I admit, of course, that creating fear is a plausible motive for many terrorist acts, but it may well be that some terrorists are interested in creating anger or outrage rather than debilitating fear since they hope to induce overreactions by their enemies in order to create more recruits to the terrorist cause. No doubt terrorists generally aim to influence the behaviour of those other than their direct victims, but those 'others' need not be the usual candidates mentioned, such as the governments of the victims.

[9] The FBI definition is in this latter category: 'Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.' This has the additional disadvantage of making it unclear what laws are being referred to in the adjective 'unlawful' though the FBI, in common with other US official agencies, presumably has in mind US law and regards it as having universal remit. Cited by TerrorismResearchCenter, http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=FAQ&file=index&myfaq=yes&id_cat=1&categories=General+Questions&parent_id=0, viewed 22 July 2003.

[10] For further discussion of such issues see Coady (1985) and more recently CAJ Coady (2004a). 'Terrorism, morality and supreme emergency', *Ethics*, 114.

[11] See especially CAJ Coady (2004b). 'Terrorism and innocence', *Journal of Ethics*, 8.

[12] There is an important issue here about the incidental killing and injuring of non-combatants. This is what is often meant by the term 'collateral damage'. Incidental (as distinct from accidental) harming is foreseen but unintentional and there is a considerable body of philosophical literature on the topic, much of it concerned with the principle of 'double effect'. It seems that some incidental damage to non-combatants must be justified if modern war is to be permissible at all, but there is plenty of room for dispute about how much and what the basis for the justification can be. Where the incidental killing is unjustified, some would call it terrorism as well, but I prefer to restrict the term 'terrorism' to the deliberate attacks upon non-combatants. Where the spirit of the unjustified damage to non-combatants is sufficiently similar to that of terrorism proper, we might call it 'neo-terrorism'.

[13] See Coady (2004a) *op cit.*

[14] See Richard Jackson (2005). *Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism,* Manchester University Press: Manchester and New York: 92-93.

[15] Of course, the statistical story about how comparatively low a threat terrorism is tends to ignore certain reasons for our fearful reaction to it. Terrorism is different from diseases, poverty, and accidents in that it is the product of malevolent will, and we very understandably fear the hostile will of others in a different way to the anxiety we have about disease and accident. Moreover, in comfortable societies, outbreaks of terrorism create a threat to the normalcy of everyday life. They undermine to some degree the sort of basic trust or reliance that we have in the safety of all sorts of ordinary ventures, like catching public transport. People who gave up taking aeroplane transport after 9/11 or taking public transport in London after the July bombings were reacting to uncertainty in ways that did not reflect the real odds on danger. Nonetheless, to accuse them of simple irrationality ignores the fact that they need to factor their own fears and uncertainties into the decision. Yet it is also important to recognise the dangers that such fear can create and to avoid overreaction to the understandable alarm that terrorist episodes cause.

[16] There are many versions of Niemoller's warning. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Niem%C3%B6ller.

Fear, Race, and National Identity
Peter Gale

Introduction

Political discourse in Australia in the last decade, traced through the media, can yield a somewhat puzzling scenario. One way of considering the competing and simultaneous discourses manifested through this period, is to recognise the underlying narrative of the search for national identity. Although this is always perhaps in a process of construction and reconstruction, the stridency with which it has been asserted seems to indicate some uncertainty; the sense that such an identity is under threat. Following the 'race riots' in Cronulla in December 2005, there has been widespread debate about whether Australia is becoming a nation divided on issues of 'race'. Discourse on terrorism conflated the notions of Islam and violence, particularly in some sections of the media, contributing to an increased level of anti-Muslim sentiment.[1] Many questioned whether Australian politics had entered a new era, different from the last three decades of multiculturalism.[2]

The re-election of the Howard Government in 2001,[3] just nine months after that Government was facing almost certain electoral defeat[4] appeared to owe much to the Government's stance on asylum seekers aboard the *Tampa*.[5] The 2001 election was seen variously by political commentators as reflecting either (a) 'political opportunism' or (b) a bold political strategy on security and 'border protection'. Since 9/11 fear has become a central feature of contemporary politics in Australia.[6] Closely associated with such a politics of fear is political discourse on Islam.[7]

This contrasts with the Howard Government's national security campaign which featured images of '…harmony between Australians', working together to 'protect our way of life', and claims that 'we' are a 'friendly', 'decent' people.[8] Following the deaths of over one hundred Australian citizens in Bali in October 2002 there has been a heightened level of debate over national security and the focus of 'racial' gaze has shifted towards anti-Arab/Islamic sentiments, reflected in talkback radio, in particular.

The racial gaze

Most people around Australia, on viewing images of the violence in Cronulla in December 2005 were shocked. Along with September 11 and the war in Iraq, the violence in Cronulla was seen by many as representational of the now well worn theory of Samuel Huntington. Huntington argued that the primary fault lines and source of conflict in the new world order would be a clash of cultures based on the premise that there are fundamental differences between 'Western' and 'non-Western'.[9] This theme was taken up by many media commentators following September 11; for example, on 15 September 2001, *The Age,* under the headline, 'The clash of civilisations', reported on the phone call of George W Bush to China and Moscow as the Bush Administration sought to identify '…those on whom it can count on for support'. The events at Cronulla may have been expected by some, and seen as an inevitable clash of cultures. It is far more likely however, that the conflict was a result of many factors, prominent among them the politics of fear that has been fostered over the past decade in Australia (and elsewhere). This paper explores the discourse on security and politics of fear associated with the 'war on terror' and the Australian Government's 'National Security Public Information Campaign'.

There have been contrasting responses to what can be identified as a cluster of issues around the politics of 'race'. Two significant responses can be identified: 'racial panic', and 'moral outrage'.[10]

The former, racial panic, surrounds what is seen as a threat to 'our' national heritage and identity, or sovereign space in relation to asylum seekers, and is reflected in contemporary political debate and in media commentary on issues of 'race'. There has been no shortage of strident media commentators who have taken up what can be described as a rightwing position on issues such as the stolen generation, asylum seekers, and more recently what is called the history wars. Radio talkback hosts such as Alan Jones, John Laws, Stan Zemanek, and Howard Sattler are among contributors,[11] while Stuart Macintyre highlights a range of writers in the print media who reflect a forthright position on the political right, such as Christopher Pearson (*Australian Financial Review*), Andrew Bolt (*Herald-Sun*), Frank Devine (*The Australian*), and Piers Ackerman (*Daily Telegraph*).[12]

The latter, moral outrage, has been a significant response to issues such as the 'children overboard' affair during the 2001 election campaign, and can also be identified among media commentators. This response was as much one of upholding what is seen as one of the pillars of media discourse (namely the pursuit of 'truth' in reporting the news), as an affront to what is seen as a standard of human rights within a modern western nation state such as Australia. This outrage could be seen as in response to the contradiction between images: that of the tolerant western nation, and that of an intolerant racist nation that fails to uphold basic human rights. Public figures, including the former Governor General Sir William Deane, and past Liberal Prime Minister Fraser became strong critics of the Howard Government's policy on asylum seekers. However, much of this moral outrage in response to policies on asylum seekers, and in particular the detention of children, can be seen as reflecting as much concern over who 'we' are as a nation or who 'we' are becoming, than contributing towards any substantial shift in political discourse.

A tolerant nation?

In a front page story in *The Australian* on 18 October 2001 headlined, 'PM sends in the troops', John Howard is reported as announcing Australia's commitment of 1550 Australian troops to the 'war on terror' in Afghanistan.[13] There were no photos of Australian troops but there was an accompanying photo of Mrs Howard wearing a head scarf while visiting a mosque in Melbourne. Amid a discourse on the war on terror there is a recurring narrative of Australia as a tolerant nation, one that is founded on the belief that Australia is a multicultural country – regard, for example, 'our' Islamic population.

What we seem to be seeing here, reflected in the reporting in the media, are a number simultaneous but contradictory discourses or narratives, some of which have been recurring throughout Australian history. The discourse on national security associated with the war on terror has reinforced the recurring historical narrative of 'white Australia', and its corollary, the protection of 'our' space.

The introduction of multiculturalism, signalling the end of the 'white Australia' policy, was seen as the end of an era in Australian politics. However, the 'other', in the form of non-white migrants, already lived among 'us', and habits of thinking do not die easily. This shift in political discourse was seen as 'us' accepting 'them' (or at least

enjoying their food), as 'our' ethnic diversity reflected how 'we' are a fair and decent society.

The arrival of the first boat people from Vietnam initiated a rather different public debate, along with subsequent debates surrounding immigration during the 1980s, and then in the late 1990s. Again and again, the markers of whiteness have been significant, particularly during the 1996, 1998, and 2001 elections. One such marker of whiteness during these years centres on Indigenous issues - the stolen generations and native title - while a second is associated with security and border protection, or what is seen as 'our' right to decide who comes to this country and the way in which 'they' shall come.

Protecting 'our' place

John Howard in a speech to Briar Public School in Campbelltown in December 2002 commented:

> …living in Australia is the greatest privilege that any person can have in the world… there is no country that is freer and stronger and more tolerant and more open in the way it treats all of its citizens.

> We are a lucky country but we have to work hard to keep it that way.

> …it doesn't matter what a person's racial background is, it doesn't matter what their religion is – that's a matter for them.[14]

By 2006, however, the tune has a variation. In an interview on immigration as part of the celebration of ten years of a Howard Government, George Megalogenis reports in *The Australian* under the headline of 'PM hits out at "jihad" Muslims'. John Howard is critical of Muslim culture 'warning' that 'they' pose an unprecedented 'problem', saying 'I do not think there is …a fragment which is utterly antagonistic to our kind of society, and that is the difficulty.' John Howard is also quoted as saying that 'You can't find any equivalent in Italian, or Greek, or Lebanese, or Chinese or Baltic immigration to Australia. There is no equivalent of raving on about jihad, but that is the major problem'.[15]

The national security campaign following September 11 can be seen as another example of an ongoing discourse on national identity. This is highlighted in a letter from the Prime Minister to all Australians as part of a campaign which clearly associates national security with what is seen as 'our way of life', and a perceived threat to this 'way of life'. Featured in campaign advertising were images of who 'we' are as Australians, as a friendly, decent and democratic, multicultural Australia. The television advertising campaign presented 'images of the Australian way of life', including 'harmony between Australians'.[16]

Media discourse

The following is based on media discourse on 'Islamic issues' founded on newspaper articles from the *Newsbank* data. Key words were used from reporting in the media on issues such as the PM's Muslim summit, debate on headscarves and Australian values from articles published in August and September 2005, and reporting on the Cronulla riots in December 2005. Newsbank includes a wide range of national and regional newspapers, but this discussion placed a greater level of emphasis on *The Australian* and *The Weekend Australian*, as a newspaper with a national daily circulation, along with other major regional newspapers with significant circulation figures such as *The Age* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

The research employs critical discourse analysis, focusing on particular metaphors that form the basis of contrasting ideological perspectives. While texts do not have a fixed meaning, the analysis sought to identify the contrasting themes based on the structure of an article, consisting of the headline, lead, the main body of the text and the concluding comments. In addition to providing information, an article can be structured in a way which emphasises a particular perspective, or seeks to persuade the reader to a point of view. While news reporting often presents what is perceived as two sides to a debate, the way in which this debate is framed - with headlines, lead sentences and concluding comments - suggests there is often a clearly preferred position of the writer on the issue under discussion.[17]

Within media discourse there are often apparent disparities within a newspaper, or even within an article. Inflammatory headlines can conflict significantly with editorials. For example, headlines are often based on a perceived audience demand for stimulating and exciting news, as well as offering a form of entertainment, thereby often creating the image of a crisis.[18] Similarly, conflict and controversy are also seen as more newsworthy, while news reporting can also reproduce ideological or cultural consensus through what is included or omitted. For example, most 'white' people are not confronted daily by a public discourse, such as in the media, challenging their material goals and interests.[19] News reporting in the media can be seen to reproduce normative principles that construct symbolic national and cultural boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.

Australian values and citizenship

Recent debate surrounding what are described as 'Australian values' began in August 2005 with the (then) Education Minister Brendan Nelson advocating that such values should be taught in schools. Making reference to Gallipoli and the icon of Simpson and his donkey, Nelson is reported as saying that John Simpson Kirkpatrick '…represents everything at the heart of what it means to be Australian'.[20] Simpson is identified as an example of Australian mateship, and the belief that Australians are a fair and decent people. However, this stands in contrast with media reporting on the level of racism in contemporary Australia. For example, an article in the *Sunday Age,* under the headline 'climate of fear', concludes with the comment that 'Migrant groups claim racism in Australia has hit alarming new peaks not seen since the days of Pauline Hanson's One Nation …inflammatory remarks by federal ministers have contributed to a new climate of fear'.[21]

The dominant theme through this debate was that Australian values should be taught in schools and that education should include education for citizenship. Comments reported in the media however showed a somewhat astonishing muddle of attitudes and associations in the political discourse.

John Howard called a summit of Muslim leaders, and argued that the answer lay in the right education and the nation's twenty nine Islamic schools '…must promote tolerance and prevent extremism'.[22] This is reflective of the binary representation of the good and bad Muslim, or the moderates and radical Muslims. The theme of the threat of radical Muslims in Australia was reported in *The Weekend Australian* on 27 August claiming that 'Australian police and agents have foiled at least four serious terror plots aimed at Australian targets'.[23] John Howard is also quoted in *The Age* as claiming that 'I have said for a long time this country can't imagine that it's free from the prospect of a terrorist attack.'

Reporting on the summit included comments from Ministers Brendan Nelson and Peter Costello that Muslims who did not integrate and adopt 'Australian values' should 'clear off'. This is reminiscent of the public debate on asylum seekers prior to the 2001 election when the Liberal Party campaign theme of 'we decide who comes to this country and the way they shall come' featured prominently. In response to criticism from both within and outside the Party that such a position did not reflect the long standing tradition of liberal values, the NSW Liberal Party state director, Scott Morrison was reported as claiming that the '…heavy anti-refugee campaign would destroy Pauline Hanson by stealing her policies … [and] was just a temporary, one campaign thing'.[24] Such debates on Australian values can be seen to be more focused on addressing the electoral aspirations of the major political parties than on any attempt to enhance the 'Australian value' of tolerance..

Similarly, there is a construction of what appears to be conditional citizenship as boundaries are placed around the notion of tolerance based on what is seen as the good Muslim in contrast with the perceived threat of the radical. For example, in an article, under the headline of 'Don't get too radical' *The Weekend Australian* reported on the Muslim summit and the monitoring of a 'radical' cleric by ASIO, while also highlighting in the text that 'Muslims are already loyal citizens of Australia'.[25]

While there was a call for a debate on what are seen as core values in Australia, there were very few oppositional voices in response to Nelson. However one example, Iktimal Hage-Ali in the *Daily Telegraph*, highlighted that 'Young people of the Islamic faith have borne the brunt of media attacks on the Islamic community. And they have become the target of verbal and physical abuse by racist members of the broader Australian community.' Hage-Ali argued that such education on Australian values should focus on mainstream Australia as the racism and abuse experienced by young Muslims in Australia '…go against all the Australian values that federal Education Minister Brendan Nelson insists should be taught in Islamic schools.'[26]

Headscarves and hysteria

Amid the debate on Australian values, the Federal Liberal Party backbencher, Bronwyn Bishop, was reported widely around Australia arguing that '…the Muslim headscarf should be banned from public schools' and that the 'hijab defied equality between men and women that is basic to Australian values'.[27] Bishop claimed that 'When someone says they feel free within the confines of sharia law it's the same as people saying they feel free under slavery'. Bishop argued that such a ban has been 'forced on us' because of a 'clash of cultures'. The president of the Muslim Women's Association, Maha Krayem Abdo responded by saying that such a ban went against the Australian value of being a 'fair-go society'.[28] The *Herald Sun* reported on the growing momentum among MPs to ban the Muslim head scarfs in schools with arguments that it was a security issue with 'Muslim women not showing their faces in identity photographs'.[29]

Opposition to the call to ban the headscarves in schools was also reported widely. For example an article in the *Herald Sun* reported on the response of the Victorian Principals Association's support for the wearing of headscarves.[30] ACT Education Minister, Katy Gallagher responded to the call to ban Muslim headscarves in schools by appealing to '…Australian values of respect and tolerance for all cultures and religious beliefs rather than isolating certain children and making them the scapegoats for broader paranoia'.[31] This viewpoint was echoed in an article in *The Age* beginning with 'Ignorant MPs calling for the ban on headscarves are inciting hatred.' The author,

Iktimal Hage-Ali, deputy chair of the NSW Youth Advisory Council concludes that it is irresponsible '…to further incite hatred and whip up hysteria related to a piece of clothing'.[32]

Revisiting Cronulla

Reporting on the violence at Cronulla commonly referred to the 'race riots'.[33] For example, headlines included, 'Hundreds join second night of race riots', and 'Battle Plan, Race Riots the Second Wave', or 'Religion Race Riots Counting the Cost'.[34] Reporting on the 'race riots' reflected on what was seen as the growing tension between the 'Anglo-Saxon' Aussie and the young men of 'Middle Eastern appearance'. For example, Caroline Overington and Drew Warne-Smith in *The Weekend Australian* describe Cronulla as '…a white, Anglo-Celtic, Christian heartland. But ominously, this white sanctuary is hemmed in by the great Middle Eastern melting pot of Sydney'. Cronulla is represented as the Australian icon, the beach, lifesavers, and home of Steve Waugh and Ian Thorpe. Alan Jones was accused of 'race-baiting', through reading inflammatory text messages on air, such as 'Who said Gallipoli wouldn't happen again', and 'Witness Aussies beating (sic) Turks on the beach', and concluding that 'I don't hear people complaining about Catholics and Protestants'.[35] The clash of culture theme is reflected in many articles as 'Aussie' youths declare that they are defending the beaches, 'just like Diggers', while 'Mohamed and his friends' are seen as 'defending their faith'.[36]

Many articles reflected moral outrage over the violence, such as in *The Advertiser* under the headline of 'Mobs run riot in nation's day of shame', and in *The Australian* with the headline, 'War declared on mob riots'.[37] There were also articles reporting on attempts to address what was seen as racism and also some of the underlying social and cultural issues related to such racism. However there was a significant focus on second generation 'Lebanese Australians', and their '…failure to integrate more fully with mainstream Australia'.[38] This is reflective of much of the reporting on the racism in Sydney and reporting more generally on issues such as immigration and multiculturalism.

