


# OCCASIONAL PAPER

**AUSTRALIA**

in its

**ASIAN CONTEXT**

*Occasional Paper Series 1/1996*



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## DEFINING AUSTRALIA IN ASIA

Anthony Milner

When the Academy launched its *Australian-Asian Perceptions Project* in 1991 — the *Project* which I have been directing — the issues of culture and identity were only just beginning to come onto the horizon in public discussion about Australia's engagement with Asia.<sup>1</sup> We often spoke of 'Australia' being 'in Asia' or 'not in Asia' without giving serious thought to what is involved culturally in being either 'in' or 'out' of the region. Nor did we reflect carefully on how useful the term 'Asia' itself is as a rubric for so many different countries, cultures and peoples. And what about the word 'Australia'? Is there enough homogeneity within this country to allow talk of such things as 'the Australian people' and 'Australian attitudes'?

In the 1980s, under the auspices of a Labor Government firmly committed to 'Asia' as an Australian priority, reports were written which focussed on Australia's commercial, security and diplomatic future in the region. (Fellows of this Academy were prominent in this vigorous report writing).<sup>2</sup> The role played by cultural difference in creating misunderstanding and confusion in all these practical areas of Australian-Asian relations is sometimes touched upon in the official reports. Yet in general, until the last couple of years, there has been a neglect of the cultural underpinnings of Australia's engagement with the region. Neglect of culture as a concept, in fact, seems to be a long-standing feature of Australian approaches to the world — one might say, almost a characteristic of 'Australian culture'.

Attention to perspectives, perceptions and values is often seen to be out of tune with our commitment to pragmatic, hard-headed commonsense thinking. We Australians tend to believe that we see the world as it really is, and *not* through the veil of culture.<sup>3</sup>

Why then, has culture emerged at last in the 'Australia in Asia' debate? It is partly because the very business of engaging closely in the region has forced the issue upon us. The newspapers contain one report after another about clashes of culture. Thus, Australian businesspeople perceive corruption to be endemic in China and Indonesia and, as a result, so it is reported, Australian capital cannot be raised for some ventures in these countries.<sup>4</sup> In May of 1995 the Australian Bureau of Industry Economics announced that 'Asia' has been replaced by Britain, the United States of America and New Zealand as the 'most popular location for Australian investments'. The report cites the importance of 'historical ties, cultural and commercial familiarity' in bringing about this recent (and one hopes, temporary) move away from Asia.<sup>5</sup>

Taking an example from the sphere of the media, Australia's new television service in the Asian region, ATV, has been accused of presenting programs that are unintelligible to Asian audiences. As one critic puts it: 'What's the use of (screening) 'Gardening Australia' . . . (or) 'Roy and H.G.'? Who gives a damn in Asia?'<sup>6</sup>



In political relations in the region also, Australians are increasingly aware of problems of a cultural nature. Australian public comment during the so-called 'recalcitrant' debate with Malaysia is an obvious example. At a more routine level, despite our official rhetoric about close collaboration with Asian states, Australian officials grow impatient as they listen to an Indonesian military leader explain in detail the significance of the 'family principle' in Indonesian political thinking. Similarly, in one official meeting after another in the region, Australians have made the observation that nothing solid seems to be achieved. Yet here, as in the previous example, the Australians concerned are increasingly likely to see that their Asian counterparts are not so much incompetent as merely possessing different agendas and different styles of negotiation.

Those Australians working cheek by jowl with business, diplomatic, education and other representatives from Asian countries are on the front line of Australia's engagement with Asia. They tend to develop earlier than most a sensitivity to the presence and the significance of cultural difference. Sometimes their knowledge brings them a sense of caution or despair, but the fact that so many Australians have moved into close and often tense Asian relationships is slowly having its impact on the wider Australian community. A sign of this impact, perhaps, is that 69 percent of Australians now support the idea that the people of this country should make a greater effort to develop the study of Asian languages and culture.<sup>7</sup>

Community experience, however, is only part of the reason for the growing interest in contrasting values and perceptions as an ingredient in Australian-Asian relations. Academic initiatives, including (I think it is fair to say) the *Academy Project*, have also contributed. They have focussed not only on specific types of Australian interaction with the region, but also the larger question of Australian identity in the Asian context. In particular, the American political scientist, Samuel Huntington, has provoked debate by arguing that, in the post-Cold War period, the world will be divided not by ideological commitment but by 'civilisational' fault lines. We will be divided, he says, by language, culture, tradition and religion. 'Western' will compete, for instance, with 'Confucian' and 'Islamic' — and the latter two will compete with one another. In the context of the 'clash of civilisations', Huntington, whose views have aroused the ire of many, including our own Foreign Minister, Senator Evans, has identified Australia as a 'torn country' — a people who, in his words, are 'divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or another'.<sup>8</sup>

The doyen of Australian philosophers, John Passmore, in a much discussed article of 1992, addressed the issue of Australia's cultural identity in a way that left no doubt as to where he believes Australia stands in civilisational terms. He argued that Australia is fundamentally European: 'our historical memories are European', he said, and the 'leading ideas which have constructed our society are of European origin'. When he is invited to Japan, Passmore reported, it is not as a 'fellow-Asian'

but because '(I am thought to be) fundamentally introducing my Japanese audience to European ideas'.<sup>9</sup>

Against this insistence on Australia's 'European-ness', other commentators have reacted by suggesting that Australia is undergoing a far-reaching process of 'Asianisation'. The influential journalist, Greg Sheridan, in a recent book, suggests that 'Asianisation' involves more than the fact that two-thirds of Australia's exports now go to Asia and three-quarters of a million Japanese tourists come annually to Australia. Our educational and military links with the region are increasingly comprehensive and some seven percent of our population is now 'Asian'. 'Asianisation', according to Sheridan, will entail the emergence of the Australian community as 'a numerous honey-coloured people . . . a universal people with universal aspirations'.<sup>10</sup>

Prime Minister Keating (in some but not all of his speeches) has added to this vision by anticipating that Australians will be 'transforming ourselves — our habits of mind and work' in the process of our 'historic shift to Asia and the Pacific'.<sup>11</sup> The 'national culture', he argues, will be 'shaped by, and help to shape, the cultures around us'.<sup>12</sup>

I will return to these diverging visions of Australia — the 'European' and the 'Asianisation' visions — but the very existence of such a debate, it is clear, has helped to highlight the issue of culture in Australian-Asian relations. In doing so, it also underlines the current relevance of the work of this Academy's *Australian-Asian Perceptions Project*.

