



ACADEMY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN AUSTRALIA

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## About the Academy

The Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia was established in 1971. Previously, some of the functions were carried out through the Social Science Research Council of Australia, established in 1942. Elected to the Academy for distinguished contributions to the social sciences, the 347 Fellows of the Academy offer expertise in the fields of *accounting, anthropology, demography, economics, economic history, education, geography, history, law, linguistics, philosophy, political science, psychology, social medicine, sociology and statistics.*

The Academy's objectives are:

- to promote excellence in and encourage the advancement of the social sciences in Australia;
- to act as a coordinating group for the promotion of research and teaching in the social sciences;
- to foster excellence in research and to subsidise the publication of studies in the social sciences;
- to encourage and assist in the formation of other national associations or institutions for the promotion of the social sciences or any branch of them;
- to promote international scholarly cooperation and to act as an Australian national member of international organisations concerned with the social sciences;
- to act as consultant and adviser in regard to the social sciences; and,
- to comment where appropriate on national needs and priorities in the area of the social sciences.

These objectives are fulfilled through a program of activities, research projects, independent advice to government and the community, publication and cooperation with fellow institutions both within Australia and internationally.

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## President's column

### *Fay Gale*



At the beginning of February the Minister for Education, Training and Youth Affairs, The Hon Dr David Kemp MP, wrote to me advising of the review of the learned academies and giving the terms of reference.

As you are aware the academies have been reviewed every five years since they first received direct annual grants from the Education portfolio when John Dawkins was minister. Our last review was in 1995 and thus we are to be reviewed again in this current year.

The Minister has appointed Professor Geoffrey Blainey, previously professor of history at The University of Melbourne and former Chancellor of Ballarat University, and Professor John Maloney, the previous Vice-Chancellor of Curtin University of Technology and former Deputy Vice-Chancellor (International and Public Affairs) of Monash University. Mr Jason Finley of the Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs will provide the secretarial services.

The Terms of Reference provided by the Minister are as follows:

1. Examine the role and effectiveness of the Learned Academies in promoting their respective areas of interest to the Australian and international communities, noting in particular, developments that have occurred since the last Review was undertaken in 1995.
2. Examine the role and effectiveness of the Learned Academies, including through their publicly funded activities, as sources of advice to Government.
3. Identify cost effective means by which the public funded activities of the Learned Academies could further contribute to the development of public policy.
4. Develop and examine mechanisms to ensure the Academies' effectiveness in assessing excellence in research and scholarship, with particular regard to the role the Learned Academies could undertake in benchmarking and quality assurance, and how this might be achieved.

We have already commenced preparing our submission and this will be discussed and finalised at the meeting of the Executive in April. Other committees will also meet then to consider their contributions to the final submission. Over the last two years the Academy has made a number of changes to its procedures and these will be important in the review process. All Fellows have also been asked to provide the Secretariat with a summary of their interests and their public activities over the last 10 years to help us demonstrate the major contribution that Fellows of our Academy make to the national interest and to international scholarship across a whole range of socially significant issues.

### **The White Paper**

At the end of last year the Hon Dr David Kemp released the white paper entitled *Knowledge and Innovation: A Policy Statement on Research and Research Training*. There had been a great deal of discussion and many concerns were raised about a number of aspects described in the initial green paper. All of the Learned Academies made submissions arguing for changes of various kinds. The four presidents also had an appointment with Dr Kemp in Parliament House, Canberra. We asked a number of questions, the answers to which allayed some, but not all, of our concerns. The issues which particularly worried us dealt with the pivotal role of an independent and well-funded Australian Research Council, the need for effective, realistic and respected procedures for quality assessment of research and the assurance of high academic standards in postgraduate training.

The white paper does not fully answer the key areas that need to be addressed in the second and third of these concerns. However, one thing that is assured is the establishment of a new and independent Australian Research Council supported by its own Act, the Australian Research Council Act. Independent from the Department, but still within the Education, Training and Youth Affairs portfolio, it should enable the Council to play a more strategic and policy oriented role in research and research training in Australia. I have been appointed to this new Council and hope to be able to provide a strong voice for the Social Sciences.

In the first issue of *Dialogue* for 1999 I raised our concerns about the future of the ARC following the Penington report. It is gratifying to know that so many scholars responded to the green paper and made strong representations. Clearly these were not in vain.

### **Cross-Disciplinary Research**

The ARC has now released an important discussion paper entitled *Cross-Disciplinary Research*. It is especially important that social scientists assess this paper since we have such a wide coverage of cross-disciplinary research. It is an issue we have often debated, even in relation to our panel structure and how we incorporate new fields of knowledge. Much of the really ground-breaking research is now taking place at the edge of old disciplines and depending on methods of several areas whilst developing new techniques along the way. As we do with our panels, the ARC has a discipline-based program structure to determine funding. The ARC Council, recognising the limitations of such a structure and the barriers it presents for problem-based issues that cross disciplines, commissioned this discussion paper.

The paper begins by saying: 'There is currently widespread recognition that many of society's major problems, such as violence in families, drug addiction and environmental problems such as global warming, can no longer be addressed appropriately within the confines of individual disciplines.' These are certainly topics we have

discussed and we have debated ways of recognising such cross-disciplinary scholarship. Our workshops do cross discipline boundaries which adds greatly to their effectiveness. But we have not yet resolved this problem at the panel level.

I am sure Fellows will find this discussion paper interesting. The section for example on judging merit in cross-disciplinary research is of special relevance to us. Particular attention is drawn to the report of our review, *Challenges for the Social Sciences in Australia*, and to the attention our Academy has tried to give to the problems of evaluation and funding of cross-disciplinary research.

### **International Year for the Culture of Peace**

The primary focus of this, the first edition of *Dialogue* for 2000, is the recognition that 2000 has been designated the International Year for the Culture of Peace. As those of you who attended the Annual General Meeting of the Academy in November last year will know, we agreed to make the subject for our annual symposium *The Culture of Peace*. We plan to do this in conjunction with UNESCO and are hopeful that funding will become available from that body. A committee was established at the last AGM to prepare the symposium. In addition, the Academy of the Humanities will be meeting in Perth just prior to our meeting and they have now decided to adopt the same topic. If UNESCO funding is sufficient we plan to share some international visitors. I cannot say more until the funding is determined as this will influence the nature and scope of the symposium and whether we run it alone or in conjunction with the other bodies.

### **April Meetings**

On 11 and 12 April a number of the Academy's sub-committees will be meeting followed on 13 April by the first Executive Committee meeting for 2000. A central topic for discussion at these meetings will be the Review. I will be having a preliminary meeting with our Executive and members of the Department for Education, Training and Youth Affairs on 10 March. After that we hope to have a clear idea of what is required. It is exciting that, for all these meetings, we will have the benefit of our new rooms with greater space and more efficient offices and meeting rooms.

### **Social Sciences in the United Kingdom – the new Academy**

Since my first report of the establishment of an Academy of Social Sciences in Britain, we have had various correspondence with both the new Academy and the British Academy. There was initially some concern amongst some of our academicians and associated colleagues about the relationship of the new to the older Academy and the degree of overlap. In a previous issue of *Dialogue* (4/1999) we published a letter from one of our Fellows, Professor John Barnes, outlining some of these issues. In this edition of *Dialogue*, I am reproducing two letters from Sir Tony Wrigley, President of the British Academy (see under Academy News). These are self-

explanatory and demonstrate the progress being made. Sir Tony suggested that I also publish the list of names and affiliations of the foundation academicians elected to the new Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. The new academy, in announcing the inaugural members, states:

Members of the Academy were nominated by more than 40 learned societies affiliated to the Association of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences.

The new body will represent the social sciences of the United Kingdom in government, research councils, business and international bodies.

Space does not allow us to publish the full list of names and affiliations, but a copy is available on request from the Secretariat.

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## Vice President's note

### *Ian Castles*



At the Academy's Symposium *Facts and Fancies of Human Development on 8 November 1999*, I was one of several speakers who were critical of the UNDP *Human Development Report* (HDR), which was described in the conference program as 'a much-quoted and influential but highly misleading document'.

Subsequently, I prepared and provided to the Australian Bureau of Statistics a paper listing a number of examples of what I considered to be 'unprofessional treatment of statistical evidence' in the most recent report from the UNDP. At the initiative of Australia, this matter was added to the agenda of the recent session of the Statistical Commission of the United Nations, which meets annually in New York. My paper was circulated to members of the Commission as the room document for this agenda item. Following detailed discussion, the Commission adopted the following proposal by Canada on 3 March:

Without being able to directly verify the findings of Mr Ian Castles of Australia during its thirty-first session, the Statistical Commission took note of his report on the Human Development Report (HDR). The Commission is very concerned to ensure that the HDR is based on valid statistical evidence. The Commission, therefore, requests its Chairman to appoint a small group of statistical experts to prepare, in conjunction with the UNDP, a report on the accuracy of the statistical information in the HDR, focusing on the points raised by the room document authored by Mr Castles. The Group should report to the Bureau not later than June 2000.

The Commission authorizes the Bureau to take whatever follow-up steps it deems necessary.

The paper that is now to be reviewed by an Expert Group, in conjunction with the UNDP, is reproduced below.

### **The *Human Development Report 1997***

Opinions differ about the merits of the *Human Development Report* (HDR), issued annually by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

According to Amartya Sen, 1998 Nobel Laureate in economics, it is 'one of the major sources of information and understanding of the social and economic world';<sup>1</sup> and the UNDP's new Administrator, Mark Malloch Brown, sees the *Report* as the organisation's 'crown jewel'<sup>2</sup>.

But David Henderson, former head of the Economics and Statistics Department of the OECD, has recently described the HDR 1999 as 'a badly flawed document' which offers a false perspective on world

affairs<sup>3</sup>. Among many ‘excesses, deficiencies and misrepresentations’ of the HDR, Henderson referred to its ‘irresponsible and unprofessional treatment of statistical evidence’ and drew attention to my review article on HDR 1998.<sup>4</sup>

This paper follows up my review article. It points to a number of examples of ‘unprofessional treatment of statistical evidence’ in HDR 1999. These examples show that the statistics of the *Report* cannot be relied upon. I believe that professional statisticians have an obligation to make this known to the world’s governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media and the research community.

### 1. Share of rich countries in world output

*‘By the late 1990s the fifth of the world’s people living in the highest income countries had ... 86% of world GDP . . .’ (p 3, and chart on p 2)*

- The correct figure for the late 1990s is 60-65%. In 1996 the UNCTAD secretariat, using data provided by the HDR Office itself, estimated that the proportion of the world’s GDP of the richest quintile of the global population - ranking countries by their real GDP per capita (PPP\$) - was 64.4% in 1960 and 63.7% in 1991.<sup>5</sup>
- The early HDRs gave prominence to a claim that the share of the world’s GDP produced by the richest fifth of the global population increased from 70% in 1960 to well over 80% by the late 1980s. The claim that the proportion has now reached 86% will not bear scrutiny: its corollary is that the remaining 80% of the world’s people produce only 14% of global output.
- In fact, a somewhat **smaller** group – the 75% of global population in ‘low income’ and ‘lower middle income’ countries, as defined by the World Bank – produced 63% of the world’s cereals and 81% of the roots and tubers in 1995, and were responsible for 44% of the output (and 38% of the consumption) of commercial energy in 1997<sup>6</sup>
- Six developing countries (China, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil and Turkey) alone accounted for more over 25% of world GDP in 1997, according to Angus Maddison’s estimates and the databases for the IMF’s *World Economic Outlook* and the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators*. Yet none of these countries (not to mention most of the rest of Asia, Africa and Latin America) has a place in the world’s ‘richest fifth’.

### 2. Share of poor countries in world output

*‘By the late 1990s ... the bottom fifth [of the world’s people] had just 1% of world output ...’ (p 3, and chart on p 2)*

- Allowing for differences in price levels between countries, the proportion of output produced by the bottom fifth is now about 4%. It was 3.6% in 1991, according to the UNCTAD estimate cited above.



- In HDR 1999 itself, the 'Least developed countries' (LDCs), with about 10% of the world's people (Table 16, page 200) are shown as having an average real GDP per capita (PPP\$) equivalent to 15.7% of the world average in 1997 (Table 1, page 137).
- This means that the 'poorest 20%' of the world's population must produce more than 3% of global GDP, even if those in this group who are not in LDCs are just as poor as those who are.

### 3. Gap between the rich and the poor

*'Today, global inequalities in income and living standards have reached grotesque proportions. The gap in per capita income (GNP) between the countries with the richest fifth of the world's people and those with the poorest fifth widened from 30 to 1 in 1960, to 60 to 1 in 1990, to 74 to 1 in 1995.'* (p 104).

- These claims were first made in HDR 1992, and were rebutted in the UNCTAD report already cited.
- Estimates of real GDP (PPP basis) in successive HDRs suggest that the ratio of the top fifth to the bottom fifth, ranked by country averages, was about 12: 1 in 1960, 18: 1 in 1990 and 16: 1 in 1997.
- All experts agree that estimates which disregard differences in price levels cannot validly be used in comparisons of 'living standards' or of 'human development'.
- In any case, the HDR figures are internally inconsistent. The ratio of 74 to 1 is said to relate to 1997 in the 'Overview' to the 1999 *Report* (p 3), and to 1995 in the main text of the same *Report* (page 105); yet in the 1998 HDR, the 1995 ratio was put at 82 to 1.