The Howard Government has been successful in appealing to what is seen as 'our' cultural heritage while simultaneously maintaining an emphasis on the concerns and fears associated with the 'war on terror' and security. However, there is a contradiction between the representation of Australia as a 'friendly, decent people' in the national security campaign, and the level of recent 'racial' violence. What becomes apparent in examining the discourses surrounding the war on terror is a recurring binary between 'us' and 'them', most nastily reflected in discussions around what happened in Cronulla. Many might also conclude that this may also herald an end of the kind of multiculturalism we once prized as part of our national identity in Australia.

Dr Peter Gale *is Senior Lecturer in Australian Studies, Unaipon School, Division of Education, Arts and Social Sciences, University of South Australia. His book,* The Politics of Fear: Lighting the Wik*, Pearson Education: Sydney, was published in 2005.*

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Diversity, Trust and Redistribution
Andrew Leigh

Since the time of European settlement, Australia has been shaped by immigration. Successive waves of newcomers from Europe, the Americas, Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East have enriched Australia in many ways. From a purely economic standpoint, immigration supplements our labour market with much-needed skills. And thanks to our immigration points system, studies have found little evidence that immigration increases the unemployment rate in Australia. In a deeper sense, immigration is valuable because it weaves new threads into our cultural tapestry. Native-born children have much to learn from their migrant peers, just as adults can gain a deeper understanding of the world from yarning over the back fence with their foreign-born neighbours. Our restaurants would be bland imitations of themselves without the flavours brought by successive waves of Italian, Thai and Vietnamese immigrants.

Yet the impact of immigration goes beyond the economic and the culinary effects. Two other areas that are less commonly discussed are the relationship between ethno-linguistic diversity and interpersonal trust, and between diversity and support for a generous welfare state. The results of a succession of studies suggest that we may have to work harder if we are to make Australia both diverse and high-trust, and to combine high levels of immigration with a generous welfare state. The first part of this paper focuses on the evidence on trust and diversity, while the second part reviews data on trust and support for a redistributive welfare state. The final section concludes with some tentative suggestions as to how these issues may play out over future decades.

Trust

In regions where people trust one another, institutions, markets and societies seem to work better. Trusting societies have more effective bureaucracies, schools that function more efficiently, less corruption, and faster growth. Trust acts as a kind of 'social glue' that enables business and communities to operate more effectively. For these reasons, social capital, once solely the domain of sociologists, has increasingly attracted attention from economists.

An important question in this research is why people in some areas are more trusting (or trustworthy) than others. To better understand patterns of trust across Australia, I used data from the Australian Community Survey (carried out by Edith Cowan University and NCLS Research), which asked over 6000 respondents whether they agreed with the statement that 'Generally speaking, you can't be too careful in dealing with most Australians'.[1] Responses to the question were used to class people as trusting or distrusting.

Using multiple regression analysis, it is possible to test the effect various demographic factors, holding other factors constant. At an individual level, gender makes little difference, but better educated people, and those who work full-time, are more likely to be trusting. By contrast, longer commuting times are associated with lower levels of trust, which may be due to the fact that commuting time crowds out social activities.

It is also possible to observe the effect of neighbourhoods, and to see how trust changes when we observe similar individuals who live in different communities. At a neighbourhood level, trust is higher in rural Australia than in cities, and higher in richer neighbourhoods than in poor ones.

Neighbourhood-level analysis also throws up a startling finding – albeit one that is consistent with the studies cited above: trust is lower in linguistically diverse neighbourhoods. Residents of multi-racial neighbourhoods are more likely to agree that 'you can't be too careful in dealing with most Australians'. In particular, neighbourhoods where many languages are spoken tend to have lower levels of trust, suggesting that the main issue may whether people can communicate effectively with those living nearby.

Linguistic Diversity and Trust Across Australian Neighbourhoods

The negative correlation between trust and linguistic diversity in Australia is similar in size to results found in the United States by economists Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara.[2] It also accords with studies looking at diversity in other contexts requiring cooperation. In fruit-picking teams on a British farm, more ethnically heterogeneous teams picked less fruit.[3] Across United States counties, higher ethnic fractionalisation is associated with a lower rate of completing and returning the 2000 Census questionnaire, an action which secures significant federal grants for the community.[4] Racially heterogeneous school districts and counties in the United States are more willing to forego the economies of scale that come from consolidation.[5] Indeed, even analysing companies that served in the United States civil war, more ethnically diverse companies appear to have had higher desertion rates.[6]

In developing countries, the same patterns show up. Across Indian regions, more caste or religious fractionalisation is associated with lower levels of public goods provision.[7] Across communities in Northern Pakistan, infrastructure projects are better maintained where there is less heterogeneity in terms of clan, religious and political divisions.[8] Across Kenyan school districts, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is

associated with worse school facilities and less voluntary fundraising.[9] Across countries, there is a negative correlation between ethnic fractionalisation and growth, which researchers William Easterly and Ross Levine attribute to ethnic diversity making it more difficult for communities to agree on the provision of public goods and pro-growth policies.[10]

Redistribution

Another context in which diversity may have unexpected effects is in the political support for redistribution.[11] In a recent book, Alberto Alesina and Ed Glaeser explore why the American and European welfare systems are so different from one another.[12] They conclude that two factors explain why America spends 15 per cent of national income on social programs, compared with 25 per cent in Europe. The first is voting systems. The second is racial diversity.

The impact of voting systems operates as follows. In majoritarian systems, where each politician represents a single electorate (as in the United States and the Australian House of Representatives), politicians' main incentive is to look after the interests of their local areas. This kind of geographic pork-barrelling is rarely aimed at helping the rich or poor, but at boosting the interests of one region's residents over the rest of the country. By contrast, under systems of proportional representation (as in many European countries and New Zealand), several politicians represent the same district. This leads to a different incentive – rather than aligning themselves with a region, politicians tend to develop class-based affiliations, increasing the pressures for universal programs, which often redistribute resources from rich to poor. Alesina and Glaeser show that across countries, proportional representation leads to more social spending, and more income redistribution.

For present purposes, what is more interesting is the relationship that Alesina and Glaeser observe between welfare spending and racial diversity. After careful scrutiny of the evidence, they conclude that about half the difference in welfare spending between the United States and Europe can be explained by the fact that the United States is more racially diverse. In part, this is due to simple prejudice. A variety of studies on prejudice have shown that people tend to be hostile to those who are different from them along some salient dimension. Often, the most important dimension is race or ethnicity. In the United States, a quarter of the population is African-American or Hispanic. In Sweden, 95 per cent of the population are of the same race, ethnicity and religion. The potential to exploit racial antipathy is therefore considerably greater in the United States than in European countries like Sweden.

That racial diversity is an obstacle to forging a common coalition around distribution from rich to poor has often been noted. Writing in the nineteenth century, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels anticipated that America's ethnic divisions would impede the growth of a United States socialist movement.[13] During the first half of the twentieth century, while Europeans harnessed the power of the state to build a nascent welfare system, racial politics in the American south was blocking redistribution. When Democratic President Lyndon Johnson finally implemented civil rights reforms in the 1960s, the result was to hand political control of the south to the Republican Party.

Race and redistribution are powerfully linked. Across the United States, states that are more ethnically diverse tend to have more negative attitudes towards welfare, and lower levels of social welfare spending. The same pattern holds internationally – countries with more racial and ethnic heterogeneity also tend to spend less on welfare programs. The simplest interpretation of this finding is that people are less generous

to those who are different from them, but there is also another factor: politicians who use racial hatred to discredit redistributive policies. Pat Buchanan, Joerg Haider, Jean-Marie LePen and Pauline Hanson have all used hatred against racial minorities as a way of building an anti-redistribution constituency.

Can such a theory explain Australia's attitudes and policies towards welfare and progressive taxation? To check this, I went back to the same surveys, and calculated the results for Australia. On a range of indicators, Australians' attitudes towards poverty seem to be closer to those in the United States than to those in Europe. Asked whether the poor are trapped in poverty – and hence presumably deserving of welfare – only 39 per cent of Australians agree, much closer to the United States (29 per cent) than Europe (60 per cent). Another question that would tend to favour redistribution is whether luck determines income. Just 40 per cent of Australians agree, slightly above the United States (30 per cent), but well below Europe (54 per cent). Asked whether the poor are lazy, nearly half (49 per cent) of Australians agree, again much closer to the United States (60 per cent) than Europe (26 per cent).

Linguistic Diversity and Belief in Redistribution
### Across Australian Neighbourhoods (excluding Queensland)

Consistent with these views, Australia's welfare system is closer to that of the United States. Our social welfare spending comprises 18 per cent of national income, considerably closer to that of the United States (15 per cent) than Europe (25 per cent). In policy terms, Australia is sometimes said to be in the mid-Atlantic. In truth, we are nearer the Statue of Liberty than the canals of Amsterdam.

Compared with the United States and Europe, how racially and ethnically diverse is Australia? A useful measure is the fractionalisation index, which varies from 0 (a

society that is perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (a society with an infinite number of tiny groups). On a measure of ethnic fractionalisation, Australia (0.09) is lower than both Europe (0.19) and the United States (0.49). But in terms of linguistic diversity, Australia (0.33) is higher than both Europe (0.23) and the United States (0.25). Our high level of linguistic diversity helps explain Australia's relatively small social welfare sector.

What about patterns across different regions in Australia? To test this, I pooled the views of about 4000 Australians, surveyed in Australian Election Studies between 1993 and 2001, I then tested whether people in ethnically diverse Australian suburbs are more or less likely to agree with the statement that 'income and wealth should be redistributed'. Holding constant other factors such as income, I find little relationship between diversity and beliefs about redistribution. The exception is Queensland, where the United States pattern holds – those in more diverse suburbs tend to oppose redistribution. This probably reflects the fact that in recent years, racially-driven politics has been stronger in Queensland than in any other state (in 1998, One Nation held one-eighth of the seats in the Queensland Parliament). It is conceivable that the same pattern also holds in the Northern Territory, but the sample was too small to test this.

**Linguistic Diversity and Belief in Redistribution
Across Queensland Neighbourhoods**

Diverse futures

Over the coming decades, it is a safe bet that most developed countries will become more ethnically and linguistically diverse. Several factors will drive pressure for high

levels of immigration, among them: the growing political constituency for family reunion, the falling cost of airfares, and large wage gaps between developed and developing nations. For Australia, this represents more of the same. At the end of World War II, 10 per cent of Australian residents were born overseas (2 per cent in a non-English speaking country). In the most recent census, 23 per cent of Australians were born overseas (15 per cent in a non-English speaking country). More than most countries, immigration will continue to shape Australia into the twenty-first century.

A spate of studies suggest that continued high levels of immigration will most likely bring a raft of economic and social benefits to Australia. But we should not gild the lily. Unless we find better ways of building trust in immigrant neighbourhoods, higher diversity will most likely lead to lower levels of interpersonal trust. Immigration is also likely to create the opportunity for anti-welfare politicians to build a constituency against redistribution. The rise of the One Nation Party was not a unique Australian phenomenon, but the same sort of anti-minority, anti-welfare demagoguery that has worked well in the United States, and is now increasingly emerging in Europe.

One 'solution' would be to reduce diversity by drastically cutting our immigration intake. Although this might raise levels of trust and political support for the welfare state, it would probably be detrimental to Australian society on balance. Lower immigration would impose an economic cost, as much-needed skills could not be imported. And there would be social costs too; families denied any chance of sponsoring their close relatives are less likely to participate wholeheartedly in Australian society.

The challenge for policymakers is how to maintain the current high levels of immigration while mitigating the impact on our social and political fabric. When it comes to interpersonal trust, one useful strategy would be to focus more attention on the problem itself: building local trust in immigrant communities. With regard to political support for a redistributive welfare system, the challenge is upon those who are concerned about inequality to frequently and forcefully make the case for redistribution.

A final hope is that over time race and ethnicity become less salient divisions in Australian society. Robert Putnam, who is conducting research on diversity and social capital in the United States, argues that diversity reduces trust since people 'act like turtles', hunkering down to avoid those who are somehow different. Yet he also sees hope in the declining importance of the Catholic-Protestant divide in America over the past half-century:

> Growing up in a small Ohio town in the 1950s, I knew the religion of just about every kid in my 600-person high school … When my children attended high school in the 1980s, they didn't know the religion of practically anyone. It simply didn't matter …. In my lifetime, Americans have deconstructed religion as a basis for making decisions. Why can't we do the same thing with other types of diversity?[14]

On the issue of diversity and immigration, the challenges for Australia and the United States are surprisingly similar. The big question is: will those who support diversity, trust and redistribution recognise the tensions between their goals, or will they hunker down like turtles?

Dr Andrew Leigh *is an economist in the Research School of Social Sciences at the Australian National University. His blog is at http://andrewleigh.com, and his academic website is at http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/~aleigh/.*

He received the Early Career Award 2006 from the Academy (jointly with Jennifer Hudson)

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2   Alesina, A and E La Ferrara (2002). 'Who trusts others?', *Journal of Public Economics*, 85, 207-234.

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8   Khwaja, A (2002). 'Can good projects succeed in bad communities? Collective action in public good provision', *mimeo*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University.

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11 This section draws upon Leigh, A (2004). 'Race, redistribution and welfare' *AQ: Journal of Contemporary Analysis,* 76, 6: 35-38.

12 Alesina, A and E Glaeser (2004). *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

13 See Lipset, S and G Marks (2000). *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States.* New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

14 Quoted in Goldsmith, WM (2006). 'Prof. disputes paper's portrayal', *Harvard Crimson*, 26 October.

Primates and the Evolution of the Human Mind

Thomas Suddendorf

How did the human mind evolve? Why do we appear to be so different from other animals? These rather profound questions have attracted plenty of speculation in philosophy, anthropology and psychology. Yet, many remain appropriately sceptical about the proposals that have been put forward. How could one possibly go beyond just-so stories and make proper scientific progress in this domain? Although there is an ever growing archeological record of our ancestors, minds unfortunately do not fossilise. Many reconstructions, such as those showcased in popular TV documentaries, seem little more than plausible conjecture at best. In recent years, researchers have increasingly looked to extant primates for clues as to how to breathe life into the fossilised remains of our forebears. But there has been little explicit discussion in psychology of how the study of primates can inform us about the evolution of the human mind. Here I will present ways through which real progress may be made.

Figure 1

Phylogenetic tree of the hominoidea. Based on genetic analysis, the lines that led to humans and to chimpanzees split 5.1 million years ago, the line that led to gorillas split 6.3 million years ago and orangutans diverged 13.8 million years ago. Old World monkeys, on the other hand, split off from the line that led to modern apes some 25.3 million years ago. Other data suggest that gibbons split off some 18 million years ago.[1]

Humans are primates (Figure 1). Like other primates, and unlike most other mammals, we rely more on vision than smell and our brains are large relative to our body size. There are clear continuities between the anatomy and physiology of humans and our closest living relatives. Yet, humans are the only primates to have colonised most habitats on this planet, built a diversity of civilisations, gained immense power to create and destroy, and invented elaborate ideas about divine beings that care about humans. These differences may reflect our special minds. Indeed, to many people, human minds appear so vastly superior to anything that can

be found in the animal kingdom that it is difficult to reconcile this apparent gap with Darwin's notion of descent with modification. Curiously, however, there is no established inventory of uniquely human mental traits. The first way in which the study of primates can help us, then, is in establishing what in fact the differences are that set us apart from other primates.