### *Australian-Asian Perceptions Project*

The *Project* has been concerned to examine the role of culture at the two levels I have mentioned. Firstly, we have sought to investigate the way differences in values and perspectives cause misunderstanding and sometimes tension in Australia's business, diplomatic and other relations in the Asian region. Secondly, the *Project* has tackled the wider question of how Australian society is to be defined in regional terms — that is to say, the nature of our 'otherness' in Asia.

The findings of the *Project*, presented in a series of research papers<sup>13</sup> and, soon, a three volume series of books,<sup>14</sup> provide what might be termed cultural assistance for many types of Australian practical endeavours in the Asian region. But the larger conclusions of the *Project*, which in one way or another has engaged well over 100 researchers, many of whom are strongly committed to Australia's engagement with Asia, are cautionary. They suggest that we face a task far more challenging than many Australian opinion leaders have predicted, and that 'Asianisation' is unlikely to be the best way of describing Australia's future with respect to the region.

Let me say something about the strategy adopted by the *Academy Project*. In considering the role of cultural difference, the *Project* — which focussed on East

(including South East) rather than South or West Asia — has followed three lines of inquiry, each line producing a single volume of essays.

First, essays have been written introducing the societies of the region (including Australia) and commenting, in particular, on the 'world views' which operate in these societies: the dominant concepts and values and the manner in which they are challenged by competing perceptions.

The second line of inquiry involves a series of case studies, each attempting to identify particular practical ways in which conflicts in cultural perspective have had an impact on specific developments in Australian-Asian relations.

Finally, in the third element of the *Project*, we have carried out a number of comparative studies which focus on key areas of Australia's relations with the region — areas such as human rights, business ethics, national security and labour relations. Moving from one key area to another, the different studies compare specific Australian approaches with approaches influential in Japan, China, Indonesia and other Asian countries.

Although the entire *Project* is concerned with cultural difference, it should be noted that the context in which this investigation takes place has little in common with the world in which such studies were undertaken a generation and more ago. The agenda behind the *Project* is Australian, and it reflects the needs and anxieties of a community by no means complacent about its relationship to the Asian region and Asian cultures. Some decades ago people doing this type of research might have been concerned to identify the cultural and other factors which had been responsible for the retarded development of many of the societies in the region. Today, in explaining cultural difference, we are more concerned to learn to develop an effective way of operating in Asia. The international power equation, particularly in the case of Australia, is far distant from that which sustained Orientalist and then Development scholarship.

The *Project*, it ought also to be observed, is concerned with culture in action. Its different component studies seek to identify the role of contrasting value or conceptual systems in concrete situations. They note the way such systems change over time, and the fact that they are often challenged and influenced by competing systems even within a single ethnic community. The studies illustrate how cultures can be invented or constructed in certain circumstances, sometimes for ulterior motives.

Cultures, therefore, are seldom static — yet this is not to say they can be dismissed as mere outwardly visible products of deeper social or economic processes. Culture is grounded in, among other things, culture. Traditions are certainly constructed or invented in numerous situations;<sup>15</sup> but, as our colleague, the anthropologist Bruce Kapferer, has argued in a rare comparative study of Australia with an Asian nation (Sri Lanka): 'No tradition is . . . discontinuous with history . . . Nothing apart from

nothing comes out of a void'. Kapferer takes the case of the Australian Anzac soldiers of the First World War. They referred to themselves as 'making history and as inventing a tradition' but that tradition was 'ingrained with an egalitarian and Christian ontology that is deeply part of the historical world out of which it was formed'.<sup>16</sup>

Ingrained styles of thought, in fact, prove resilient when they come up against all types of novel trends and processes. For instance, the 'comparative' studies in the *Academy Project* — that is, its third line of inquiry — offer numerous examples of the strength of long-term notions of community, self, narrative and so forth when challenged by Western ideologies propagated during the colonial and post-colonial periods. A television soap opera in Indonesia, an advertisement in Japan, a social welfare policy in Singapore, a conception of polity and empire in China — all may reveal the shaping influence of earlier conceptual structures. This is not to say that traditions always survive intact; rather, older ideas may fuse with new concepts, or, more often, engage with them dialectically. Thai notions of 'democracy', Malay concepts of 'race' and 'nation', for instance, are not to be understood as straightforward ideological borrowings from the West. They also reflect, to some extent, the influence of earlier, indigenous forms of social thought.<sup>17</sup>

Such processes of fusion and adaptation, it might be added, will also determine the fate of the much vaunted globalising cultures which are sometimes expected (including in influential Australian circles)<sup>18</sup> to bring about a world-wide homogeneity of values and tastes. The studies undertaken by the *Academy Project* are full of examples of the vitality of the 'local' in these processes. There is every indication that the world system is in fact substituting one diversity with another, although the new diversity is more about interrelations than about autonomy.

### 'Asia'

Diversity is certainly the major theme in the *Academy Project's* presentation of the Asian region. The frequent use of the term 'Asian' can in this sense be misleading. It is used, of course, not only by outsiders who are quite unaware of the different religions, cultures, ethnicities and economies in the region. Within the region also there is increasing talk of 'Asian values' and 'Asian attitudes'.

For instance, Noordin Sopiee, the Director-General of a leading Malaysian think-tank, has argued that 'East Asians value (to a point many others cannot understand) education and training'. He adds that 'we do not run our societies on the basis of the individual but on the community'. Asians value 'saving and thriftiness', and family loyalty. They are prepared to 'work very hard', he says, and 'do not believe that government and business must be natural adversaries'.<sup>19</sup>

There are elements of truth in such generalisations. A number of the studies we have made, in fact, draw attention to the significance of such values in Asian societies.

Nevertheless, Noordin Sopiee's formulations possess a certain rigidity. They ignore, for instance, an important degree of ideological give and take between 'East' and 'West'. For example, the stress on 'hard work' in Japan and certain other Asian societies, so recent scholarship suggests, owes much to the influence of the nineteenth-century English popular philosopher, Samuel Smiles, whose writings about 'Self Help' exercised a remarkable world-wide influence.<sup>20</sup> Also, any mention of communitarian values should take account not only of Asian priorities but also of the history of Socialistic thinking coming from Europe. And 'Western' ideas of law may have been just as important as 'Asian' notions of the interdependence of business and government in promoting economic development in the region.