### 4. State of Human Development in the LDCs

*'The marginalization of the least developed countries continues, accelerating as a result of the Asian crisis'* (p 105).

- There have been wide differences between the LDCs in their rate of human development in recent years.
- Estimates by the IMF staff published in *World Economic Outlook: October 1999*<sup>7</sup> indicate that real GDP per head in the LDCs as a group (which is very low in absolute terms) has been growing faster than in the 'Group of 7' (G7) major industrial countries. This will be true in the year 2000 for the sixth successive year. Allowing for the increase in the total population of the LDCs, estimated by the UN at 2.5% annually, the IMF estimates imply that real GDP per head of the LDCs increased in 1995 by 3.7% (G7, 1.6%); in 1996 by 3.1% (G7, 2.3%); in 1997 by 2.5% (G7, 2.3%); in 1998 by 2.0% (G7, 1.7%); in 1999 by 2.7% (G7, 2.0%); and in 2000 by 2.8% (G7, 1.9%).
- UNESCO data show that, between 1985 and 1996, gross education enrolments in the LDCs increased by 48% at the first

level of education, 55% at the second level and 70% at the third level.<sup>8</sup>

### 5. Rate of Growth of Output in LDCs

*Average GDP per capita of the LDCs (1987 US\$) decreased from \$277 in 1990 to \$245 in 1997 (Table 6, p 154).*

- These figures cannot be reconciled with World Bank estimates or IMF *World Economic Outlook* data, which imply that real GDP per head of the LDCs as a group **increased** by more than 10% between 1990 and 1997.
- The decrease during the 1990s shown in HDR 1999 arises because the HDR Office has not compared like with like. Their calculated average for 1997 excludes one major LDC (Sudan) which was included in 1990. As Sudan's average GDP per capita was over three times the average for the LDCs in 1990, and increased much faster than the average for these countries between 1990 and 1997<sup>9</sup>, the exclusion of the Sudan in 1997 produces a false comparison.
- Using the HDR's own data, the average per capita GDP of the 30 LDCs for which GDP estimates for both 1990 and 1997 are shown in Table 6 of HDR 1999 increased from \$US224 in 1990 to \$US227 in 1997. The average for these countries plus Sudan (using the HDR estimate of this country's GDP per head and the World Bank estimate of its increase) increased from \$US270 in 1990 to \$US297 in 1997 (which is consistent with the 10% increase implied in the *World Economic Outlook* estimates).

### 6. Rate of Growth in Output in 'South Asia'

*Average GDP per capita in 'South Asia' decreased from \$US463 in 1990 to \$US432 in 1997 (Table 6, p 154).*

- This comparison is obviously wrong, because all countries in 'South Asia' for which comparative figures for 1990 and 1997 are given in Table 6 (ie, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) show increases in GDP per capita over this period. The only major country for which figures are not given for 1997 (Iran) also increased its GDP per capita over this period.<sup>10</sup> The average of six positive numbers cannot be a negative number.
- Again the reason for the error in HDR 1999 is a failure to compare like with like: the 1990 average includes Iran, the 1997 average excludes Iran. As this country's average GDP per capita is much higher than in the other countries (especially on the 1987 exchange rate conversion basis used by the HDR Office), its exclusion in 1997 depresses the average for that year and invalidates the comparison.

### 7. Rate of Growth in Output in 'South Asia (excluding India)'

*Average GDP per capita in 'South Asia (excluding India)' decreased from \$US709 to \$US327 between 1990 and 1997 (Table 6, p 154).*

- Of more than 130 countries for which comparative figures are shown in Table 6, none suffered a halving of their GDP per capita between 1990 and 1997. It follows that such a massive reduction could not possibly have occurred in a group of countries with a combined population of almost 400 million.
- In fact, the changes in average GDP per capita between 1990 and 1997 in the South Asian countries other than India which **are** shown in Table 6 are as follows: Bangladesh, +22%; Maldives, +13%; Nepal, +18%; Pakistan, +15%; and Sri Lanka, +26%.
- Again the error arises because of a failure to compare like with like: Iran is included in the 1990 average, and excluded in 1997.

#### **8. Effect of the Asian financial crisis on other countries**

*'Angola and Kuwait could . . . have their GDPs decline by 14-18% [in 1998]. . . Zambia can expect . . . a 9% decline in its GDP [in 1998]' (p 40).*

- These estimates, made in a publication released in July 1999, were also shown in Table 1.3 headed 'The Asian crisis hurts distant economies and people' (p 41).
- In fact, these declines had not occurred, according to the IMF *World Economic Outlook: May 1999*, released on 20 April 1999.
- Angola and Venezuela were estimated in HDR 1999 to have suffered declines in their GDPs in 1998 of 18% and 6% respectively: the IMF estimates published in April 1999 showed no decline at all. The GDPs of Gabon, Nigeria, Mongolia and Chile were estimated in HDR 1999 to have decreased in 1998 by 13%, 4%, 6% and 3% respectively: according to the IMF staff there were increases of 2-4% in all of these countries. And the estimated decreases in Kuwait and Zambia shown in HDR 1999, of 14% and 9% respectively, compare with estimated decreases of only 2% on the IMF estimates.

#### **9. Growth in GNP per capita in the 1990s**

*'During 1990-97 real per capita GDP [of the world as a whole] increased at an average annual rate of more than 1%' (p 22).*

- This is an extreme understatement. Real GDP per capita of the world as a whole increased at an annual rate of 2.2% between 1990 and 1997.<sup>11</sup>
- The average annual rate of growth in real GDP per capita in 'developing countries' (IMF definition), with 77.5% of the world's population, was 4.3% between 1990 and 1997, compared with a average rate of about 1% per annum for these countries during the previous 170 years.<sup>12</sup>

#### **10. Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and the CIS**

*'Sixty countries have been getting steadily poorer since 1980' (Foreword by Administrator of UNDP, Mark Malloch Brown, p v).*

- The Administrator appears to have misinterpreted the statement in the body of the *Report* that 'For 59 countries – mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe and the CIS – GNP per capita declined' (p 31).
- This statement refers to the net change over the whole period 1980-1996: it cannot be inferred that all of these countries were 'getting steadily poorer' over the period. On the contrary, the GNP per capita of many of these countries increased during 5- or 7-year periods between 1980 and 1997 (Table 6), and the per capita GNPs of most of them increased between 1995 and 1998.<sup>13</sup>
- According to these IMF Staff estimates, the real GDP per capita of 21 of the 27 'countries in transition', and of 35 of the 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, increased in the 1995-98 period.<sup>14</sup>

### 11. Life expectancy in countries affected by HIV/AIDS

*'A loss of 17 years [in life expectancy] is projected for the nine countries in Africa with an HIV prevalence of 10% or more – Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe – down to 49 years by 2010 . . .'* (p 42).

- The statement implies that average life expectancy in the countries reached 66 years (49+17 years) before the onset of the epidemic.
- According to UN Population Division estimates,<sup>15</sup> none of these countries achieved an average life expectancy higher than 61 years, and in most of them the highest average reached was far lower.
- This is not to deny the extreme seriousness of the epidemic, and the significance of the losses in life expectancy projected by the UN.

### 12. Number of females not expected to survive to age 40

*'Nearly 340 million women are not expected to survive age 40'* (p 22).

- Of the 3020 million females in the world in mid-2000, the UN Population Division estimates that 2280 million are under 40 years of age.<sup>16</sup>
- Of these 2280 million, more than 2200 million (96.5% of the total) are expected to survive to age 40. (This calculation is made by taking the sum of the projected female population aged 40-44 years in 2040, 35-39 years in 2035, 30-34 years in 2030, and so on). According to the UN estimates, the number of women not expected to survive to age 40 is therefore less than **80 million**, not 340 million.
- The error in the text of HDR 1999 is probably attributable to the incorrect column heading in Table 4 ('People not expected to survive to age 40 (as % of total population)'). This has led the

authors to apply the proportion of non-survivors to age 40 for the 'World' (12.5%) to the entire female population.

- In fact, the probability of death before age 5 in the world as a whole, both for females and for males, is 8.3%.<sup>17</sup> The non-survivor proportion of 12.5% from age 0 to age 40 shown in the HDR therefore implies a very high probability of survival from age 5 to age 40.

### 13. Number of people not expected to survive to age 60

*'Around 1.5 billion people are not expected to survive to age 60' (p 22)*

- This is another incorrect inference from an incorrect column heading (Table 5, 'People not expected to survive to age 60 (as % of total population)').
- The UN Population Division estimates imply that the number of people now living who will not survive to age 60 is about **750 million**, not 1500 million.

### 14. Youth unemployment in OECD countries

*'Among the youth [in OECD countries], one in five is unemployed' (p 32)*

- The proportion of youth (persons aged 20-24) **in the labour force** in industrial countries who are unemployed is 16%, or about 1 in 6 (Table 26, p 236).
- A footnote to Table 26 correctly notes that the 'total' unemployment rate is related to the labour force, but there is no footnote to indicate that this is also true of the youth unemployment rates cited.
- The proportion of unemployed 15-24 year-olds in industrial countries is less than one in ten.

### 15. Agriculture as % of GDP in South Asian countries

*'In many South Asian countries agriculture accounts for more than 33% of GDP . . . ' (p 94)*

- According to the HDR 1999 itself (Table 12) the only South Asian countries in which agriculture accounted for as much as 33% of GDP in 1997 were Nepal (41%) and Bhutan (38%). The population of these two countries is less than 2% of the population of South Asia.
- In Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, agriculture accounted for between 20% and 25% of GDP.

### 16. Combined gross enrolment ratios: use of UNESCO data

*'This year's HDI is based on . . . revised data on . . . combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios from UNESCO' (p 128).*

- The resulting significant changes in HDI rankings, which were attributed to revised data on gross enrolments in Table TN1 (pp

164-166), arose because for about 50 countries the data advised by UNESCO had **not** been used in HDR 1998.

- With some exceptions (see below) the HDR Office used the data supplied by UNESCO in HDR 1999. It was this decision by the HDR, and not 'revised data . . . from UNESCO' which led to significant changes in HDI rankings.

#### 17. Capping of gross enrolment ratio at 100%

*HDR 1999 did not report the combined gross enrolment ratio (GER) advised by UNESCO for Australia, Belgium, Sweden and the United Kingdom. For these countries the reported ratio, which the HDR Office used to calculate the human development index (HDI), was 'capped' at 100% (Table 1, p 134).*

- The decision to cap this ratio shows that the Office does not understand the basis of these figures. The 'gross enrolment ratio' is the number of students enrolled in a level of education, **regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of official school age . . .** (p 254, emphasis added).
- There are large numbers of enrolments of persons who are above official school age in many 'high human development countries', and it is illogical to adjust **some** of these ratios downwards. The four countries in respect of which the ratio was capped are those in which the number of 'above official school age' enrolments exceeded the number of the 'official school age' population which is not enrolled.
- If the HDR Office had not made this error, the country at the top of the HDI ranks in 1999 would have been Australia, not Canada.

#### 18. Combined GERs: Gender-related development index (GDI)

*For purposes of the GDI table, and in calculating the GDI, the combined GERs for females advised by UNESCO were 'capped' for Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom; and those for males were 'capped' for Australia and Belgium.*

- This procedure is illegitimate, for the reason explained in 17 above.
- Serious distortions are introduced into the gender-related development index as a result. In the case of the United Kingdom, for example, the combined GERs reported by UNESCO were **109%** for females and 99% for males. For purposes of the GDI, HDR 1999 reported that the United Kingdom ratios were **100%** for females and 99% for males.
- Although the ratio of females to males in UK enrolments was greater than in any other country, the basis upon which the GDI values were calculated assumes that the ratio of females to males is greater than in the United Kingdom in 47 countries: Canada, Norway, the United States, Sweden, Iceland, France, Finland, Denmark, New Zealand, Italy, Ireland, Spain, Israel,

Brunei Darussalam, Portugal, Bahamas, Slovenia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Argentina, Uruguay, Qatar, Slovakia, United Arab Emirates, Hungary, Venezuela, Panama, Estonia, Malaysia, Cuba, Belarus, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Samoa (Western), Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Honduras, Namibia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Botswana and Lesotho.

### 19. Meaning of gender-related development index

*'The closer a country's GDI is to its HDI, the less gender disparity there is in the country. But the GDI for every country is lower than its HDI, implying that there is gender inequality in every society. For 43 of the 143 countries, the GDI rank is lower than the HDI rank, revealing the unequal progress in building women's capabilities compared with men's' (p 132)*

- The HDR Office has misinterpreted the GDI results. The GDI is silent about whether the 'unequal progress' has been 'in building women's capabilities compared with men's' or *vice versa*.
- Comments in previous *Reports* that 'no society treats its women as well as its men' (HDR 1997, p 39), and that 'The human development achievements of women fall below those of men in every country' (HDR 1998, p 31) reveal a similar misconception.
- Gender-specific indices can readily be calculated from the data in Table 2. They show that for such countries as the Russian Federation, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the female-specific index is **higher** than the male-specific index. This is mainly because, in these countries, the average life expectancy at birth of women exceeds that of men by a much larger margin than the difference of five years which the HDR Office allows 'to account for the fact that women tend to live longer than men' (p 160).