Route 1: Fact finding

It may be instructive to consider for yourself what you think are uniquely human mental traits. When I ask my students the most common answers involve language, reason, complex emotion, foresight, conscience, self-awareness, and creativity. But these answers are not straightforward. Consider the most popular answer: language. Clearly non-human animals communicate.[2] So we need to specify what it is about the human communication system that may set it apart from other such systems. Whereas animal communications are typically restricted to specific signals in settings such as mating, predation and territoriality, human language is open-ended and not restricted to a domain. It involves the application of rules that allow us to combine a finite set of arbitrary symbols into a virtually limitless set of expressions.[3] Although researchers have tried to teach great apes such communication systems (eg, sign language), there is as yet no reason to expect that a chimpanzee will one day address the Academy (as in Franz Kafka's famous story). Apes can learn hundreds of symbols, but application of rules that allow us to combine and recombine symbols into novel, open-ended sentences appears to be uniquely human.[4]

Similar qualifications have to be made for the other purportedly unique human attributes. For example, apes can solve problems in their minds.[5] They show evidence of means-ends reasoning. Thus, what aspect of human reasoning is unique, and hence needs explanation, has to be determined from careful examination of comparative data. If we want to investigate how the human mind evolved, we need to first identify more precisely what aspects of our mind are in fact unique and what is shared with our closest relatives.

The study of primate cognition has certainly revealed some extraordinary findings of mental sophistication.[6] And some previously cherished notions of human uniqueness have already been eliminated through such work.[7] For example, the ability to use tools, to manufacture tools, to cooperate to kill conspecifics (ie, members of one's own species), or to have sex for reasons other than procreation, can no longer be upheld as distinguishing characteristics of *Homo sapiens*. Even the notion that we are the only species to retain group specific traditions (arguably, culture) had to be abandoned as chimpanzees and orangutans have been shown to have such socially maintained traditions.[8]

Andrew Whiten and I reviewed the evidence in great apes for various cognitive abilities typical of a human toddler of 18 to 24 months.[9] There is evidence for pretense, means-ends reasoning, understanding invisible displacement, interpreting depictions, attribution of intentions and emotions to others and self-recognition in mirrors. These abilities are hence not uniquely human. According to the Perner (1991) theory of cognitive development, these abilities all involve a capacity to entertain secondary representations.[10] That is, the child or ape has to hold in mind more than one model or representation of the world. For example, in pretense, they have to represent the pretend (eg, a pie) and the real world (eg, mud), and not confuse one for the other (ie, not eating one's mud pies). Apes and two-year-old children seem to share this mental power.

Only by around age three and a half do human children reach Perner's next level of representational skill: to form meta-representations; that is they then can represent representational relations. Meta-representation may be involved on some level or other in many of the characteristics often purported to distinguish human from animal minds. For example, it is required to understand how other people may (mis-) represent the world, to invent symbols, and to reflect on past and future events.[11] There is as yet no convincing evidence that apes, or any other animals, form meta-representations,[12] and this might therefore constitute a fundamental cognitive ability that sets humans apart. Further systematic comparative work needs to be done to establish a proper inventory of what is uniquely human and what is shared with our closest living relatives.

Route 2: Phylogenetic reconstruction

Let us assume, for the moment, that we are right in attributing secondary representations to the other great apes. How can this help us reconstruct the evolution of our mind? From an evolutionary perspective, traits can be shared for two very different reasons. One is analogy (or *homoplasy*) and the other is homology. In the first case, species share the same trait or characteristic because they solve the same problem. For example, wings in birds and wings in insects both solve the problem of flight. However, the morphology is very different. They are the result of different but convergent adaptations – independent evolutionary events. In the case of homology, a feature is shared between species because of common descent. The common ancestor had the characteristic and passed it down to the descended species that currently share the trait. We share the hand characteristic of an opposable thumb with other primates, because our common ancestor had it already and we inherited it. If we are right and all great apes have the ability to form secondary representations, then we can ask whether that is because of homology or analogy.

To decide between the two options, researchers use phylogenetic reconstruction.[13] The best, or most parsimonious, phylogenetic hypothesis is the one that requires the fewest changes. How then, do we explain that all the great apes do have the ability to form secondary representations? It could be that they each evolved this trait independently. That would require that on each of the branches (see Figure 1) there must have been a time at which each species evolved this capacity. So we would have to make at least four assumptions about change – four times there would have been a separate event in which the capacity evolved (or five if bonobos and chimpanzees also evolved it independently from each other). The alternative hypothesis is that all of today's great ape species have this trait because of common descent. We would have to propose that our common ancestor some 14 million years ago already had this capacity. Because this homology hypothesis requires only one change, emergence of the ability before 14 million years, this is a far more parsimonious proposal than the alternative.[14]

Phylogenetic reconstruction thus suggests that the great ape common ancestor had the capacity for secondary representation.[15] This is therefore a quite powerful method of inference. We are making a statement about the mind of a creature that lived 14 million years ago without ever having to lay eyes on a fossil of that species. We are currently investigating if secondary representation is older still by studying the capacities of lesser apes (ie, gibbons and siamangs). Phylogenetic reconstruction is

an underused method that can significantly expand our knowledge about the minds of our ancestors.

Route 3: Analogy

There is a temptation to animate our extinct ancestors more generally through analogies with living primates. For example, it is often proposed that we evolved from a 'chimpanzee-like' ancestor. Wrangham (2001) even goes so far as to suggest that we should call *Australopithecene* hominids who lived between 4 and 2 million years ago *Pan Prior* (ie, the earlier chimpanzee).[16] However, such analogies can be misleading. One may, for example, find oneself arguing over which one of two equally distant extant species would be the better model. In our case, some scholars debate whether our common ancestor was more like the chimpanzee or the bonobo. Was it a hunting species like the chimpanzee where males dominate, or was it more of a peacenik like the bonobo, living in an egalitarian society and engaging in an extraordinary amount of sex? Bonobos and chimpanzees are quite different and they are equally far removed from the human lineages, as they branched off from each other approximately 2.5 million years ago (see Figure 1). Rather than argue about which of the two is the better model, I think that the difference between these species of *Pan* should remind us that they too have evolved since the time of the common ancestor. We are not descended from chimpanzees or bonobos. These apes would have an equal right to claim that they have evolved from humans (or *Homo prior*). They too have had over 5 million years of evolution since the last common ancestor.

We need to realise that phylogenetic reconstruction only works for an individual trait, not for the entire phenotype. One can say something about a shared trait (eg, the thickness of tooth enamel) that a common ancestor is likely to have had. However, that does not mean that other non-shared characteristics can be extrapolated back into the past. The common ancestor of chimpanzees, bonobos and humans may have had characteristics not present in any of the living descendents, and others that are present in one or another of its descendents. Analogies to living species can be inspirational and can lead to novel hypotheses. But other sources of information are required to substantiate such ideas. For instance, analogies may be related to the archeological record via investigation of how the extant living system would transform into a fossil record.[17] Without such substantiation, the use of analogy may be very misleading and should be treated with appropriate suspicion.

Route 4: Regression models

How else, then, could the study of living primates inform us about the evolution of the human mind? There is a fourth way. We can use models that describe the relationship between variables in the present world and apply them to the past. For example, Robin Dunbar identified a correlation between neocortex ratio (ie, the ratio between the size of the neocortex and the size of the rest of the brain), and group size in primates.[18] As the number of average group members increases so too does the neocortex ratio. This finding has been used as an argument for the social intelligence hypothesis, which claims that the driving forces of the evolution of the intellect have not been physical but social challenges. There is good evidence that apes do keep track of individuals' relative positions in their social hierarchy.[19] They also know how individuals are related to each other. There is even evidence for tactical deception and other forms of social problem solving.[20] The social structure changes with coalitions that are established and maintained through grooming. So the more members there are in a group, the more complex is the web of information of which an astute social

player has to keep track – and this may require a bigger cognitive apparatus to process.

The social intelligence hypothesis is only one of several competing proposals.[21] However, one can use the fact that there is an association between group size and neocortex ratio in living primates to make inferences about the past. The archeological record does feature skulls of our hominid ancestors from which one can infer neocortex ratio. With this variable available, one can use regression to infer the likely group size in which these extinct hominids lived. According to Dunbar's interpolation, over the last 3 million years there has been a steady increase in the average group size that hominids lived in from 70 to 150. This method, like phylogenetic reconstruction, can therefore produce better than chance predictions about long extinct ancestors.

Dunbar takes the interpolation process one step further.[22] Grooming is an important factor in maintaining group cohesion. More grooming time is required in larger groups. Primates spend up to 20-30 per cent of their time grooming each other. Grooming time can therefore be predicted for our ancestral species because, based on their brain sizes, we have an estimate of their group sizes. Of course we introduce another error term in the equation, but this method is still more likely to be accurate than mere guesswork. Dunbar argues that in line with the previous regression the natural human group size is about 150 (citing evidence ranging from average hunter-gatherer groups sizes to the average number of people that attend funerals). Extrapolating from the regression of grooming time on group size in primates, a group size of 150 would require group members to spend about 40 per cent of their waking time grooming. This would seriously cut into the time required for gathering food and other essentials. Clearly, humans do not groom each other 40 per cent of the time. Dunbar suggests that we talk instead - we gossip.[23] This is not my theory to defend. But the point is that one can use general models about the relationship between variables in primates and use them to reconstruct and make predictions about our past. Ideally, one would then seek to reconfirm predictions through the archeological record, using converging evidence to create a far more convincing account.

Bridging the gap

The study of primates can help us solve the puzzle of the evolution of the human mind. Continuing fact-finding should bring into clearer view what is unique about our mind. Characteristics of the mind of our common ancestor with chimpanzees and the other great apes can be inferred through phylogenetic reconstruction. The question about how to bridge the evolutionary gap then becomes more refined: how did the mind of that ancestor change over 5 million years into our modern human mind? One of the most common mistakes that people make in this context is to presume that our ancestors went straight forward along a single direct trajectory, evolving up the stairway to *Homo*. This was not the case.

There were a variety of different hominid species. And fossil evidence of new species emerge surprisingly regularly.[24] For example, consider the important period between 1.6 and 1.8 million years ago, a time when some hominids first developed bi-facial hand axes and other stone tools. Although there are debates about some classification[25] this period seems to feature six species of hominids: *Homo erectus, Homo habilis, Homo ergaster, Homo rudolfensis, Paranthropus robustus,* and *Paranthorpus boisei*. These were all upright walking, big-brained hominids who

probably at times even shared the same valleys. *Paranthropus boisei* (a heavy build hominid with a wide face) and *Homo erectus* (the manufacturer of bi-facial hand axes) graced the planet for over a million years, whereas modern humans have merely been here a fifth of that time. Since there were several branches, the question is why we are the only surviving lineage of this multitude of hominid forms. Why did the others die out?

Radical environmental changes (eg, ice ages) are often responsible for extinctions. However, I suggest that, given what we know about our own recorded history, we ourselves are a suspect. It is clear that humans can be ferocious in displacing other human groups that are inferior in terms of technology.[26] Humans have the frightening habit of quickly displacing previous inhabitants, whether through genocide, through competition, habitat destruction, or, more indirectly, through the introduction of novel germs. The plight of today's indigenous peoples is a continuation of this process. In Australia, we should certainly be aware of the rapid and devastating effects a technologically advanced population can have on more ancient cultures.[27] Of course, we could do better than that; and we should. In the face of current globalisation, we can and should make ethical choices that take the threat of more such extinctions into consideration.[28] The point, however, is that this is a common pattern in human history.

This tendency must have emerged at some stage. In terms of active destruction, note that evidence for warfare goes back to prehistoric hunter-gatherers.[29] Chimpanzees are the only other primate known to cooperate to directly kill conspecifics. Such aggression may hence have quite ancient roots. However, bonobos, as far as we know, do not engage in such killings. Thus, this characteristic may have evolved independently in humans and chimpanzees, or it evolved in the common ancestor 5 million years ago and bonobos lost it. Evolutionary parsimony cannot decide between these options as both require two changes.

It is clear, however, that humans today, and throughout recorded history have been directly (eg, through force or competition) and indirectly (eg, through habitat destruction or germs) responsible for the demise of other species and of other human ethnic groups. Thus, we need to consider the possibility that the best explanation at present may be that our more ancient forebears similarly were involved in the extinctions of closely related hominid species.[30] The gap between animal and human mind may appear so large, and so baffling, only because we destroyed the missing links. By displacing our hominid cousins, we ourselves may have burnt the bridges across the gap. And we found ourselves on the other side of the divide, wondering how we got there.

I am not suggesting that our ancestors deliberately went out to exterminate all other hominid species. The various extinctions were probably complex processes involving a multitude of different factors. However, I do want to emphasise that it is certainly quite possible, if not likely, that our forebears played some role in this. Such a perspective may help demystify the apparent gap between animals and humans. It also raises an intriguing question about our present situation. If we were involved in creating the gap, are we continuing to increase it? We could increase the gap by becoming smarter. If continuing IQ test score increases[31] were anything to go by, that would seem to be the case. However, there is also the perhaps traditional way of widening the gap: we could destroy our closest living relatives, the other great ape species. In fact, we are in the process of doing just that. All the great ape species are under threat. Continued habitat destruction may mean that in a few decades these

relatives of ours may become extinct. And with the extinction of the other great apes, our own descendents might wonder about how different they are from their closest living animal relatives: the monkeys. I thus put forward the hypothesis that the perception that we are very unique and different from other animals, is to a large extent our own doing. We came about by natural selection and gradual transitions, but intentionally or unintentionally contributed to the extinction of our closest relatives, creating the *appearance* of a gap in the evolutionary record.

Conclusions

I discussed four different routes through which we can reconstruct the past by studying living primates. We can find facts in order to identify what is unique and what is shared. We can use those facts to reason about the mind of our common ancestors using phylogenetic reconstruction. We can speculate about analogies, and we can use generalised regression models that work for living primates and apply them to our past through interpolation. There appears to be a vast gap between animal and human minds, but our closest living relatives are far smarter than many people might believe. They have the ability to think about things not currently perceived much like a 24-month-old human child. Phylogenetic reconstruction suggests that our common ancestor living some 14 million years ago already had this capacity. Some of our mental characteristics, like the ability to meta-represent, appear not to be shared and hence must have evolved after the time our line split from that which led to chimpanzees some 5 million years ago. I argued that the difference between human and animal mind may appear so vast because our ancestors displaced our hominid relatives. Our mysteriously unique status on Earth may be our own, rather than God's, creation.

Dr Thomas Suddendorf *is in the Early Cognitive Development Unit, School of Psychology, University of Queensland. He holds the post of Reader and his most recent professional papers include (2006). 'Foresight and evolution of the human mind'.* Science*, 312: 1006-1007 and (with M Nielsen and V Slaughter) (2006). 'Self-recognition beyond the face'.* Child Development*, 77: 176-185.*

Dr Suddendorf was the Academy Early Career Award winner for 2005.

1   See Wildman, DE, Uddin, M, Grossman, LI, & Goodman, M (2003). Implications of natural selection in shaping 99.4% nonsynchronous DNA identity between humans and chimpanzees: Enlarging genus Homo. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 100*, 7181-7188; Waddell, PJ, & Penny, D (1996). Evolutionary trees of apes and humans from DNA sequences. In A Lock & C R Peters (Eds), *Handbook of symbolic evolution,*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 53-73.

2   Hauser, MD (1996). *The evolution of communication*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

3   For example, Corballis, M. C. (2003). *From hand to mouth: The origins of language*. New York: Princeton University Press.

4   Pinker, S (1994). *The language instinct*. London: Penguin.

5   For example, Suddendorf, T and Whiten, A (2001). Mental evolution and development: evidence for secondary representation in children, great apes and other animals. *Psychological Bulletin, 127*, 629-650.

6   Tomasello, M and Call, J (1997). *Primate cognition*. New York: Oxford University Press.

7   One of my own proposals, that the capacity to imagine future episodes may be uniquely human (Suddendorf, T, & Corballis, MC (1997). Mental time travel and the evolution of the human mind. *Genetic Social And General Psychology Monographs,* 123: 133-167; Suddendorf, T, & Busby, J (2003). Mental time travel in animals? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences,* 7: 391-396), has recently been challenged by new evidence of primate competency (Mulcahy, NJ and Call, J (2006). Apes save tools for future use. *Science,* 312: 1038-1040; but see also Suddendorf, T (2006). Foresight and evolution of the human mind. *Science,* 312: 1006-1007).

8   van Schaik, CP, Ancrenaz, M, Borgen, G, Galdikas, BM, Knott, CD, Singelton, I, Suzuki, A, Utami, SS and Merrill, MY (2003). Orangutan cultures and the evolution of material culture. *Science,* 299 (3 January): 27-28; Whiten, A, Goodall, J, McGrew, WC, Nishida, T, Reynolds, V, Sugiyama, Y, Tutin, CEG, Wrangham, RW, & Boesch, C (1999). Cultures in chimpanzees. *Nature,* 399: 682-685.