Some of the values Noordin Sopiee mentions as 'East Asian' are not so much embedded as consciously and deliberately inculcated in certain Asian communities. In Malaysia itself, commencing in the 1970s, the government attempted to reinvent the majority Malay community, which had long been the economically backward segment of the population. Malay communal values, it was argued, placed too little stress on hard work, the accumulation of capital and discipline. The task was seen to be that of making the Malays think more like the Chinese of the country (who had been relatively successful in the economic sphere) or like well-known American entrepreneurs. Care was taken to comb the writings of Western sociologists and philosophers, seeking ways to achieve what the Malay leadership termed a '*revolusi mental*' or 'revolution in thinking'.<sup>21</sup>

The concept of 'Asia' must, as well, also take account of the deep-seated divisions that exist in the region. As a senior Singapore government minister, George Yeo, observes: 'deep suspicions' still exist 'between China and Japan, between Japan and Korea, between China and Vietnam, and between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese in South-East Asia'.<sup>22</sup>

This type of suspicion, it is true, also disrupts the supposed 'civilisational' unities which Samuel Huntington has written about. The conclusions of the Academy *Project* in one sense agree with Huntington in that they place a stress on the role of cultural difference. But they do not by any means see the region in terms of static civilisational blocs. Thus, to ignore the role of Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia would fly in the face of much that we know about attitudes in those societies to business ethics or to law (to take examples from the comparative studies undertaken by the *Project*). But to lump Malaysia and Indonesia together as members of the Islamic world, assuming they will align with one another in policies and general approaches to the world, would ignore the real national differences — the products of differing geographies, colonial experience and ethnic mix. Equally, the Confucian states of Singapore, Taiwan and China exhibit profound differences, and centuries of war between Thailand and Burma remind us of the danger of assuming that these countries might be categorised in a comprehensive way as components of a Theravada Buddhist world.

The Asian region then is far more complex and dynamic than Huntington's 'civilisational' paradigm would suggest, or than the term 'Asia' itself implies. Buddhism, Confucianism and Islam are certainly ingredients in the Asian cultural mix investigated by the *Project*: so too is the Shintoism of Japan and the Christianity of the Philippines. The impact of colonialism has also been culturally divisive — labour relations laws, styles of government and educational concepts have all been shaped by the experience of French or British or Dutch or American colonial systems. In China, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia there is, in addition, the influence of Communism. These contrasts and clashes of religious and political traditions are complicated further by an economic pluralism. The latter is often evident even within a single country as one moves from paddy fields where traditional agricultural techniques are still in evidence to modern and post-modern cities possessing spectacular and imaginative architecture. Merely driving a few kilometres — for instance, on a road out of Kuala Lumpur or Jakarta — can demonstrate effectively that Australia confronts not one but many 'Asias'.

### Countries

These many 'Asias', this extraordinary diversity, raises the question of just what type of categories are most meaningful when we discuss the peoples and societies of Asia. The *Project* has followed the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, in focussing on states or countries.

In certain respects the nation-state is becoming more important as a social and cultural unit.<sup>23</sup> Each regime in the region, including the Australian government, is engaged in an extraordinary degree of nation building. Using new techniques of communication and control, the different states enunciate and inculcate national ideologies, social objectives and development plans within their state borders.

In a book published in 1995, Clifford Geertz confronts the issue of the characterisation of 'countries' by focussing on his own two research fields — Indonesia and Morocco — and by insisting that 'coming into . . . virtually any country . . . is an experience palpable enough to be felt on the skin, and penetrant enough to be felt beneath it'. No one who comes to Morocco or Indonesia, Geertz suggests, 'is likely to confuse them with each other or to be satisfied with elevated banalities about common humanity or a universal need for self-expression'.<sup>24</sup>

The Academy *Project's* first line of inquiry, which has become its volume of introductory essays *Australia in Asia: Communities of Thought*, attempts to say something about the cultural palpability of a number of countries in the Asian region. The hierarchies and the stress on deference in the 'integralist' state of Indonesia, with its relentless inculcation of the *panca sila* ideology, seem to convey the type of palpability alluded to by Geertz. In the case of Thailand there is seen to be the long-established preoccupation with modernity; in China there is what Gereme Barmé refers to as a pervasive self-loathing. Malaysia is striking in its far-

reaching pluralism — its ethnic, religious and regional fragmentation. Malaysia's extreme multi-culturalism reminds us that, despite Australian official claims, Australia, in its shared value systems and even its demographic structure, continues to be a relatively homogenous society.

Moving from one country to another in the *Project's* introductory survey of the region<sup>25</sup> it is immediately apparent that Australians face a formidable complexity in their engagement with Asia and, as we have seen, the cultural elements contributing to this complexity of values and perceptions are likely to possess a certain resilience. Some Australian observers — and our current Foreign Minister is one of them — would appear to be over optimistic in speaking of a globalisation of values in the region. Senator Evans has asserted that along with the development of English as the *lingua franca* in the region, an ideological consensus is emerging around such liberal principles as multiculturalism and democracy, and the need for 'inclusivity' and cooperation.<sup>26</sup> Such a trend might be reassuring for Australians, but in all aspects of the work of the *Academy Project* we have seen evidence that it will face strong resistance. In China, for instance, the abiding fear of chaos goes well beyond anything most Australians can easily imagine. And it is a fear that can have all types of implications in the social and political life of that country. Both the Chinese and the Japanese have also been much concerned about their supposed uniqueness, and this too is likely to have far-reaching repercussions for their interaction with other societies. As 'unique people' it will be argued that the standards and interpretations employed in considering the operations of other societies simply do not apply.

In Japan, a section of the bureaucracy would still 'prefer the legitimacy provided by the Imperial aura to the more accountable legitimacy of the *demos*'. The War and how it is remembered continues to preoccupy Japanese thinkers, and in ways which Australians find increasingly baffling. The deference and the ceremony encountered in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand also cause confusion. How can it be, interested Australians might ask, that a people like the Indonesians who have been through a revolution and once called one another something like 'mate', now tend to call one another *Pak* (father) or *Ibu* (mother) to convey abiding respect. The Indonesians are a republic (as many Australians aspire to be) but their President is treated as a Javanese God-king of 'feudal' times.