### 20. Relationship between GDP growth and human development

*'Even though there is a strong link between trade and growth, there is no automatic link with human development. . . Egypt and Pakistan achieved . . . per capita income growth of more than 3% in 1985-97, yet both still have far to go in human development.'*

- The relevant comparison with growth in income is with the **improvement** in human development, not with its absolute level.
- In fact, Egypt and Pakistan did not achieve per capita income growth of more than 3% annually in 1985-97: the growth rates implied in the data provided in HDR 1999 itself (Table 6) are 1.7% per annum for Egypt and 2.5% per annum for Pakistan.
- Yet there was rapid 'human development' (as measured by the HDI) in both countries in the 1985-97 period. HDR 1999 itself lists Egypt, after Indonesia, as the 'low human development' country which achieved the **fastest** progress (after Indonesia) in these years (p 130).

- The analysis in HDR 1999, and particularly in Table 4.1 on page 85, shows that the HDR Office has been led into error by the index upon which it places such store.
- Specifically, the 'stronger links' between economic growth and human development which the Office believes to be established for some countries (Singapore and the Hong Kong SAR) merely reflect, for these countries with high HDIs, the dominating influence of rapid per capita income growth in their percentage 'reduction in human development index shortfall'. The argument is circular.
- Conversely, there are no grounds for asserting that there are 'weaker links' between economic growth and human development in the case of countries with relatively low HDIs such as Pakistan and Egypt. It was these countries, rather than Singapore and the Hong Kong SAR, which achieved rapid human development in the education and life expectancy components of the HDI in the 1985-97 period. The HDI obscures rather than reveals the relative progress of countries in human development.

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<sup>1</sup> Sen, Amartya (1998), 'Mahbub ul Haq: The courage and creativity of his ideas', speech at the Memorial Meeting for Mahbub ul Haq, 15 October. UNDP website.

<sup>2</sup> UNDP (1999), *Human Development Report*: v.

<sup>3</sup> Henderson, David (2000), 'False Perspective: the UNDP View of the World' in *Facts and Fancies of Human Development*, Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia Occasional Paper Series 1/2000, forthcoming.

<sup>4</sup> Castles, Ian (1998), 'The Mismeasure of Nations: A Review Essay on the *Human Development Report 1998*' in *Population and Development Review* 24, 4, December.

<sup>5</sup> UNCTAD (1996), *The Least Developed Countries: 1996 Report*, page V.

<sup>6</sup> World Bank (1995 and 1997), *World Development Indicators 1995 and 1997*.

<sup>7</sup> IMF (1999a), *World Economic Outlook: October 1999*.

<sup>8</sup> UNESCO (1998), *Statistical Yearbook 1998*: 2-12.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank (1999), *World Development Indicators 1999*, Table 4.1.

<sup>10</sup> IMF (1999b), *World Economic Outlook: May 1999*: 153.

<sup>11</sup> IMF (1999a), *op cit*: 158.

<sup>12</sup> Angus Maddison (2000), 'Economic Progress: the Last Half Century in Historical Perspective' in Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia, *Facts and Fancies of Human Development*, Occasional Paper Series 1/2000, forthcoming.

<sup>13</sup> IMF (1999a), *op cit*: 169-179.

<sup>14</sup> IMF (1999a), *ibid*: 176, 179.

<sup>15</sup> UN (1999), *World Population Prospects: the 1998 Revision*, Vol 1.

<sup>16</sup> UN (1999), *ibid* Vol 2: 11.

<sup>17</sup> WHO (1999), *World Health Report 1999*: 90.

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## Gender Justice and a Culture of Peace

**Ingeborg Breines**



Equal rights and opportunities for women and men, girls and boys are essential, if not a precondition for the full realisation of UNESCO's vision of a culture of peace. The status of women and gender equality has had since the 80s a particularly prominent place in UNESCO's programs and is presently one of the four priorities of the organisation. Despite previous and on-going efforts by the United Nations, Member States and civil society we are however, far from achieving gender equality on a global basis including within UNESCO's fields of competence: education, science, culture and communication. This article will not deal specifically and from a statistical point of view with the issue of gender injustice but will concentrate on and argue for the importance of gender equality and gender justice, *de jure* and *de facto*, in the realisation of the concept and vision of the UNESCO trans-disciplinary project: Towards a Culture of Peace.

The article will relate to the UNESCO Women and a Culture of Peace Programme that builds on relevant normative instruments at the United Nations and UNESCO, including the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women), the Beijing Platform for Action, and UNESCO's Agenda for Gender Equality and the Statement on Women's Contribution to a Culture of Peace, both prepared for the Fourth World Conference on Women. The conclusion of the Agenda for Gender Equality reflects the point of departure of this article: 'There can be no lasting peace without equality before the law and the full enjoyment of human rights by men and women.'

### **A Culture of Peace**

A culture of peace as defined by UNESCO encompasses not only peace as absence of war, but focuses on the content, the substance and the conditions of peace. In the words of the Director General of UNESCO, Mr. Federico Mayor: 'The culture of peace is a transition from the logic of force and fear to the force of reason and love'. In a Culture of Peace, dialogue and respect for human rights replaces violence; inter-cultural understanding and solidarity replaces enemy images; sharing and free flow of information replaces secrecy; and egalitarian partnership and full empowerment of women succeeds male domination.

Building the culture of peace entails unlearning the codes of the culture of war and violence that has pervaded our existence in a myriad of ways. It entails questioning the institutions, priorities and practices of this culture as well as the destructive production, trafficking and use of arms and drugs. It further entails challenging a series of concepts and notions such as the current notion of development based primarily on economic criteria; the narrow concept of security, often measured by the counting of arms and tanks, instead of measuring social and human security and the costs

of war and violence; the notion of power as power over, rather than shared power; as well as different, other more sophisticated types of injustices, discrimination and exclusion.

The goals, ideals, and strategies that comprise the movement from a culture of war to a culture of peace are drawn from, and seek to revitalise major international, normative instruments which are basic to the United Nations' mission of helping secure peace in the world community, and protecting the human rights of all the world's citizens. It is in the spirit of these normative instruments that the UNESCO Culture of Peace Project insists on the prevention of violent conflicts; on acting in a timely manner with long-term preventive measures to radically attack the root-causes of violence: poverty, exclusion, ignorance, inequality and injustice, and to avoid the terrible waste of human lives and material resources occasioned by violent conflict and war.

It has been asserted that in this century more than a hundred million persons have died due to war and war-like activities. This decade alone has seen some hundred armed conflicts, and growing structural and physical violence in all parts of the world. The data also presents evidence of a growing tendency in modern warfare for civilian victims, mostly women and children, to largely out-number any other group as the casualties of war. According to the UNHCR, women and children account for approximately 70-80 per cent of the world's refugees.<sup>1</sup> In just one decade, the number of soldiers engaged in UN peace-keeping missions has risen from 10,000 to 85,000. The costs of these operations have also increased tenfold, shifting resources away from preventative peace-building initiatives. The vast amounts of resources used for peace-keeping and in-conflict and post-conflict humanitarian assistance depict our failure to meet basic human needs and concerns in an adequate and timely manner.

In a culture of peace, people would assume a more global identity, which does not necessarily replace, but rather builds upon other multiple identities such as sex, family, community, ethnicity, nationality, profession and age. Building a sense of global, multiple identities, underlining the growing inter-dependence among all countries and peoples is likely to bring us closer to inter-cultural understanding which is vital for peaceful relations. Such an identity would also provide a sense of common humanity among all the peoples as citizens of the world. It is this universal human identity which could provide the strongest assurance for the protection of human rights. The universal human identity envisioned as the hallmark of a culture of peace would not tolerate disparities among any groups of human beings, including systematic discrimination of women.

### **Scenarios for the new millennium**

The process of transforming societies away from expressions of war and violence towards a culture of peace and non-violence, has become a system-wide challenge. UNESCO, with strong support from the civil society, has spear-headed the concept of a culture of

peace that has been accepted by the wider UN system. The General Assembly resolutions 52/13 and 52/15 (November 1997) proclaimed the Year 2000 as the International Year for the Culture of Peace, designated UNESCO as the lead agency and requested the UN Secretary General in cooperation with the UNESCO Director General to prepare a draft UN Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace for submission to the 53<sup>rd</sup> General Assembly (Autumn 1998). Nobel Peace Prize Laureates suggested to ECOSOC (July 1998), a Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World to follow the International Year, and all Member States will be encouraged to develop their own respective National Programme of Action for a Culture of Peace.

As we approach a new millennium, the culture of peace concept provides us with a marvellous and new opportunity to reflect and to refine our visions for the future, confronting ourselves with such fundamental questions as: Why is the world seemingly more willing to pay for the costs of war and violence than the costs of peace? How can we reduce the enormous gaps between military and social expenditure? What are the main obstacles to a global culture of peace? Who benefits from the culture of war and violence? How do we learn to live together and how do we best celebrate human and creative diversity?<sup>2</sup> While these fundamental questions are not new to the human quest for peace, never before in history have they had the same urgency; and never before have they been considered from a gender perspective.

New and alternative approaches to development based on gender equality and equal partnership are essential to overcome pessimism and inertia, and to inspire new dynamism and hope in the future, for all the world's citizens. Women have distinct contributions to make to the traditionally male-dominated and defined power structures. Due to experiences gained from gender-specific roles, assigned throughout different life stages, and from the demands related to their 'mothering and caring' functions, women might have different perspectives, alternative visions and methodological approaches. Largely excluded from formal decision making, women share collective experiences from family and community work, despite their heterogeneity as a group. It is time that this insight be used also in political policy making. With more men in caring functions and more women in political decision making, old patterns will change and the potential of every human being will matter more than their sex.

### **Education: the leading modality for change**

*'Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed.'*<sup>3</sup> For UNESCO, education is the key to achieving equality, justice and democracy in every day life and a guarantee of a sufficiently broad basis for recruitment to decision-making positions. Education, both formal and non-formal, in schools, in the family, through mass media and

social institutions, is the most important process by which people can gain the values, attitudes and behavioural patterns of a culture of peace. Education is the leading modality to promote a culture of peace, provided however, that the education include the excluded, is relevant to different socio-cultural contexts, is of high quality, is gender-sensitive, (ie, recognises the differences between women and men, honours their fundamental equality, seeks to overcome gender inequities) and encourages inter-personal, inter-cultural and inter-national dialogue.

Education for human rights, peace, democracy, non-violence and tolerance is particularly important for bringing about a change towards a gender-sensitive culture of peace as defined by people themselves on the basis of their socio-political, economic and cultural conditions. The world's ministers of education meeting on the occasion of the International Conference on Education, Geneva, 1994, in adopting the *Integrated Framework for Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy*, endorsed by UNESCO's General Conference, underlined their intention 'to take suitable steps to establish in educational institutions an atmosphere contributing to the success of education for international understanding, so that they become ideal places for the exercise of tolerance, respect for human rights, the practice of democracy and learning about the diversity and wealth of cultural identities'. They also pledged 'to pay special attention to improving curricula, the content of textbooks, and other educational materials including new technologies, with a view to educating caring and responsible citizens, open to other cultures, able to appreciate the value of freedom, respectful of human dignity and differences, and able to prevent conflicts or resolve them by non-violent means'.

In the report of the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-First Century<sup>4</sup> four pillars of education are outlined: learning to know, learning to do, learning to be and learning to live together, with the greatest emphasis placed on the challenge of learning to live together. Learning to live together is seen as a 'second literacy', as indispensable to a culture of peace as literacy itself. A subcategory of the 'second literacy' might well be 'gender literacy' - learning to interpret the nature of the gendered world which separates men and women in what some have called 'gender apartheid', and to read the significance of the gender dis-aggregated data the UN now gathers as it 'mainstreams' a gender perspective.

### **Girls and Women's Education**

In most parts of the world, girls are under-represented at every school level. The gender gap widens the higher one advances in the educational system. Such factors as economic constraints, preference accorded to the boy-child, the distance to school, early marriage and teenage pregnancy constitute major obstacles and must be addressed.

Despite recent improvements, the present gender imbalance in educational opportunities is a challenge to concepts of justice and development. It is equally a challenge to peace. The world deserves literate women and men, critically and constructively participating in shaping our common future. Equal access to education and training does not suffice. Renewed attention must be given to the relevance, quality and content of education. It should reflect the needs and aspirations of both girls and boys.

The lesser status assigned to women and girls in most societies and the resulting negative psychological effects hamper their pursuit of studies, work and social position. Specific measures such as the promotion of a broader implementation of relevant normative instruments and the development of appropriate gender sensitive teacher training, curricula and teaching material are required. Given existing gender imbalances, it might be important to stimulate boys and girls differently, under the same curricula, to compensate for past biases in opportunities and expectations. Although basics of home economics, life skills education, preparation for parenting and values education based on gender equality are important for both girls and boys, these elements would, for compensatory reasons, be of particular benefit to boys, also as a vital means of reversing socialisation processes that might lead to aggression and violence. Adolescence is a crucial period when important decisions are made regarding family-life and careers. There are some positive global trends towards longer schooling and delayed marriages. But there is also an increasing number of adolescent pregnancies and a growing exploitation of young women, both detrimental to their health and dignity. The aggregated impact of HIV and AIDS on education will likely affect the education of girls more than boys, thereby hindering the progress made in female education over the last decade.

Education, as an important factor for poverty alleviation, must also stimulate creativity and entrepreneurship, and be geared towards the world of work. In a world increasingly monetised, technical and vocational education and training, educational and vocational guidance and career counselling, as well as higher education need to target girls and women in order to break with practices confining women to low-skill, low-paid jobs, highlighting the correlation between educational levels, occupational status, power and income.