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12 Call, J (2001). Chimpanzee social cognition. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences,* 5: 388-393; Whiten, A & Suddendorf, T (2001). Meta-representation and secondary representation. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences,* 5: 378.

13 Sober, E (1988). *Reconstructing the past: parsimony, evolution, and inference*. London: MIT Press.

14 Suddendorf & Whiten (2001) *op cit.*

15 Suddendorf, T, & Whiten, A (2003). Reinterpreting the mentality of apes. In K Sterelny & J Fitness (Eds.), *From mating to mentality: evaluating evolutionary psychology.* New York: Psychology Press: 173-196.

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Academy News

ARC Learned Academies Research Project 2004: 'What is to be done with management ethics? Addressing national needs and priorities'.

The book from this project, *Management Ethics. Contemporary Contexts* (Routledge UK) was launched by Michael Kirby on Monday 20 November at Hicksons Lawyers, Sydney, hosted by partner John Markos. Stewart Clegg and a number of authors were represented and invited guests, including Sydney-based Fellows, attended.

ARC Learned Academies Special Projects 2006-2007

Funding for the Bruce Chapman/ Glenn Withers 2006 research proposal 'New Social Policy Approaches for Sharing Risk' has been approved.

The Research Committee asked all Fellows to provide research proposals in the form of an Expression of Interest, to be considered for funding under the Learned Academies scheme in 2007. Of the three proposals received the Committee short-listed the project *Creativity and Innovation: Social Science Perspectives and Policy Implications* (Janet Chann/ Leon Mann) and a full proposal was submitted to the ARC in October.

International Program

Australia-France Social Sciences Collaborative Research Projects (SSP)

The Academy and the French Embassy received eight applications this year (the first year the program is for the social sciences only) and the standard of applications was very high. Representatives of the International Committee and the French Embassy short-listed the following four projects for support:

- Integration Challenges for Muslim Minorities in Western Liberal Democracies: France and Australia;
- Enhancing emergency incident management teamwork through intelligent workplace design;
- Concepts of skills and competence: a comparative analysis of France and Australia;
- Socio-economic determinants of country risk: International comparison and application to the Asia-Pacific region.

Australia-China Exchange Program

Ingrid Nielsen, Lecturer, Department of Management, Faculty of Business and Economics, Monash University has been selected as the ASSA scholar to visit China in 2006-2007. Dr Nielsen is currently conducting joint research with *Associate Professor Wang Dewen* from the Institute of Population and Labour Economics at CASS on a project titled: 'English Language Self-Efficacy Among Chinese Market Vendors: Impact on Bargaining with International Customers'.

Australia-Netherlands Exchange Program

This year we received a record eight applications for support under the program for 2000-07. We have agreed a short list of three proposals which we have nominated to the Netherlands Academy for support under the program:

Dr Lorraine Elliott, Senior Fellow in International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University; 'Global governance, including global environmental governance; Asia Pacific regionalism; non-traditional security'. Host: Professor Frank Biermann, Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Dr Johannes Pols, Lecturer and Director of the Unit for the History and Philosophy of Science, University of Sydney; 'Medicine, Medical Education and Public Health in Colonial and Modern Indonesia'; Host Peter Boomgaard, KITLV, Leiden; Amsterdam School of Social Science Research.

Dr Bob Pokrant, Associate Professor of Anthropology, Director, South Asia Research Unit, Curtin University, Western Australia; 'Fisheries Governance in South Asia'; Host: Dr Maarten Bavinck, Director of the Centre for Maritime Research (MARE), University of Amsterdam.

Australia-India Exchange Program

The International Program Committee has recommended Professor Lesleyanne Hawthorne, Associate Dean International, Faculty of Medicine, Dentistry and Health Sciences, University of Melbourne as the Academy nominee for a visit to India under the program. She is researching global skilled migration, in particular the contribution of foreign medical graduates to global workforce supply, India being the primary source to date, for western immigrant-receiving nations.

UNESCO Social Science Network

The Academy assisted in obtaining grant funding from UNESCO for the workshop 'Migration Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region in the 21st Century' which was hosted by Amarjit Kaur at the University of new England on 28-29 November 2006.

Policy and Advocacy Program

A Policy Roundtable on 'Wellbeing', chaired by Sue Richardson, was held on 4 August at the Australian National University. The Roundtable brought together social scientists from a range of disciplines with senior policy makers to explore conventional and innovative understandings and measures of wellbeing, and how these can inform debates concerning resource allocation, policy development, and social welfare programs (see pp 87-93 for a report on that Roundtable).

The next Policy Roundtable on 'Community' will be chaired by Mike Keating and held on 24 November in Canberra. The Roundtable will be dedicated to the concept of 'community' in contemporary Australian society, methods for assessing community strength and engaging communities, and how this is relevant to the development of social policy and service delivery. Some key questions to be discussed at the Roundtable are:

- What impact does individual social and economic disadvantage have on the community, and what types of programs or services can ameliorate these levels of disadvantage?

- Is it possible to develop a community assessment tool that will provide a systematic approach to dealing with disadvantage through a process of identification, assessment, purpose-built responses and evaluation of outcomes?

- How can we work more effectively across the whole-of-government, and in partnership with business and the community, to improve the wellbeing of all Australians?

Workshop Program

Forthcoming Workshops

*'*ANZAC day in the new millennium: Developing a multi-disciplinary vision'. Anne-Marie Hede, Ruth Rentschler, Di Waddell, John Hall, Joan Beaumont (Deakin University). 22 – 23 November 2006.

'Migration challenges in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st Century'. Amarjit Kaur, Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Ian Metcalfe (University of New England). 28 -29 November 2006.

'Communicating the gendered impacts of economic policies'. Siobhan Austen and Therese Jefferson (Curtin University of Technology). December 2006.

'Mediating Across Difference: Asian and Oceanic Approaches to Security and Conflict'. Morgan Brigg and Roland Bleiker (University of Queensland). March 2007.

'Student engagement with post-compulsory education and training: meaning making in a context of blurred boundaries and shifting policy and work contexts'. Alison Mackinnon, Terri Seddon, Marie Brennan and Lyn Yates (Adelaide). February 2007.

Reports from workshops conducted under the Workshop Program, including policy recommendations, are published in *Dialogue*, usually in the first issue following the workshop.

Jerzy (George) Smolicz AM, Professor of Education and Director of the Centre for Intercultural Studies (CISME) at the University of Adelaide, died on 3 November.

His obituary will appear in the *Annual Report.*

Reports from Workshops and Policy Roundtables

Free Speech, Hate Speech and Human Rights in Australia
Adrienne Stone and Katharine Gelber

The workshop 'Free Speech, Hate Speech and Human Rights in Australia' was convened by Adrienne Stone and Katharine Gelber, and held at the Australian National University on 8-9 September 2006.

The idea for the workshop emerged during discussions between the two convenors, both of whom had interests and research work in the area, and in recognition of the fact that there had as yet been no opportunity for scholars working in this field around Australia to meet and discuss their mutual interests and research findings. This lack of opportunity was ideally remediable through hosting an ASSA-sponsored workshop. The workshop was also supported by the Law Program, Research School of Social Sciences ANU; the Centre for International and Public Law, ANU College of Law; The Freilich Foundation; the National Europe Centre; and The ANU Culture of Human Rights Network.

'Hate speech' is a phenomenon that encompasses a wide variety of vilifying expression including vilification directed at race, religion, ethno-religious status, sexuality and gender. Although the central problem posed by hate speech laws is their apparent inconsistency with free speech principles, a worldwide consensus has emerged that hate speech poses an important human rights problem. The Australian legal response to hate speech is unusual and thus warrants further investigation. The first purpose of the workshop was to discuss cutting edge research in the field of hate speech regulation in Australia.

To this end, the workshop brought together established and emerging scholars from a number of legal disciplines (including constitutional, international, anti-discrimination and criminal law), history, psychology, geography, political and legal theory and empirical political science. A further objective of the workshop was to establish an interdisciplinary network amongst Australian scholars (who had not previously met together to discuss their research synergies) that will support the future development of other research projects in this field.

The workshop was divided into four sessions, in each of which several related papers were presented. There was ample time for discussion, which workshop participants noted as one of the most useful aspects of the event.

Foundations

The first session began with a paper by Katharine Gelber which outlined the legal and political landscape within which hate speech events take place and are (attempted to be) regulated in Australia. This paper also raised some important emerging issues in the field, including the idea that the institution charged with acting to counter the effects of hate speech (the state) can itself be involved in perpetrating (more subtle and pervasive forms of) hate speech. Where and when this may be the case, it presents new challenges to those who wish to rely on the state to combat the problem of hate speech, and raises the possibility among policy makers of considering alternative methods of response other than state intervention and/or punishment.

The second paper in the 'Foundations' session was presented by Adrienne Stone and it provided background to the specific issue of hate speech regulation versus free speech protection in a broader discussion about the principles on which both outcomes are sought. In a comparative piece, Stone argued that a dominant explanation for the difference between US and Canadian approaches to free speech protection versus hate speech regulation is that the US prioritises liberty whereas Canada prioritises equality. The liberty versus equality debate is, argued Stone, an insufficient explanation for the differences between these jurisdictions since it insufficiently acknowledges the extent to which US First Amendment jurisprudence relies on equality considerations, and the extent to which Canadian jurisprudence reflects the importance of individual liberties. Thus, the debate ought to be characterised in another manner in order to take account of the richness of First Amendment and Canadian jurisprudence, and to recognise the complexity of claims to liberty and equality. This first session generated interested discussion concerning the frameworks within which later papers might be considered.

Challenges for the legal regulation of hate speech

The second session was introduced by a paper from Dan Meagher arguing weaknesses in existing criminal law models responding to virulent forms of hate speech, and in favour of an alternative model based on penalty enhancement. Simon Bronitt examined the effectiveness of specialised 'hate speech' offences (including the new federal offence of sedition inserted into the *Criminal Code* that makes it an offence to urge inter-group violence on racial or religious grounds) and compared them with general public order laws relating to offensive behaviour. Gail Mason's paper addressed the nature of hateful expression that hate speech laws target. It considered recent attempts by some far right organisations to civilise their hate language in a bid to achieve greater respectability in the mainstream. A comparison of the policies and propaganda of these organisations revealed a denial and displacement of hate as a motivating factor. She argued this reconstruction of hate language has implications more broadly for the consideration of contemporary manifestations of hate speech. Mason's paper was particularly enlightening in its characterisation of some contemporary forms of hate speech, and in highlighting some of the problems faced by regulators in combating hate speech in all its forms. New forms of hate speech as they manifest in contemporary debate thus became an important theme of discussion.

Understanding hate speech: perspectives from history, psychology and geography

The third session provided an opportunity for perspectives to be presented from a wide variety of disciplines, fulfilling the workshop's aim to be interdisciplinary. Ann Curthoys provided a historical overview of the character of racism in Australia, arguing it has a particularly volatile character which helps to explain events such as the recent Cronulla race riots as neither aberrations nor symptomatic of a permanent underlying racism. Rather, Australia has throughout its history since white settlement experienced a racism which can flare and retreat. The reasons for this volatility were explored further during discussion. Kevin Dunn, a geographer, presented some results from the UNSW Racism Project noting that in his surveys of incidences of racism, 'hate talk' was the most commonly experienced manifestation. This empirical data thus substantiates the idea that vilification is a persistent problem and helps to explain the ways in which hate speech manifests and is experienced by targeted

communities. Hate talk is a prominent, locally-immediate and palpable manifestation of contemporary racism. It generates non-belonging, apartness, and nudges separatism. Craig McGarty, a psychologist, presented perspectives from a psychological viewpoint on stereotype formation and the existence of hate.

Hate speech in courts and tribunals

The fourth session heard from Kate Eastman, a barrister with practical experience in hate speech cases. She presented a range of practical considerations to do with vilification cases being presented in court, including pre-trial investigation and conciliation. This practical perspective assisted participants in understanding the extent to which anti-vilification laws are (or are not) able to be of assistance to those communities whom its proponents claim to want to protect. Lawrence McNamara reported on the deliberations during a recent religious vilification case in Victoria, using the case to highlight the broader question of whether religious vilification ought to be treated in the same way by regulatory bodies as other grounds for vilification. The judgment in this case is yet to be handed down, but participants noted that religion as a basis for anti-vilification laws raises particular issues not extant on other grounds; notably the reliance in religious talk on faith as opposed to 'science' or 'fact', and the centrality of faith to an individual's identity. Given that several states are currently debating whether to introduce religion as an anti-vilification category, and in the context of increasingly identifiable hate speech against Muslims, this issue is topical and crucial to the debate.

Hate speech laws and institutional structure: comparative perspectives

The final session allowed participants to consider the regulation of hate speech within the broader phenomenon of human rights discourse. Simon Evans discussed the enactment of religious vilification laws in the Victorian parliament as a case study of how human rights discourse affects parliamentary and legislative outcomes. He argued that where issues being debated in parliament are highly controversial, legislative deliberation is not ideal and outcomes may not reflect human rights priorities. This is an important counter-argument to opponents of bills of rights and judicial review as mechanisms for human rights protection, who tend to argue that a democratically elected legislature is the right place to make human rights judgements. Luke McNamara reflected on whether the domestic human rights environment, including the presence or absence of a bill of rights, exerts an influence on the way in which decision-makers approach and resolve hate speech controversies. He argued that legal form was not decisive in determining the manner in which complaints were raised and mediated, and their outcomes.

The workshop was opened by Hilary Charlesworth, FASSA. A number of attendees participated in discussion but did not present papers; indeed one of the purposes of the workshop was to open up possibilities for such rich discussion. Other participants included Amelia Simpson, Elisa Arcioni, James Stellios, Jennifer Clarke, Kim Rubenstein, Peter Bailey, Peter Cane, Renata Grossi and William Buss (University of Iowa). Representatives from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs also attended. Breaks during the official program as well as the workshop dinner provided ample opportunity for informal discussions.

Most of the draft papers presented at the workshop will be reworked into chapters for a book entitled 'Hate Speech and Freedom of Speech in Australia'. A contract for

publication of this book has been secured with Federation Press, Sydney. The book is expected to be published in 2007.

Childcare: A Better Policy Framework for Australia
Barbara Pocock and Elizabeth Hill

This report documents a national workshop 'Childcare: A Better Policy Framework for Australia' sponsored by the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia (ASSA) and convened by the University of Sydney and University of South Australia, 13-14th July 2006, through the 'Work and Family Policy Roundtable' (http://www.familypolicyroundtable.com.au).

The workshop brought together twenty-one Australian and international researchers on early childhood education and care and related policy perspectives, from a diverse range of disciplinary backgrounds, including economics, sociology, paediatrics and child health, early childhood, political economy, psychology, government and working life. Five experts from the community sector and governments also attended.

Overall Workshop summary

Early childhood education and care (ECEC) has been discussed and debated for decades in Australia. In recent years it has undergone significant changes that reflect wider social and political trends and which many believe are shifting the focus of early childhood services away from the needs of children and families. Some forms of services, like long day care, are seeing new interest groups like shareholders entering the picture, with relatively untested outcomes for children.

A common theme throughout this workshop was the competing goals of early childhood education and care services. These goals range from those that put the child's developmental needs at their centre, to those that focus on parent's need to participate in the labour market (neither of which is mutually exclusive) to those that prioritise corporate needs for profit. There is some evidence that pursuit of the later goal undermines the needs and rights of children and, in cases where quality is compromised, may be impacting on the health of children in long day care.

Affordability, availability and choice are key concerns for parents and this workshop has heard various economic arguments for a change in funding policy and tax models concerned with ECEC. Such changes should coincide with paid leave entitlements for parents and proper recognition (in training, pay and stability) for child care workers. **The overwhelming consensus among workshop participants was for a universal public system of ECEC that was integrated with the school system and consistently accredited and regulated across states and territories. Such a system should be affordable and accessible to all Australian children and their families.** The responsibility for ECEC is multi layered, however it would be led by government, through appropriate policy and funding, in consultation with parents and communities.

The childcare policy challenge and some principles for discussion
Barbara Pocock – Centre for Work and Life, University of South Australia
Elizabeth Hill – Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Sydney
In their introduction to the workshop Barbara and Elizabeth outline issues with childcare policy in Australia. The primary goal of the workshop was to discuss childcare in terms of current policy, research and practice in order to develop a set of key policy principles within which an equitable, evidence-based childcare policy can be developed. This childcare policy would clarify the relationship between early childhood education and care, and children's health, development and future prospects, as well as respond to the needs of carers and workers. This paper highlighted problems with affordability, access, quality, provision, and equity in childcare in the Australian context and suggested eleven policy principles for discussion during the course of the workshop.

Lessons from the Swedish experience
Anita Nyberg – National Institute for Working Life, Stockholm
In this presentation Anita highlights key principles that underpin childcare policy in Sweden. These include the principle that all adults should be given the opportunity to support themselves through work and that all children should have equal access to childcare conditions that support their social, emotional and educational development. Since the 1960s, childcare policy in Sweden has shifted from a focus on providing public childcare for parents who work or study, to the provision of childcare for all children. This shift in focus from enabling women's employment to child development and wellbeing has been accompanied by policies that maximise quality (staff education and staff/child ratios) and equitable access (income related fees with a capped maximum) for all families.