Nearly everywhere we look in East Asia we find dynamism and transformation, but, once again, there is no clear indication that the general direction of change is toward the type of moral and cultural norms favoured by most Australians. The modernity of the ASEAN states and South Korea, for instance, is obvious, with their thriving economies, modern and post-modern architecture, 'mobile telephones, facsimile machines and paging devices'. But 'modernity' for many Malaysians and Thais is evidently consistent with the retention of monarchy and of forms of politeness in speech and manner which Australians tend to associate with an earlier era. The

Korean language, one of our contributors, James Cotton explains, 'is structured so that a discourse of equals is extremely difficult to sustain'.

South Korea's modernisation has been dramatic in the extreme. 'Greater wealth and power', however, do not necessarily mean submission to wholesale globalisation. Rather they have provided the 'foundation for greater self-confidence and self-esteem' and Koreans are becoming less reticent about the importance in their society, for instance, of shamanism and of specific regional identities. Looking at the direction of change in China, Gereme Barmé anticipates that the 'need to reassert itself as a major civilisation may well be a feature of China's history in the next century'. He adds that in their TV series, intellectual debates and trade disputes, Chinese 'be they conservative or pro-modernisation, have revealed an increasing resentment of the West and its value systems'.

These brief observations on the cultural civilisations of the Asian region are taken from the studies produced in the first element of the *Academy Project's* research strategy — that is, our introductory survey of the countries of the region. But the cultural challenge of Asia is equally apparent in the case studies and the comparative studies that we have undertaken.

### Cultural challenges

Among the case studies,<sup>27</sup> for instance, an analysis of the Australia-Korea beef trade suggests that the growth of democracy in Korea will have the effect of strengthening, rather than weakening, the voice of the conservative rural lobby. And it is that lobby which defends Korean beef production against foreign competition partly because of the traditional and national values invested in local rural industry. A case study on Australian-Malaysian relations suggests how differences in perception in the two countries — particularly with respect to race, political freedom, labour relations and religion — persistently foster misunderstanding, suspicion and sometimes tension.

A further study, dealing with the issue of the Multi Function Polis in Japanese-Australian relations, draws attention to the expectation on the Japanese side that — to use the Japanese wording — 'it is necessary to control the consciousness of the public and related organisations very carefully'. Japanese officials 'spoke respectfully about what they perceived to be the contrast between the 'top down' approach on the Australian side and the 'bottom up' Japanese way'. In Australia, as well, we know that there has existed in certain quarters the long-standing desire for a 'great and powerful' friend. It can take the form of a cargo cult mentality, a hope of obtaining riches loaded on some 'Good ship Multi Function Polis'.

Our case study of the Timor issue in the Australia-Indonesia context discusses the way Australian governments since 1975 have had to 'steer a tortuous course between the pragmatic need to get along with our important neighbour on the one side and the demands of public opinion on the other. Possessing a fundamentally different

approach to the whole issue of governance and to the role of public discussion, this is 'a problem the Suharto government has never had to face — and seems not to understand very well'. The authors of the Timor study observe that 'no two neighbouring countries in the world are as dissimilar . . . in their geography, history and cultural heritage, as Australia and Indonesia'.

In other case studies commissioned by the Academy *Project* such observations about cultural difference and its significance appear time and again. Turning from the case studies to the comparative studies,<sup>28</sup> it is here that we assembled perhaps the strongest body of evidence of the wide range, and of the potency, of the value and perceptual system of Asia. It is here too that the *Project* probed most deeply the issue of Australia's otherness.

The comparative studies, as I have said, focussed on such practical areas in Australian-Asian relations as human rights, business ethics, national security and labour relations. They examined, too, perceptions of the media, democracy, government, citizenship and education. In each case they compared the values and perspectives which operate in Australia with those operating in a number of Asian countries.

The procedure we adopted in writing the comparative studies was unusual.<sup>29</sup> It could not have been otherwise. There are few specialists in Asian studies with experience of in-depth comparative analysis. It is rare to find someone specialising in more than one Asian language, and systematic comparison between Australia and Asian societies is even more unusual. In these circumstances, the *Australian-Asian Perceptions Project* brought together teams of authors in five-day writing sessions, or 'composition meetings'. The teams always included a specialist on Australia — often someone with no previous experience of Asian Studies. The other six or seven members on each team included specialists on a range of Asian societies — often representing several different disciplines — in some cases, specialists from the region.

The engagement itself was intensive. The process began with exploratory discussions in which the participants in each of the writing groups, many of whom had never met before, obtained some sense of one another's perspectives. The groups then spent a day or two meeting with other people, often non-academics, who had been involved, in one way or another, with the issue at hand. A trade union official spoke of his experience of unionism in Indonesia; a Chinese business consultant spoke of her attempts to advise Australian executives. Such interviews often served as a stimulus for the writing groups, suggesting possible directions for analysis and raising questions that one author or another might be able to answer.

Over the rest of the five-day period, the writing group prepared a very rough draft, each member tending to take responsibility for a particular section and then seeking the views of others in making appropriate comparisons. Everyone was aware that

having access to the range of expertise brought together for this short period was a rare opportunity. The polishing of each study report could be left for later; what was essential during the 'composition meeting' week was to interrogate one another, attempting to pin down real differences and similarities operating in the region. This often required the criss-crossing of disciplinary as well as cultural boundaries. Together in one location — either Canberra, Braidwood, Brisbane, Fremantle or Melbourne — the writing groups attempted, at the very least, to forge a few ideas, a few paragraphs, that could be developed later in a more systematic way.

Once again the point emerges in most of the comparative studies that the region contains many 'Asias'. As is evident in the study on labour relations, South Korea is, by other 'Asian' standards, very confrontational in the industrial relations arena. The brief survey of ethical attitudes contained in the study on business ethics suggests executives from some Asian countries have attitudes closer to those of Australians than to those of other Asian business elites.