Adult education facilitates skills training and retraining in a society in which the skills needed for survival are rapidly changing. Women still lag behind, despite the fact that women might be better prepared than men to confront uncertainties and instability, as they historically have had to cope with shifting life situations - imposed mainly by child bearing and rearing and economic trends which have made women move in and out of the labour market. Adult education is crucial for women to keep up with new challenges and to compensate for past educational deprivation. Non-formal education, tailored to adult needs and interests, may contribute to financial autonomy and to strengthening participation in community life. For

women in rural areas, or isolated communities, the combination of relevant technologies and innovative teaching methods may offer new hope.

The Culture of Peace radio program in El Salvador is an example of women's empowerment at the grass-roots level. In the Buenos Tiempos Mujer project, former factions work together on building a gender sensitive culture of peace, based on the development of self-esteem, dialogue, and the overcoming of violence both in the family and in society. A number of women correspondents ensure that the content of the radio program is relevant to the population, especially to those living in deprived areas. They also ensure that a broad variety of women's voices are heard. The program is broadcast on a regular basis on almost 50 radio stations, including former guerilla stations. Innovative educational material and popular games accompany the emissions.

Distance education has proved to be of particular value to women, who often are less geographically mobile than men, due to family obligations and cultural factors. Community radio, local-language newspapers, mobile teacher teams and libraries, solar powered transmitters, desktop publishing and satellites are all examples of distance education and learning across frontiers, effective means for reaching the unreached. Higher education is a key component in the empowerment process, as it provides women with the necessary decision-making skills. Low female representation in the sciences, both in research and application, is largely a manifestation of gender biases in expectations and the quantity and quality of education that girls and women receive. Poor education and training hamper women's ability to articulate their needs and priorities and to make full use of existing opportunities. If women and men are to be partners in development, they must have equal access to knowledge.

### **Main-streaming a gender perspective**

All four UN Conferences on Women have had as their themes equality, development and peace. At the Beijing Conference in 1995 the need for action and the need to see the inter-relation between these themes were strongly underlined. This comprehensive and holistic approach to development which is only now finding its way into mainstream policies owes its strength and vitality to the productive and cooperative efforts of the UN, the women's movement and feminist research.

Since the 4th World Conference on Women in Beijing, the United Nations system has been committed to the main-streaming of a gender perspective in all its activities and policies. Main-streaming a gender perspective requires compilation and analysis of statistical data showing life conditions of women and men, how women and men are involved in society at different levels, what they each contribute, their particular needs and interests, and how each

gender benefits or suffers from policies and projects, including how resources and power are distributed and used.

UNESCO, as a member of that system, established the Women and a Culture of Peace Programme in 1996, *inter alia* with reference to the Beijing Platform for Action, which states that the 'full participation of women in power structures are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace'. The main task of the Women and a Culture of Peace Programme is main-streaming a gender perspective on the project Towards a Culture of Peace.

Besides analysing the gender related factors that hamper or inspire development towards a culture of peace, the Women and a Culture of Peace Programme works towards:

- Supporting women's initiatives for peace,
- Empowering women for democratic participation in political processes to increase their capacity and impact especially in economic and security issues, and
- Gender sensitive socialisation and training for non-violence and egalitarian partnerships, with a special focus on boys and young men.

#### **What do women bring to the cause of peace?**

The prevailing gender disparities, the feminisations of poverty, and continued discrimination and violence against women have prompted a new search for effective strategies and concrete actions in order to remedy the situation and achieve the goals of equality, development and peace.

Women make up more than half of the world's population. Their physical resources are currently overtaxed and under-valued. Their intellectual and creative potential is largely ignored. As transmitters of cultural values, in particular to children and youth, and as agents for change, women are an under-utilised source of creative energy, experience and wisdom. Women's manifold contributions to society are, however, increasingly being made visible and acknowledged. The so-called 'women's issues' are gradually being taken out of isolation and made societal issues of justice, human rights and human resource development, to be tackled by men as well as by women.

Women and men are in general socialised differently. In most societies women are educated for caring functions, not only for children, but also for the sick and the old, and even for able men. The world is desperately in need of this experience, which can be appropriately called women's 'rationality of care'. In general, women are also outside the present power structures and are therefore free to provide a substantial critique, much needed alternatives, as well as a rethinking of existing structures, institutions and practices.

Women have only to a limited degree participated in the description and analysis of political and economic reality and have therefore, on

a general basis, hardly influenced policy-making. It is essential to involve women both in the description of reality and in policy-making. It is further necessary to listen carefully to how women define their visions of a culture of peace, and to strengthen the growing number of women who now want to influence decision-making, to solve problems at the root instead of utilising 'stop-gap' measures in emergency situations. The story about a fisher woman standing on the shore of a river unable to fish because she constantly had to rescue drowning persons in the river rapids is representative of an emerging attitude among women faced with the dilemma of short term emergency actions versus long term strategic planning. The fisher woman tried desperately to assist, but with no abatement in the flow of victims, decided finally to leave and go up-stream to see who was throwing those people who had not learnt to swim into the water.

A growing number of women want to change not only their realities but that of society at large and create a positive environment for future generations. To this end, several UN agencies assist in gathering, analysing and disseminating information on women's traditional and innovative methods and practices for peace building and conflict prevention and transformation. Even though we do not as yet have irrefutable evidence that women in a critical mass would make a difference in political and economic decision-making positions, we cannot afford to continue to under-utilise half of humanity. All of the human talents that are evenly distributed between women and men are required and must be applied in solving the global problems that impede the realisation of a culture of peace. Moreover, it is an acknowledged human right of both women and men to participate on equal terms in democratic processes at all levels of society. The exclusion of and discrimination against women cannot be tolerated, neither in the name of freedom of expression, market economy, cultural traditions and practices, nor through the interpretations of any religion.

There is some evidence that women politicians give priority to what is generally called 'feminine values' like social security, education, ecological security, such as clean drinking water and food for the children, and that due to hardship they have developed strong survival skills and flexibility. In general women are also questioning the tremendous gap between military and social expenditure. This gives promise to the potential of women making a significant difference by encouraging policies that support gender equality and peace.

Other studies also describe foreign policy, and notably defence issues, as areas in which women and men are deeply divided in their attitudes and policy preferences. However it is imperative not to romanticise or over-emphasise (ie, attribute to nature or female biology) the peacefulness of women in a way that undermines the overriding goal of an egalitarian partnership between women and men.



### **Enhancing solidarity and women's participation in democratic processes**

A growing number of countries are now moving towards democracy. Nonetheless, the majority of existing democracies are still but 'unfinished democracies'. One third of the countries of the world have less than 5 percent or no women in parliament. A very few countries have recently approached a critical mass of women in parliament, and only the Nordic countries for some years have had a critical mass of women (minimum 33.3 per cent) in both parliament and government. Throughout world history there have been less than 30 elected female Heads of State or Government. All of them held office during the last fifty years, most of them in the last ten years, with a maximum of ten women at the same time. At present only 3 countries have an elected woman head of state or government - Bangladesh, Ireland and Sri Lanka. An examination of the present situation reveals that there are only 1 per cent of women elected heads of state and government; 7 per cent of women ministers, and very few heading powerful ministries such as Foreign Affairs, the Interior or Finance; and 11 per cent of women parliamentarians. This implies that 99 per cent of the top political power is in the hands of men, as well as some estimated 99 per cent of the world's resources. Women have yet to take advantage of their majority position to influence political decision making. It is equally important to develop and encourage networking among empowered women; parliamentarians, mayors and local leaders, to build solidarity and strengthen their roles as promoters of a culture of peace.

Women's solidarity is traditionally strongest in times of difficulties and distress, where women shoulder each others burdens, share survival strategies and actions, take care of children, aging, and sick, or support each other when men are absent. There is less proof of solidarity with women in positions of power and authority. The reason might be a lack of experience with women in powerful positions, lack of efficient networks and support groups, and also the tough competition to get through the series of obstacles often referred to as the 'glass-ceiling'. Recruitment to higher positions often has been from women of a better-situated class. The few women who have risen to positions of power usually have had to adapt to existing patterns in order not to be marginalised by the rest of the power structure, thereby risking alienation from other women. Conditions have not always encouraged solidarity among women in power, nor between them and other women.

In order to encourage the process leading toward gender equality in political decision-making, it is important to strengthen solidarity, both through broad women's support for women in decision-making positions and through the accountability of 'empowered' women towards their female constituencies. The formation of women's caucuses in representative bodies, and international associations are significant developments in this process.

### **Only because he is a man - the question of quotas**

While there seems to be broad agreement at an intergovernmental level of the need for practical measures in order to ensure gender equality, the question of quotas, (ie, calling for specific percentages or numbers of women in various political and economic bodies and other public institutions) remains politically delicate.

There is a clear reluctance to institute concrete, practical, measurable steps to undo the injustices that are strongly imbedded. Is change slow in coming because the full picture of gender inequality is not widely known, or is there the assumption that much more has been achieved than is actually the case? Is it that the majority of men and some women are still not gender-sensitive and therefore opt for keeping things the way they are? Or is it that some men are afraid of partnership and real equality with women and are not ready to give up their privileges? Could it be that some women because of privileged circumstances and others because they have not been socialised to ask for anything for themselves or their sisters have not sought change? Or is it that in periods when jobs are scarce, women are not encouraged to seek work or positions? Could it be that quotas for women are not always practised satisfactorily? Or that some women find quota systems to be demeaning when there should be fair distribution and human rights?

### **Masculinities**

The first broad attempt by the UN to put male roles and masculinities in relation to peace issues on the world agenda, was made by UNESCO, when organising an Expert Group Meeting on Male Roles and Masculinities in the Perspective of a Culture of Peace in Oslo, Norway, September 1997. The concept of the meeting, that brought together an equal number of women and men, gender researchers, peace researchers, and activists, stems from the realisation that a culture of peace can only be achieved through more egalitarian, partnership-oriented male roles that replaces stereotypical views of masculinity based on dominance, force, and aggressiveness. It also reflects the understanding that rigid and stereotyped gender roles prevent individuals from realising their full potential and run counter to the principle of participatory democracy. The participants acknowledged that whilst women's roles and status have been broadly debated over the last decades, men have been seen as the standard human being - the norm - and men's roles and positions have hardly been discussed, and much less questioned.

It was argued that most men through their upbringing, feel entitled to dominant positions in the family, work and political life, and react negatively when this entitlement is not fulfilled. These reactions might lead to domestic violence, violence in schools or in the street, adherence to extremist gangs and sects, or wanting to join legitimate structures which use force, such as the police and the military. It might also lead to reinforced structural violence like

exclusion, or the refusal to vote on concrete measures towards gender equality in the workplace or in different levels of society.

The Oslo Meeting explored the social, cultural and economic conditions producing violence among men, political and practical strategies for reducing men's violence, and the possibilities for raising boys in ways that emphasise qualities such as emotional response, caring and communication skills that are vital to a culture of peace. There is a clear link between masculinity and violence. Statistics, however insufficient, show that men (often young men) are responsible for almost 90 per cent of all physical violence, though it must be emphasised that most men are not violent, nor naturally violent. There seems to be a general 'masculinisation' of societies, including the emergence of militarised masculinities in communities under threat. The masculinisation has in some societies even reached young girls who have started using violent methods in their search for equality and recognition.

The Meeting also undertook the task of formulating recommendations for practical measures that enhance the development of a gender-sensitive culture of peace, in relation to society and its major institutions. Since some groups of men are becoming a risk factor, not only to themselves, but to society at large, notably the poorly educated, the unemployed, the demobilised soldiers, and groups rigidly linked to power structures, special emphasis should be given to developing insight and training to address the uncertainties, conflicts, frustration and feelings of 'dis-empowerment' to prevent recourse to violent behaviour.

State supported parental leave for fathers, establishment and or strengthening of networks of young men against violence, training in non-violent conflict-resolution and conflict transformation on different levels of the school system were among the recommendations for a post-patriarchal society for the new millennium.

### **Commitments**

Among the main obstacles to a gender-sensitive culture of peace are the myths that nothing can be changed because (i) violence is inherent in human nature, and (ii) violence is effective. Women who subscribe less readily than men to the myth of the efficacy of violence, have shown themselves as strong supporters of a culture of peace. Many women - and some men - have committed themselves to the principles of the UNESCO Statement on Women's Contribution to a Culture of Peace, notably to:

- support national and international efforts to ensure equal access to all forms of learning opportunities, with a view to women's empowerment and access to decision-making;
- promote relevant quality education that imparts knowledge of the human rights of men and women, skills of non-violent conflict resolution, respect for the natural environment, inter-cultural understanding and awareness of global

interdependence, which are essential constituents of a culture of peace;

- encourage new approaches to development that take account of women's priorities and perspectives;
- oppose the misuse of religion, cultural and traditional practices for discriminatory purposes;
- seek to reduce the direct and indirect impact the culture of war on women - in the form of physical and sexual violence or the neglect of social services for excessive military expenditure;
- increase women's freedom of expression and involvement in the media as well as the use of gender-sensitive language and images;
- promote knowledge and respect for international normative instruments concerning the human rights of girls and women and ensure widespread dissemination in order to further the well-being of all, men and women, including the most vulnerable groups of societies;
- support governmental and intergovernmental structures as well as women's associations and NGOs committed to the development of a culture of peace based on equality between men and women.