The policy context in Australia
Deborah Brennan – University of Sydney
In this presentation Deborah makes a case for the analysis of childcare policy in the international, national and sub-national contexts. Such analysis allows the identification of problems at the national and local level and the identification of possibilities through international comparisons. International evidence can then be used to formulate policy recommendations when lobbying government and policy makers. In her analysis of the costs of childcare, Deborah describes current national and state policy as inadequate but suggests there are some potential strengths (such as access to a subsidy) that could be better implemented.

The new discrimination: taxation and childcare
Patricia Apps – University of Sydney
In this paper Patricia describes current government taxation and childcare policies as the 'new discrimination'. This discrimination is based on two driving assumptions. The first is that family income is a reflection of family living status; the second is that childcare can be left to the 'market'. Both of these assumptions are flawed and the tax and childcare policies into which they feed result in inequity and an unfair tax burden for dual earning families with a 'middle' combined income.

The goals of a good national system: placing priority on the wellbeing of children
Bettina Cass – University of NSW

In this paper Bettina takes a child-centred approach to the discussion of childcare goals. She acknowledges the substantial literature providing evidence for the benefits of good quality childcare on children's social and emotional wellbeing and cognitive development and argues for the right of all children to have access to early childhood education and care. By introducing the notion of children as *present citizens* (not just *future citizens* with a human capital worth) the discussion focuses on children's early childhood education and care needs. Quality in this context includes the provision of education and care that enhances wellbeing and cognitive development, the opportunity to improve social networks among parents, the provision of a safe, stimulating and social environment and the protection of children at risk. Access and affordability are key issues in the provision of early childhood education and care but these are seen as issues, especially for disadvantaged children, in the current setting.

Childcare – the goals of a good national system? The welfare of children, the good of the labour market and socio-economic equality?

Lynne Wannan – National Association of Community Based Childcare

Lynne extends the discussion of child focused 'children's services' (a term inclusive of education, care and individual child needs), and stresses the importance of a nationwide network of sustainable, quality, community owned, not-for-profit early years children's centres. Such a system would meet the needs of all stakeholders by supporting children's developmental needs, supporting parents' need to work and raise their children, supporting community cohesion and safety and enabling participation of all in Australia's social and economic life. The current rise of corporate players in the childcare sector is likely to undermine the goals of a good national system due to a fundamental focus on profit which seems incompatible with a focus on children.

Perceptions about care of children: recent survey evidence

Gabrielle Meagher – University of Sydney

In this paper Gabrielle presents findings from an analysis of attitudes towards working mothers and child care, using data from the Australian Survey of Social Attitudes (AuSSA) and the International Social Survey Program. Her findings suggest:

(i) Although attitudes towards working mothers are softening, full time childcare for preschoolers is still not preferred;

(ii) Childcare is an arena of gender contestation: women significantly less likely than men to have negative attitudes to child care and working mothers. However, there is little difference in attitudes between those who identify with the Labor Party and those who identify with the Coalition; and

(iii) Perhaps surprisingly, children and recipients of childcare subsidies do not present a clear constituency for a particular policy focus and direction.

Affordability, availability and subsidies

Rebecca Cassells – NATSEM

Using HILDA and ABS longitudinal data Rebecca describes childcare usage in Australia and highlights issues with availability and affordability across household types. In general cost, as a reason for not using additional childcare, has decreased over time and availability reasons have increased. Significant numbers of households report difficulties with cost and availability and these problems are persistent for many. Overall, lone parents report more problems with availability and couple households report more problems with affordability.

Employees' views on quality

Emma Rush – The Australia Institute

In this paper Emma reports on a national survey of long day childcare staff. Six hundred long day care staff responded to questions related to the quality of the care provided to children in the long day care setting within which they worked. While most staff believed the quality of the care offered in the centre was quite high, there were differences across provider type. With corporate chains perceived as providing poorer quality care than community based and independent private child care centres. A number of recommendations are made to improve the quality of care across all types of childcare centres. These include the following: improve staff-to-child ratios; maintain and increase the supply of qualified and experienced child care staff; monitor the quality provided by different provider types; and fund the development of new community-based centres.

Public investment, fragmentation and quality care: options for the future

Frances Press – Charles Sturt University

In this paper, Fran describes the context of early childhood education and care in Australia as fragmented; with various levels of government responsibility, regulations, quality standards and curricula. Increased corporate involvement in this area is also shifting the focus of responsibility from children, families and communities to shareholders and profit. Challenges facing early childhood education and care are competing policy frameworks (enabling workforce participation; developmental rights of children), lack of functional integration of care and education, the need to develop a child centred system and, the need to improve levels of teacher qualified staff. This paper concludes with suggestions for a way forward which are underpinned by a national vision that values children in the 'present', and includes coherence within and across early childhood education and care systems, system supports reflective of the fundamental criteria for quality, and a nexus between early childhood education and care policy, and maternity and parental leave policy.

Regulating for Quality: Registration, standards and accreditation

Alison Elliott – Australian Council for Education Research

Alison echoes the arguments of the previous paper by highlighting the need for consistency across early childhood education and care systems and coherence between care and education in the preschool years. She calls for a formal system of registration, accreditation, and regulation to improve practice quality in this sector and suggests that the professionalising of this sector will lead to better outcomes, particularly for the most disadvantaged.

The determinants of quality care

Margaret Sims – Edith Cowen University

Margaret reports the findings of research studying cortisol levels in children and caregivers in 16 childcare centres around Perth. Cortisol is produced by the brain under conditions of stress and levels of cortisol typically decline over the course of the day. When cortisol levels are chronically high, damage can occur to that part of the brain that controls cortisol levels, resulting in long term outcomes such as impairments in health, wellbeing, social, emotional and cognitive development and behaviour problems. In this study, cortisol levels were directly correlated with child care quality. In centres rated as unsatisfactory, cortisol levels in children increased.

Where quality was satisfactory, cortisol levels declined slightly and, where quality was good and staff well trained and experienced, cortisol levels declined in the typical way. Interestingly, cortisol levels in caregivers increased in good quality centres and decreased in unsatisfactory centres raising concerns about staff health and wellbeing in good quality centres.

Who should pay? Who should provide?

Juliet Bourke – Chair, Taskforce on Care Costs

Juliet introduces the background and aims of the Taskforce on Care Costs and highlights recent findings from current research investigating the impact of the costs of care on workforce participation. Key findings include the following: 1 in 4 workers with caring responsibilities are likely to leave the workforce due to cost of care, 1 in 4 workers has already reduced their hours of work due to costs of care, 35 per cent of workers would increase their hours of work if care was more affordable. Affordability was an issue for all income groups. In addition, there are high levels of informality in care arrangements, particularly for preschool children, and there are significant tax losses for the majority of employees who pay for care but do not declare these costs.

A better policy framework for Australia

Joy Goodfellow – Macquarie University

Joy discusses the influence of 'free market economy' ideas on the provision of early childhood education and care. She argues that such ideas do not fit with, or work for, early childhood education and care because it is a unique 'market' with multiple goals (such as child development and enabling work participation) and numerous benefactors (such as children, parents, community, schools society and government). Responsibility for early childhood education and care lies heavily with government but in collaboration with parents and communities. Quality should be a primary consideration and this should be underpinned by a focus on the child and informed by knowledge about children's social, emotional and cognitive development.

Funding children's services

Eva Cox – University of Technology, Sydney

Eva reviews the political and social environments that have influenced the provision of early childhood education and care over the past 30 years. The recent move toward parental choice and market forces has opened up this area to commercialisation and resulted in the commodification of early childhood education and care. In this environment the focus is shifted away from the needs of the child. This paper suggests an alternative to current models of funding for early childhood education and care which starts from the assumption that the child is the focal point of the services on offer. Commonwealth funding would be given to individual centres rather than chains and this funding would be linked to service contracts that cover such things as quality, budgets, fees etc. Within this model, centres become community hubs, offering opportunities for social capital building and social support networks.

Ten Policy Principles for a National System of
Early Childhood Education and Care

The workshop's participants agreed on a statement of principles that arise from the existing body of research on early childhood education and care in the Australian context and the research discussed at the Workshop.

To summarise, the group of experts agreed on the need for a new nationally coordinated, planned approach to an integrated system of early childhood education and care (ECEC). Discussion supported an ECEC system that gives priority to the needs of children and their wellbeing, places the issue of high quality care and education more centrally on the policy agenda, and recognises the pressing need for increased public funding to ensure universal access to early childhood education and care services for all children from birth to school entry. Discussion also recognised the need to locate good ECEC policy alongside other important policy initiatives like paid parental leave and a progressive individual tax system.

1. Promote the wellbeing of all children

The primary goal and guiding principle of a national system of early childhood education and care (ECEC) should be the wellbeing of all children.

A system of high quality education and care should emphasise children's development and wellbeing. This will have measurable positive effects on the health and wellbeing of children in the present and into the future and promote social equity.

2. Early childhood care and education is a public good

A high quality early childhood education and care system is a public good, and so requires significant public investment.

The benefits of high quality early childhood education and care accrue to children and their families, but they also accrue to society more broadly. High quality early childhood education and care that prioritises the needs of children will have a positive impact on women's participation in employment, gender equity, human capital development and economic growth. This 'public good' property of high quality ECEC means that significant, ongoing government investment is required to ensure adequate resources are devoted to it.

3. Universal early childhood education and care

Australian governments should implement a national, universal and integrated early childhood education and care system, particularly for children in the two years prior to starting school, and up to three years for children from disadvantaged backgrounds.

International evidence about the positive role that early childhood education and care plays in the development and wellbeing of all young children provides a strong case for this. The evidence supports access to at least two years early childhood education for all children under school age, and access from the age of two for children in disadvantaged households. Education and care interventions in the early years have a demonstrated capacity to narrow social inequity and improve the health, educational and economic outcomes of children from disadvantaged backgrounds over the life course. Universal access to a guaranteed option of education and care prior to starting formal schooling will complement the services available to babies and infants under a nationally integrated ECEC system.

4. Rational planning of ECEC system growth

Governments must collaborate to plan a rational expansion of the ECEC system in order to meet the needs of all children equitably, to ensure that service quality is high, and to maintain diversity in provision to give parents genuine choice.

Private investment decisions, rather than need, increasingly determine the distribution of ECEC services in Australia. Further, increasing rates of corporate provision of ECEC services in Australia, especially long day care, pose a significant challenge to accessible, high quality outcomes for children. A growing body of international and Australian evidence suggests that quality is threatened where the interests of shareholders conflict with the interests of children. Government support should therefore be adjusted to expand public ECEC services, especially those linked to other services and community-capacity-building activities, in the context of a rationally planned expansion of provision. This includes renewed support for capital grants and/or the provision of land at concessional rates to encourage public services to be built in poorly serviced areas and integrated with other public services.

5. High quality standards

High quality education and care, especially a high ratio of university or TAFE trained and appropriately qualified staff to children, is the priority issue in ensuring positive outcomes for children.

An accumulating body of international evidence suggests that positive outcomes for children arising from early childhood education and care are directly related to the quality of these environments. High quality is a function of staffing ratios, carer and teacher skills and qualifications, and the size of the care group. National quality standards must reflect international best practice. Research supports staff/child ratios of at least 1 adult to 3 children for infants (1:3); at least one adult to four children for one to two year olds (1:4), and at least one adult to eight children for three to five year olds (1:8). A commitment to high quality care requires implementation of these ratios in all sectors of ECEC. Teachers and other ECEC staff must be appropriately trained and qualified. To be effective, these standards must be linked to a robust regulatory and compliance regime.

6. Good employment practices

High quality care depends upon stable, qualified, appropriately rewarded staff.

Children and parents benefit from long-term care relationships. Stable care relationships, and the recruitment and retention of skilled teachers and carers, requires secure jobs, attractive pay and conditions, and rewards for higher education and training. Wages in the sector remain too low despite recent increases, and many services lack enough skilled teachers and carers. Professional qualifications and wages for carers and teachers must be upgraded. Trained and qualified staff must be rewarded commensurate with other comparable workers. Resources must be made available to allow teachers and other staff adequate time to undertake program design, documentation, reporting and in-service training. Government has a strategic role to play in developing a workforce planning strategy to meet current critical shortages of appropriately qualified ECEC teachers.

7. A robust regulatory system

High quality early childhood education and care requires a robust and integrated system of monitoring and compliance that is based on best practice standards and which targets structural, process and adult work quality dimensions.

Government regulation can play a critical role in promoting and safeguarding high quality ECEC. Australian research suggests that the current national accreditation system and state regulations have limited capacity to effect high quality ECEC. An effective regulatory framework will promote high structural standards (ie, staff to child ratios, small group sizes, and qualified teachers); standards of excellence in children's experiences whilst in ECEC services; and best practice adult work experience (eg, job satisfaction, work conditions, staff retention rates). A robust system must be able to identify and enforce sanctions on centres that provide poor quality care, while also actively recognising and supporting ECEC teachers and staff committed to providing high quality education and care. An effective regulatory system will be transparent and subject to ongoing independent review by appropriately qualified reviewers.

8. Affordable and equitable ECEC services

Access to ECEC and good outcomes for children depends upon affordable services.

Evidence suggests that the costs of ECEC are increasing much faster than inflation in Australia. The cost of high quality care makes affordability a significant and ongoing concern for parents and ECEC providers. An investigation into alternative funding methods to ensure affordability and sustain the growth of ECEC provision into the future must be undertaken. COAG is urged, as part of its National Reform Agenda addressing the promotion of Human Capital, to investigate the feasibility of pooling public sector funding for early childhood infrastructure and funding from different jurisdictions and government agencies to create a more affordable, equitable and integrated system of ECEC.

9. Supportive parental leave and tax policies

A high quality ECEC care system requires supportive, complementary policies.

International evidence shows that significant benefit will flow to children and working carers from Australia's adoption of a universal system of paid parental leave that gives parents and primary carers the practical opportunity to take leave from work for at least a year, and preferably up to eighteen months, to care for infants and young children. This requires a payment system that confers a living wage during the period of leave, allows it to be combined with other forms of leave (including the opportunity to request to return to work part-time) and allows parents to share leave (and requires fathers to use a portion of it on a 'use it or lose it basis'). The effective and efficient use of parental leave policies requires a progressive individual tax system that does not penalise parents who move between paid work and caring duties or disadvantage dual-income households.

10. Building healthy communities and social capital

Well resourced ECEC centres provide a focal point or 'hub' for multiple community services that support families with young children and strengthen community capacity.

Co-locating ECEC services with other educational and child and parent health clinics and services facilitates important 'social joins' and strengthens social connections for both children and parents. These settings can be sites for other universal family support services for families with babies and very young children. This will ensure that all adults responsible for the care of young children are able to access the support they need to offer young children the best possible experiences for nurture and learning. ECEC services that link with schooling facilities help to build child and parent communities and create natural bridges for children into formal education and social life. These are cost effective and transport and time efficient.

Indigenous Knowledge in the Workplace: A Workshop for Indigenous Practitioners

Steve Kinnane and Peter Read

This workshop drew together Indigenous professionals to discuss Indigenous Knowledge in the context of their own workplaces.

The idea for the conference in part grew out of a feeling of vague dissatisfaction, amongst Indigenous practitioners in the social sciences, with statements about the meaning of world-wide Indigenous Knowledge. Such statements, while positive and fulfilling, sometimes still leave professionals thinking: but how does this work for me? Here is one example:

> Traditional knowledge is a cumulative body of knowledge, know-how, practices and representations maintained and developed by peoples with extant sets of histories of interaction with the natural environment. These sophisticated sets of understandings, interpretations and meanings are part and parcel of a cultural complex that encompasses language, naming and classification systems, resource use practices, ritual, spirituality and worldview. ('Science and Traditional Knowledge', paper delivered to 27th General Assembly of ICSU, Rio de Janeiro, Sept 2002: 3).

Participants were asked to discuss, then: how useful is this definition to you in your professional life?

Steve Larkin, Principal of the Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, argued the highly subjective nature of policy based on supposedly 'hard evidence' operating out of a number of supposed 'realities'. These presumptive knowledges assume value, create frameworks and set indicators that repeatedly fail. Indeed, they often oppose Indigenous Knowledge systems they do not understand, mediate or negotiate. Specifically these neo-liberal processes focus on the individual and the free market, ignoring collectivity, a 'new prudentialism' aimed at optimising performance that is measurable, quantitative and based within dominant western cultural frameworks.