In these comparative studies as in other parts of the Academy *Project* the observation is made that cultures do not stand still. Political attitudes, consumer tastes and educational concepts, for instance, are subject to constant change, and sometimes — as in the case of democracy, citizenship and human rights — there are indicators that value systems everywhere can seem to be on the same trajectory. Once again, however, the problem with proceeding to conclusions about a global convergence of ideas is that modernity has different nuances from one country to another. For instance, democracy and citizenship are loaded in Thailand, Indonesia or Japan with assumptions shaped not only by contact with the West but also by deep-running local traditions. In a sense, the Western inventors of these concepts have lost control of their own inventions. Concepts such as 'democracy' and 'citizenship' have become what one of our participants called 'free-floating signifiers': terms possessing multiple definitions. Local knowledge, the *Project* findings indicate, is clearly important for Australians if they are to engage in a regional dialogue about the issue of democracy. It is equally important if Australians wish to understand the modern preoccupations of Indonesian or Singaporean governments with the inculcation of national ideology. Armed with local knowledge (as recommended in the *Project's Perceiving Government* study), we are able to appreciate that current presidents and prime ministers have inherited, to some extent, the pre-colonial monarch's role as 'teacher' of the people.

A discussion of the media provides perhaps the strongest grounds for suspecting the presence of cultural convergence on a global scale. The proliferation of satellite television, and the global exchange of ideas, images and information, seem to be breaking down cultural barriers. Young people tune into MTV, and don T-shirts and jeans. As the comparative study of perceptions of the media conveys, however, the way in which a television show is received and interpreted, or the meaning of a T-shirt, is by no means predetermined. Something as apparently prosaic as a news



broadcast can be shaped as much by local categories of perception and experience as by the influence of so-called 'international' styles. The degree of stress placed on the 'eye witness' report, the presentation of 'official' news and the manner in which interviews are conducted are all likely to vary from one society to the next. The presentation of a news 'story' in Indonesia, for instance, may well follow the style of a Shadow Play tale rather than that of an Australian *Four Corners* investigation. Indonesian news services are likely to present President Suharto as the 'good king' figure from Javanese *Wayang* theatre rather than as a participant in a male combat episode.

In the *Project's* comparative studies as in its other activities, we encountered the growth of a certain cultural assertiveness in the region that reinforces the impression of resistance to global culture. In the studies on democracy and human rights, in particular, we see evidence of this assertiveness. Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, as every newspaper reader knows, is both a persistent and an eloquent challenger of 'Western' values; representatives from Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, Singapore and many other countries in the region tend to express similar views, but in a less direct way. They interrogate their Islamic, Buddhist and Confucian pasts in order to craft moral systems with the capacity to counter the claims made by modern secular systems promulgated by the West.

Such ideological vigour, in fact, may do more than resist the encroachment of European-based values. Certain values and concepts operating in Asian countries are achieving a wide influence. Our study on business ethics raises the possibility of non-Western values becoming the norm in the region, at least with regard to trade. That Chinese play a leading part in the commercial life of virtually every part of the region certainly suggests that it would be unwise to assume that, country by country, the whole of Asia will begin to adopt the business practices and principles with which Australians are most familiar. The study on labour relations also draws attention to indications of convergence of values on other than Western terms: both the Australian 'accords' between unions and government, and the development of enterprise bargaining can be seen to bring Australia itself closer to certain Asian norms.

The vision of interacting cultural influences and tenacious local traditions which has emerged in the comparative studies and other parts of the *Academy Project* contributes to the growing suspicion that the post-Cold War period in the Asian region offers few certainties. Australians will need to possess skills of a cultural and not merely commercial and technological type. The old views of the diplomat as a type of elite culture broker may need to be revived;<sup>30</sup> one of our case studies dealing with legal contracts suggests that today Australian lawyers are certainly playing that culture broker role in the region. In our universities, Asian studies, as it is often called, cannot be restricted to economic and political analysers. Work on Asia will

need to probe the deeper social and cultural processes which shape strategic, commercial and other perceptions in the Asian region.

### Defining Australia

When we think about future directions for Australia in the context of the comparative studies, however, another line of thought also suggests itself. The comparative studies more than any other part of the *Project* focussed attention on Australia and its 'otherness' in Asia. In so doing they have a significance not only for the question about 'Europe' and 'Asianisation' (in Australian identity) with which I began this lecture, but also for the task of making our Australian population more receptive to Asia.

All of our comparative studies tack back and forth between Australia and the different countries of the Asian region. Taking illustrations from China, Indonesia or South Korea, we nevertheless return repeatedly to Australia. In the process, a sharper image develops of the body of values and perceptions that operate in Australian society.

Consider the example of citizenship — Stuart Macintyre gave an account of this 'composition meeting' in the 1992 Cunningham Lecture. At least until the Australian government recently made attempts to promote public discussion about the history and meaning of citizenship,<sup>31</sup> Australians have seldom reflected on the matter. The term itself seems to possess a certain emotive power, at least when it is used in a negative way: 'second class citizenship' is a condition that many Australians would profess to abhor. But just what is implied by 'citizenship' in Australian political thinking receives little attention. When we compare Australia with most Asian societies, at least some features of the Australian experience become immediately apparent. Even in Asian states that have been heavily influenced by European constitutional and political ideas, it is the communitarian rather than the individualistic dimension of citizenship that predominates. In Australia there tends to be a far greater emphasis on the rights of individual citizens and less on their duties to the community. In Australia, too, the term is today remarkably free of ethnic connotations — a point that certainly could not be made about citizenship in Japan, South Korea and numerous other countries in the region. Egalitarianism is another feature of the Australian approach — or at least this appears to be the case when we see the hierarchy of citizenships that exists in Malaysia, for instance.

Our comparative study on perceptions of government also helped us to gauge Australia's position in the region. By most Asian standards, Australia's strong democratic traditions and its federal system have the effect of limiting the strength of government. But by the same standards, Australian government is also intrusive in its scope, mediating persistently in areas such as unemployment relief, health care, child abuse and gender relations. The perception of the government's role in these

matters is liberal in character, stressing the government's duty to protect and foster the rights and freedoms of its citizens as individuals.

The primacy of the individual — of individualism — is also central when we consider issues relating to education or human rights. The myth of the individual is expounded and inculcated at virtually every stage of the Australian educational process. At university the teacher specifically instructs the student how to write a well-argued, seemingly individualistic essay, and one such individualistic essay often looks remarkably like another. But whatever the degree of homogeneity that actually exists, the concepts of originality and independence are nevertheless promoted in Australia as ideals, so that a student from China or Indonesia is likely to find the educational atmosphere in Australia unresponsive, lonely and impersonal. In human rights matters, Australians, not surprisingly, tend to show little sympathy towards Islamic and other non-Western rights. More specifically, their liberal heritage leads most Australians to stress individual rather than group rights and, thus, to recode what they define as Asian human rights situations in ways that can genuinely confuse and confound the 'Asians' concerned.