If you would like to sign the Statement, to commit yourself to the development of a culture of peace based on equality between women and men, contact UNESCO at its Headquarters in Paris, in the field offices, or through the National Commissions for UNESCO.

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<sup>1</sup> United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (1998), *1997 Statistical Overview*.

<sup>2</sup> UNESCO (1996), *Our Creative Diversity*, Report of the Commission on Culture and Development. UNESCO.

<sup>3</sup> Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 16 November, 1945.

<sup>4</sup> UNESCO (1996), *Learning, the Treasure Within*. UNESCO.

*Ingeborg Breines is Director of Women and a Culture of Peace Programme, UNESCO. This article is a slightly modified version of one which first appeared in Bhandare, Murlidhar (ed) *The World of Gender Justice*.*

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## Peace

### *Ken Inglis*



Peace hath her victories No less renowned than war, wrote Milton. Not in Australia, if monuments are the mark of renown. To be sure, we do have some statues and other memorials honouring individuals and enterprises not of a warlike character, though even they may have a connection with war not evident to the casual observer. The Archibald fountain in Sydney's Hyde Park, for example, an apparently peaceable sculpture, was conceived as 'commemorative of Australia and France having fought side by side for the liberties of the world.'

Most of our public monuments commemorate the two decades or so of Australia's wars rather than the almost two centuries when our nation was at peace. An allegorical figure deemed to represent peace does appear on some of those war memorials, but her meaning is obscure. In Mildura, Victoria, for example, the stonemason's female figure leaning towards a cross was familiarly known as both Peace and Grief. If a winged woman carried a laurel wreath, was she Peace or Victory? And who cared? Unlike the ubiquitous statue of the digger, she was not inspected for authenticity; neither in body nor in spirit was she supposed to be either a representation of Australian womanhood or a depiction of women's qualities and aspirations.

When I began to study these war memorials I thought at first that a number of them did make affirmations about peace, since they are named Peace Memorials. I wondered whether that word signified some pacifist intent among the makers. But it nearly always means only that the memorial was an enterprise of 1919, the year of the Peace Treaty, initiated by people with perceptions of the war no different from those of neighbours who happened to create their tributes earlier or later.

A peace-loving observer might well choose to give the memorial a more peaceable reading than its makers had intended. The socialist writer Nettie Palmer cherished a modest monument made of two rough granite boulders at Kalorama, near Melbourne: 'a miracle of grace and feeling', she found it, and she remembered its inscription as 'In Memory of the Peace, 1919.' She had forgotten part of the message. The inscription actually reads: 'To Commemorate the Peace of 1919. These men served the empire in the Great War of 1914-1918.' Here as elsewhere, the wording is comfortably about war and empire as well as peace, just as those female figures of Peace rise from pedestals similarly inscribed.

We do have from that war one monument uniquely dedicated to peace, a passionately conceived anti-war memorial, constructed by Richard Ramo in the general cemetery at Toowong, Brisbane, in 1924. Richard Ramo was a second-hand dealer in Brisbane. He was

also a socialist and a rationalist. His son Gordon was killed at Gallipoli at the age of eighteen. His son Henry died of wounds in Belgium at the age of twenty-nine. His son Victor was killed, also in Belgium, at the age of twenty-seven. Then in 1923 his adopted son Fred shot himself dead at the age of twenty-seven.

On a plot just inside the gates of the civic cemetery Ramo built a monument like no other anywhere: a mausoleum inscribed to express at once a parental grief not softened by hope of heaven, a pacifist socialist rage at war, and a cry to the mothers of all nations and the workers of the world as saviours of humanity. Inside the mausoleum were tablets in memory of the three sons buried in Turkey and Belgium and the tomb for the adopted son.

Though the monument was private, its dedication was a large public event, a rally of Brisbane radicalism. Several thousand people gathered. The Labour Band played, as men with red rosebuds in their lapels carried Fred's exhumed remains ahead of a procession. Outside the mausoleum Harry Scott Bennett, president of the Australian Rationalist Conference, gave an address similar in ritual purpose, though not in substance, to a speech at the unveiling of a conventional war memorial. He offered Ramo sympathy and also admiration for creating 'a memorial to victims of the last war, and an indictment against the rapacity and life-destroying agencies engendered by modern capitalism.' Ramo, pale and ill, stumbled through a response which ended by exhorting the people to believe not in killing but in sustaining life. The band played 'The Red Flag' as Fred's remains were lowered into their tomb, which was then covered with a red flag and piled with flowers. The crowd that day, and everybody who visited the monument later, could read on its lintel that here was THE TEMPLE OF PEACE. The visitor might well be distracted from that message by the expression of a still wider suffering inflicted on an atheist Job, punished in peace as well as war by a fate which goes on to kill his adopted son and even his dog Pup, 'a faithful canine friend maliciously poisoned', thus mourned in yet another, later inscription and placed in effigy on Fred's tomb.

The Great War duly became World War I. The conflicts known as World War II yielded, as far as I know, no memorials dedicated to peace. In the national capital the most striking object in sight was the Australian War Memorial, dedicated to the memory of the men (and some women) who had died in the military service of their country. Visitors to Canberra sometimes discerned an imbalance between the monumental recognition accorded to war and the virtual invisibility in the national landscape of any other aspect of Australian experience.

From time to time the Australian War Memorial appeared an attractive site for members of a 'peace movement' to demonstrate against preparations for war. One such gathering of protesters aroused controversy in 1983. RSL leaders described the demonstration as an offensive breach of the reverence towards war dead enshrined in the building. A correspondent in *The Canberra*

*Times* (my wife Amirah, as it happens) defended 'the presence of peacemakers on a national memorial', and declared that war memorials were 'exactly the right place to urge that no more shall die'.

Might the scope of the Australian War Memorial be broadened to accommodate perceptions of peace? Some such idea occurred in 1984, the second year of the Hawke Labor government, to Elaine Darling, federal Labor MP, one of the first women on the Australian War Memorial's Council and the first member not to have served in the armed forces. She asked the Council to support a plan for an Australian Peace Memorial, to be erected alongside their own institution. When she failed to persuade them, Darling lobbied the Hawke cabinet for a 'peace complex' on the other side of Lake Burley Griffin. This proposal got as far as the drawing board: an avenue of peace, colonnaded buildings to house galleries (matching those in the War Memorial) for displays on the theme of peace, meeting rooms, an open-air stage for assemblies. To begin with, Darling was content with a grant of \$10,000 for landscaping and dedication of the site. That was done, and nothing more, by the time Darling disappeared from the Council and from parliament.

Between the National Library and the lake, in a small Peace Park, a flattish monument of marble slabs and gently flowing water was dedicated by Bill Hayden as governor-general on 24 October, United Nations Day, 1990. It is inscribed with the word 'peace' in the six official languages of the United Nations and in the language of the Ngunnawal people 'who first settled this area', and with a message dedicating the park to all peacemakers and inviting readers to commit themselves to peace and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Visitors are few, apart from lunchtime joggers who do not pause to read.

Across the lake, the richly resourced War Memorial commemorates ever more eloquently the victories and tragedies of war. In recent times two bronze pieces, both by Peter Corlett, have been installed to signal not quite peace, but the saving rather than the destruction of lives in war. At one side of the front steps stands a sculptured group: Simpson and his donkey rescuing a wounded soldier at Gallipoli. In the grounds between the Memorial and its cafeteria stands a statue (replica of one not far from the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne) of the next war's life-saver. 'Weary' Dunlop, legendary surgeon to prisoners on the Burma-Thailand railway. He leans gently forward, unwarlike in posture, in civilian clothes, his lapel holding a poppy, that emblem of 11 November which recalls the ending of war and not, as so many of our memorials do, the interruption of peace, the beginnings of war on 25 April.

From now on the main activity of Australia's armed forces may well be 'peace-keeping'. The Australian War Memorial has already housed one exhibition on the work of Australian peace-keeping forces, and the theme is sure before long to be represented

permanently in its galleries. 'Peace-keeping forces' is a complex notion. So, for that matter, is 'the culture of peace'. The grand War Memorial and the modest Peace Park could both be good places to meditate this year on the meanings of war and peace. I wonder if anything is planned for the Peace Park on the coming United Nations Day.

*Emeritus Professor Ken Inglis is Visiting Fellow, Australian Dictionary of Biography, Australian National University.*

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## Academy News



Further information regarding the recent establishment of the UK Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences has been provided by Sir Tony Wrigley, President of The British Academy. His letters to this Academy's President have been reproduced with permission.

Dear Professor Gale

12 November

You may have heard that a new academy in Britain is to be launched in London on 17 November 1999. The new body, which is being developed out of one called ALSISS (the Association of Learned Societies in the Social Sciences), is to be called the Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences. Since its launch will involve the claim, already made in a recent news sheet for its constituent societies that 'As an overarching body the Academy for the Social Sciences (sic) will take its place alongside the Royal Society, the British Academy and the Royal Academy of Engineering, and fill a long felt gap in the national and international representation of the social sciences' and that 'The Academy will represent the social sciences of the United Kingdom to government, research councils, business and international bodies', it seems appropriate that I as President of the British Academy should write to our sister academies and partner research organisations overseas about this new development.

The British Academy, which was established by Royal Charter in 1902, has long been recognised as the national academy for the humanities and social sciences in the UK, the counterpart to the Royal Society which exists to serve the physical and biological sciences. Election to Fellowship of the British Academy, as to that of the much older Royal Society, is a great accolade and mark of scholarly distinction. Both bodies distribute public funds to promote research in their various disciplines, notably in the area of international programmes and exchanges.

ALSISS has been in existence since 1982. It was founded essentially as a lobbying group to promote the interests of the social sciences collectively, to try to secure an enhanced flow of research funding for these subjects, and to bolster the self-esteem and self-confidence of social scientists, who felt that their subjects were suffering from a combination of indifference and hostility on the part of government, and perhaps more widely among the general public of this country. Among the societies and professional associations affiliated to ALSISS, there are some which would not ordinarily be regarded, or indeed regard themselves, as scholarly or learned bodies — for example, the Association for Family Therapy, the British Universities Industrial Relations Association, the Housing Studies Association, the Market Research Society, and the National Institute for Social Work. Some learned societies in the social sciences have determined against joining ALSISS, notably the Royal

Economic Society.

The governing body of the new Academy will be made up of eighteen members of whom twelve will be elected by a College of Learned Societies and six by a College of Academicians. The predominant voice therefore will lie not with the individual Academicians but with the constituent learned societies. There is no analogue for this within the British Academy, although, of course, we maintain close and cordial relations with many more specialised Learned societies across the humanities and social sciences. Further, there will be significant differences in the criteria for election to Fellowship in the two academies. Fellowship of the British Academy is in recognition of a substantial body of scholarly published work of high distinction, whereas attaining distinction as a practitioner or strong commitment to the advancement of the social sciences will also be acceptable qualifications for election in the new Academy. Inasmuch, therefore, as the new Academy will represent a collective association of learned societies, and inasmuch as election as an Academician will be on grounds other than those which determine election within the British Academy there is no conflict of roles.

Yet substantial grounds of potential confusion and conflict remain. First, the new Academy expects in due course to elect about 300 Academicians, a number closely similar to the number of social scientists who are already Fellows of the British Academy. A majority of those elected as Academicians may be expected to be chosen on grounds essentially similar to those which govern elections within the British Academy, and in principle it is therefore reasonable to suppose that there might be a substantial overlap between the Fellowship of the two bodies. Viewed by an impartial observer this might well seem an unnecessary and confusing situation. In this regard it is worth noting that at present 33% of all the Ordinary Fellows of the British Academy are social scientists; that in 1999 50% of the 34 newly elected Fellows were social scientists; and, that our electoral policy is to maintain this proportion of 50% in future. So far as it is possible to be objective in such matters, the evidence suggests that there is an equal probability of election to Fellowship in the British Academy for scholars in humanities and in social science disciplines.

Second, while much of the activity of the new Academy seems likely to be driven by the concern of its constituent learned societies to ensure that there is effective lobbying on behalf of the collective interests of the social sciences, if the new Academy were to attempt to usurp the range of roles played by the British Academy either domestically or overseas, this would certainly involve conflict. It is for this reason that it seemed timely to write to you now. The British Academy would be dismayed if its present relationship with international organisations, which we value greatly, were disturbed by the arrival on the scene of the new Academy; and I should emphasise that we intend to continue with our partners the same

kinds of activities as at present, and indeed hope to develop them in future.

The foregoing does not preclude the possibility that the two bodies may discover a *modus vivendi* which is mutually acceptable. It is to be hoped that this proves to be the case, but our earlier experience gives only limited ground for optimism in this regard. ALSISS did not see fit to consult with the British Academy in developing its plans, especially during the early and formative stages of the work of the implementation group which was charged with formulating them. It would then have been a simple matter to distinguish between those aspects of the plans of ALSISS which were complementary to the role of the British Academy and those which were not, and to discuss any prospective problems. Coupled with a tendency on the part of ALSISS to release inaccurate and misleading statements about the place of social science and social scientists in the British Academy, this represented an unfortunate start to the relationship between the two bodies. Subsequently there has been greater contact between them and some evidence of a greater understanding of the British Academy's role on the part of ALSISS. Nevertheless the British Academy remains very cautious about the future of its relationship with the new body. I trust that the reasons for our caution have been made plain by the contents of this letter.

26 January 2000

Many thanks for your letter of 5 January. I am delighted that you found my letter about the proposals of ALSISS over the founding of a new Academy helpful.