If that is what Indigenous Knowledge is not – then what is it? To Kerrie Tim, a senior officer of the Office of Indigenous Policy Co-ordination, Indigenous Knowledge imbues all aspects of her personal life. Knowledge to her is both personal and communal. It is centered in her upbringing as a Murri (Queensland Aboriginal) within an extended family and Indigenous community bound to country through practice: learning tracking, observing kinship obligations, respecting country and ancestors, instilling the core element of 'respect' for its interconnected, yet specifically practical, nature. Through an understanding of the particularity of individual and collective Indigenous Knowledge, Tim presented the current paradox of programs seeking to engage individuals, yet framed to ignore the particularity and regional specificity of Indigenous Knowledge. Government assumes a singular Indigenous 'problem' to be solved, rather than engaging with the reality of Indigenous diversity.

Nor does one need to be raised within one's own family to hold one's own Indigenous Knowledge. Wendy Hermeston, a community health researcher at Northern Rivers University, argued strongly that the individual experiences of removed children forms part of a collective Indigenous experience, a unique Indigenous Knowledge that must be respected and valued as an experience within wider Indigenous Knowledge

Systems. While bound in colonial action, the experiences were encompassed by Indigenous individuals and collectives.

Indigenous Knowledge, then, is diverse, and often specific to place and time. Of the urban Indigenous writer Anita Heiss, it is often assumed that, being Indigenous, she will know everything from 'bush survival skills to Skippy's mobile number'. She has her own personal and family knowledge, related to history, location and to complex sets of belonging. To this extent, there is no single means for outsiders to engage this knowledge. However, through adherence to a set of protocols respecting ownership, guardianship and connection to place, appropriate engagement with Indigenous experience is possible. Heiss discussed protocols for writing Indigenous stories and the role of editors and publishers in ensuring they contribute to a respectful process of book production.

While no set of understandings will cover all aspects of Indigenous Knowledge, adherence to negotiated protocols will bring a greater potential for Indigenous Knowledge to be represented in a manner appropriate to the group concerned. This is not a process of censorship or template reproduction of knowledge. Rather, protocols enable intra-Indigenous and Indigenous/ non-Indigenous collaborations to flourish more creatively precisely because, through respecting knowledge and practice, more creative spaces can be negotiated.

The point is that one brings one's own experience and local knowledge to whatever profession in which one finds oneself. A member of the faculty of Business Studies at Swinburne University, Dennis Foley found that his own and his people's knowledge have provided the tools to see and appreciate Indigenous entrepreneurship in social and micro-economic reform that gives Indigenous people choices. These choices are to be independent, financially, socially (to a degree) and spiritually from that which is settler society. It has enabled Foley and other Indigenous practitioners to take the first step in changing their perspective from that of accepting colonised frameworks, to reinvigorating appropriate and particular Indigenous Knowledge Systems. Localised knowledge frames the world view.

To Kaye Price, of the Education Faculty of the University of Canberra, the definition is too narrow, homogenous and uncritical. A sure way to re-direct the dominant educational paradigm is to instigate access and understanding of Indigenous Knowledge at all levels of education. Disappointed at the lack of appropriate materials available for school teachers, Price worked for many years to redress this imbalance, utilising the Indigenous Knowledge gained as a member of her own extended families and community networks. Then, as now, the core problem is one of valuing Indigenous Knowledge and Indigenous Studies within a mainstream western education system.

The public can also be educated in less formal ways. The historian John Maynard of the Wollatuka School of Indigenous Studies, University of Newcastle, begins with a premise that history 'belongs to all cultures' holding 'differing means of recording and recalling it'. His paper explored 'the undercurrents of Australian history and the absence for so long of an Aboriginal place in that history, and the process over the past forty years in correcting that imbalance'. History can and should utilise Indigenous Knowledge as a means to give new readings of material that is, 'largely embedded within a white viewpoint of the past.' It has often been the very personal journeys and keeping places of familial stories by which Indigenous histories have

been recovered from the same dominant western frameworks in which, hitherto, Indigenous history has been devalued. By using Indigenous sources and reassessing non-Indigenous frameworks, more complex and exciting histories are challenging the status quo.

Indigenous professionals in the social sciences, then, have a role in disseminating Indigenous Knowledge through the nation's communities. These can be tough responsibilities. Margo Neale, the Indigenous Advisor to the Director-General of the National Museum of Australia, considered the multi-layered meaning imbued in material cultural artifacts belonging to Indigenous people conserved within non-Indigenous Keeping Houses, or more generally, mainstream museums. For example, a shell necklace held in the museum was 'borrowed' back by Indigenous community members. Such artifacts, returned temporarily to a community, acquire a new provenance, a renewed life. In this way, Indigenous Knowledge must be viewed within the context of the particularity of individual and collective relationships to cultural material. Cultural material, like Indigenous Knowledge, must be engaged within a constantly reflexive relationship of re-imagining and re-inscription that imbues cultural material with value, power and knowledge.

Yet museums also exist for the viewing, and generally non-Indigenous, public. Barbara Paulson, a Curator in the Indigenous section of the same museum, explained the difficulties of deciding what to present and how to present it. She finds Australian society all too ready to utilise Indigenous Knowledge and cultures as a means of representing a unique 'Australian' identity, while not adequately recognising the basis of Indigenous governance and society on which this culture is based. Yet while the material is mostly viewed by non-Indigenous people, Paulson's first audience remains Indigenous, that is, the people consulted in the display, collection and storage of cultural material. Indigenous engagement, as with Margo Neale, to Paulson comes through consultation as a process not only necessary but creative in adding value to the cultural capital of the nation.

The arguments apply equally well to the 'hard' social sciences. Mark Wenitong, of the National Aboriginal Health Council, related that, within the health professions, Traditional knowledge is both real and relevant to current practice. The major issues centre on embedding Indigenous Knowledge in the current health and research environment. This involves Indigenous medical and health practitioners, Indigenous health researchers, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health services and communities, traditional healers, and traditional medicines which are still widely used in both remote and urban Indigenous settings. Wenitong found that Indigenous doctors were more concerned with a whole-of-community approach to health as opposed to focusing only on the individual patient. They engage with their community and clients in a relationship of valuing collective knowledge based in identity, wellbeing, governance and the environment. Currently Indigenous Knowledge was not sufficiently acknowledged by the mainstream medical profession.

Carmen Cubillo, a psychologist, described Indigenous psychology at Charles Darwin University, as 'a movement questioning the western model of psychology, searching for more appropriate methods of research, assessment, and treatment of mental health issues for Indigenous people.' Through an examination of the 'Let's Start Exploring Together' program, an early intervention program for parents, preschools and community agencies to help young children with emotional and behavioural problems, Cubillo revealed that the use of Indigenous Knowledge as a means of

reframing psychological practice, is relevant to both mainstream and Indigenous students in Darwin and the surrounding areas and on the Tiwi Islands.

Like other speakers, Cubillo found western knowledge, in this case, psychology, assumed a universality, while Indigenous psychology focuses on the particular and the specific. It is precisely this specificity that is ignored at the peril of Indigenous clients. A model of Indigenous psychology would incorporate culture, language, philosophy and science.

Steve Kinnane, of the Social Organisation and Expressive Culture section, Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, entitled his talk 'The role of Indigenous Knowledge in sustaining country, community and culture'. Environmental issues are among the most critical: non-Aboriginal Australia needs the expertise which Aboriginal people have developed in sustaining country for many millennia. Experts in sustainability acknowledge Indigenous Knowledge in the levels to which it is valued, utilised, practised and invested in 'Caring for Country' programs. These programs are being conducted by Indigenous community based movements aimed at creating culturally appropriate economies on Indigenous country. They have carved out a space within sustainability with Indigenous Knowledge at the core, but 'the ideals of sustainability that are claimed to underpin these movements must be tested and reframed within Indigenous terms, not least to enable sustainable occupation of Country by Traditional Owners'.

Margaret Raven, of Murdoch University, continued the discussion in asking how research organisations and bureaucracies face the challenges of recognising Indigenous legal and economic rights to their Indigenous Knowledge. Returning to the theme of appropriate protocols raised by Anita Heiss, Raven asked whether they ensure that Indigenous Knowledge is recognised and engaged with ethically by researcher organisations and bureaucracies. For example, The Desert Knowledge Cooperative Research Council sought to engage with Indigenous Knowledge as a means of creating viable Desert Settlements. There now exist a series of research protocols aimed at protecting Indigenous Knowledge and recognising the Indigenous economic rights and interests that could result from the application of that knowledge for commercial gain. She argued that, despite these and other protocols, what is required is a new Indigenous Research Agenda. If this were implemented in concert with appropriate protocols for ethical research and recognition of Indigenous Knowledge, then bodies such as the Desert Knowledge CRC would be better placed to realise their aims of viable desert communities, and within a wider scheme, of better collaborations and partnerships for Indigenous Knowledge.

Clearly the rest of Australia has far to go in both respecting and utilising Indigenous Knowledge appropriately and for everyone's benefit. John Williams-Mozley, director of the Indigenous Higher Education Centre, University of Southern Queensland, explored the contexts associated with changing the structure of Indigenous higher education at his university. He highlighted the challenges in convincing senior university executives that Indigenous Knowledge has a place within the broader university environment, not just teaching and learning. He noted the divide between a university system that does not adequately recognise the equality and usefulness of Indigenous Knowledge and problems of dominant Western paradigms that equate Indigenous engagement at university with 'support'. An Australia-wide combined and

collaborative Indigenous Knowledge network would encourage policy development and influence the current practices and funding processes of ARC research.

In newer established industries there are encouraging signs of progress. Peter Radoll, of the Australian National University's School of Accounting and Business Technology Systems, considered the leadership of current knowledge systems embedded in new information technologies. Indigenous Knowledge is contained in modes of communication through language, natural and cultural resource practice, dance, song, art and law. Yet a seemingly technically-based system of digital technology can also be imbued with Indigenous Knowledge. Indigenous communities are already using the element of 'interactivity' of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in new and creative ways that utilise non-Indigenous technologies with Indigenous approaches to knowledge. These include the format and structure of websites, the use of chat-room technology for meetings across wider distances, and gender- and clan-related access to information. Known as 'Cultural Site Management Systems' practitioners have developed virtual 'Keeping Places'. Thus, information and communications technologies were proving to be creative spaces where Indigenous Knowledge could create new fields of interactivity.

The workshop of Indigenous practitioners revealed a great diversity of Indigenous Knowledge underpinning a range of professional practice and projects. From academic analysis and narrative development to medical programs and culturally appropriate conservation programs, Indigenous Knowledge was found to be an active, regionally specific, individually expressive, yet collectively based system. A common thread across these Indigenous Knowledge bases was the core element of respect for the holders of this Knowledge and their rights to practise this within the obligations and responsibilities of the peoples and groups to which they belonged. While a missing element of many technical definitions of Indigenous Knowledge, the 'respect factor' was found to be an essential element in the transmission and practice of Indigenous Knowledge nationally.

Social Capital and Social Justice: Critical Australian Perspectives
Geoff Woolcock

The workshop was held at the University of Queensland on 19-20 July 2006, with the objective of moving towards a more critical consensus on the application and implications of social capital discourse in Australian public policy. This workshop built on the interest of the Academy in social capital (particularly Marginson's *Investing in Social Capital*, Falk's *The Role of Social Capital in Alleviating Persistent Poverty* and Manderson's *Re-Thinking Well-Being*) by taking up the challenges foreshadowed by this earlier work of the ASSA. The concept of social capital continues to be the subject of heated discussion and debate in both social policy and social science arenas. The sustained interest in social capital within the public sector warranted the inclusion of

several participants from selected government departments and all were active contributors to the workshop.

The workshop was also proposed as a platform to move towards some consensus on what are distinctly Australian approaches to the study and application of social capital theory, an analytical approach that has been taken up successfully in North America and Western Europe. A workshop with a concentrated focus on social capital enabled a number of key themes to be addressed:

- the extent to which contemporary scholarship on social capital is reflected in current social and public policy at local, state and federal government levels;

- whether particular disciplinary interpretations and understandings of social capital are more or less likely to strengthen public policy and social justice;

- how various efforts to measure social capital have benefited or weakened public policy;

- exploring the utility of closely related concepts (wellbeing, quality of life) as effective alternatives to strengthening public policy and social justice; and

- identifying more effective means of aligning theory and practice through establishing more permanent dialogues and forums about social capital.

The workshop was opened by ASSA Fellow, Lenore Manderson from Monash University. She encouraged participants to take a critical stance toward social capital as conventionally employed in relation to complex contemporary societies, by questioning any dogmatic wedding to the concept and testing its robustness under different social and cultural circumstances. In particular, she urged the group to review the application of social capital: for its value added to social analysis; for its utility in social policy; and for the potential radicalism – or profound conservatism – that might result.

Workshop presentations occurred in similarly themed session blocks, with time for questions and general discussion at the conclusion of each session. The opening session focused on social capital's application at government policy levels and commenced with a presentation from David Adams, Executive Director of Strategic Policy and Research in the Department for Victorian Communities and Professor of Management at the University of Tasmania, who emphasised the dissonance in how senior public servants and academics conceptualise social capital. In particular, he observed that social capital language is rarely used in senior policy discussions (eg COAG) where the safety of other discourses is preferred, but that some basic ideas (eg 'bonding / bridging / linking') have high currency at a pragmatic level including among parliamentarians. He also claimed that governments know that central ideas associated with social capital of trust, identity and security resonate and so will continue to make even more claims of its benefits, although cause and effect continue to be scrambled. Among policy makers, Adams noted caution about the extent and scale of social capital's impact beyond local neighbourhoods.

Martin Mowbray (RMIT) followed with a paper 'Faking social capital: State intellectuals as spin-doctors'**,** claiming that there is little or no evidence to support numerous assertions by ministers, their advisers, and senior public servants about the efficacy of social capital. He argued that if we are to move towards agreement about the application and implications of social capital discourse in Australian public policy, a vital condition is that we are able to agree on the need to ensure that claims about

social capital are well grounded, rather than based on wishful thinking or politically driven hype. He outlined a range of conditions necessary for reaching such an agreement including the imperative that ideas be sourced, credit and responsibilities properly attributed and, as far as possible, anonymity avoided. Similarly, Mowbray implored that the goals of government community building programs be practical and measurable and that provisions for quality evaluation, conducted by agencies at arm's length from government and with a commitment to objective assessment, should be built into all major programs from the outset. He stressed that impacts of public policies on social capital, such as levels of trust, should be considered on a genuine whole-of-government basis with policy arenas as disparate as public finance, taxation and other revenue collection, corporate regulation, and industrial relations, all being considered for their effects on social capital or community well being.

Tom Nankivell, a research manager at the Productivity Commission, offered reflections on the Commission's 2003 research monograph *Social Capital: Reviewing the Concept and its Policy Implications,* concluding that in practice, it is at present difficult for policy analysts of any persuasion to incorporate social capital in their analyses in a robust way. He observed that this reflects not least the uncertainty about what constitutes beneficial social capital, its sources and its effects, and how different policies affect it. He also noted that because social capital is difficult to measure and even though qualitative assessments are a reasonable way in which to proceed in such circumstances, in some cases policy analysts have found it difficult to be confident about the direction of social capital impacts, let alone to gauge them in a qualitative sense.

The second session addressed the perpetual challenge of measuring social capital. ASSA Fellow John Western discussed the development of an approach to measuring social capital based on measuring different aspects of formal and informal structures or networks, and the formal and informal norms that govern behaviour in these networks. He based his comments on a 2002 study commissioned by the Australian government's Department of Family and Community Services which both developed a measure of social capital and identified significant relationships between the three variables of social capital, anomie and perceived quality of life and wellbeing. The extent to which these relationships are spatially anchored, in the sense that they can be shown to be tied to socio-demographic and related characteristics of areas, is a pressing concern for Western's current explorations.

He was followed by Horst Posselt (Australian Bureau of Statistics), in conjunction with Elisabeth Davis, who explained how the ABS, following the publication of a framework and suggested set of indicators for social capital in 2004, has been developing modules of questions to address many of the framework elements. These modules, as well as a voluntary work survey, are part of the 2006 General Social Survey (GSS) currently being conducted. While not comprehensive, there is already a stock of data relating to framework elements among ABS collections, including the 2002 GSS. Posselt spoke about how the ABS had recently prepared an analytical report, *Aspects of Social Capital*, which draws this information together, as well as presenting various indicators and providing a reference to available ABS data sources. The paper provided an overview of the social capital content of the GSS and other 2006 collections, and outlined proposed approaches to analysing and disseminating the results of these surveys.

Mike Salvaris, who has specialised in measuring community wellbeing internationally, chose to present a more critical analysis through 'Evaluating the social capital phenomenon: baby or bathwater?' He drew attention to some criticisms made of the concept, in particular its propensity to be methodologically contorted, but more pressingly, he emphasised its proponents' tendency to ignore structural causes of community decline and hence its susceptibility to allegations of being an acontextual and ahistorical concept. Salvaris observed that part of the phenomenon of social capital can be attributed to its receptiveness by both left and right political forces as a palatable answer to the complex questions of declining levels of trust in public institutions and civic participation. He urged a far more modest approach to 'claim making' on behalf of social capital and posed the challenge that a broader set of understandings of social progress and connectedness might be found in the agenda of establishing universal human rights.