Another perception or value that can cloud Australian judgements in the area of human rights concerns our adversarialism, which is influential, for instance, in Australian thinking about labour relations. Although tension in the work place is encountered throughout the region, the actual style of labour relations differs from one country to another. In Indonesia and Thailand much stress is laid on harmony, hierarchy and paternalism, though these ideals can be the source of strained work relations. In Australia the legal system offers the opportunity to air disputes. The process of conciliation and arbitration recognises the interests of both sides; it recognises the legitimacy of labour in conflict with management, even though that conflict can, in practice, sometimes appear to be very ritualistic.

This adversarialism is ever present in the education process, the media and parliament. The teacher is understood to engage dialectically with the student; the news broadcaster has a duty to solicit at least two, preferably opposing, opinions on every major issue. Again there is sometimes a sense of ritualism: the politicians who confront one another in parliament may be arguing for policies that differ by only a hair's breadth. By many Asian standards, the Australian political system is characterised by a remarkable degree of consensus; after an apparently hostile debate, political opponents may go off for a drink together. But Australians do not consider the political system to be healthy unless this vigorous adversarialism is evident. Here too — with respect to the degree of consensus, as well as the need for debate — Australian characteristics are easiest to observe when thrown into relief by comparison with Asian countries.

Another key element of the Western liberal package that is so strongly evident in Australia is the nation-state. Our comparative study of national security argues that Australians are more comfortable than many peoples in the region with the 'realist'.

conception of a world of competing nation-states, each attempting to secure the greatest benefits for itself. Australians are likely to possess a clear sense of their own nation-state, with its well-defined borders, and can be insensitive to the fact that many people in the Asian region see their countries and the international environment in different terms. Do the Thais and Vietnamese, it may be asked, treat Cambodia as a nation-state of equal international status? Or is it perceived, rather, as a vassal state? That all states, in an international forum, use a similar vocabulary of international diplomacy does not necessarily mean that the Javanese of Indonesia have discarded older concepts, or that the Chinese have ceased to organise the political geography of their region in hierarchical and civilisational terms (with their own civilisation firmly at the summit). In Japan the maintenance of racial purity is sometimes seen as a national security matter, just as it once was in Australia.

### The liberal package

In thinking about Australia today in comparative terms, what comes through persistently is the significance of the liberal ideological package.<sup>32</sup> The nation-state, the tradition of freedom and individualism, the stress on equality and an abhorrence of a too vigorous official nationalism, and a lively adversarialism are all central. And they are all the clearer when we contrive to stand outside Australia, looking in. During one of our composition meetings a Japanese participant, who had never previously visited Australia, was amazed to watch the broadcast of parliament on television. He observed a prime minister and an opposition leader engage in apparently vicious debate, standing face to face, at spitting distance, cutting one another apart before a national audience. At moments like this, with the Japanese guest staring wide-eyed at the television, we Australians are indeed able to see our country more clearly as the 'other'. This clarity of vision, this sharper sense of a national culture or national core values, takes us back to the issue of identity suggested in the title of this lecture — *Defining Australia in Asia*.

The experience of the Academy *Project*, particularly the intensive comparative sessions where Australianists were locked in dialogue with Asian specialists of many types, suggests that the national engagement with Asia may strengthen the perception of the role of certain dominant values and concepts in Australian society.

This prediction comes at a time when there is a renewal of concern about identity and core values. Governor-General Hayden,<sup>33</sup> Prime Minister Keating<sup>34</sup> and Archbishop Hollingsworth<sup>35</sup> have all spoken enthusiastically on the subject. The social analyst, Hugh Mackay, has warned that many Australians are already anxious about what they see as the growing fragmentation of their society — a fragmentation encouraged, for instance, by multiculturalism, the women's movement and a long overdue recognition of Aboriginal cultural claims. Such Australians now perceive 'Asia' (and particularly the type of 'Asianisation' which Greg Sheridan has written about) as a further reason for anxiety.<sup>36</sup> The Australian public, according to the

author of the *Academy Project's* introductory study on Australian society, Judith Brett, lags behind the government in its commitment to an Asian future. A 1993 poll showed that only thirty percent of voters thought of Australia as part of Asia. Young Australians, according to the poll, were 'the group most likely to see Australia and Asia as separate'.<sup>37</sup> In the popular press and the wider community the type of analysis carried out by Professor John Passmore — insisting on the fundamentally European character of Australian society — attracts considerable support.

The *Academy Project* should help to separate out the issues of 'commitment to Asia', on the one hand, and 'Asianisation' on the other. To develop our sensitivity to Asia, to gain a more sophisticated appreciation of Asian value and perceptual systems and the way they are changing, is not the same thing as becoming part of Asia. It does not necessarily involve the reshaping of Australian culture by Asian cultures — although this may indeed occur, just as European migration since the War has added new facets, new dimensions to the earlier English/Scottish/Irish mix.

Engaging more closely with Asia, so the *Academy Project* leads one to conclude, may well assist Australians — be they academics, bureaucrats, business people or tourists — to perceive in their own society the continuing presence of dominant values or perceptions which they had once taken for granted. In the Asian comparative context Australians, who are usually inclined to concentrate, in a period of considerable social change, on their diversity not their homogeneity, on their divisions based upon gender, ethnicity and class, will be able to gain a clear view of these values that many of us hold in common. When we have thought about Australian identity in the past, it has often been with reference to Britain or America. I think of Miles Franklin's stress on our 'swagger',<sup>38</sup> Les Murray on our sense of 'sprawl',<sup>39</sup> CEW Bean on our 'mateship',<sup>40</sup> WK Hancock on our resentment of privilege.<sup>41</sup> In the comparative Asian context other features of our society come more clearly into view. The liberal ideological package — the individualism, the egalitarianism, the adversarialism — can be seen for what it is. Well entrenched in the Australian community, these concepts are products of a long rather than a brief history, in some cases their origins reach back through the Enlightenment and Renaissance in Europe, and further still to the origins of the Christian and classical tradition. The fact that Australians react as they do, in an apparent knee jerk fashion, to official killings in China or Indonesia, or to government ethnic discrimination in Malaysia or Fiji, is a consequence of inheriting this deeply-rooted liberal tradition.