Since my earlier letter, the launch of the new Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences has, of course, taken place, and the list of 'foundation' Academicians has been published. There are 65 names on the list. I enclose a copy of the list, which appeared in the *Times Higher Education Supplement* of 19 November 1999. As you will see, the list includes names from a wide variety of professional backgrounds. Many of those who appear on the list were plainly chosen on grounds other than those which determine election to the British Academy. Only four of the new Academicians are Fellows of the British Academy. This initial list, therefore, raises the possibility, encouragingly, that the 'overlap' in the fellowship of the two bodies may be more limited than might have been expected. It is too early to tell whether the reasons for disquiet in other aspects of the initiative taken by ALSISS, to which I made reference in my earlier letter, will prove justified or not.

You suggested that it would be helpful to publish my letter of 12 November 1999 in your newsletter. I am happy for this to be done but, since events have moved on somewhat since then, it would be sensible, I think, to reproduce this letter also, together with the enclosed list of the new Academicians, since both will provide useful additional information to that contained in the earlier letter.

Yours sincerely, *Sir Tony Wrigley*, President, The British Academy.

## Research Projects



**Postgraduate Training in the Social Sciences.** On 4 December 1999 ASSA organised the first workshop for participants in the postgraduate training research project. The day's proceedings were chaired by Professor Simon Marginson (Project Director) and Professor Lenore Manderson (ASSA Project Committee). The purpose of the workshop was to discuss the overall direction of the project and to consider how the range of topics across the disciplines would be researched and developed. Each contributor provided a short chapter summary for consideration at the workshop as follows: Richard Nile - History/ Australian Studies; Jane Kenway - Education and information technology; Lenore Manderson - Human services and health; John Trinder - Psychology; Jane Marceau - Business studies/ public policy/ globalisation studies; Gill Palmer - Management/ Business; Margaret Jolly - anthropology/ cultural studies; Desmond Manderson - Law and ethics; John Lodewijks - Economics. A second workshop to consider full draft papers will be held in Melbourne on Monday 8 May.

**Creating Unequal Futures? Rethinking Poverty, Inequality and Disadvantage in Australia.** The manuscript has now been edited and will be published by Allen & Unwin in the latter part of 2000.

**Research Committee.** On Tuesday 29 February ASSA's Research Committee comprising all Panel Chairs met to consider the development of possible research proposals to be considered for Special Projects Funding for 2001.

## Academy Workshops



Professor Peter Saunders has reported on the workshop *Social Security in the Context of Social Development in East and Southeast Asia* held in Sydney in September 1999.

For most of the last three decades of the twentieth century, social development and social protection were seen as by-products of economic development. Relatively little attention was paid to strategies for providing social security coverage to the majority of the population, including poverty relief through social assistance. Instead, most countries adopted a version of the 'trickle down' theory of poverty relief, in which the benefits of economic development would eventually filter through in the form of rising living standards for the poorest. While admittedly successful in a number of countries, this approach was vulnerable to changes in economic conditions, whilst also perpetuating a situation of increasing economic inequality.

Social security development was thus in a state of flux throughout many parts of Asia, even before the financial crisis struck in 1997.

Those responsible for social security systems were grappling with a number of seemingly intractable problems of coverage, delivery and affordability. The onset of the financial crisis brought these difficulties into sharper focus. The needs of the poor increased dramatically at the same time as the ability of many countries to deliver rising prosperity was eroded.

In responding to the crisis, the leading international agencies acknowledged the need for policies that provided protection to those least able to cope with the economic downturn. Speaking at a conference held in Seoul in 1998, for example, the World Bank's Director for Social Policy in the East Asia and Pacific Region, Katherine Marshall, argued that: 'Today, as the crisis appears far from abating, with deep roots and consequences, we see that the social ramifications also are clearly much more far-ranging than was thought even three months ago. A fundamental rethinking of the social agenda, with a focus on safety nets for hard times, on approaches to poverty alleviation, and on the foundations of social policy in education, health and approaches to civil society, is what is required'.

The sentiments are noble, but what do they mean in practice? Will a new balance be struck between economic and social objectives, or will the traditional emphasis on promoting the former – at times at the expense of the latter – be embraced once the immediate effects of the crisis have passed? What specific reform options are implied by the new rhetoric and what role will national governments and international agencies play in designing, implementing, reviewing and resourcing new social programs?

These questions were at the forefront of the social policy agenda in many countries throughout 1998 and 1999 and remain there today, even as the effects of the crisis are beginning to fade. In addressing them, it is necessary to have a good understanding of the nature of existing social security and related programs, to the difficulties they are encountering, and to the prospects - economic, political, legal and administrative - for alternative reform strategies.

This in turn requires current social problems and pressures to be identified, along with the successes and failures of existing social programs. The problems of the poorest groups, particularly those living in rural areas are widely acknowledged. Less attention has been paid to the plight of other vulnerable groups, including those experiencing a disability, orphans, and the very old – particularly those living alone. Gender segregation has been a neglected issue, as has the pressures associated with family break-ups associated with increased urbanisation.

It was against this background that the Academy agreed to fund a workshop designed to explore these issues in a regional context by drawing on the rich variety of national experience that exists in the region. The specific aims of the workshop were:

- to provide a forum for an informed discussion of social security issues, problems and prospects in the region;
- to identify common constraints to the development and implementation of social protection and social security schemes in the region;
- to explore some of the key social security policy issues and identify where research is needed and what role it can play;
- to assess the extent to which the social reform agenda has been affected by the financial crisis; and
- to consider how other countries can benefit from the Australian experience in the design, delivery and evaluation of social security programs.

It was decided that such a discussion could only be fruitfully conducted with the active involvement of participants from as broad a range of countries as possible. To this end, supplementary funding was sought in order to allow as many national experts as possible to attend. Financial support from the Social Policy Research Centre, the University of New South Wales and, most significantly, from AusAID made this possible.

In addition to a number of leading Australian social security, social policy and Asian scholars, the workshop involved participants from China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. AusAID funding allowed the very important involvement of national experts from Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. In addition, papers addressed developments in Hong Kong and Singapore.

The workshop was structured around two broad themes. The first was concerned to identify some of the broad pressures and policy directions that are occurring across all countries in the region. Amongst the issues canvassed over the first of the two days were: the nature and impact of demographic ageing; the changing roles and responsibilities of family members, including their gender dimensions and implications; the structure and evolution of existing social programs; the nature and impact of programs designed to privatise social security and social protection arrangements; and the alternative forms of equality and the impact of existing social security schemes on them.

Among the specific topics raised in this section of discussion were the implications of population ageing, fertility and longevity trends on the life course of females throughout the region. A second paper placed these trends in the context of the recommendations of the World Summit for Social Development, held in Copenhagen in 1995, and its follow-up scheduled to take place later this year. A third paper reviewed Western social security experience and concluded that the effects of social assistance on inequality and poverty alleviation were less marked than is often claimed (although the conclusions of this paper elicited a lively discussion and a number of criticisms from the many comparative analysts in the audience).

The workshop then considered a series of papers focusing on national social development and policy experience, beginning with a series of comparative papers. Topics addressed here included the aged care systems in Australia and Japan (including its gender basis and impacts), notions of efficiency and equality in Australia and Singapore, and the alternative forms of privatisation that have taken place in social policy in a number of Southeast Asian countries.

These papers led to the second main theme of the workshop, which explored in detail the social policy experience of a number of individual countries. Papers covered aspects of the experience of China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. A theme to emerge from these papers was the enormous variety and richness of the experience of different countries as they have attempted to deal with the challenges posed by the financial crisis and its associated effects. At the same time, however, a number of themes echoed what has been happening here in Australia. The changing roles and aspirations of women and what this implies for social policy in an era of demographic change was a recurring theme. Another was concerned with the difficulties faced by people with a disability that makes it that much more difficult for them to be engaged with the world of paid work without the necessary supportive infrastructure of family and state-provided (or at least state-funded) services.

The impact of market reforms on social protection policies was addressed in several papers including one that focused on reforms to the system of social relief in China, where a number of major institutional changes are currently confronting political and resources constraints. The paper on the origins and structure of 'workfare' programs in Korea was of particular interest, because of its relevance to many other countries, including Australia. Although still in its very early stages the program, which emphasises active training and skill acquisition rather than passive income support relief, has met with some success, even though it was ill prepared to cope with the crisis and has generally suffered from an inadequate level of resources. The main conclusion of the paper, however, was that the main pillars of the Korean welfare state are already in place and have been able to withstand the pressures brought on by Korea's severe economic slump of the late 1990s.

Overall, the workshop was an undoubted success. This was the unanimous view of all of the contributors to the closing discussion session, amongst them former Deputy Prime Minister of Australia, Brian Howe, the recently appointed Director of the Australian Institute of Family Studies, David Stanton, and leading poverty and social security researcher Professor Nanak Kakwani. Along with others who attended the workshop, all three argued that much of value had emerged from what it was hoped would be the first of a series of similar events. Papers presented at the workshop are currently being prepared for publication through the Social Policy Research Centre. Further information can be obtained from the

SPRC Home Page at <http://www.sprc.unsw.edu.au> or by contacting me at the Centre.

> Two more workshops were held in early February 2000. *Volunteering for the New Millennium - Is there a future?* convened by Drs Jeni Warburton and Melanie Oppenheimer and held in Sydney. Publication of the papers will be available in December 2000, and a report will be in the next *Dialogue*.

*Population, Gender and Reproductive Choice: the motherhood questions.* Convened by Professors Alison Mackinnon and Lois Bryson, this workshop was held in Adelaide. Session themes included declining fertility (theories, policies and practice), reproductive health and well-being, and home and work: the continuing dialectics of work and care. A full report will be published in the next *Dialogue*.

The Workshop Committee meets in March, July and October, however, proposals can be submitted at any time of the year. Please contact Sue Rider at the Academy for a set of *Workshop Guidelines* before submitting a proposal.

## International News



**Australia-China Exchange Scheme** In September 1997, a group of scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) led by Vice President *Professor Ru Xin*, was hosted by *Professor Peter Saunders* of the Social Policy Research Centre. The theme of the study tour was Social Security and Social Control under Market Economy. In response to an invitation from Professor Ru for further discussions on this and associated issues, Professor Saunders visited CASS under the Academy's Australia-China Exchange Scheme in October 1999. Below is Professor Saunder's report on his visit.

The main purpose of my visit was to make contact with scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and others researching issues associated with the measurement of poverty in China and the reform of its social security system. A supplementary goal was to explore the potential for undertaking comparative research on the measurement of trends in poverty and income inequality in China and Australia.

Following as it did, the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the PRC on 1 October, the first week of my visit coincided with a national holiday (announced after I had arranged my schedule). Arranging meetings in this period was very difficult, although I was briefed about trends in poverty by Professor Xu Feng Xian from Institute of Economics at CASS and had an active program of meetings arranged over the following weekend when everyone returned to work.



The break provided me with an opportunity to explore Beijing and observe its people. Strolling through Tiananmen Square with the hundreds of thousands of citizens from all over the country that came to admire the displays that had been paraded through the city on National Day was a memorable experience. Beijing itself was an absolute delight. A modern city, built for the convenience of the thousands of pedestrians and cyclists who greatly out-numbered motorists. With broad majestic streets, it is possible to walk without hearing the noise of the traffic, aside from the occasional bicycle bell and a distant squeal of brakes.

A report in the *China Daily* provided further insight into the mood of the nation. 'Social Sciences Key to Nation's Progress' the front-page headline proclaimed on my first morning. The report on a conference held by CASS, warned that: 'During the periods when social science research was neglected, the State often faced obstacles to development'. An important and universal message, though one not recently heard in Australia – particularly on the front pages of our newspapers!

Over the weekend of 8-10 October, I had a series of stimulating meetings with CASS scholars. On 8 October, I discussed issues associated with poverty and development, focusing on the changing role of the family, with a group from the Institute of Rural Development. The following day I spent the morning discussing social policy developments in Australia and China with a large group from the Institute of Sociology at CASS, where I discovered that the Institute has recently established its own Social Policy Research Centre and is actively engaged in research on poverty and social security.

The following day I had lunch with Professor Ru Xin, former Vice-President of CASS, now retired but still actively involved as the Head of its recently established academic advisory committee. That evening, over dinner with a group of scholars from the new Social Policy Research Centre, we discussed their research on poverty and how we might undertake some collaborative work with the assistance of the Statistics Bureau. They agreed to explore the practicalities, warning that this may take some time!

After Beijing, I travelled to the regional capital city of Xi'an where I met with scholars from the Shaanxi Academy of Social Sciences. We had a very stimulating discussion about strategies for poverty relief in rural areas. They have moved away from providing financial assistance towards encouraging 'self development assistance' through schemes that provide loans and other direct support to farmers for identified projects. While financial assistance encouraged dependency amongst the rural poor, the new system was said to be more effective at encouraging independence *and* reducing poverty. The loans, while part of the new anti-poverty strategy, were not considered part of the social security system, as they had to be re-paid eventually.

I came away from the meeting refreshed by the vigorous debate we had had about alternative notions of poverty, but mindful of the need to discuss poverty relief strategies in the appropriate social and development context for research to be of practical value.

The contacts made during my brief visit are already bearing fruit. I am in constant contact with several CASS scholars and we are discussing various forms of on-going including research and conference collaboration. I am greatly indebted to the Academy for the financial and organisational support that made my visit possible.