Three papers explored particular contextual dimensions of social capital. Lenore Manderson presented a few compelling qualitative case studies as part of her paper, 'Bowling again: social capital, wellbeing and resilience in regional Australia', drawn from data collected as part of a comparative study of people living with impaired mobility in both rural and urban settings. In using current ideas of social capital to identify and explain wellbeing, she asked how interpersonal factors and community structures interact to protect individuals and, in the process, support the wider community. In doing so, she noted an implicit tension between desires for autonomy and engagement with others that influences the degree to which individuals are willing to participate in social structures beyond the immediate family. Manderson's research highlights individuals who have little or no social capital at all; and it is the absence of bonding capital that draws attention to their social poverty and consequent lack of wellbeing.

Fran Baum followed with a comprehensive overview of the growing association of public health and social capital, highlighting how in the past decade, an increasing number of articles have been published in public health journals about the impact of social capital on health status. However, Baum unpacked some of the methodological and application problems associated with these principally epidemiological approaches where social capital has been measured in a crude manner using only a few items collected in broad social or health surveys. Nonetheless, she noted the multiple associations of social capital with health measures that have been found across many studies, although the relationship with mental health appears to be stronger than that with physical health. More specifically, in describing the findings from a series of research projects conducted at Flinders University that have examined the relationship between social capital and health, Baum reiterated how significantly her research has been guided by Bourdieu's perspective on social capital and stressed the extent to which levels of social capital are associated with measures of social class such as household income and educational level.

'Network capital: borrowing on your neighbours' social capital for sustained outcomes' introduced the notion of one of social capital's most closely related conceptual frameworks, social network analysis. On behalf of a research team at Queensland University of Technology, Chrys Guneskara drew on two local case studies to unpack the social capital metaphor and highlight the nature and impact of social ties between community members. In doing so, the paper attempted to shift social capital from a generalised or abstracted 'feel good' term to a stronger evidence based concept

centred on a relational perspective. His findings were presented as evidence of the existence of network capital, which has been expanded to include the ongoing operational capability, learning and facility infrastructure that evolves from embedded social networks and builds and sustains local capacity.

Reflections on the sessions were guided by Michael Woolcock, a senior social scientist at the World Bank, and an established social capital scholar. Sharing his own experiences of current World Bank projects, he stressed the need to see social capital as one of many helpful analytical tools, rather than burden it with impossible expectations of what it might achieve at both the local community level and public policy reform.

The application of social capital in more specific contexts commenced with a session exploring its association with place and geography. Gabrielle Gwyther's paper examined the concept of social capital and its application to both lower and middle-income suburban communities, drawing on qualitative research within two middle-income, master planned estates and two predominately lower-income, public housing estates, located in close proximity in outer southwest Sydney. Her analysis of the research literature indicates that the concept of social capital is considerably more likely to be applied to lower-income and disadvantaged communities than middle-income communities and she argued that this in turn influences the parameters under which social capital comes to be understood by the wider audience. Gwyther concluded that research into social capital within middle-income communities can inform a more critical approach to social capital in lower-income and disadvantaged communities.

Geoff Woolcock focused on the study of a private developer's explicit attempts to build social capital in a master-planned community on the southwest fringe of Brisbane. The paper examined some planning tools or strategies employed by developers, acting in partnership with government and community organisations, to build social capital in new residential suburbs and in particular, how social scientists and developers might work together more effectively to build sustainable communities. While recognising the importance of the study in distinguishing distinctive features about social capital in new communities, Woolcock also stressed the importance of the study placing itself in a long and rich tradition of Australian community studies.

Deborah Warr's paper 'Gender, class and art and craft of social capital' firstly examined assumptions of class and gender in the theoretical literature on social capital, and then explored the influence of class and gender contexts on social networks among women living in socio-economically disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Victoria. Her analysis revealed the multiple ways in which social network assets are conditional on socio-economic and gender circumstances.

The next session focused on social capital's relevance to regional Australia, and specifically higher education, Indigenous and natural resource management communities. Ian Falk and Ruth Wallace presented a paper exploring whether social capital has value in framing and explaining partnership structures, processes and outcomes for university relationships with their stakeholders. Drawing on two case studies - the partnerships strategy of the Charles Darwin University to build key stakeholder groups or networks with both the Northern Territory Government, and Northern Territory regional communities - they argued that social capital discourse provides a means of enabling policy effectiveness, particularly where the efficacy of

the policy and partnerships can be challenged by the complexity of sharing knowledge between stakeholders with diverse structures, capacity and priorities. Their analysis of partnerships in terms of social capital shows how the development of shared language and understandings about bonding, bridging and linking ties, and associated notions of social capital, enable stakeholders to create organisational space and commit resources for these activities to occur.

Chelsea Bond and Mark Brough drew on a range of recent studies conducted by both authors in the area of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander social research. Their paper 'Friend or foe? The application of social capital in achieving social justice for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people' provided a critical reflection on the dynamics involved in conceptualising social capital in relation to social justice, arguing that many 'old' social injustices have been re-centred around the language of social capital within both social research and social policy, and discussed what might be revealed and what might be hidden within such an agenda for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Australians. Their key argument centred on the dangers in focusing on the production of social capital as an 'output' of social policy, without first ensuring that the 'inputs' actually resonate with the lived experience of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

Peter Oliver used the conceptual lens of social capital to analyse empirical evidence gained from recent PhD research on development of effective natural resource management (NRM) partnerships in Queensland and three years of research on regional body/ grassroots group relationships. He concluded that collaborative NRM has considerable limitations, not least its reliance on the maintenance and accumulation of social capital among and between participants. Devolvement of power and authority to non-government organisations may exacerbate power imbalances. In such instances, Oliver demonstrated that the less empowered may finish up under-represented in decision-making, leading to 'less' democratic outcomes and lower levels of participation for those already less empowered.

The workshop's final session began with John Harrison, who presented a series of National Archives photographs from the late 1800s/early 1900s to explore what he termed alternative sources of social capital in Australia, in particular the role of associations, trade unions, churches and even the military forces in developing a social capital stockpile in Australia.

Paul Frijters took an economist's perspective on social capital to argue that a relational capital analytical framework was needed to capture the economic importance of social capital for growth and innovation.

Jenny Onyx's paper 'Resilient communities and social capital' examined the application of her own Onyx and Bullen scale of social capital developed during the 1990s that identified four capacity building blocks - trust, social agency, tolerance of diversity, and value of life - and four social arenas in which these may be expressed - community connections, neighbourhood connections, family and friends connections and work connections. Her meta-analysis of the Onyx and Bullen scale with questionnaire responses from over 7,000 people, with approximately 4,000 responses from designated communities, suggests that while social capital operates as a complex whole and no factor is necessarily causal prior to the development of other aspects of social capital, some causal pathways are more likely than others and that the most prevalent causal path differs between communities.

Eva Cox ('The ethics of social capital') could not be present but reflects that if social capital has managed to both explain and predict social processes, then we should see it as a useful tool, despite containing a range of sub-theoretical possible explanations. However, she goes on to pose the challenge that if areas with high social capital work better on a range of indicators and produce better health and economic outcomes, how can these be reproduced ethically? She outlines her current work on an organisational culture measure for ethical audits that does incorporate some social capital measures and the possibility that these two areas of work could be more intertwined.

The final summary session invited participants at the workshop who had not presented papers - particularly those in public policy settings - to share their reflections. There was considerable group agreement that the social capital critique and discourse needed to be more actively integrated into parallel discussions occurring within public policy circles, especially with regard to interpretations of building 'community' and understandings of health and wellbeing. Such discussions are already underway with roundtables in Canberra occurring later in 2006. Attention was drawn to the current work of the OECD in measuring societal progress and wellbeing and the opportunities for those interested in the empirical measures of social capital to be more involved in the Australian application of the OECD's initiative. In the short-term, it was unanimously agreed that the workshop presentations be made available on the ASSA website and it is anticipated that the outcomes from the workshop will be in the form of (a) book or special issue of a journal and (b) the exploration of the potential for a research project under the auspices of the Academy.

Risking Birth: Culture, Technology and Politics in 21st Century Maternity Care

Kerreen Reiger, Alphia Possamai-Inesedy and Karen Lane

Background

The workshop extended existing social science analyses of the medicalisation of childbirth by bringing together a multidisciplinary group to address the 'politics of maternity care'. While previous research into the area shed a critical light upon childbirth practices, recent social changes and resulting social theory debates pose new challenges in both theory and practice. The field of childbirth is increasingly contentious in Australia with media reports of escalating staff shortages and conflicts over philosophy of management, service delivery and professional care providers. Moreover the pervasive cultural construction of birth as a medical event laden with risk and in need of technological management can be usefully interpreted, following Ulrich Beck, as part of 'risk society' characterised by reflexive modernisation and individualisation.

The workshop

A group of 26 experts met together over two days on 26-27 June at the University of Western Sydney's Campbelltown Campus. Participants had been invited on the basis of their complementary research and professional expertise. The conveners reflexively targeted those with cross-cultural interests, including prominent midwives with a social sciences orientation and training as well as two senior obstetricians who are involved in state policy committees in Victoria and NSW. Several early career researchers, including postgraduates, consumers and a representative from maternity services management also participated. Although we can outline the scope of the workshop and the structured opportunities for informed commentary and general dialogue, such a skeleton cannot capture the rich discussion that took place around the papers, especially through use of commentators, and which continued long after the business closure of the forum. Debates were lively, as sociologists, midwives, doctors, policymakers, researchers and consumers grappled with teasing out the relationships between cultural and social change, provision of professional care and the diversity of women's individual experiences. Networks were forged between researchers from different states and territories, and across the Tasman, and new personal and intellectual relationships were established. Major themes and presentations were as follows:

1.   The social, intellectual and cultural context of childbirth

Several participants drew upon the work of Beck on 'risk society' to understand contemporary experiences of pregnancy and childbirth. The opening paper by Alphia Possamai-Inesedy argued that choice and flexibility, claimed to characterise risk culture, present new dilemmas for childbearing women and their partners as they now face a myriad of decisions concerning testing and the self-management of a pregnant and lactating body. Modernist feminist critiques however, argued Ann Taylor, failed to appreciate the importance of language and power in the distribution of knowledge. Drawing on empirical work in an Australian hospital, she argued that poststructuralist interpretations of the fluidity of power offer a welcome antidote to the implied determinism of some feminist accounts and of aspects of risk society theory. Kerreen Reiger and Rhea Dempsey extended the risk society thesis to considering the 'performance' of birth. They proposed that the cultural norms around fear of birth may become materialised in the body via social processes that augment or diminish women's agency, arguing that the challenge is to develop better support strategies to assist healthy women confronting normal, positive labour pain rather than succumbing to an obsessive preoccupation with self and risk-avoidance. Rea Daellenbach presented a sociological analysis of a high profile event in New Zealand (media coverage of reports into neonatal deaths) to demonstrate the media's role in reconstructing risk and agency in such a way that directed blame towards midwives and women at a time of intense interest around the introduction of new midwifery-led models of care.

Attention to the cultural context was extended by several papers - on contestation of fertility control strategies in India by Victoria Loblay, on maternity waiting homes in Laos by Elizabeth Eckermann and on Indigenous birthing by Sue Kildea and Fleur Magick. These contributions raised the issue of competing cultural constructions of reproduction and of where women should give birth. Struggles around management of reproduction, argued Loblay, can be highly political and complex, involving powerful interests and conflicts over

knowledge in which women's diverse interests can be silenced. Traditional cultural beliefs as well as local economic imperatives need to be acknowledged, Eckermann and Kildea both argued, in designing maternity care regimes that reduce infant and maternal mortality rates but minimise social dislocation and lack of support. The pivotal role of community and the cultural dimensions of 'risk' were themes central to Kildea's paper on Indigenous constructions of risk - ideas which stand in stark contrast to dominant non-Indigenous definitions. While high-technology, obstetric-dominated hospital settings are assumed by health providers to be the safest place to give birth, Aboriginal women tend to perceive the hospital as the crucible of risk. As Aboriginal women state, they would rather birth in their own community with known caregivers 'even if it is not as safe'. Risk management for them is thus choosing among a hierarchy of risks rather than eliminating risk altogether. This argument was made especially clear at the workshop through a powerful visual presentation given by a young Indigenous mother, Fleur Magick, who described her experiences of seeking to birth 'on country'. Her account of struggles with professional caregivers who took only a medically-oriented risk-framework indicated its inadequacy to address Indigenous women's needs.

A major theme emerging in discussion of these papers concerned the ways in which the fear of death in childbirth, common to traditional cultures and still salient in developing countries, has largely given way in the West to fear of the dangers of *life* - concerns about the future wellbeing of the baby and mother. A paper by Lynne Staff considering the experience of women who reported 'choosing' C-section indicated how powerful emotions arising from fear of their bodies shaped these women's 'choices'. Such fear is exacerbated in risk society by media influences, especially those that offer limiting notions of female beauty, by the over-use of genetic testing in pregnancy, increased surveillance by health professionals and increasing pressures on caregivers in an increasingly litigious society. All these factors were discussed as central to shaping not only women's and their families' experiences but to the politics of care provision.

2.   Institutionalising risk: policy and practice issues

In a paper providing a critical overview of Australian maternity policy development in recent years, Kerreen Reiger explored the contradictory and contingent role played by the state as it both responds to competing interests yet advances a politically-driven health reform agenda. Workplace realities that reflect the pressures of health service rationalisation and managerial control undermine new developments. Presentations by senior obstetricians, Jeremy Oats and William Walters, were based on their roles within Victorian and NSW policy-making committees which are encouraging moves away from obstetric-led to more collaborative models of care. Challenges include major workforce shortages, overcoming professional resistance to primary maternity care provision, meeting women's expectations, and the influence of private sector obstetrics.

State policy developments and changing divisions of professional labour were also addressed by Maria Zadoroznyj who compared the South Australian government's universal Home Visiting Program with the Mothercarer program. Whereas the first acts more like a screening strategy that privileges surveillance, the latter provides mothers with direct and appreciated support. Issues of professional power and surveillance were also raised in discussion of how birthing practices can empower or disempower women. Jenny Parratt drew upon her own professional journaling as a midwife to reflect on the midwife's role in facilitating 'integrative power' which supports

the woman or 'disintegrative power' which undermines her confidence. Kathleen Fahy drew attention to the importance of the geographical dimensions of the birth space that may also impede or enhance the ability of the woman to realise her physiological capacity to give birth.

3.   Professional issues

In addressing changes in models of care, Karen Lane's paper focused on changes in professional boundaries in the 'marketising' environment of the 'audit society'. Exploring data from a study of inter-professional relationships, Lane asserted the importance of midwifery 'emotion work', not just as a strategy for pain relief, but as a highly-developed professional speciality in helping women to realise their own strengths in birthing without complication and without medical interventions. Positing 'emotion work' as a new object of knowledge in the ongoing professionalising project allows midwifery to claim a new professional equivalence with obstetrics in this new state and market-driven era of collaborative care. The dramatic difference between midwives' experiences of working within the obstetric model and in the midwifery model became evident from Carolyn Hastie's presentation of some data from the new midwifery-led unit of which she is a manager. The former obstetric model was seen by the midwives as having produced risk-oriented births, unsettled mothers and babies, conflicting advice and professional defensiveness. The introduction of a midwifery model of care by contrast had improved both women's and midwives' confidence, self-regard and agency.

The extent to which professional practice is shaped by the larger social context was raised in papers by Bill Maddern and Sally Tracy. The legal environment governing risk and birth practices was covered by Maddern, a lawyer, who discussed the ways in which litigation authorises and impacts upon medical practices. Assisted conception, surrogacy agreements, posthumous parenthood, wrongful birth, birth trauma, legal duties to mother and child and data on medical error and litigation are all contentious. Tracy, a midwifery researcher, argued that new medical technologies have made transparent the biological processes of pregnancy in an effort to identify risk factors and ensure a risk-free outcome. An unintended consequence has been a repositioning of the symbiotic mother/child dyad as an inherent conflict between mother and foetus. A new stage of development of the relationship between healers and patients is being reached through the spread of 'biomedicalisation' which focuses on health and risk (rather than illness and disease) and a transformation in the way biomedical knowledge reassigns bodies and personal identities in line with the increasingly 'techo-scientific' nature of biomedical practices. The management of risk in childbirth exemplifies this trend where an obsessive attention to risk management through new technologies may in fact achieve exactly the reverse of that intended by users. Unwittingly, therefore, the new 'transparent-seeking' technologies may increase uncertainty and further intensify an individual's perception of being at risk.