A greater appreciation of the importance of this tradition will, at one level, reassure Australians concerned about what they perceive as a cultural threat implied in Australia's 'Asia' policy. It will also suggest to people in Asian countries that we Australians have become a little more relaxed or confident about our national identity and dominant values, and where they come from. In various surveys and newspaper interviews, numerous representatives from Asian countries have stated their conviction that Australian society is based essentially on concepts of European,

and particularly British, origin.<sup>42</sup> They do not necessarily view these concepts in negative terms.<sup>43</sup> What confuses such Asian commentators is why we sometimes pretend otherwise. In addition, many Asians believe — as do some Australians — that a degree of confident self awareness is not necessarily to be seen as a conservative force in society. It can be a pre-condition for a sustained program of social or economic revival.

### Culture

Finally, a growing awareness of the cultural structures underlying Australian approaches to the world — structure like those in Asian countries which are seldom static — will itself be a vital ingredient in future Australian endeavours to engage more closely in the Asian region. The neglect of culture, the innocence (one might term it) with which Australians often insist that they merely see the world 'as it is', works against our attempts to carry out the type of sensitive analyses of other societies and cultures which is vitally important to achieving Australian practical objectives in the region. To use a term employed by the cultural analyst, Dipesh Chakrabarty, we need to 'provincialise'<sup>44</sup> Australian culture, to recognise that we too view the world in a manner shaped by local traditions of thought and not in some universal, culture-free way. Even 'common sense', a phrase so often used in Australian conversation, is (in Clifford Geertz's words) 'not what the mind cleared of cant spontaneously apprehends, it is what the mind filled with presuppositions . . . concludes'.<sup>45</sup>

By identifying those presuppositions, by accepting that what once were considered 'givens' or 'self obvious' facts are in fact elements in a provincial Australian culture, we strengthen our capacity to engage with Asian societies. Recognising the importance of our own culture we are more likely to take seriously the values and perceptions which operate beneath the surface in other societies, including those complex societies of the rapidly changing Asian region which is so crucially important to Australia's future.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The *Project* involved a large number of people from Australia and from Asian countries. In particular I would like to thank the three Executive Directors of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia with whom I have worked: Bruce Miller, Oliver MacDonagh and James Jupp. I should also like to thank the members of the *Project* Advisory Committee: James Cotton, Sir Neil Currie, David Goodman, Stuart Harris, John Legge, Bruce Miller (who does indeed deserve to be thanked twice), Tony Reid and Nancy Viviani. Barry Clissold, Peg Job, Sue Rider, Wendy Pascoe and Kelly Raymond helped in numerous ways at the Academy headquarters. Finally, my co-editor of the three *Project* volumes published for Oxford University Press, Mary Quilty, and the Project Manager, Leanne Lynch, deserve special mention at this stage, when I am reflecting in a general way on the progress of the *Project*. For their comments on the draft of this lecture I should like to thank Tony Day, Jane Drakard, John Legge, Claire Milner, Mary Quilty and Jim Walter.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, R Garnaut (1989), *Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy*, AGPS, Canberra; S Harris (1986), *Review of Australia's Overseas Representation*, AGPS, Canberra; S FitzGerald (1988), *Immigration: a Commitment to Australia*, AGPS, Canberra; and P Dibb (1986), *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities: Report to the Minister of Defence*, AGPS, Canberra.

<sup>3</sup> Judith Brett has noted the 'dominance of positivist forms of knowledge in the Social Sciences in Australia'; quoted in C Wallace-Crabbe, 'Strutters', in R Nile (1994), *Australian Civilisation*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 206. See also Peter Sheehan's survey of the discipline of psychology in Australia, where he notes 'there is something peculiarly Australian, perhaps, about the preoccupation with 'useful research'. The utilitarian orientation has defined our past, and is being increasingly formalised to affect our future'; 'Guided by Utilitarian Philosophy', *The Australian*, 5 October 1994. For a more comprehensive statement, see Sheehan's address (September 1995) to the Annual Conference of the Australian Psychological Society, 'Anticipations ahead for psychology: looking from past to future', Perth.

<sup>4</sup> Reported in *The Australian*, 7 June 1995, 37.

<sup>5</sup> Megalogenis, G (1995), 'Record foreign investment boom bypasses Asia', *The Australian*, 5 May.

<sup>6</sup> Simper, E (1995), 'Signal Failure', *The Australian*, 12 June, 11.

<sup>7</sup> Rudd, K (1995), 'Creating an Asia-literate Australia', in G Sheridan (ed.), *Living with Dragons: Australia Confronts the Asian Destiny*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

<sup>8</sup> See the Owen Harries comment quoted in SP Huntington (1993), 'The Clash of Civilisations?', *Foreign Affairs*, Summer, 45. For Senator Evans's critique see G Evans (1995), 'Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 49, (1), 106-7.

<sup>9</sup> Passmore, J (1992), 'Europe in the Pacific', *Quadrant*, September, 10-19. FR Dalrymple (1992), (who has been Australian Ambassador in both Japan and Indonesia)

has observed that: 'In terms of what are usually thought of as Asian social and cultural attitudes and values, the average Australian is less 'Asian' than about anyone on earth'; 'East and West Down Under', Edward A Clark Center, University of Texas and Austin, Second R.J.L. Hawke Lecture, 9.

<sup>10</sup> Sheridan, G (1995), 'Australia's Asian Odyssey', in G Sheridan (ed.), *Living with Dragons*, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>11</sup> Quoted in *The Australian*, 26 January 1993, 2.

<sup>12</sup> Speech by the Prime Minister, the Asia-Australia Institute, Brisbane, 26 October 1994. Quoted also in G Sheridan (1994), 'Keating's Asian Vision', *The Weekend Australian*, 29-30 October, 28.

<sup>13</sup> *Perceiving 'Education', Perceiving 'Business Ethics', Perceiving 'Labour Relations', Perceiving 'Government', Perceiving 'Democracy', Perceiving 'National Security', The Role of the 'Media', Perceiving 'Human Rights', Perceiving 'Citizenship'*. All of these were published by the Asia-Australia Institute of the University of New South Wales.

<sup>14</sup> The books (to be published by Oxford University Press) are edited by Anthony Milner and Mary Quilty and have the titles: *Australia in Asia: Communities of Thought*, *Australia in Asia: Comparing Cultures* and *Australia in Asia: Episodes*. Tapes of a twelve-part radio series based on the *Project* are available from the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Southbank Centre, Southbank Boulevard, South Melbourne, Victoria 3205. The title of the series is *Orientations: Defining Australia in Asia*.