**Australia-Netherlands Exchange Scheme** The Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences has agreed to host two Australian scholars in 2000 as part of its Exchange Agreement with our Academy and the Australian Academy of the Humanities. They are: *Dr Gerrit Treuren*, Deputy Director, Centre for Applied Economics, Hawke Centre of the University of South Australia. In April, Dr Treuren will be presenting a paper at the European Social Sciences History Conference, and developing working links with Dutch institutions that have an interest and a capacity in the sort of collaborative work related to the implications of the OECD discussions on labour management questions.

*Dr Christopher Lloyd*, Head, School of Economic Studies, University of New England. Dr Lloyd will be presenting a paper on societal evolution, and a discussant at a session on globalisation at the European Social Science History Conference in April. He will also further his collaborations in the areas of philosophy and methodology of long-run historical inquiry with scholars at the Free University of Amsterdam, the Posthumous Institute, Utrecht and the University of Utrecht.

> *Professor Geoffrey Norman Blainey*, AO has been made a Companion in the Order of Australia (AC) for service to academia, research and scholarship, and as a leader of public debate at the forefront of fundamental social and economic issues confronting the wider community.


Two Fellows of the Academy have died recently.

Emeritus Professor Wilfred ('Mick') Borrie, formerly of the Australian National University, and former President of the Academy.

Emeritus Professor Russell Mathews, formerly of the Australian National University.

Obituaries will appear in the *Annual Report*.

## Books



*How Big Business Performs: Private Performance and Public Policy.* Edited by Peter Dawkins, Michael Harris and Stephen King, with a foreword by Phillip K. Ruthven. Allen & Unwin in association with Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, 1999.

As the preface and introductory chapter make apparent, big business in Australia is of considerable importance to all Australians. This is the case despite popular political rhetoric that often seems to focus on small business. (Not that this is a very helpful category, incidentally, as it can contain everything from old laggard to young gazelle companies, as well as Mom and Pop stores). Big business not only manufactures and services a disproportionate number of the things we consume; it also employs many people and generates considerable wealth. And it is not performing as well as we should want it to: average weighted returns on equity, compared with the US and UK, are between nearly 50% and 25% lower, respectively. In other words, comparatively, Australian capitalism is not as efficient as it should be.

The book uses aggregate economic data from the unique database of IBIS Business Information to make its analyses. This is both a strength and weakness of the book. While it provides big picture sectoral snapshots of the Australian economy it does not tell us very much about the specifics of Australian big business: that is, it does not take us inside the specific organisations that comprise it; it does not tell us about their management practices and organisational dynamics. It is principally a work drawn from the methods and measures of the economics discipline.

After an initial chapter, presenting an overview of the Australian economy, the book presents a theoretical chapter in which various operational definitions of profit, drawn from both the accounting and economics literature, are dissected and discussed. The chapter is a preparatory exercise to several that follow, including one that asks 'What's Happened to Big Business Profits in Australia?' The short answer is that between the mid-80s and mid-90s they have generally improved, with manufacturing doing somewhat better, in line with the business cycle. More specific analysis is required: the later chapters promise it but it is not delivered until another theoretical chapter clarifies the differences between what are proposed as four categories of influence on firm profitability. These are the macroeconomic environment; market environment; business strategy, and management principles. Only the latter two, it should be noted, can differentiate between high performance and low performance firms at any given time.

In determining profitability in Australian manufacturing, analysis demonstrates that it falls with greater union density; with greater import penetration, and rises with industry concentration. However, the public policy implications of having no unions, no imports, and no

competition, are not developed. The following chapter adds an advisory against conglomeration. Don't do it, it will only diminish profits, seems to be the message. But the following chapter is more positive: do be focused (ie, not a conglomerate) and odds are that the organisation will perform better in terms of R&D expenditures, and these will be positively associated with various dimensions of company performance, especially where R&D is regarded as a core commitment of the firm rather than a variable activity to be seasonally adjusted in terms of the business cycle and environment.

In chapter eight the book gets down to the nitty-gritty: what management principles, in practice, have what relationship to profitability? Using a list of fourteen principles derived from research into global 'best practice' the author establishes a statistically significant relationship suggesting that better managed companies make more profits. Encouraging. The remaining chapters suggest that they also need clear public policy environments in which to work, but is somewhat fuzzy on what these might incorporate. Chapter ten suggests that in manufacturing monopoly may not be very inefficient, in consumer terms, for the economy. The implications for competition policy are not addressed. Chapter eleven looks at data on takeovers and mergers. After takeovers bidder firms typically decline in profitability and firms that are taken over tend to be industry under-performers. Costs seem to increase after a takeover, as organisation culture research would suggest. In a further chapter the particular case of the petroleum industry is discussed. Penultimately, the relation between innovation and public policy is discussed in rather inconclusive terms. Finally, the editors draw some lessons from the chapters.

Overall, the book will be of interest to business economists. It has little to say to the public policy community that is not very general and generic and it will disappoint management academics because the levels of aggregation in the data make it difficult to relate to the firm. Nonetheless, it is a useful snapshot of how big business performed in Australia during the mid-80s to the mid-90s. The overall score card suggests that the concerns of that era, best seen in policy interventions such as the Karpin Inquiry, were well justified. The international ratings that ranked the institutions of business in this country below those of public policy and the unions seem vindicated. It remains to be seen from any possible volumes that are produced from later data sets whether such interventions had the desired effect. Is Australian capitalism any more efficient than it used to be?

### **Stewart Clegg**

*One-Eyed: A View of Australian Sport.* By Douglas Booth and Colin Tatz. Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1999.

This is described by the authors as a history of sport in Australia, though the 'view' in the sub-title is very much in evidence. The book is divided into periodic chapters from 1788 to 2000. Each chapter is

placed in a social and political context and is not confined to the development of sport. Women and aboriginals are given separate treatment for each period.

The book is lively and opinionated, and written in good prose, except for a taste for that dangerous weapon, the exclamation mark. There is a substantial bibliography and much acknowledgment of previous writers in the field. Throughout the work, there is heavy criticism of sporting management, and of bad behaviour by both crowds and players. The harshest criticism is preserved for the finale, in a bitter attack on the commercialisation of spectator sport, especially through television.

My first problem is with the title. 'One-Eyed' is meant to indicate that many Australians are 'partisan, intolerant, narrow and unreasonable' about sport; but is this something confined to Australia? It can be just as well applied to the French, the Pakistanis, the English and just about everyone else. Examples of bloodymindedness and bad behaviour can be found everywhere. Why make them so central here?

There are other worrying things about the book. It is very largely taken up with Sydney and Melbourne, ignoring the other capitals. It concentrates on cricket and the various footballs (plus some swimming and athletics), with next to no attention to such popular sports as netball, hockey, golf, tennis (apart from the 1950s and 60s) and basketball. These are all socially significant.

The book's worst failure is to ignore completely the great participation in sport at the district and local levels – again highly significant if one is concerned with sport in society at large. Along with this goes a failure to recognise the delight which spectators feel so often at the sight of sporting excellence. Victor Trumper is mentioned only as a sponsor of rugby league; Dally Messenger does not appear; and 'Up there, Cazaly' might never have been sung.

It is a very personal book, and has to be judged as such. Perhaps it needs a category of its own. Confessional/ historical?

**JDB Miller**

*The Pure State of Nature. Sacred cows, destructive myths and the environment.* By David Horton. Allen & Unwin, St Leonards. 2000.

David Horton's *The Pure State of Nature* is a big blend of science, public policy and popular culture, with a bit of tongue in cheek humour. It explores interactions between Aboriginal people and their environment, and ranges from archaeological evidence to the far Right's reactions to Cathy Freeman being named Australian of the Year. Subtitled, *Sacred cows, destructive myths and the environment* it has a lot to say about all of our attitudes. If you've formed a comfortable view about Aborigine-environment interactions, this book should challenge you.

Horton seems to be tying up ends left loose after his *Encyclopaedia of Aboriginal Australia*: 'facts' that don't fit, circular logic masquerading as science, and popular misconceptions. Robyn Williams describes it as 'immensely readable'.

Horton keeps returning to whether Aboriginal people significantly changed their environment, especially through use of fire. (It isn't giving the plot away to say that Horton thinks not.) This theme is woven very closely with possible reasons why Aborigines didn't farm (if indeed they didn't, which to me seems unproven). He re-explores a great question: Would colonist have found megafauna in Australia (Diprotodons *et al*), if Aborigines hadn't arrived here first?

The author's approaches to, on the one hand, demolishing myths and, on the other, building fresh ones are quite different. Horton usually dissects carefully, relying on detailed archaeological techniques and deduction to do the myth demolition. When offering alternative positions, he doesn't seem to build his conclusions as carefully. Another device is to present an absurdity, then, by pointing it out, assume the myth to be demolished. I don't think it always works. Maybe it doesn't matter. Perhaps the book works best as a thought-provoking exploration, not a rigorous deconstruction of destructive myths. I sometimes felt baffled with the mix of specialised science and Horton's personal opinions. For readers who want to pursue the issues further, the book's index and the referencing are quite extensive.

Horton's visions of the way things might have been prior to colonisation appeal to me. It's a relief to see anonymous characters of history presented as intelligent and sometimes funny rather than as mindless beings driven by circumstances. The book uses recent events as examples of social attitudes, some of which may quickly become dated. On the other hand, if placed on undergraduate reading lists soon, it could become a classic of how we view our environment.

**Peter McAdam**

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## Letters to the Editor

### Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa* and Boasian Culturalism

In my book *The Fateful Hoaxing of Margaret Mead* (1998) there is an account, based on the sworn testimony of Fa'apua'a, of how Margaret Mead in March of 1926 on the island of Ofu in American Samoa was hoaxed about the sexual mores of the Samoans by her two Samoan travelling companions, Fa'apua'a and Fofoa.

I write to inform Fellows of the Academy of the discovery of direct evidence, from Mead's own papers, that Margaret Mead was indeed taken in by the 'whispered confidences' (as she called them) of Fa'apua'a and Fofoa. This incontrovertible historical evidence finally brings to closure the long-running controversy over Margaret Mead's Samoan fieldwork of 1925-1926. The case is of particular interest in that Franz Boas, who wrote the glowing Foreword to Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa*<sup>1</sup>, and Margaret Mead herself, both became Presidents of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Boas in 1931, and Mead in 1976. The implications for anthropology are fundamental.

The crucially important direct evidence in question is contained in a little known book entitled *All True! The Record of Actual Adventures That Have Happened To Ten Women of Today* published in New York in 1931<sup>2</sup>. The 'adventure' by 'Dr Margaret Mead' is entitled 'Life as a Samoan Girl.' It begins with a wistful reference to 'the group of revered scientists' who in 1925 sent her to study<sup>3</sup> 'the problem of which phenomena of adolescence are culturally and which physiologically determined' among the adolescent girls of Samoa, with 'no very clear idea' of how she was 'to do this.' It ends with an account of her journey to the islands of Ofu and Olosega in March of 1926 with the 'two Samoan girls,' as she calls them, Fa'apua'a and Fofoa. In fact, Fa'apua'a and Fofoa were both twenty four years of age and slightly older than Dr Mead herself. Dr Mead continues her account of her visit to the islands of Ofu and Olosega with Fa'apua'a and Fofoa by stating

In all things I had behaved as a Samoan, for only so, only by losing my identity, as far as possible, had I been able to become acquainted with the Samoan girls receive their whispered confidences and learn at the same time the answer to the scientists' questions.

This account, *by Mead herself*, is fully confirmed by the sworn testimony of Fa'apua'a. It can be found on page 141 of the second and paperback edition (1999) of my book *The Fateful Hoaxing of Margaret Mead. A Historical Analysis of Her Samoan Research*<sup>4</sup>. It is definitive historical evidence that establishes that Martin Orans is in outright error in asserting that it is 'demonstrably false that Mead was taken in by Fa'apua'a and Fofoa.'<sup>5</sup>

It is also evidence that establishes that *Coming of Age in Samoa*, far from being a 'scientific classic' (as Mead herself supposed) is, in

certain vitally significant respects (as in its dream-like second chapter), a work of anthropological fiction.

In 1928, in Chapter 13 of *Coming of Age in Samoa*, Dr Mead concluded, unreservedly, that the phenomena of adolescence are due not to physiology but to the 'social environment.' This extreme environmentalist conclusion was very much to the liking of Franz Boas, 'the father of American anthropology,' who was both the sponsor and the supervisor of Mead's Samoan researches. In 1934, in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*<sup>6</sup> Boas asserted that 'the genetic elements which may determine personality' are '*altogether irrelevant*' as compared with the powerful influence of the cultural environment' (emphasis added). This is a succinct statement of the Boasian culturalism that, in the words of George Stocking<sup>7</sup> 'from the late 1920s' became 'fundamental to all American social science.'

In Samoa, Mead had acted as Boas's agent and, having been given Boas's enthusiastic commendation, *Coming of Age in Samoa* became one of the most influential texts of the 20th century. We now know from detailed historical research that the extreme environmentalist conclusion to which Dr Mead came in *Coming of Age in Samoa* is based on evidence that is quite unacceptable scientifically. Furthermore, in the light of present day knowledge<sup>8</sup> this also applies to Boasian culturalism which at the beginning of the 21st century has become a scientifically unacceptable belief system.