Workshop outcomes

Apart from the important contribution to intellectual exchange between sociologists from several universities, the workshop fostered an unprecedented, at least in Australia, interdisciplinary dialogue between health professionals and social scientists. New research was reported and refined, and information from different geographical locations was shared. The feedback sheets at the close of the forum remarked not only on the quality of the venue and catering but the value of the intellectual and

personal exchanges that took place. The most direct outcome has been the preparation by the convenors of an edited collection of several of the workshop papers. With a foreword by American sociologist of childbirth, Barbara Katz Rothman, this was published as a special issue of *Health Sociology Review* in October 2006. Available as stand-alone text and as an e-journal this reaches an international audience, allowing the productive exchange of views at the June *Risking Birth* workshop to continue to impact on analyses of the relationship between cultural context, politics and professional concerns in contemporary maternity care.

Policy Roundtable on Wellbeing

Introduction

The impetus for this roundtable was the overlapping and often contradictory conceptualisations of wellbeing. There are acute differences in the conceptualisation of wellbeing across disciplines, across professions, and in this context also across government departments. While conceptualisations around health and wellbeing has implications for social justice and human rights, there is also a question about how government policy might be informed by those considerations, and that while inevitably a government will be mindful of fiscal questions and the wellbeing of the economy, there also needs to be a mindfulness about the wellbeing of individuals and community.

Finding the evidence for wellbeing

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) publishes on a biennial basis a publication entitled *Measures of Australia's Progress*, which is aimed at providing an information base for others to judge whether life is getting better in Australia. The publication includes sections on prominent issues such as health, education and environment, but also includes issues related to the sustainability of the current conditions.

Useful contexts for measuring the dynamics of wellbeing are the pathways and transitions in people's lives. These transitions from birth; home to school, school to work, work to family and work to retirement are often high-risk phases where policy interventions are most effective.

While government agencies often focus on wellbeing, the measures that are used are those related to 'illbeing'. The dynamics of wellbeing, what leads to wellbeing, how is it characterised and measured, are more elusive.

Quality of life can be measured objectively and subjectively. Objective, or familiar, ways of measuring wellbeing relate to aspects of life such as how healthy we are and how much money we've got. Subjective wellbeing is generally positive as people feel it important to maintain a positive attitude towards wellbeing. When individuals cannot find a balance between their resources and the internal and external challenges they face, wellbeing is defeated. The result of the loss of ability to maintain wellbeing is

depression. Generally it is external events that create this inability, such as overwhelming stress, the stress on someone at home without enough money, or caring for a disabled person in the family. Internal resources are what we are genetically equipped with (resilience), which is hard to measure. The external resources that people use to overcome challenges are money and relationships.

Gaining extra income beyond a fairly minimal level doesn't seem to enhance people's wellbeing. If that theory *is* true, then it more or less follows that there isn't a lot that governments could do to enhance wellbeing. There is a need for long-run data which maps people's wellbeing over time to test this theory.

On the population level, wellbeing is to a large extent dependent on people whose wellbeing is failing. While redistributions of wealth, improved health care and other related services reduce illbeing and thus reduce levels of anxiety and depression, they do not enhance wellbeing, as far as we know.

There is a vast gulf between what science describes and the human experience of what it is to be alive, and obviously, wellbeing and quality of life are about the human experience of what it is to be alive. The subjective dimension of wellbeing therefore embraces a much richer array of resources than the objective dimension, which we can use to flesh out the subjective dimension of quality of life in Australia. So then the question is: is one measuring anything of real value that would guide politicians or government departments to make policies and programs?

One of the queries for policy makers in regards to wellbeing is does *source* of income matter in terms of the outcomes you see, and does source of income have a link to ability to use the resource? The precept is that money is a flexible resource, but does it matter where it comes from? And does that, or do other things, have an effect on ability to use it?

Unemployment certainly impacts on people's wellbeing, most particularly for males and most particularly for middle-aged males. The effect of unemployment is devastating, because people need a purpose in their life, and one of the internal factors that is very powerful in controlling wellbeing is a sense of purpose, and that is often perceived to have been taken away.

The reasons as to why that source has become the dominant source of income seems to play a crucial role, whether it is unemployment, parenting, disability or retirement. Different reasons carry different levels of self respect around those life courses, rather than the actual source of the income.

Wellbeing and social capital

In order to achieve higher living standards for all members of the Australian community, economic growth for its own sake is not enough; it needs to be coupled with measures that improve and achieve higher living standards.

Wellbeing and social capital are both concepts which are evolving as meaning is teased out or attributed. Three elements underpin social capital:

- Norms and informal rules that govern societal behaviour;

- Social interconnectedness and networks; and

- The concept of trust, which incorporates expectation and reciprocity.

Many define social capital only in terms of its positives but, like other forms of capital, it is how it is used that is important. There are very strong personal incentives to build

and invest in social capital, however social capital is not something that can be owned in isolation; it is collective and interactive. When government attempts to proactively build or develop social capital there is the danger of undermining civil society.

The impact of social capital on policy is important. One tension, among others, is around bonding versus bridging. Bonding in society is often represented as negative as it is seen as exclusive of others, whereas bridging is seen as positive because it helps social mobility and cohesion.

High levels of social capital do not necessarily mean a high level of wellbeing. On the contrary, high levels of social capital can sometimes reflect a lack of wellbeing. Indigenous Australians, for instance, enjoy extraordinary bonding social capital but generally do not enjoy a high level of wellbeing.

The engagement of government with communities is important to negate perceptions of disengagement and democratic deficits but the model requires engagement between governments and welfare and service organisations which are based on trust. It is also important to support community initiatives rather than simply engineer or replicate previous models which have been successful.

Trying to measure wellbeing at a community level is challenging. The method should employ evaluation of clusters of individuals within communities and extrapolate from that data. But how do you measure community wellbeing more generally, and is that a proxy measure for social capital?

There is a whole raft of government policies aimed at developing individual human capital in relation to matters like housing and employment policies and, because all of these policies have important consequences for the social capital, that can evolve. By investing in human capital, governments are creating resource pools that can network, and have the capacity, skills, ad self-confidence from which individuals can extend outwards into the community. It is important, however, to recognise that different ways of developing human capital policies result in different outcomes in terms of the social capital. It is therefore necessary to facilitate the development of social capital hand in hand with the development of human capital with the end result taking into account that social cohesion is the ultimate bond between individuals and society.

Gender, wellbeing and welfare

Policy is ultimately a combination of evidence and values. Evidence helps to provide solutions for problems and it also suggests what impact those solutions may have. The reality with policy making is that there are always gaps between the evidence based solution for a problem and the impact policies have in solving that problem.

An example of this process is the Welfare to Work policy. The evidence showed that across a range of countries there was *very* high incidence of jobless families in Australia compared with the OECD average. The result was that about 600,000 Australian children lived in a family where either one or both parents did not have a job. The evidence showed that the outcomes for the children of these families, as a group, were worse than for those growing up in families where the parents had jobs. The evidence therefore showed that Australia had in conjunction a good thing, our safety net, and a bad thing, jobless families. Ultimately, the balance between those two things comes down to the values of the government of the day.

Paid and unpaid work broadens the connections between work and wellbeing. Women have a higher rate than men in the informal provision of child care, elder care

and disability care whereas men have a higher rate of participation in paid employment, and in longer hours of paid employment. If we fail to adequately recognise the fundamental matter of caregiving for children, grandchildren, disabled or severely ill spouses, elderly parents, and other disabled relatives and friends – we are rendering invisible in public policy-making the wellbeing of people spread over the generations.

Caregiving is located within a normative framework of obligation and responsibility. It is an activity with financial and emotional costs, which extend across public and private boundaries. At different stages in the life course, carers may be obliged to withdraw from or forego education or employment, with possible subsequent difficulties entering and returning to education or the labour force when caregiving obligations end. There are also constraints for carers on social participation and networks and other forms of interconnectedness.

It is necessary to consider more than the composition of the family – sole parents as against partnered parents, for instance – but what human and social capital resources - such the types of jobs available in a region - militate against both partners in a disadvantaged family gaining employment.

To improve both the economic and social wellbeing of carers, and the wellbeing of their families, policies designed to increase overall levels of labour force participation must also recognise the ways in which caregiving and employment are interrelated through the life courses of women and men.

At a societal level we tend to undervalue volunteering or doing unpaid work in any form. This suggests that we underestimate the role that relationships and support networks play in wellbeing and overestimate the importance of employment. What appears to be a paradox is that in our relatively individualistic and free market oriented society we assume that individuals are the best judge of everything. So we have to ask the question: who is going to judge one's wellbeing? We assume that parents are the best judges of children's wellbeing, but when it comes to the individuals targeted by the Welfare to Work scheme, it seems that governments and researchers alike feel entitled to become paternalistic.

Marrying the evidence and the values when it comes to welfare reform, child poverty and the role of parents is a difficult task. In recent times there has been a heavy emphasis on obligations rather than rights. Perhaps there needs to be a rebalancing of the equation.

The government has taken a view that increasing employment and reducing welfare reliance is bound to increase people's wellbeing. This premise therefore is informing the policy direction. On this basis, it is relatively easy to measure the success of Welfare to Work, because if it doesn't increase employment, if it doesn't reduce welfare reliance, if it doesn't see more people on welfare actually earning income, then we can assess fairly objectively whether Welfare to Work has failed or succeeded.

Economic growth and wellbeing

'Consumption possibilities'

Thinking of economics in terms of 'consumption possibilities', rather than 'growth', encompasses the idea of GDP per capita, one measure of living standards that is often used in this country. But it is a lot more than just GDP per capita, which does not

include unpaid or voluntary work which affects consumption possibilities for both individuals and society as a whole.

There is also the matter of timing about intergenerational aspects of consumption possibilities. If we consume more now, what are we doing for future consumption possibilities? There are issues around environmental values: if we consume more resources and deplete or alter irrevocably the nature of the environment, what does that mean in relation to future generations and their possibilities?

Economic development is not just about growth: equality of opportunity, access to services, capacity to develop individual capabilities, removing constraints on the capacity of people to develop their capabilities through education and training are all important. Nor is it just a matter of the volume or the quantum of those consumption possibilities; it is about how they are distributed, across incomes, across family types.

Increasing complexity

Over time, governments' interactions, government interventions and society in its entirety, is becoming much more complex. People are obliged to interact with each other and with infrastructures of administration and government far more than in the past, and perhaps this too is a factor impinging on wellbeing.

Attempts to simplify some of the government's interactions with individuals and the society may improve both the individual's wellbeing and possibly the government's as well, but is certainly likely to improve society's wellbeing as a whole. In a more complex society, there is a more complex set of decisions to make about individual wellbeing, with perhaps greater risks attached; things might go wrong. Do governments or does society as a whole have a greater responsibility to actually ameliorate risk for people in the present than in times gone by? What does this mean for insurance markets; for superannuation or for the whole income support system?

'Illbeing'

Most people in the field, especially psychologists, tend to regard wellbeing and what is being called 'illbeing' as at least somewhat separate dimensions and not as opposite ends of the same dimension. It seems that people can have rather high levels of life satisfaction which can co-exist with high levels of anxiety. If wellbeing and illbeing are somewhat different dimensions, they may have different causes, and different policy interventions are needed to be utilised. The causes of wellbeing seem to relate mainly to personality, which in some sense is uninteresting from a policy standpoint. But they also relate to the quality of relationships and to social networks. Illbeing and mental health seem to depend a great deal on stresses related to marriage, work, and, often, health issues. It should be recognised that welfare states have done a considerable amount to reduce illbeing in relation to job and health insecurities.

In more income-egalitarian communities, there is a much reduced incidence of health inequalities. Even if they have a *low* GDP per capita, if their income distribution is less compressed, then the health inequality gradient is more compressed. But the latest evidence seems to suggest that socioeconomic inequality doesn't actually have a big impact on population health. There are gradients within countries, but income inequality doesn't seem to be a major determinant of population health of countries or societies. The picture seems to have become much more complex and confused than it was, say, five or 10 years ago, when there appeared to be a clear relationship between levels of inequality and life expectancy, for example.

Frameworks

The Copenhagen Forum offers an exercise which asks participants to focus on a framework. They are asked to imagine they have a billion dollars to spend. They then select three policy interventions that might enhance wellbeing and put them in order of preference, indicating how the billion dollars would be allocated.

Thinking through towards a framework like that, focusing on the transitions in the life course, suggests interventions: 'here is the early years cluster of risks, and investments we would like to give citizens; here is the school to work situation; here is the ageing one'. Trying to address where people are most at risk in those transitions will suggest the policies which may ameliorate risk; for instance, improve opportunities, increase literacy and numeracy in the early years, improve job opportunities from school to work, and offer caring opportunities or assist in caring responsibilities into old age. This kind of framework could focus the way we think about the human capital agenda.

General discussion

In measures of 'happiness' or wellbeing in this country, a constant finding seems to be that money or material resources are a bit helpful – they enable protection from disaster, primarily – but the really important factors are relationships, health, and social connections. Illbeing, on the other hand, appears to arise from conditions of stress and poor health, or perhaps poor working conditions.

If that is the case, and this is an accurate characterisation of the human condition and what gives us wellbeing and illbeing, it doesn't seem to match at all with the priorities of government policy, which are *very* focused on material resources, and more and more material resources, at the expense, often, of these things that seem to matter more. An example is what is happening in the workplace, where there is real stress: stress about insecurity of jobs, stress about long (and increasing) hours of work, stress about feeling vulnerable because the balance of power has changed hugely against the individual worker. Government policy in this area presumably is meant to increase GDP per capita. That policy, however, seems to be at odds with the evidence about wellbeing.

Setting completely aside the values of intervening in relationships, even if we wanted to, as a government, as a society, what tools do we have and what is the likely success of employing those tools? In the relationships space it is particularly difficult, and the possibility of change perhaps limited.

Government policies intervene very indirectly, and so within the very structure of policies and thinking about systemic values, some policies influence in inadvertent ways. Policies related, for instance, to employment opportunities and work have *indirect* impacts on people's relationships, and consequently touch very *directly* on what human wellbeing is about. Government needs to be aware of and to consider carefully the ways in which the structures they have in place are impacting indirectly on people's wellbeing. The way in which the macro-economic social policy sector can impact on relationships through, for example, job security or the hours people are working, can impact heavily on relationships, and we need to keep the broad policy agenda firmly in mind.

Humans are not necessarily very good at identifying what is 'good for us', nor are the decisions we are making as individuals necessarily in line with the subjective

wellbeing of the larger society. Obviously, it is a problem for government if the issues that give the government electoral success are not those which promote the greater wellbeing of the society. It is essential to take into account here the kind of cultural influences and pressures that will often push people to act in ways that go against their own best interests or against their own values. Those pressures can be intense if one considers the power of the media, marketing and advertising.

People can sustain a certain level of anxiety and still maintain their wellbeing. But as with any homeostatic system there is a threshold, and once that threshold is crossed, wellbeing goes down. In examining the data that are collected around health and illness rates, suicide, crime, unemployment and so on, what we learn is that things aren't working at a community level.

It is likely that the community will accept a lower rate of growth, because we don't want the stresses on families that policies promoting high levels of growth can generate. That is part of what the World Trade Organisation free trade debates are about, where countries are saying, 'We will not free up agriculture, because that is going to destroy communities.' Destroying the communities may well increase growth - but at a very high price.

A huge thrust of government policy is to increase economic growth, but the welfare state – which is the biggest slice of government expenditure in every country – is primarily about reducing illbeing. It does a reasonable job. How then, can we create policies which enhance wellbeing rather than reduce illbeing.

Public policy recommendations are for the Australian community as a whole. That is the framework, and therefore must be considered in terms of their impact on economic growth, among other factors.

Perhaps one way forward is to focus on attempting to understand the impact on the wellbeing of those who fall out at the bottom as a result of such policies. If we can do something about measuring this impact, maybe we can better target the structural adjustment policies by identifying some consequences, and suggesting policy recommendations which minimise the negative impact on wellbeing and reduce the fallout from those broader policies.

BIG ISSUES: A JOB FOR BOUNDARY-SPANNERS

A new report details the benefits to Australia of encouraging big collaborative research projects, to provide solutions to the problems the country faces. These 'big issues' include caring for an ageing population, maintaining water supply, cyber crime, and Aboriginal health and welfare.

The report *Collaborating across the Sectors* is published by the Council for the Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences, and CHASS President Stuart Cunningham said that a new breed of researcher was needed to find the answers. 'Australia needs 'boundary spanners', researchers willing to stretch out over the normal boundaries to work with people from other disciplines', said Professor Cunningham. The report, funded by the Commonwealth Department of Education, Science and Training, makes five key recommendations to remove the institutional and funding impediments to conducting this research. It is available at: www.chass.org.au.

The **Academy Annual Symposium**, 'Australians on the Move: Internal Migration in Australia', held on 21 November, attracted a large crowd of interested scholars and policy makers. [Photos courtesy of Jennifer Fernance.]

James Walter (left) and *Peter McDonald* (speaker) were among them.

So too, were *Salut Muhidin* and *Ann Larson* (speaker)

New Fellows were welcomed to the Academy at the Annual Dinner, and among those receiving their Testamurs were:

Ngaire Naffine (left)

and

Frances Baum

Gavin Kitching

Stephen Crain

A warm welcome to all new Fellows elected in 2006.