<sup>15</sup> Hobsbawm, E and Ranger, T (1983), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; B Anderson (1991), *Imagined Communities*, Verso, London. For a recent discussion of the danger of using 'culture' as an 'interpretive constant' see DS Lev (1995), 'On Examining Givens: Economic Growth, Political Change and Southeast Asian Studies', *SEAS PAN* (the Northeast Regional Consortium for Southeast Asian Studies), IX, I, Autumn, 1-2.

<sup>16</sup> Kapferer, B (1988), *Legends of People. Myths of State*, Smithsonian Institute, Washington and London, 211.

<sup>17</sup> See, for instance, the *Project* paper *Perceiving 'Democracy'* (see n. 13 above) and also AC Milner (1995), *The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

<sup>18</sup> Evans, G (1995), 'Australia in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific: Beyond the Looking Glass', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 49, (1), 106-7.

<sup>19</sup> Soviee, N (1995), 'The Development of an East Asian Consciousness', in G Sheridan, *Living with Dragons*, *op. cit.*, 180-93.

<sup>20</sup> Kinmonth, EH (1981), *The Self-Made Man in Meiji Japanese Thought. From Samurai to Salary Man*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

<sup>21</sup> Senu Abdul Rahman *et al.* (1973), *Revolusi Mental*, Penerbitan Utusan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur.



<sup>22</sup> Yeo, G (1995), 'A New Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?', in G Sheridan, *Living with Dragons*, *op. cit.*, 176.

<sup>23</sup> Will Hutton, writing in the *Guardian Weekly*, 24 September 1995, criticises Andrew Marr's recent book, *Ruling Britannia: the Failure and Future of British Democracy* for making 'too many concessions to the fashionable arguments over globalization . . .' 'The state', Hutton observes, 'remains the most reliable fountainhead of power around . . .'

<sup>24</sup> Geertz, C (1995), *After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 23.

<sup>25</sup> To be published as *Australia in Asia: Communities of Thought*.

<sup>26</sup> See n. 18. For an acerbic Singaporean comment on 'European assumptions' about the globalisation of values, see Kishore Mahbubani (1995), 'The Pacific Way', *Foreign Affairs*, January/February, 105.

<sup>27</sup> To be published as *Australia in Asia: Episodes*.

<sup>28</sup> To be published as *Australia in Asia: Comparing Cultures*.

<sup>29</sup> It is described in generous terms in the 1992 Cunningham Lecture: Stuart Macintyre, 'Rethinking Australian Citizenship', 3-4. For support in funding and hosting the workshops I should like to thank: Austrade, the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia Japan Foundation, Australian-Indonesian Institute, East Asian Analytical Unit), Griffith University, Monash University, Murdoch University, University of Melbourne, Swinburne Institute of Technology, La Trobe University, the University of New South Wales, James Cook University, UNESCO, Joanna and Forbes Gordon ('Manar', Braidwood), the Australian Institute of International Affairs, LBH (Indonesian Legal Aid) Jakarta, the United States Information Service, the Embassy of Japan.

<sup>30</sup> See Wang Gungwu, 'Cultural Interpreters', in AC Milner and T Wilson (eds), (1986), *Australian Diplomacy: Challenges and Options for the Department of Foreign Affairs*, Australian Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper No 5, Canberra, 73-76.

<sup>31</sup> See (1994) *Civics and Citizenship Education: Report of the Civics Expert Group*, AGPS, Canberra.

<sup>32</sup> The significance of the liberal tradition in Australia has been discussed in a number of works. See, for instance, IW Eggleston (1951), *Reflections of an Australian Liberal*, FW Cheshire, Melbourne; WK Hancock (1930), *Australia*, Ernest Benn, London; H Collins (1989), 'Political Ideas and practices', in N Meaney (ed.), *Under New Heavens*, Heinemann, Melbourne, 83-106; T Rouse (1978), *Australian Liberalism and National Character*, Kibble, Malmsbury Victoria; S Macintyre (1991), *A Colonial Liberalism: the Lost World of Three Victorian Visionaries*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne; B Head and J Walter (eds) (1988), *Intellectual Movements and Australian Society*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne; J Walter (1996), *The Failure of Political Imagination*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney.

<sup>33</sup> Hayden, W (1994), 'Core values needed to hold nation together', *The Australian*, 27 January, 9.

<sup>34</sup> Henderson, I (1995), 'PM welcomes Asian culture', *The Canberra Times*, 16 February, 4; see also *The Australian*, 24 February 1994; 23 August 1995; and the Prime Minister's handling of core values in his major lecture in Singapore, quoted at length in G Sheridan (1996), 'Keating claims our place in Asia's future', *The Australian*, 18 January, 11.

<sup>35</sup> Hollingsworth, P (1994), 'Moral vacuum threatens liberal state', *The Australian*, 8 November, 19.

<sup>36</sup> Mackay, H (1993), 'A National Identity? Wait and see . . .', in J Beaumont, *Where to Now? Australian Identity in the Nineties*, Federation Press, Sydney, 12-25.

<sup>37</sup> Carney, S (1993), 'Asia-Australia divide is still wide', *The Age*, 11 October.

<sup>38</sup> Franklin, M (1947), *All That Swagger*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney.

<sup>39</sup> Murray, LA (1983), *The People's Otherworld*, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 28.

<sup>40</sup> Bean, CEW (1981), *The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume 1: The Story of Anzac*, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, (originally published 1921), 3-7.

<sup>41</sup> Hancock, WK (1930), *Australia*, Ernest Benn, London, 274, 277.

<sup>42</sup> See, for instance, *The Australian*, 21 July 1995 and Hideo Susuki, quoted in R McGregor (1993), 'Why we don't rate in Asia', *The Weekend Australian*, 6-7 November, Review, 1.

<sup>43</sup> Wang Gungwu (1988) has commented: 'Paradoxically, what Australians value about their culture: the law, the respect for human rights, the parliamentary system, which are not features of Asian societies, are what attract Asians'; 'Asian Perceptions of Australia — what Asians will see', *University of New South Wales Occasional Papers* 13, 5.

<sup>44</sup> Chakrabarty, D (1992), 'Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks of 'Indian Pasts'', *Representations*, Winter, 20-21.

<sup>45</sup> Geertz, C (1983), *Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, Basic Books, New York, 84.