This liberating change in the *Zeitgeist* of the late 20th and early 21st centuries is evident in the fact that the Intercollegiate Studies Institute of Wilmington, Delaware, in listing the 50 worst and best books of the century has adjudged Margaret Mead's *Coming of Age in Samoa*, with its approving Foreword by Franz Boas, to be the 'very worst' book of the 20th century<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Mead, Margaret (1928), *Coming of Age in Samoa*. New York : Morrow.

<sup>2</sup> Mead, Margaret (1931), 'Life as a Samoan Girl, in *All True! The Record of Actual Adventures That Have Happened to Ten Women of Today*. New York : Brewer, Warren and Putnam.

<sup>3</sup> Mead, Margaret (1925), Plan of Research Submitted to the National Research Council of the USA. (Archives of the National Academy of Sciences).

<sup>4</sup> Freeman, Derek (1999), *The Fateful Hoaxing of Margaret Mead*, Boulder: Westview, 2nd edition.

<sup>5</sup> Orans, Martin (1996), Not Even Wrong Margaret Mead, Derek Freeman and the Samoans, Novato: Chandler and Sharp: 92.

<sup>6</sup> Boas, Franz (1934), 'Race,' *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol 13 :34.

<sup>7</sup> Stocking, George W Jr (1973), 'Franz Boas,' *Dictionary of American Biography, Supp 3*: 86.

<sup>8</sup> Ridley, Matt (1999), *Genome*, London : Fourth Estate.

<sup>9</sup> Henrie, Mark C *et al* (1999), 'The Fifty Worst (and Best) Books of the Century,' *The Intercollegiate Review*, 35, 1: 3-13.

Derek Freeman, Emeritus Professor of Anthropology, Australian National University, January 2000.



## Opinion

Opinion



### Theory Building in the Social Sciences: some comments on the place of moral values

**Brian Crittenden**

The following are among the basic questions about the nature of the social sciences: How are the social sciences related to the natural sciences and the humanities? What part do moral values play in the methods of inquiry and the theories that are distinctive of the social sciences?

Among the more interesting and challenging responses to these questions are those given by Edward O Wilson. In *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, he claimed that 'sociology would only become a truly scientific discipline. . . if submitted to the Darwinian paradigm.'<sup>1</sup> In a recent book,<sup>2</sup> he continues to argue for a structured relationship among all systematic forms of knowledge - from the natural sciences to the social sciences to the humanities. But he also recognises, somewhat obscurely, that there are important differences. Among these is the role of the social sciences (and humanities), as distinct from that of the natural sciences, in the study and justification of moral beliefs and practices. It is useful to recall that Durkheim, one of the pioneers of sociology as a social science, gave close attention to moral values. In his theory, the defensible moral ideals and rules were those required by the *conscience collective* of each particular society at a given time.

The relationship between the social sciences and moral values is a complex one, and I shall comment here on only some of its aspects<sup>3</sup>. In the first place, I shall refer to Wilson's treatment of the topic.

He claims that the role of the social sciences is analogous to that of medical science. Their main task is to provide systematic knowledge for predicting what will happen if society follows one course of action rather than another, and for remedying social problems. But, for the most part, this objective has not been achieved, and the main reason, in Wilson's view, is that social scientists as a whole have failed 'to embed their narratives in the physical realities of human biology and psychology'.<sup>4</sup> Other serious obstacles he identifies are: the subjecting of research to a guiding political ideology; commitment to cultural relativism (especially in anthropology) and the rejection of a common human nature; the reification of the group and thus the ignoring of individual members.

In Wilson's view, there is a general tendency for social scientists to take an extreme position on the relative influence of culture and biology in the shaping of human beings by giving virtually exclusive support to one or the other. Wilson argues for a combination of the two. It should be noted, however, that his own theory places much heavier emphasis on the biological. Thus, although he strongly emphasises the importance of moral issues in the social sciences,

he believes that the crucial test of contending moral values is their relative efficiency in promoting human survival. Also, he appeals to the biological features that shape a common human nature as the ultimate ground for rejecting moral relativism. While his argument may be sound on the latter point, it faces the difficulty that 'human survival' is not a simple criterion for distinguishing among conflicting moral values. The interpretation of the conditions of human survival that are regarded as desirable itself includes an appeal to moral values.

Despite his references to 'gene-culture evolution', for Wilson the study of morality (and religion) by the social sciences needs to rely heavily on such fields as cognitive neuroscience, human behavioural genetics, evolutionary biology, and the environmental sciences. The explanation of moral beliefs and practices from the perspective of social science is, for Wilson, largely a matter of drawing on the findings of the physical sciences about the evolution of human organisms.

He sees the key to an understanding of ethics in human society as being in the study of the biology of moral sentiments. This is why he closely relates morality and religion<sup>5</sup>. The latter provides, in various ways, strong incentives for moral practice. He claims that the sources of religion are in mental emotional developments encoded in human genes. They are closely linked with genetically developed tribal identity. By fostering group identity, both serve to improve the likely survival of one's genes to the next generation. Wilson is confident that the scientific account of the evolution of human life will provide the basis for secular religious beliefs (associated with morality) that will eventually displace supernatural religion in the many forms it has taken. *Homo sapiens* is a single gene pool into which individuals enter in one generation and into which they are dissolved in the next. This, Wilson claims, is the sound basis for a new intimation of immortality and a new mythos. He believes that eventually the scientific basis of our knowledge of human life will lead 'to the secularisation of the human epic and of religion itself'.<sup>6</sup>

A serious gap in Wilson's account of morality (and religion) is that it does not address the radical differences among individuals and groups on the content of moral values. We do not need to go beyond recent human history to see how, in some cases, these differences are accommodated by tolerance (which may, or may not, be based on belief in moral relativism), while in other cases, they lead to the efforts of one group to impose on others what it regards as its superior moral (and other cultural) values. The conviction of superiority has even sanctioned the use of most brutal forms of repression. Wilson would have to explain, for example, how the gene pool of *homo sapiens* generated the ethical precepts and practices of Nazism.

In the study of moral values, the social sciences certainly need to draw on the findings of biology and other related natural sciences. But the variable features of human societies and their cultures - the

direct object of study by the social sciences and humanities - play a much more significant role in shaping moral beliefs and practices than Wilson seems to recognise. In any case, if the test of a moral code is its efficiency in promoting human survival and evolution, what are the criteria by which we distinguish progressive from regressive evolution? A group's survival is no guarantee that the moral quality of its life is desirable. Depending on the circumstances, commitment to desirable moral values might militate against survival.

It is reasonable to claim that the social sciences will gain in explanatory power through linkage with the natural sciences. This may make clearer, as Wilson claims, the crucial importance of ethics as we face dramatic changes in human technology and knowledge of the physical world. But it does not provide a method of justification in the face of conflicting moral values. Presumably, it is at this level that the social sciences need close liaison with the humanities. One would expect philosophy to play a particularly important role here. However, if Wilson's view of Western philosophy is correct, there would need to be a revolution before much could be expected from that quarter. He claims that it 'offers no promising substitute (for theology). Its involuted exercises and professional timidity have left modern culture bankrupt of meaning'.<sup>7</sup> (At least, there is an implicit acknowledgment here that philosophy does have an important cultural role to play.)

It is interesting that while Wilson regards economics as best suited to bridge the gap between the social and natural sciences, he is almost as critical of its current approach as he is that of philosophy. He notes two basic weaknesses: the attempt to bring all economic phenomena under simple general laws; the separating of economic activity from the complexities of human behaviour and the constraints of the environment. Competitive indexes and gross domestic product figures are quite inadequate. 'New indicators of progress are needed to monitor the economy, wherein the natural world and human well-being, not just economic production, are awarded full measure.'<sup>8</sup>

At a general level, these criticisms and suggestions seem to be sound. In the 1999 Academy Symposium, 'Facts and Fancies of Human Development' (to be published in April), there was support for this view. Although the main attention was given to criticism of weaknesses in various comparative quantitative measures of human development and well-being across nations, a number of papers emphasised that quantitative measures, whatever their statistical rigour, do not address the fundamental question of the **quality** of human life within, and between, societies. Thus, for example, Gavin Jones, in his paper 'Global Human Development: The Education Agenda', notes on several occasions the lack of comparative data on the quality of education. He also points out that, while quantitative differences among nations in the provision of education can be illustrated by a few summary statistics, there are serious obstacles

to documenting qualitative differences in this way.

Not all the value issues that affect the nature of the social sciences are of a moral kind, but the latter have a pervasive and fundamental role. Their influence is not simply on the ends to be served by social scientific inquiry as in, say, the conduct of medical research with the objective of alleviating human suffering. In the social sciences, moral values are intrinsic to the practice. A basic reason for this is that human beings shape their behaviour in the light of values, rules and the like that express their beliefs about how they should act as distinct from how they can act. This is related, of course, to their more general capacities for freedom of choice and rational decision making. Thus, the application of a causal explanatory model to the social sciences must be adjusted to accommodate moral values and other significant features that are not part of the physical world. Another complicating factor for the social sciences is that many of the objects they study have meaning by virtue of human intentionality. The material objects that are treated as money in human economic activities provide a very clear example.

In referring to anthropology, Clifford Geertz emphasised the role of interpretation, and likened its methods to those of literary studies.<sup>9</sup> While this analogy may be too strong, the features I have mentioned require that any systematic study of humans as social beings should include a thorough interpretative (or hermeneutic) dimension in its methodology. (It is an irony that the role of interpretation was recognised in the natural sciences before it came to be accepted in the social sciences.) Interpretative social science not only requires a carefully argued account of the beliefs, values, attitudes and so on that influence the members of a society, but also a justification of the perspective of values from which the social scientist's interpretations are made. Subjective, relativist interpretation (such as that advocated by postmodernists) is as much to be avoided as the positivist restriction to the quest for causal laws that exhaustively explain social phenomena.

As John Searle<sup>10</sup> has pointed out, a crucial difference between natural and social sciences is that, in the first, the objects studied exist independently of any human activity while, in the second, they are always, in some sense, shaped by social acts. Some are biologically based or have a function related to an object's physical properties. (These he calls 'social facts'.) There are many others however, whose physical characteristics are unrelated to the assigned and collectively recognised function. (Searle refers to these as 'institutional facts'.) The sounds of language probably form the most pervasive and basic example.

While Searle rejects a dualistic view of biology and culture, he does not merge the two, as seems to be the case in Wilson's theory. For Searle, consciousness and intentionality are emergent properties of the human brain. (For an example of 'emergent properties', he refers to those of water in relation to its constituent elements of hydrogen and oxygen.) Culture is the manifestation of collective

intentionality. Unlike other animals, human collective behaviour is marked by symbols. 'The biological capacity to make something symbolise - or mean or express - something beyond itself is the basic capacity that underlies not only language but all other forms of institutional reality as well.'<sup>11</sup>

This is the level at which inquiry in the social sciences must work. There are important connections with biology and related natural sciences, but the emergent properties that characterise the objects of study in the social sciences require differences in methods and purposes of inquiry. A natural scientist can explain, say, an earthquake without any need to take account of such questions as what awareness the earthquake has of itself and of what it is doing. However, a social scientist cannot explain (or interpret) religious practices, for example, without giving attention to how such activities are understood by those who engage in them. One does not have to agree with Max Weber (and others) that primacy should be given to empathic understanding (*verstehen*) in the social sciences in order to acknowledge that the phenomena studied require close attention to the ways they are perceived by those who engage in, or are affected by them. This is a crucial ingredient in the study of moral values by the social sciences - whether the primary objective is one of explanation, interpretation, criticism, prediction. . .

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<sup>1</sup> Wilson, Edward O (1975), *Sociobiology: The New Synthesis*, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press: 145. Wilson's views on the social sciences in this book (along with those of Chomsky and Geertz) are discussed by John Horgan (1998), in *The End of Science*, London: Abacus, Ch 6, 'The End of Social Science'.

<sup>2</sup> Wilson, Edward O (1998), *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*, London: Little, Brown and Co. The word 'consilience' literally means 'jumping together'.

<sup>3</sup> I have considered the first question briefly in 'The Structure of the Social Sciences', *Challenges for the Social Sciences in Australia*, Vol 2, 1998. (Prepared by the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia for the Australian Research Council.)

<sup>4</sup> Wilson (1998) *op cit*: 202.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*: 284 (in chapter 11 entitled 'Ethics and Religion').

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*: 296.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*: 301.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*: 326.

<sup>9</sup> Geertz, Clifford (1973), 'Thick description: towards an interpretive theory of culture', *The Interpretation of Culture*, New York: Basic Books.

<sup>10</sup> Searle, John (1995), *The Construction of Social Reality*, New York: Free Press, especially Ch 2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*: 228.

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## 2000 Calendar

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| 11 | April    | Meeting of International Relations Cttee   |
| 12 | April    | Meeting of Finance Committee               |
| 13 | April    | Meeting of Executive Committee             |
| 1  | July     | Deadline for <i>Dialogue 2/2000</i>        |
| 5  | July     | Meeting of Membership Committee            |
| 28 | July     | Meeting of Workshop Committee              |
| 30 | July     | Closing date Australia-China Program       |
| 31 | July     | Closing date Australia-Vietnam Program     |
| 2  | August   | Meeting of Executive Committee             |
| 15 | August   | Closing date Australia-Netherlands Program |
| 27 | October  | Meeting of Workshop Committee              |
| 1  | November | Deadline for <i>Dialogue 3/2000</i>        |
| 5  | November | Meeting of Executive Committee             |
| 6  | November | Annual Symposium                           |
| 7  | November | Annual General Meeting                     |
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